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                                                                       Abstract 
  
This thesis is based on a wide range of primary and secondary sources and explores British 
policy towards the development of the Albanian national movement and the parallel demise 
of the Ottoman Empire. It pursues three major objectives.  
 
Firstly, it argues that during the period under discussion (1876-1914) Britain had only a 
limited involvement in the Albanian Question because of a lack of any major interest in 
Albania. This changed only during the various political crises and wars in the Balkans. In the 
context of such events, the British aimed to maintain the status quo in the region and 
secure their interests in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, mainly by preserving Ottoman 
rule. There was a significant difference between Liberal, Gladstonian views towards the 
Balkans and Albania, and Conservative views, which were mainly created by Disraeli. British 
Liberalism had a long-standing influence on the way the Ottomans and the Albanians were 
viewed and showed partiality towards Christians in the region. The Albanians did not fit 
neatly into this Liberal framework, namely due to their multi-religiosity and  a certain liberal 
partiality towards Christians. 
 
Secondly, this thesis argues that although Albanian nationalism was born in the early 
nineteenth century, it only grew significantly after 1878 as a result of the changes that were 
introduced by the San Stefano Treaty and the Congress of Berlin. Given the weakening of 
the Ottoman Empire, Albanian nationalist leaders believed that the Porte could not offer 
Albania sufficient protection against the territorial desires of neighbouring Balkan states like 
Greece, Montenegro and Serbia. Albanians therefore hoped to win British support and 
protection against the aggressive designs of their neighbours.  
 
The third major objective is to analyse the role of the Albanian insurrections in 1908, 1909, 
1911 and 1912, and other important events in the lead-up to the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire. This thesis argues that Albania achieved independence due to a number of 
interlinking factors: as a result of Albanian nationalism, as a consequence of the Balkan 
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Wars, as a result of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and lastly also as a consequence of 
British involvement, as shown during the conference of London in 1912 where an Albanian 
national state was finally created.   
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Britain, the Albanian Question and the Demise of the Ottoman Empire 1876-1914 
          
                       
The Albanians passionately wanted a prince or Mpret [King]. The Great Powers 
promised to give them one. They wanted an Englishman because they believed 
that England, alone of the Great Powers, had no interests at stake in the 
Balkans. - Margaret Fitzherbert.1   
 
 
Introduction 
In May 1913 the work of the London Conference of Ambassadors was still ongoing, but one 
important decision had already been taken: the independence of Albania. This decision 
gave rise to speculations about the choice of a sovereign for Albania and many European 
royal names were mentioned as potential candidates for the Albanian throne. At that time, 
a delegation of the Albanian Provisional Government had arrived in London, aiming to 
influence the decision-making process of the Conference and to win the support of the 
British public and government. Ismail Bey Qemali, also known as Ismail Kemal (1847-1919), 
the head of the Provisional Government and of the delegation, asked the British diplomat 
and politician Aubrey Herbert (1880-1923) how he would respond if the throne of Albania 
was to be offered to him. ‘Of course, the Prime [Minister] and all the rest of them have 
been ragging about it for an age, but I don’t know if I should have their support if it really 
comes along’, wrote Herbert.2 Herbert was, in many ways, the right man for the Albanian 
throne, but he could not accept the offer without the approval of the British government. 
He put this matter to the British Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey. An Englishman on the 
                                                             
1   Margaret Fitzherbert, The Man who was Greenmantle, A Biography of Aubrey Herbert (Oxford University Press, 1985), 
p. 123. 
2   Bejtullah Destani and Jason Tomes, eds., Albania’s Greatest Friend: Aubrey Herbert and the Making of Modern Albania: 
Diaries and Papers 1904-1923 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), p. 93.  
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throne of Albania meant a duty and responsibility that the British government was not 
ready to accept. 
The wish of the Albanian leaders to win the support of the British public and government 
will be a recurring theme throughout this thesis, which aims to examine the development 
of the Albanian Question and British policy towards it during the period 1876 to 1914. This 
study will illuminate the objectives of Britain’s policy, while also assessing the reaction of 
the Albanians towards the position of British diplomacy. In broader terms, the British 
position towards the Ottoman Empire, within the context of relations with the other Great 
Powers, will also be explored. This thesis argues that the Albanian national movement grew 
as a reaction to other Balkan national movements, the Macedonian crisis of the 1890s and 
the weakening of the Ottoman Empire. The very fact that the British had no interests at 
stake in the Balkans and were a democratic superpower was the reason Albanian leaders 
wanted British support and protection.  
This lack of major interests was reflected in British public and academic circles, 
demonstrated by the fact that during the period under discussion, and even today, Albania 
remains a largely unknown country. Those who intend to research and study this field will 
face a relative absence of books or secondary sources. The number of scholars and experts 
who dealt with the Albanian Question of the nineteenth and early twentieth century was 
small, and their work remains almost unknown today in Britain. One such scholar was Edith 
Durham (1863–1944), a Balkan specialist and a rare expert on Albania’s national 
movement, politics and ethnographic composition, whose work will be widely explored in 
this thesis. Recently there has been some renewed interest in Durham’s life and work. 
Many of her letters and writings were published to offer help to those interested in this 
subject.3 Albania’s Mountain Queen,4 a significant work by Marcus Tanner, is the only 
biography published so far about Edith Durham. This thesis therefore examines Durham’s 
work to a deeper extent, exploring her support for the Albanian national question, her 
influence on the British government and the role she played among the members of the 
                                                             
3   See: Bejtullah Destani, M. Edith Durham: Albania and the Albanians, Selected Articles and Letters, 1903-1944 (London: 
Centre for Albanian Studies, 2001) and Robert Elsie and Bejtullah Destani, The Blaze in the Balkans, M. Edith Durham, 
Selected Writings 1903-1914 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014). 
4   Marcus Tanner, Albania’s Mountain Queen – Edith Durham and the Balkans (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014). 
12 
 
Balkan Committee, an organisation which was established and functioned on principles of 
Gladstonian Liberalism. 
In most history books, including contemporary secondary sources which discuss the 
Balkans during this period, the Albanians are described as playing a minor role in broader 
historical events. Because of this, Albanians are always characterised as being late starters 
as far as national awareness is concerned, and the last to form their nation state. In reality, 
the study of the role of the Albanians in the history of Ottoman Europe proves that this 
matter has been widely overlooked and underestimated. James Tallon, in his research on 
the Albanian insurrections of 1909-1912, maintains that the Albanians have played a major 
role in the history of the Balkans and gave several reasons why the Albanians and their 
history received considerably less coverage than their Balkan neighbours. According to 
Tallon, the older works of (non-Albanian) Balkan authors have imposed their views on 
English speaking scholars. These authors tended to minimise the role of the Albanians by 
introducing the Slavs and Greeks ‘as principal actors in the general narrative of the 
Balkans’. Therefore, within this framework, the Albanians were presented as ‘auxiliary 
actors’. An additional factor is that most scholars have no reading knowledge of either 
Albanian or the Ottoman-Turkish language. The third reason, which Tallon emphasises, is 
that the Albanians, the majority of whom are Muslim, did not fit well into any of the 
‘schemes frequently laid out in the general monographs on Balkan History.’ Therefore, 
notions such as ‘Turkish Yoke’, ‘Turcocratia’ or ‘Turkish Long Night’ do not necessarily apply 
to the Muslim population of the Balkans, meaning the Albanians tended to fall into the 
category of the ‘oppressor’ and not the ‘oppressed‘ a term reserved exclusively for the 
Christian population.5 
Until 1998, when Noel Malcolm’s book Kosovo, A Short History6 was published, the only 
available solid scholarly work in English on the history of Albania was Stavro Skendi’s book 
published in 1967.7 However, in these two publications, British involvement in the Albanian 
Question has been studied only partially, superficially or in isolated fragments. Skendi’s 
                                                             
5   James N. Tallon, ‘The Failure of Ottomanism: The Albanian Rebellions of 1909–1912’, The University of Chicago, 
ProQuest Dissertations Publishing (2012), pp. 1-16 (p. 4) <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1082026784> [accessed 6 
April 2017].  
6   Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1998).   
7   Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967). 
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work covers the historical period of this thesis and explores the views of the Great Powers 
on the Albanian Question in general. His book also concentrates on the subject of the 
Albanian national and cultural revival, whilst the British position on the Albanian Question is 
only rather superficially addressed. Noel Malcolm’s book is the other serious scholarly work 
on the topic. However, as the title suggests, it only covers the territory of Kosovo without 
emphasis on other parts of Albania and does not overly concern itself with British foreign 
policy. The intention of this thesis is therefore to deepen our understanding with new 
sources and with greater scrutiny.  
After the fall of communism and the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation, Albania and 
Kosovo have attracted some attention among historians and scholars of other fields. As a 
result, several valuable works which study particular segments of Albanian history, have 
emerged. George Gawrych’s book, The Crescent and the Eagle, is one such work.8 Gawrych 
has recognised the existence of the Albanian ethnic identity in the early nineteenth 
century, which went on to develop into nationalism during the period between the 
activities of the Albanian League in 1878 and the insurrections of 1908–1912. By examining 
the efforts of Albanian nationalists, who aimed to gain nationality rights, and the efforts of 
conservatives to maintain local privileges under Ottoman rule, Gawrych has provided new 
and important perspectives on the development of Albanian nationalism. Emiddio Licursi 
maintains in his PhD thesis that the development of Albanian nationalism took place from 
1878 to 1913, a period of time similar to that outlined by Gawrych and others. Licursi has 
described Albanian nationalism as 'multi-vocal' and presents it as different from other 
nationalist movements in the Balkans. In addition, he maintains that Albanian nationalism 
grew as a reaction to Turkish nationalism.9 
This thesis will accept, to a degree, this established pattern and, in addition, will argue that 
the birth of Albanian nationalism is to be sought in the early nineteenth century and went 
on to develop with higher intensity between 1878-1912. Furthermore, it will be argued that 
the efforts of Albanian intellectuals to develop the Albanian language, and the question of 
                                                             
8   George Gawrych, The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874-1913 (London: I. B. Tauris, 
2006).   
9   Emiddio Pietro Licursi, ‘Empire of Nations: The Consolidation of Albanian and Turkish National Identities in the Late 
Ottoman Empire, 1878–1913’, Department of History Columbia University, (2011), pp. 1-138 (p.8) 
<http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedora_content/download/ac:131865/CONTENT/...> [accessed 20 
January 2016]. 
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Macedonia, became the driving forces behind the development of Albanian nationalism in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.        
The Albanian Question has also attracted limited attention in other recent publications, 
which primarily address the Macedonian or Balkan Question of the first decade of the 
twentieth century. In this regard, several authors have studied the Macedonian Question, 
the Young Turk movement and the revolution of 1908 from different points of view and 
have given a wide account of the events. However, all of them have overlooked the role of  
Albanian nationalists in the Young Turk movement and their conflict with Turkism. In 
Christopher Psilos’ PhD thesis, the role of the Albanians in the revolution is recognised, but 
the Albanian Question in Macedonia does not receive proper attention.10 In her PhD thesis 
Ahsene Gül Tokay has also shown a considerable interest in the role of Albanians in the 
Young Turk movement and revolution, but the Albanian Question and nationalism are 
missing, since she presents the Macedonian Question mainly as a Muslim–Christian 
problem.11 Şükrü Hanioğlu, in his highly valuable studies on the Young Turks, has shown the 
importance of those Albanian nationalists who participated in the Young Turk movement 
and revolution.12 However, none of these studies has focused on the Albanian Question in 
Macedonia and in all of these studies British involvement is almost entirely missing. 
Furthermore, none of these authors have looked into the reasons that led Albanian 
nationalists to give high levels of support to the Young Turk movement, nor why they were 
subsequently so disappointed with the revolution and involved in organising the counter-
revolution which took place a few months later. The fallout between the Albanian 
nationalist leaders and the Young Turks will therefore be examined through the issue of 
language, which served as a subject of confrontation between Albanian nationalists and the 
Turkish nationalism that emerged from the ranks of the Young Turks. This confrontation, 
which ended with armed conflict, also heralded the end of the Ottoman Empire and the 
birth of the Albanian state. So far, these developments have not been recognised or 
                                                             
10  Christopher Psilos, ‘The Young Turk Revolution and the Macedonian Question 1908-1912’, University of Leeds (2000), 
pp. 1-253 (pp. 40-45) <http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/4058/1/uk_bl_ethos_567897.pdf> [accessed 5 May 2015].  
11   Ahsene Gül Tokay, The Macedonian Question and the Origins of the Young Turk Revolution, 1903-1908 (PhD Thesis, 
University of London, 1994) <https://library.soas.ac.uk/Record/273276/Details> [accessed 9 September 2015].  
12   Şükrü Hanioğlu’s explored works are: The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford University Press, 1995) and Preparation 
for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908 (Oxford University Press, 2001).  
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examined, and chapters V and VI of this thesis therefore aim to assess these missing 
explanations and fill a gap in the existing literature.  
This research aims to examine Britain’s interest in the Albanian Question. In this regard, it 
questions how the image of Albania was created in Britain during the nineteenth century 
and how it had developed by the early twentieth century. Occasionally, the formation of 
Albania’s image will be compared with that of Greece, Serbia and Montenegro. Chapter I of 
this thesis looks at two views which contributed to the image-building process, the 
foundations of which were laid by British travel writers and diplomats. The first view was 
established by travel writers, who described the Balkans and Albania without consideration 
for religion. This view was subsequently adopted by the Conservative party in Britain and its 
leader Benjamin Disraeli. The second view, which was also established by travel writers and 
diplomats, regarded religion as an important element in building the image of Albania. 
Among members of this group, William Gladstone played an important role in establishing 
the British Liberal view, which also became known as Gladstonian Liberalism. The first, non-
religious Conservative view, favoured the Albanian national cause while the second, 
religiously-minded Liberal view, ignored the Albanians, the majority of whom were Muslim, 
and gave priority to the Christians in the Balkans. The priority given to the Christians was 
shown through publications which kept them in focus and suggested that their plea for 
freedom should be supported by the public and the government.    
It was this religiously-minded Liberal view which led public opinion, politicians, and even 
academics, to believe that under Islamic Ottoman rule, the concept of state and religion 
were intertwined and to see the two as separate would be ‘completely alien to 
Mohamedan mind.’13 The contradiction between their religion and national demands 
seems to have spread further confusion among European, and particularly British, liberal 
politicians and public opinion, who were unable to see a distinction between Ottoman and 
Albanian identity. Overall, there was little knowledge about Albania in Britain and Europe.14 
                                                             
13   Robert William Seton-Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (New York: Dutton, 1918), p. 21. 
14   Edward Gibbon (1737-1794) had described Albania as a land within sight of Italy and less known than the interior of 
America; See: ‘Albania Little Known Country’, Cambridge Sentinel, 21. 4 (1925), p. 6 
<http://cambridge.dlconsulting.com/cgi-bin/cambridge?a=d&d=Sentinel19250124-01.2.48#> [accessed 21 December 
2016].  
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Ignoring the existence of an Albanian nationality and their political ambitions was simpler 
than reckoning with it.   
Autonomy, as the main demand of the Albanian nationalist leaders, takes an important 
place in this study, as will be demonstrated by analysing the Conservative and Liberal 
approaches to the Albanian national cause. The question of Albanian autonomy will also be 
examined as a subject which is linked with Ottoman and British policy. In this regard, a 
considerable part of this study covers the Congress of Berlin (1878) and the Albanian 
political and military struggle which was led by the Albanian League from 1878 to 1881. 
This is explored in Chapter II, which aims to analyse the Albanian national question and 
British interest. Although the Albanians had proved capable of autonomous government 
with the activities of the League, their request for autonomy was denied. The Congress of 
Berlin had a great impact on Albanian nationalist leaders, who had marked the four vilayets 
(Ottoman administrative provinces) of Kosovo, Shkodra, Janina and Manastir as Albanian 
territories to be included in the future state of Albania. The importance of the Congress of 
Berlin can also be seen in its consequences which are felt to this day. The borders decided 
upon then still have the potential to create new conflicts or to rekindle old ones. 
Moreover, this issue and its importance has, hitherto, not been studied in sufficient depth – 
an oversight that this thesis intends to address. The Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin 
showed little regard for the principle of nationality when deciding the new borders. Since 
then, because of this disregard, many wars have been fought. The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 
1913 and the First World War all came as a result of struggles for border changes. At the 
London Conference of Ambassadors (1912-13), the Paris Peace Conference (1919) and the 
resulting Treaty of Versailles, the Powers continued with the attitude displayed at the 
Congress of Berlin and showed no respect for the principle of nationality when deciding the 
borders of the Balkan countries. As a result, more than half of the territories inhabited by 
Albanians were included in Greece and in the new state which became known as the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and later Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, again, did not 
satisfy the principle of nationality, breaking up violently at the end of the twentieth century 
and ending with the Kosovo War in 1999.15 
                                                             
15  Carole Rogel, The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004), pp. 69-71. 
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The debate between the Liberals and Conservatives, as the two parties in the British 
Parliament, and the press about the Albanian Question continued during and after the 
Congress of Berlin. Although originally markedly different in their approach, eventually 
there was little difference between the two parties regarding the main objectives of British 
foreign policy. Even Gladstone had accepted that maintaining the Ottoman Empire meant 
protecting the route to India.16 Both political parties had also declared that the Balkans 
stood outside vital British interests. However, since Disraeli and the Conservatives had 
recognised the existence of the Albanian nationality, there was hope for Albanian leaders 
to find support for their national cause in the future. 
The chances for Albanian leaders to win British support grew slim with the development of 
Gladstonian Liberal policy. After the Macedonian crisis of 1903, British public opinion and 
Liberal organisations, such as the Balkan Committee, pressured the government for closer 
engagement in the Balkans. In order to explain these early twentieth century developments 
in the Balkans and Albania, this study puts forward several questions: Why and how did the 
Macedonian Question contribute to the development of Albanian nationalism? The answer, 
inevitably, leads to new questions as to why Albanian nationalists, who aimed to create 
their own state, were engaged in the Young Turk Movement and the revolution.  
However, the main question posed in this research is whether British policy and the 
Albanian nationalist movement had a common interest. Thus far, it has generally been 
accepted that the British government, due to a lack of major interests in the Balkans, had 
no separate policy regarding the Albanian Question and viewed this matter within the 
broader framework of the Eastern Question. Albanian leaders saw their national interests 
as best guaranteed by the continuation of Ottoman rule. But, in moments of crises in 
Albanian-Ottoman relations and when the Ottoman Empire was nearing the end, the 
Albanian leaders turned to the British for support. The intention of this thesis is therefore 
to offer a new interpretation of British policy by arguing that there were periods when the 
British government showed an interest in the Albanian Question. The Albanian Question 
came under the consideration of the British government during the international crises that 
took place in the Ottoman part of the Balkans. Such crises were addressed during the 
                                                             
16  William Norton Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, a Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement 1878-
1880 (London: Franc Cass, 1963), p. 7. 
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period of the Congress of Berlin, during the Macedonian crisis (1903-1908), and the 
Conference of London that was the result of the Balkan Wars (1912-13).  
It was as a result of these Balkan Wars, the fall of the Ottoman Empire and as an interest of 
British policy that the Albanian state was born. The final part of this thesis (chapters VII and 
VIII) focuses on how British Liberal policy impacted the creation of the independent 
Albanian state. How did Gladstonian Liberal ideas manifest themselves in British public 
opinion, why did it show support only for the Balkan Christians and did this policy have an 
effect on the British government when the Albanian state was created? It is for these 
reasons that Edith Durham, Aubrey Herbert and a group of intellectuals, who formed the 
Albanian Committee in 1912, became engaged in refuting such public opinion and policy 
which, according to them, was not in favour of applying the principle of nationality in the 
case of Albania.  
The approach of this study will be chronological, analytical, empirical and narrative. The 
main areas of research have been primary and published archival sources. The archival 
sources include those of the British Foreign Office, other government departments, 
consular and diplomatic reports, personal or private correspondence housed in the 
National Archives in Kew, London, as well in the House of Commons and the House of Lords 
(Hansard).  
Other diplomatic and consular reports are explored from Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (The 
Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office) in Istanbul, Arkivi i Shtetit Shqiptar (the 
Albanian State Archive) in Tirana and Arkivi i Kosovës (Kosovo Archive) in Prishtina. Most of 
these archival sources are used to explain important Albanian events, as well as the role 
and position that the Sublime Porte, other powers and Balkan countries maintained in the 
Albanian Question.   
The collection of Aubrey Herbert’s papers located in the Somerset Archives (Heritage 
Centre, Taunton) which thus far have rarely been used, are also explored for research on 
this topic. This includes a large number of documents used in this study to explain the 
activities of Herbert, who formed the Albanian Committee in 1912, with the aim of 
influencing public opinion and British policy in favour of the Albanian Question (chapter 
VIII). Although Herbert was a prominent British diplomat and Member of Parliament, he 
19 
 
remains almost unknown in British and Albanian history. Herbert was particularly important 
given that the Albanian leaders considered him fit for the Albanian throne. The documents 
(personal correspondence, speeches and newspaper articles) of the Somerset Archives and 
Herbert’s published works are used in this study to explain this missing element which is 
important for both British and Albanian history.  
Of particular help to Chapter VII of this thesis was the Edward Boyle Collection of 
correspondence and papers which were deposited in 1976 at Leeds University Library 
(Brotherton Library - Special Collections).17 This research exploits for the first-time valuable 
correspondence between Edward Boyle and Edith Durham and papers relating to the 
Balkan Committee, which are part of this collection. This correspondence reveals aspects of 
Durham’s role and her contribution to the Albanian national cause, British involvement in 
Albania, as well as some activities of the Balkan Committee which, until now, were 
unknown. This correspondence shows the important impact that Liberal views had in 
British politics, diplomacy and intellectual Liberal circles. Other documents that have rarely 
used before are those of the Surrey History Centre Archives and the Archives of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute in London, which are also utilised in this study.   
The British diplomatic and consular reports have been most useful sources for this 
research. These reports are used here to describe situations even if there was no direct 
British link with or interest in Albania. The British diplomatic or consular representations in 
the field have covered almost every important event regarding Albanian matters in Albania, 
Constantinople and neighbouring countries. A considerable number of documents for the 
first time shed light on the developments of Albanian nationalism and other important 
events.  
Of course, this study also draws upon secondary literature in the form of books, memoirs, 
pamphlets, and newspapers articles. The exploration of primary as well as secondary 
sources that are used in this study has required a knowledge of English, Albanian, Serbo-
Croat, Macedonian and French languages. Some of the documents in Turkish and Ottoman 
language (Lisân-ı Osmânî) have been translated with the help of friends. 
                                                             
17  Sir Edward Boyle was Chairman of the Balkan Committee and the father of Lord Boyle - the Vice Chancellor of the 
University of Leeds from 1969 to 1981. 
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Chapter I 
Creating the image of Albania 
 
I like the Albanians much; they are not all Turks; some tribes are Christians. But 
their religion makes little difference in their manner or conduct. - Lord Byron.18   
 
Introduction 
No travel writer has described the Albanians better, nor indeed liked them more, than Lord 
Byron. In describing the Albanians, Byron has pointed out that to him as to the Albanians 
religion was not important. Yet, as we shall see below, religion did matter to other people 
in Britain and was a factor which played a fundamental role in forming an image of Albania 
in British politics and public perception.  
This chapter presents the way in which the image of Albania was created in Britain, the 
impact it had on the British public and government, and the role this played in the lack of 
major British interest in the Albanian Question. This process, which took place during the 
nineteenth century, will be presented by analysing the religious and non-religious views 
that were adopted by travel writers and diplomats. The non-religious view was manifested 
by a group of travel writers who used Gothic aspects of English literature from the period, 
including novels and travel writings, to describe people and places. This non-religious 
perspective will be shown through the works of travel writers such as Lord Byron, John 
Hobhouse, Benjamin Disraeli (also known as Lord Beaconsfield), David Urquhart and others 
who visited Albania. This non-religious view was later upheld by Disraeli’s Conservatives in 
their policy towards the Albanian Question, showing little regard for religion and supporting 
the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. 
                                                             
18    Leslie A. Marchand, ed., Lord Byron: Selected Letters and Journals (Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 33. 
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However, their intention to build a positive image of Albania was quickly overshadowed by 
those travel writers who viewed the region through the prism of religion, such as William 
Gladstone, Thomas Smart Hughes, Thomas Maitlan and others. This view was prejudiced 
against Albania on religious grounds, where the majority of the population were Muslim. 
These religiously-influenced views of Albania fitted Gladstone’s doctrine of British 
Liberalism and contributed to their support of the Balkan Christians. This difference in 
opinions and priority given to religion caused these two politicians and their supporters to 
differ in their foreign policies and clash over this matter.   
Although travel writings were not always considered historical sources, they were in fact 
powerful and significant in transmitting perceptions of other countries in Britain and 
elsewhere where English was used as a first or second language. This dispersal of 
information functioned in a triangle: between travellers’ discourse, public opinion and 
foreign policy and its impact must therefore be analysed. The situation was complex due to 
the plurality of sympathies in Britain for different Balkan countries; in many groups or 
classes of British society there was at turns either sympathy or antipathy for the Ottomans, 
Greeks, Serbs, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Albanians, Orthodox Christians or Muslims.  
In the case of Greece, travellers who found that their imagined ‘classical expectations’ did 
not meet with reality became disappointed and depicted modern Greeks negatively. Other 
Balkan nations were depicted in the same way, mainly by travellers who were sympathetic 
towards the Ottoman Empire. Albania, as it will be argued below, was seen differently and 
Albanians were generally spared from negative depictions. In specific cases Albania was 
even glorified. In connection with this, it will also be argued that travel writers, generally, 
transmitted a picture of Albania which was based on perceptions or assumptions. Yet 
despite the relative increase in depictions of Albania by travel writers, this did not make a 
large impact in Britain during the nineteenth century and British foreign policy and the 
British public remained largely uninterested in Albania. 
Yet British travellers did not only contribute to the process of image building of Albania in 
Britain. Their works became a valuable effort in building and enriching the 
historiographical, anthropological, linguistic, political and geographic understanding of 
Albania. In particular, geographic and historic parts of travel publications were greatly 
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explored by Albanian nationalists and ideologists, as were the issues of their origin, 
language, religion and manners.  
In Imagining the Balkans, Maria Todorova dealt with the paradoxes, perceptions and 
assumptions that created the region's negative image in Western Europe. She emphasised 
the role that religion has played in creating prejudices about the Balkans. With her work on 
‘balkanism’ she has become the main point of reference for those who study this field. The 
works of other contributors, such as Christopher Montague Woodhouse, Alex Hammond, 
Milica Bakić–Hayden, Elli Skopetea and Vesna Goldsworthy, show that Albania, compared 
with other Balkan countries, still remains a place that receives less attention. Eugene 
Michael has given more space to Albania in The British and the Balkans. As the title 
suggests, this is the only book published, so far, that deals more directly and more closely 
with the object of this thesis, although it covers only the period 1900–1950. Hence, there is 
a need for more light to be shed on the case of Albania. The forming of images of Albania 
and the creation of influences on British politics and public perceptions has not yet been 
considered as a separate subject of study in either Britain or Albania. The aim of the first 
part of this chapter is to fulfil this need. 
 
The Balkans 
Before we try to understand nineteenth century Albania and how its image was built, it will 
be necessary to ask the same question about the Balkans more broadly. Encyclopaedia 
Britannica defines the Balkans as a region comprising the countries of former Yugoslavia 
(Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia), 
Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, and portions of Greece and Turkey. Yet, there is 
general agreement and acceptance that ‘Balkan’ is a word and name that entered into use 
with the arrival of the Ottomans in this part of Europe. However, the term Balkan did not 
find immediate use in Europe. Until the Congress of Berlin (1878), the official name used by 
the British and other European governments was ‘European Turkey’ or ‘Turkey in Europe’. 
The official name used by the Ottomans was ‘Rumeli,’ meaning ‘the land of the Romans’ 
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but also meaning the area of ancient Greece. The Ottomans also used the term ‘Avrupa 
Osmanli’ (Ottoman Europe).19 
During the nineteenth century, the name Balkan became a synonym for a different Europe 
or Near East and as such became an object of discussion in history and politics. The Balkans 
have produced an opposition or division between East and West in Europe. For Todorova 
this division is ‘as old as written history,’ and the Balkans must be treated as having a 
specific history and concrete geography. 20  
This division between East and West started with the ancient Greeks, who divided the 
world between the civilised (including themselves in this category) and the barbarians. 
Barbarians were the northerners while in the East, the Persians, were semi civilised people. 
The Roman Empire, during the rule of Diocletian (244-312 AD), introduced an 
administrative division between East and West which was later taken as a division between 
Catholicism and Orthodoxy or Christianity and Islam. Albania is an example of where all 
these divisions converged. In all cases, divisions were based on religious, cultural and 
political factors. Yet only after the fall of Constantinople into Ottoman hands in 1453 and 
the growth of economic prosperity in the West was the East seen as inferior.21  
The division of Europe between East and West, as we know it today, is largely an invention 
of eighteenth century Western European writers who produced a philosophy ‘responsible 
for the conceptual reorientation of Europe along an East-West axis.’22 From the eighteenth 
century, the Ottoman Empire entered into further decline while the rest of Europe 
prospered economically as a result of the Industrial Revolution and social changes 
introduced by the Enlightenment. Since then, the East, including the Balkans and Albania, 
lagged behind economically and culturally, and was associated with backwardness, 
underdevelopment of social relations and an absence of democratic institutions. By the end 
of the nineteenth century, the Balkans became a label or cliché which presupposed the 
existence of geographical and non-geographical references. In political debates, journalistic 
essays and in other conversations, the name Balkans was used to show the existence of a 
                                                             
19   Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 27. 
20   Ibid. p. 11. 
21   Arnold Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (London: Constable, 1922), p. 6. 
22   Todorova, p. 11. 
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region which has a specific identity and certain common features which fitted the accepted 
clichés.23   
These clichés seem to have had an effect on the Balkan languages themselves regarding 
the use of the name Balkan. Excluding the Albanian language, the name Balkan has a 
derogative meaning in all other Balkan languages and stands for uncultured, uncivilised, 
backward and disorderly people. The most important word or notion that derives from 
Balkan is ‘balkanisation’. This word had entered into use by the end of the nineteenth 
century in order to create political connotations and was used to name the ‘process of 
nationalist fragmentation of former geographic and political units into new and 
problematically viable small states.’24  
Even today labels and clichés stand behind the hegemonic usage of ‘balkanism’. For Slavoj 
Žižek, a well-known Slovenian philosopher, the Balkans are still viewed with prejudice by 
the West. The West’s mistrust, contempt and animosity towards the Balkans and its people 
is viewed by Žižek as a racist projection:  
Much of this projection is racist. First, there is the old-fashioned, unabashed 
rejection of the Balkan Other (despotic, barbarian, Orthodox, Muslim, corrupt, 
Oriental) in favour of true values (Western, civilised, democratic, Christian).25   
‘Balkanism’, as defined by Todorova, was shaped over the course of two centuries and took 
a specific form around the Balkan Wars and First World War. Yet ‘balkanism’ also evolved 
as a result of disappointment among those Western Europeans who hoped to fulfil their 
‘classical expectations’ in the Balkans. These travellers, most of them British, were among 
the first to express their disappointment, particularly in the case of Greece. John Morritt 
was surprised to discover that modern Greeks had lost the physical and cultural traits they 
possessed in antiquity.26 Reverend Thomas Smart Hughes (1786–1847), a scholar, historian 
and travel writer, probably expected to find Greece inhabited exclusively by ancient Greeks, 
                                                             
23  Dušan I. Bjelić and Obrad Savić, eds., Balkan as Metaphor – Between Globalization and Fragmentation (Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press, 2005), p. 165. 
24  Todorova, p. 32. 
25  Slavoj Žižek, ‘You May!’, London Review of Books, 21, 6 (1999), pp. 3-6 (p. 3) <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v21/n06/slavoj-
zizek/you-may> [accessed 25 March 2015]. 
26  John Morrit of Rokeby, A Grande Tour: Letters and Journeys 1794-96 (London: David & Charles, 1985), p. 245. 
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and was thus surprised to find a vast number of Albanians living deep into the territories of 
Greece, as far as Attica, and including Athens.27  
The love of the British for Greece during the first decade of the nineteenth century created 
huge disappointment when Greece turned out to be different from the images they had 
composed in their minds.28 In this sense, Albania was not a disappointment because the 
travellers had no prior expectations of the country and its people. Albania, was generally 
unknown to most of them and, therefore, in most cases, appeared as a pleasant surprise.   
Yet much more than classical expectations, the question of religion had a great impact on 
the British public and politicians and was also fed by some of the travellers’ works. The 
process of independence of the Balkan countries, excluding the case of Albania, was seen 
not only as a liberation from Ottoman rule, but as a religious mission, too. On this 
Todorova, wrote:      
The Balkan’s predominant Christian character, moreover, fed for a long time 
the crusading potential of Christianity against Islam. Despite many attempts to 
depict its (Orthodox) Christianity as simply a subspecies of oriental despotism 
and thus as inherently non-European or non-Western, still the boundary 
between Islam and Christianity in general continued to be perceived as the 
principal one.29  
Todorova, as well as Žižek and many others, have pointed out that although religion was 
not only the boundary between the West and the Balkans, it was often the main base upon 
which the West has constructed perceptions and prejudices about the East, the Balkans in 
general and Albania specifically. Direct links, which usually came from state interests 
between Britain and the Balkans as a region, or with individual states, were also important. 
Such a link, was missing between Britain and Albania during the nineteenth century, but 
this absence of direct interests did not stop the process of image building.  
 
                                                             
27  Thomas Smart Hughes, Travels in Sicily, Greece and Albania (London: J. Mawman, 1820), p. 305. 
28  Tatiani G. Rapatzikou, ed., Anglo-American Perceptions of Hellenism (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 
p. 273. 
29  Todorova, p. 20. 
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                                        The murky picture of unknown Albania 
The effect of constructed images has proved powerful. Karl May (1842-1912), the famous 
creator of the literary characters Old Shatterhand and Winnetou, also became popular for 
his novels on the Near East. Although he never set foot in the Balkans, his novels were well 
researched, being based on travellers’ books, historic and geographic works. During the 
late 1970s, a German linguist visited Kosovo and Albania, admitting that these places were 
not so different from the images he had created in his childhood, probably by reading Karl 
May’s Durch das Land der Skypetaren.30 
Another example which illustrates the capacity of images to heighten expectations and 
stretch the limits of reality is that of Flora Sandes, an English woman who served as a 
sergeant in the Serbian army during the First World War. When her unit retreated through 
Albania to Corfu, she met Albanian villagers for the first time. As impoverished Albanians of 
destroyed villages from the Balkan Wars and First World War, they did not look the way she 
had imagined them. She probably expected to see them as they had been presented by 
Lord Byron, a ‘very picturesque race of men wearing spotless native costumes, and slung 
about with fascinating looking daggers and curious weapons of all kinds.’ The majority of 
the Albanians, as described by Sandes, were ‘a perfect picture of squalor and filth’ and a ‘very 
degenerate looking race’.31 
In Britain images and perceptions of the Balkan people were created through a long and 
gradual process. According to Andrew Hammond, this process of ‘imagology’ lasted a 
century and a half and was created to explain ‘mutations that have marked British 
balkanism’.32 The spread of information which contributed to creating an image of Albania 
in the British public sphere should be divided into two phases. The first phase took place 
throughout the nineteenth century. The second phase began in the twentieth century and 
brought a wider awareness of Balkan and Albanian affairs with a requirement for a closer 
                                                             
30   Ibid, p. 73. 
31   Flora Sandes, An English Women-Sergeant in the Serbian Army (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916), pp. 120-121. 
32   Andrew Hammond, British Literature and the Balkans: Themes and Contexts (London: Rodopi, 2010), pp. 9-11.   
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engagement.33 The second phase is the subject of the third chapter, to which we shall 
return later.  
During the first phase, the dispersal of information took place mainly through publications 
by diplomats and travel writers, who used religious and non-religious criteria to describe 
Albania as a geographic location and Albanians as a people, ethnic entity or nation. While 
the works of these travel writers could be considered independent in that they presented 
their own views, the independence of some publications should be questioned after 1830. 
This is especially true during and after the period of the Congress of Berlin (1878), when 
Britain, because of the emergence of Russia as a major power, adopted a policy of 
preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, some authors opted 
to follow this policy line in their works.  
Until the beginning of the twentieth century Albania remained largely unknown to ordinary 
members of the British public. In this respect Albania was ‘the Balkans within the Balkans’ 
and continued to be less known during the Cold War when it became a ‘curtain-within-a-
curtain’.34 This lack of interest among the public was reflected in government policy, which 
had no direct or major interests in the Balkans. Britain had controlled the island of Vis, 
which today belongs to Croatia, between 1811 and 1814 but at this time the eastern 
Adriatic coast was still called Illyria by the British.35  
The British also held Parga, a town which is now in Greece. Further north of Parga, just off 
the Albanian coast, the British also ruled the island of Corfu, from 1815 to 1864. These 
were the only three cases that the British had direct interests in the Balkans. Although this 
period was short, as we shall see later Parga and Corfu, played an important role in building 
the religious view in Britain which reflected negatively on Albania’s image. However, other 
powers such as the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, Italy and France, occupied bigger 
portions of the region and ruled them for longer. The British government’s lack of interest 
                                                             
33   Eugene Michail, The British and the Balkans – Forming Images of Foreign Lands 1900-1950 (London: Bloomsbury, 
2011), pp. 6-11.  
34   Hammond, p. 30.  
35   Vesna Goldsworthy, Inventing Ruritania – the Imperialism of the Imagination (London: Hurst, 2013), p. 1. 
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in the Balkans was noticeable in media coverage of the region, which was never as serious 
as that of these other European Powers.36  
As indicated earlier, the desire to see classical Greece initially attracted British travellers to 
visit the region. The region had not yet acquired the name the Balkans but became known 
in Britain, especially in intellectual circles and among politicians, because of developments 
which led to the formation of the powerful state of Ali Pasha Tepelena (1740-1822), the 
Napoleonic Wars and the independence of Greece. It was because of these developments 
that the British government opened its first consular representation in Arta in 1769.37 By 
1803 the representation became permanent when John Philip Morrier was appointed 
‘General Council in the Morea and Albania’ with the centre in Janina, which was the court 
of Ali Pasha.38 This is probably the earliest official recognition of the name Albania by the 
British government.   
France, Italy and Austria-Hungary also established their consular offices in Janina and this 
opened the way for diplomats to become pioneers of travel writing on Albania. French 
historian and diplomat François Charles Pouqueville (1770-1838) was the initiator of this 
trend at the very beginning of the nineteenth century. British writer, topographer and 
diplomat William Martin Leake (1777-1860) was sent to ‘European Turkey’ in 1804 to help 
defend this territory against French attacks and a few years later was appointed as a British 
consular representative in Janina. Another diplomat that had significant influence on future 
travel writers was the Austro-Hungarian consul and scholar, Johan Georg von Hahn, who 
travelled in Albania and gathered information on history, philology and folklore and 
published Albanesische Studien (Albanian Studies) in 1853.39  
                                                             
36  Michail, p. 11. 
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To a great degree, it was Leake who initiated the process of constructing an images of 
Albania in Britain and who influenced other British travel writers to continue the process. 
His work was published in four volumes and included travel studies which he undertook in 
Albania, Macedonia and Greece from 1804 to 1807.40 The situation changed considerably 
in 1809 when Lord Byron (1788-1824) and John Cameron Hobhouse (1786-1869), later 
known as Lord Broughton, went to Albania.41 The aim of their travel to Albania was to meet 
Ali Pasha and see the country which was thus far largely unknown in Britain. In 1813 
Hobhouse published his book describing the places that he and Byron had visited and the 
meetings they had with Ali Pasha. Although Hobhouse’s visit was made four years after 
Leake’s arrival in Albania, his book was the first major publication on this matter.42 Leake’s, 
Byron’s and Hobhouse’s publications established the non-religious view of Albania. 
 
The Travellers’ Albania 
The traveller’s geographic descriptions and ethnic distribution of Albania should be taken 
as valuable first hand observations. However, every traveller had their own description, 
differing from the others. The description of people and individuals, although made from a 
non-religious point of view, should be treated with caution, as it was the personal relation 
of the travellers with the Ottoman Empire which framed the lens through which they 
looked at the Albanians. For those travellers who adopted the non-religious view, Albania 
was a beautiful country and the Albanians were magnificent people. Travellers who 
supported the Ottomans, praised the Albanians because they saw them as protectors of 
the empire. Those who disliked the Ottomans found reasons to like Albanians because 
there were many occasions when they defied the Porte. In this respect, as David Urquhart 
(1805-1877) observed, there was no straight or distinct line of separation between the 
Sultan’s ‘Skipetar [Albanian] friends and foes’.43 
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Before the arrival of British travel writers, Albania existed as the name of a territory in the 
Balkans but with no clear shape, form or figure. With the travellers’ contribution, an image 
of Albania, in the form of a murky picture, or puzzle was created. It is not easy to say which 
one of the travellers contributed most to ‘creating’ Albania, but Lord Byron remains the 
best known in both Britain and Albania. He considered Albania as almost his own discovery 
and in a letter he sent to his friend Henry Drury, he touched on this matter by comparing 
the ‘known’ Greece with the ‘unknown’ Albania:   
Greece, ancient and modern, you know too well to require description. 
Albania, indeed, I have seen more of than any Englishman (except a Mr. Leake) 
for it is a country rarely visited, from the savage character of the natives, 
though abounding in more natural beauties than the classical regions of 
Greece, which however, are still eminently beautiful, particularly Delphi and 
Cope Colona in Attica. Yet these are nothing to parts of Illyria and Epirus, 
where places without names, and rivers not laid down in maps.44 
Because of the great effect that Ali Pasha’s personality had on travellers, territories ruled 
by him were initially taken as a base for describing the size of Albania in a geographic sense. 
Lord Byron wrote that in geographical terms, Albania was a country that once used to be 
Illyricum but was now ruled by Ali Pasha.45 Most of the travellers mention Illyria or Illyricum 
to emphasise the size of Albania, but also to give historic weight to their descriptions of the 
country which was inhabited by Albanians, who were characterised as descendants of the 
Illyrians. As they were ‘discovering’ Albania, Illyria was probably thought to be an attractive 
name for the British public and, as it turned out later, very appealing to Albanian national 
ideologists. As there was no clear geographical lay out, no precise distribution of population 
and no clear exercise of power, Albania appeared as an imagined country, as were all other 
Balkan countries before becoming nation states.     
The absence of knowledge of the population’s distribution was the reason Henry Holland 
(1788-1873) concluded that Albania could not be defined by any strict line or boundary. He 
could only give an outline of the Albanian territory on its coastal side. The country began in 
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the north of the gulf of Arta, Greece, and continued northwards to end at the border of 
Montenegro, but he had no clear idea of how far to the east the border should be 
marked.46  Due to the mixture of the population, none of the travellers was able to identify 
the eastern border, all pointing out that it should be somewhere in Macedonia. Holland 
suggested that language and other characteristics of the population should determine the 
outline in the east, and also used language to prove that the Albanians were direct 
descendants of the original population or remnants of the ancient Illyrians.47  
Another geographic layout, again under the rule of Ali Pasha, was offered by Thomas Jollife 
(1780-1872) author and travel writer. For Jolliffe, Albania included the whole of Epirus, 
southern Illyricum, a considerable portion of Macedonia, the greater part of Thessaly, 
Acarnania, Phocis, Aetolia, and the division of Boetia.48 In 1848 poet and painter Edward 
Lear (1812-1888) painted different parts of Albania and wrote an account of his journey 
which he called ‘Travels to Illyricum Albania’.49 Lear’s Albania is divided in two parts but he 
gave no lay out. He went north to Shkodra (Scutari) and called it ‘the capital of Illyricum,’50 
while Janina was the capital of the south.51  
The geographic layout, outlined by most of the travel writers, was close to the territories of 
the two pashaliks which had come into being by the end of the eighteenth century. By the 
beginning of nineteenth century the Sultan had decided to appoint Albanian pashas to 
administer their native territories, who ruled their pashaliks by employing local Albanians in 
the administration and military. Ali Pasha had used this opportunity to get away from the 
Sultan’s rule and enlarged his Pashalik of Janina. At this time, when the travel writers 
visited the Balkans, the two pashaliks had emerged as two centres of powers in the Balkan 
territories which were inhabited by Albanians. Ali Pasha ruled in the south from Janina, and 
the Bushati family ruled in the north with Shkodra as their centre. Because the travellers 
mostly visited the south we do not have many descriptions of the north, but from other 
historic sources we know that the Bushati’s influence was established by Mehmet Pasha 
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between 1757 and 1775. He extended his area of control to the north-east, widened his 
political jurisdiction and refused to pay taxes to the Porte.52 Territories were further 
enlarged by Mustafa Bushati when the war between the Porte and Russia started in 1828. 
Sultan Mahmud II needed Bushati’s assistance in raising troops and more than half of 
Albania was put under his administration in return for his support. Bushati wanted more 
power and territory but after the war, the Sultan, fearing the disobedience of the Albanians 
may lead to independence, ordered Bushati to transfer the territories to the Grand Vizier 
and to accept a garrison of Ottoman soldiers in Shkodra. When he refused the order, the 
Porte sent troops against him. Both armies clashed in Macedonia, where Bushati lost three 
battles and was forced to withdraw to Shkodra. There he was besieged and in 1831 was 
forced to surrender.53   
The Bushatis managed to mark the north-east (Kosovo and Macedonia) and central part as 
Albanian, a territory which Ali Pasha could not reach from the south. By the beginning of 
the nineteenth century both pashaliks roughly covered the territory of what is today 
Albania, northern Greece, western Macedonia, Kosovo and the south east of Montenegro. 
Both pashaliks were ruled by Albanian pashas and this created a sense of ethnic belonging 
for Albanians, which consequently led to a permanent conflict with the Porte.54 This fact 
also created a need for Albanians to seek an autonomous relationship with the Porte and 
was most probably the reason that most anti-Ottoman travel writers viewed the Albanians 
with admiration. Just before the Congress of Berlin, the Porte divided this territory into four 
administrative units that became known as Albanian vilayets: Janina, Manastir, Kosovo and 
Shkodra. This did not mean that Albanians composed the majority of the population in all 
vilayets. The Vilayet of Kosovo included the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and almost the entire 
territory of what is today known as south Serbia and parts of Macedonia. As Skendi noted, 
this administrative division came as a result of the Porte’s effort to prevent the 
development of Albanian nationalism and the creation of homogenous Albanian vilayets. 
Although this division was made almost half a century after most of the travel books were 
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written, this new administrative form created a demarcation of an Albania which was a 
rather ‘vague geographic expression’.55  
The travel writers applied the criteria of religion, language, national dress and manners to 
characterise Albanians. Scottish traveller and diplomat James Henry Skene (1812-1866) 
used different principles to differentiate between the three groups of inhabitants in the 
Ottoman provinces in Europe. Greeks and ‘Osmanlis’ were the biggest groups differing in 
religion and origin. Albanians comprised the third group and differed from both of them in 
terms of their origin but were divided between two religions: Islam and Christianity. Skene 
also underlined that Albanians did not attract the attention of Europe as much as the other 
two groups and this was why they remained unknown in Europe.56   
Because Albanians of the south were Muslim and Orthodox Christian, British politician John 
Hobhouse (1786-1869) took language and not religion as a criterion to distinguish them 
from the Greeks.57 Byron, like his companion Hobhouse, divided Albanians religiously into 
Turks (Muslims) and Christians. He wrote to his mother to explain that the Albanians were 
not all Muslim, some were Christians, but religion did not matter to them.58   
The fact that religion made no difference to the Albanians seemed to have impressed 
Byron deeply. As Woodhouse noted, to Byron ‘religion was cant’, not because he was 
unfamiliar with religious doctrines but precisely because he had studied them.59 However, 
it was Byron who made a more effective introduction of Albanians to Britain and greatly 
influenced future travel writers. Byron fell in love with the country and there he was 
inspired to write his epic poem Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage. In order to present a familiar 
picture in Britain, Byron compared the Albanians with the Highlanders of Scotland, whom 
they supposedly resembled in dress, figure and manner of living. To Byron, even the 
mountains of Albania seemed Caledonian but with a milder climate, their habits seemed 
similar and the Albanian language sounded to him like Celtic.60 
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Back in London in the summer of 1813, Byron put on the Albanian costume, which he had 
bought in Preveza, and stood in front of the portrait painter Thomas Phillips. The painting, 
which became very popular, was named “Portrait of a Nobleman in the dress of an 
Albanian” and was exhibited at the Royal Academy. The painting was also to prove to the 
British public that Byron identified himself with Albanians ‘whom he recognizes as fellow 
Europeans,’61 and showed his attachment to Albania.  
The painting has initiated considerable debate among intellectuals in Britain and elsewhere. 
In her recent studies, Katarina Gephardt has suggested that the portrait was commissioned 
by Byron only to promote his ‘self image as the author of Childe Harrold’s Pilgrimage’, and 
not to promote Albania.62 Gephardt has argued that before visiting Albania, Byron held a 
‘peripheral position in English society’, being a ‘landless aristocrat’ of Scottish descent and, 
as such, a ‘relative outsider’ in the British establishment.63 Byron was fascinated with 
Albania and probably thought that the British public would also be fascinated by this 
unknown and exotic country. Therefore, it could be argued that Byron wanted to promote 
both himself and Albania.   
When Byron’s first two cantos of the poem were published in London in March 1812, the 
expensive first printing sold out within three days. It caused a sensation among the public, 
which rather surprised Byron, who wrote in his memorandum book: ‘I awoke one morning 
and found myself famous.’64 With Byron’s fame and the sensation surrounding his work, it 
appeared that Albania had made a magnificent entry in Britain, but this was not the case, as 
while his work made some impact in the literary world, the effect in the public and political 
spheres was not significant. Representations of Albania had also been made in 1806 with 
Pouqoville’s translation, and later in 1813 by Hobhouse and in 1815 by Holland were 
unable to match the spread of image and enthusiasm for Greece. At this stage Albania’s 
picture remained unknown and murky to the British public and it was Greece that won 
British sympathy and support. 
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As a matter of fact, there is no evidence to suggest that Byron asked the British public or 
the government to support the Albanians or the Greeks. Yet, it cannot be denied that Byron 
contributed to spreading some love for Greece and Albania. He introduced Albanians as a 
free people living in their state under their leader, Ali Pasha, whom he considered as a ‘man 
of first abilities who governs the whole of Albania’.65  For Byron and most travel writers, Ali 
Pasha, the ‘Albanian tyrant of Ioannina [Janina] was a paragon of learning’ compared to the 
Greeks. Furthermore, in Byron’s view, Albanians were ‘less degenerate than both the ruling 
Turks and the oppressed Greeks.’66 To some British Philhellenes, Albania was an additional 
reason which contributed to their disappointment with the Greeks they discovered to be 
‘ignorant’; the most excellent Greek schools and libraries were in Janina, which was ruled 
by Albanians.67  
However, the notion of liberating the Greeks from the Ottoman Empire was becoming 
increasingly accepted by British intellectuals. Many thought that Russia should take over 
Greece and some, like Douglas Dakin, ‘thought that the Albanians would do so.’68 Byron 
and a dozen or so British travellers who had met Ali Pasha noted that he portrayed himself 
and the Albanians as friends of the British nation. They also noted that the Albanians, who 
were living independently, were not oppressed by the Porte and Ali Pasha was seeking to 
establish some kind of alliance with the British government.69 Therefore, Albanians and 
Albania did not seem like they needed any help from the British, but, rather, it was the 
Greeks who were in greater need of British support.  
As Byron’s biographer Matthew Iley explained, Byron’s travel writing power was immense.  
No one has described better national differences, costumes, manners and governments.70 
Byron, like no one else before, presented the Greeks as living under the ‘Turkish yoke’ but 
he never made a public call to help them. The call to help the Greeks in Britain was spread 
by other Philhellenes and travel writers. By 1823 the Philhellenes had created a feeling 
among the British public, or at least among intellectuals, that something had to be done in 
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support of the ‘heroic Greeks’ so they could be liberated from the ‘centuries-old yoke of 
their Ottoman, un-Christian and cruel oppressors’.71 The Philhellenes emphasised religion 
by emphasising that the ‘cruel Ottoman oppressor’ was ‘un-Christian’.    
On 8 March 1823 a group of Philhellenes formed the London Greek Committee, an 
organisation which would support the Greek national cause and reject Albanian 
nationalism. Byron did not attend the meeting and played no part in this initiative.72 
Edward Blaquire, a Committee activist, set off in the spring of 1823 for Greece and stopped 
at Genoa, Italy, to ask Byron if he was interested in leading an armed expedition to Greece. 
Byron accepted the invitation and during the summer of 1823 made his second journey to 
Greece to join the war of independence.73  
Even in Greece, Byron preferred to be among Albanians. In August 1823, on board the ship 
Hercules, Byron was waiting to join Albanian Suliot forces led by Marko Boçari (Marco 
Botzaris) who fought for independence of Greece. Boçari had sent a letter to Byron to 
thank him for his moral and financial support and to let him know that he would receive 
him as a noble ally on his landing. That very night, 21 August 1823, Boçari was killed in the 
attack he led against the Ottoman army.74 A few months later, on 19 April 1924, Lord Byron 
died of fever in Missolonghi and became a hero in Greece and a legend in Albania. Ali Pasha 
had died two years earlier defending his castle in Janina in his last battle against the 
Ottomans. This was the end of Albania as some of the British travel writers knew it and as 
was glorified by Byron. From that moment on, Albanians came under the Porte’s direct rule 
and found themselves in a similar position to that of the Greeks before independence.  
 
From Gothicism to Gladstonian Liberalism 
British travellers who disregarded religion, specifically Byron and Hobhouse, who were both 
supporters of democracy, promoters of liberal ideas and social reforms at home in Britain, 
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loved Albania and admired Ali Pasha. Some travellers saw the Pasha as a cruel tyrant but 
Byron, Hobhouse and some others did not look at him that way. Charles Cockerell (1788-
1863) an architect, archaeologist and writer, who visited Albania in 1814 and met Ali Pasha, 
explained why the tyrant and his governance should be admired:  
There is law — for everyone admits his impartiality as compared with that of 
rulers in other parts of Turkey — and there is commerce. He [Ali Pasha] has 
made roads, fortified the borders, put down brigandage, and raised Albania 
into a power of some importance in Europe.75 
Ali Pasha was not only known for establishing law and order in his pashalik. During his rule 
and with his support the best Greek schools were established in Janina. There, Henry 
Holland found a ceiling with decorations which showed aspects of Copernican astronomy. 
Holland discussed European and American politics with Ali Pasha and wrote that Pasha had 
a considerable knowledge of science.76 Above all, Pasha asked important and clever 
questions, such as why so many Englishmen were coming to Janina.77 ‘The correct answer 
was to meet the great Pasha himself,’ wrote Woodhouse.78 
Historical circumstances, as well as his own actions, had raised Ali Pasha to the position of 
negotiating on equal terms with Napoleon and other Western governments of his time. To 
diplomatic envoys and travellers, Pasha played the role of a believer in the democratic 
principles of the French Revolution, although his character and actions suggested 
otherwise.79 Yet he certainly knew how to impress his British guests. Seeking to establish 
friendship or some kind of alliance with Britain, he received British diplomats, travellers and 
politicians with great honour. He once served dinner on golden plates in honour of the Earl 
of Guildford in his magnificent garden on the lake of Janina.80   
Ali Pasha’s friendly behaviour towards his guests and his interest in science and world 
politics were not the only reasons most British travellers echoed Byron’s and Hobhouse’s 
approach, their admiration for the tyrant and their love for Albania and Albanians. In 1851, 
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Edward Lear used Byron’s words to present Albania as ‘savage, yet classic, picturesqueness, 
perfectly exquisite…’ Even seven decades after Byron, in 1888, another travel writer H.A. 
Brown, described Albania as a country of ‘diabolic mountains’ where ‘the wind howled like 
a wild beast.’81 
Many travel writers applied Gothicism to their works, a literary form which had emerged by 
the end of the eighteen century and which was used as a genre by British novelists and 
travel writers in search of images, symbols and motifs to ‘depict the perceived monstrosity 
of a variety of post-colonial regions.’82 The British Gothic literary tradition was known for 
portraying priests, monks and nuns as sinners.83 As such, Gothicism was anti-religious and 
important to Byron’s writing. Byron derived from it a template for his more mysterious, 
alienated characters, along with his preoccupation with ruins or architectural decay.84 He 
found plenty of these elements in Albania. Byron and Hobhouse, like many after them, 
were delighted to meet Ali Pasha because his despotic character fitted well into this 
imagined Gothic environment. Apart from political tyranny, they also found plenty of 
situations to enjoy and beautiful places to admire. In Byron’s descriptions, Albanians and 
their land also appear in romantic images, described as unknown, heroic, dangerous, 
enigmatic and beautiful. Albania, in his words, was ‘a shore unknown which all admire, but 
many dread to view’. In Childe Harold, Byron pushed the existing boundaries of poetry and 
entered into new poetic territory, creating images which influenced the British perception 
of Albania and Albanians in literature.85 However, these images, being glorified, often 
romanticised and containing Gothic elements, were a long way from reality. Yet despite all 
these hyperbolic and dramatic depictions of Albania, the point to emphasise here is that 
Byron and other writers who used Gothicism did not create prejudice against Albanians on 
a religious basis.  
Albania, Montenegro and some other Balkan countries, were rare places left in Europe 
where Gothic travel writers found powerful stimulus for their imaginations. For Gothic 
writers, Albania and other Balkan countries, were the Europe of the past. In Albania they 
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saw a frozen picture of Europe. The Gothic style also appeared in travel writings about 
other Balkan countries like Romania where the British travel writer Florence Berger, 
according to local legend, discovered ‘the genius of the Rumanian people’. Others 
discovered that Romania was the country of vampires with Dracula as their lord. 
Montenegro was full of warriors who ‘roasted children and drunk enemy’s blood’. Serbs 
barked ‘like dogs baying at the moon’ in a mournful cry, while in Bulgaria robbers appear 
out of nowhere as ’a mass of smoking, steaming horsemen’ ready to kill at any moment. 86   
Nationalist movements in the Balkans were not seen with sympathy by most travel writers. 
The territorial reduction and gradual fall of the Ottoman Empire was seen as a threat to the 
British Empire whose trade and influence was endangered, and the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire was seen as evidence of how the British colonies could be lost.87 This negative 
depiction was applied partly because the Gothic style required it be so, but mostly acted as 
a form of revenge against those Balkan nations who rose against the Ottoman Empire. Yet 
from 1800 to 1878, within which period most of these books were published, Albanians did 
not have an active nationalist movement and were therefore seen as protectors of the 
Ottoman Empire. Until 1878 they had risen against the empire many times, but not for the 
same reasons as their neighbours, and therefore Albanians were spared such negative 
depictions.  
Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881) visited Albania in 1830 when he was 26 years of age. In 
Disraeli‘s life, like in Byron‘s, religion did not play an important role. However, Disraeli’s 
Albania was specific and differed from the way it was portrayed by Byron and other 
travellers. Although he was an ardent admirer of Byron, and it was because of him that he 
visited Albania, his sympathies were in favour of the Porte and therefore against the 
Albanians who, after the death of Ali Pasha, had risen against the Ottoman Empire. When 
Disraeli was still in Corfu, he wrote that his intentions were to join the Ottoman army 
against the Albanians and Greeks.88 There was nothing strange in this decision, considering 
that he was a Conservative politician and in favour of preserving the Ottoman Empire. On 
his way to Albania he spent some time in Malta, where he was further influenced by British 
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army officers and merchants who wanted a peaceful Mediterranean coast. The army 
seemed to have been against the warlike Albanians and the merchants were against the 
Greek pirates who preyed upon British ships and merchandise.89 However, Disraeli would 
soon change his mind about Albania.   
Disraeli spent a few weeks in British ruled Corfu, waiting until the Albanian insurrection was 
over. After the insurrection, the Ottoman Grand Vizier and supreme army commander, 
Mehmet Reshid Pasha, had invited 500 Albanian leaders to Manastir to reward them for 
the role they played against insurrection in some parts of Albanian and for the contribution 
in the war against Greek independence. On 26 August 1830 he massacred them all during 
the banquet he had organised for them. Afterwards Mehmet Reshid Pasha moved north to 
subdue the northern Albanian pashalik of Mehmet Pasha Bushati.90 
This massacre and the submission of southern and northern parts of Albania was 
committed with the aim of preventing any future spread of the Albanian national resistance 
movement. The Porte believed that Albanian leaders were inspired by the Greek war of 
independence and other nationalist movements that were occurring in the Balkans. 
However, this could be considered as the first intervention of the Porte against an early 
‘Albanian nationalist movement.’91 
The massacre had taken place only few weeks before Disraeli arrived in Albania. On his 
arrival the first thing he learned of was this massacre, on which he wrote:  
I poured forth my indignation at this savage treachery. […] The practice of politics 
in the East may be defined by one word, dissimulation.92 
The massacre and destruction made Disraeli question his belief in Ottoman politics and see 
Albania through a different prism than that of the imagined ideas that Byron had created. 
Disraeli called the country Albania, with Janina as the capital, although when he visited it 
had fallen under the direct rule of Constantinople. Surprisingly, Albanians still impressed 
him even though they were subdued and their country was turned to ruins. In the town of 
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Arta, the only two buildings he saw standing and undamaged were the main mosque and 
the house of the British Consulate. He was touched by the situation and wrote about his 
feelings: 
Here for the first time I reposed upon a divan, and for the first time heard the 
muezzin from the minaret, a ceremony which is highly affecting when performed, 
as it usually is, by a rich and powerful voice.93 
The Albanians were heavily armed and to Disraeli looked dangerous and ready for the next 
rebellion. Their weapons, and the way they looked and acted, are incorporated into his 
historical romance The Rise of Iskander.94 He praised Skanderbeg, the Albanian national 
hero, with glorifying and Gothic words similar to those that Lord Byron had used in Childe 
Harold.95 Disraeli, like other Gothic writers, considered Ali Pasha a ’formidable ruler that 
had made Albania so independent.’96 On his way to Janina he described ruined buildings 
and Pasha’s rule: 
We found ourselves at a vast but dilapidated khan as big as a Gothic castle, 
situated on a high range, and built as a sort of half-way house for travelers by Ali 
Pasha when his long, gracious, and unmolested reign had permitted him to turn 
this unrivalled country, which combines all the excellences of Southern Europe 
and Western Asia, to some of the purposes for which it is fitted.97  
Almost 8 years after Ali Pasha’s death, Disraeli, like Byron and other travel writers, admired 
the Pasha’s efforts for ‘specifying Albania and extending its boundaries’. Above all, Disraeli 
was impressed by Pasha because under Pasha’s ’patronage Janina had become the literary 
capital of the Greek nation.’98 Nevertheless, Disraeli enjoyed his visit, saw ethnic 
differences between Albanians and Greeks and also recognised the will of the Albanians for 
self-rule.   
However, Disraeli did not apply the Gothic style to all his writings on Albania. In this 
respect, Disraeli made way for the new era of travel writing, which would continue to be 
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represented by David Urquhart, a writer, diplomat and politician, who was seeking to lay 
the foundation of a pro-oriental project in British foreign policy.99 This pro-oriental policy 
would have also been a pro-Albanian policy.  
Urquhart was known as the best example of ‘thwarted philhellenism’ that started after the 
independence of Greece.100 He contributed enormously to the Greek cause by taking an 
active role in the war of independence, where he was wounded. After his disappointment 
with the Greeks he reversed the whole stereotype of philhellenism, and in his book The 
Spirit of the East went on to champion the case of the Ottoman Empire and praise the 
Albanians. With his pro Ottoman and anti-Russian political views, Urquhart found a 
prominent place in Disraeli’s political camp and served as an example of how to influence 
the press. For Urquhart, the Porte had built an amazing political system of checks and 
balances and he pointed out that this system had allowed, and even favoured, the local 
independence of different religions and nationalities. Here he saw the chance for 
nationalities, including Albanians, to prosper within the Empire.101 Yet this prosperity would 
only be possible if the Porte was reformed with the help of the British government, and 
since this remained unlikely, he described Albania as a place which was suffering under the 
weight of an Ottoman Empire in the process of decay and collapse. Within this framework 
he saw the Skipetars, as he often called Albanians, and the Porte as open enemies and 
permanently engaged in armed conflict.102 Although he was a supporter of the Ottoman 
Empire he did not exclude the possibility of Albania becoming autonomous. Urquhart 
looked at the Albanian question from the position of a politician and diplomat, and from 
this angle analysed the situation and gave his sympathy to Albania. He was also the first 
travel writer to bring north Albania into view as an important political and military factor, 
evoking important historic moments of the past and proposing political strategies in case 
the conflict between Albanians and the Porte escalated further.103   
Urquhart, like many British travel writers, noticed that the Albanians were interested in 
winning British support. ‘The Albanians seem most anxious to display, on all occasions, their 
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respect for England,’ wrote Urquhart and added: ‘our power and our motives are equally 
incomprehensible to them; and no wonder.’104 It is for this reason that the Albanians would 
not send British travel writers and other visitors away ‘with a bad opinion of Albania.’105 
Urquhart should be considered the first British travel writer who voiced the need for 
Albanians to be supported by the British. He suggested that the British government should 
establish trade and cultural relations with this part of the Ottoman Empire and did not hide 
his admiration for Albanians.106 Without doubt, Urquhart was the first British travel writer 
of the nineteenth century to write with the purpose of influencing the British government 
and public opinion on the Eastern Question, and by extension the Albanian Question.  
With this contribution, Urquhart gave rise to a new group of British travel writers who 
sought to influence the public and persuade the government to form policies in favour of 
the countries they supported in the Balkans. Urquhart’s example was followed by other 
travel writers, but their influence went against his ideas and efforts. Urquhart broke with 
the Gothic tradition of writing, but at the same time he did not apply the religious criterion 
to his depiction of Albania. His efforts in influencing the British public and government were 
soon overshadowed by William Gladstone’s activities. In this respect, Urquhart should also 
be seen as the last British travel writer to have applied the non-religious view and the last 
to have tried to create a supportive climate for Albania in Britain. In other words, with 
Urquhart, the nineteenth century battle to win over the British public in favour of Albania, 
was over. The end of this phase paved the way for Gladstonian Liberalism, which was much 
more influenced by religious interpretations of the Albanian Question.   
As we saw earlier, the British ruled the island of Corfu, yet after 48 years of rule the 
government gave the island to the Kingdom of Greece. For a short time, from November 
1858 to February 1859, Gladstone had served as High Commissioner Extraordinary there 
and played an important role in giving the island to Greece.107 A visit by the British 
delegation to Albania in November 1858 heralded significant changes in British politics and 
public opinion. The delegation arrived in Albania from Corfu to visit the town of Filates and, 
according to John Morley (1838-1923), a journalist, writer and later a Liberal politician, the 
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Albanian population there had organised a magnificent reception for their British guests. 
The entire population had come out to welcome them. The host, Jaffier Pasha, served a 
dinner with 32 dishes, or ‘32 courses’ as Morley called it, which impressed most of the 
guests.108 Morley was accompanying the most important guest, William Gladstone, who 
was not impressed by the host and who did not enjoy the visit at all. During the dinner, 
Pasha’s son told Gladstone that he should become a pasha in Albania. Gladstone was not 
impressed by this ‘offer’, either. To Gladstone, Albania, particularly the mosque and 
muezzin, did not create the same impression as they had for Disraeli. On this matter and 
the whole visit, which lasted only one day, Gladstone wrote in his diary: 
Visited the mosque, heard the muezzin, & went through the town (Philiates). 
Turkish dinner in rude abundance. The whole impression is most saddening: it is 
all indolence, decay, stagnation: the image of God seems as if it were nowhere.109 
This was the only time that Gladstone visited ‘Godless’ Albania or any other part of the 
Ottoman Empire, but the visit led him to ‘fix a prejudicial image of the Ottoman realm in his 
mind’. This was also an important moment for Gladstone in developing his doctrine of 
British Liberalism.110 Gladstone was already known for his idea that Europe, particularly the 
Concert of Europe, should be a community of Christian nations.111 However, it was in 
Albania that Gladstone’s preconceptions of Ottoman rule and Muslims were ‘readily 
reinforced’. Gladstone also felt that leaving Corfu to the Greeks meant abrogating the 
Treaty of Paris of 1815 and above all meant that the island was left to the ’degradations of 
the Ottomans’ which would ‘deepen the ongoing Eastern Question.’112  
Albania had another great effect on Gladstone’s life. As a result of the visit, Gladstone 
studied Hahn’s Albanesische Studien a ‘work that seems to have swayed’ him towards 
another study. Hahn’s study focused on the fact that the modern Albanians of Epirus 
descended from the ancient Pelasgians and Gladstone had accepted this as fact. In August 
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1862 he selected the book for ‘systematic summer reading.’113 A few years later in 1869, 
Gladstone wrote Juventus Mundi: The Gods and Men of Heroic Age. Gladstone referred to 
Hahn’s studies on many occasions throughout the book,114 and was noted to have said that 
he ‘learned a great deal from Albanesische Studien and highly valued Hahn’s work'.115 
During 1862 Gladstone was also seen displaying Hahn’s book predominantly as he 
travelled. In Penmaenmawr in Wales he ‘quizzed the Bishop of Gloucester’s wife about 
Albania’.116 But, Gladstone was not interested in the origins of the Albanians, their 
geographic distribution, language, ethnic or national issues. His interest was in the religious 
side of Hahn’s work, or more precisely, the question of how Pelasgian spirituality had 
contributed to Hellenic faith and Greek art. However, it was Albania and consequently 
Albanesische Studien which seem to have been the ‘decisive factor in swinging Gladstone in 
favour of a naturalistic explanation of religion’ in ancient Greece.117  
At home Gladstone had developed religious liberalism, the idea that there should be 
equality and opportunity for all believers of the Church of England and those of other 
religious persuasions. He was also rare among politicians and intellectuals in showing no 
enthusiasm for the anti-slavery campaign.118 However, for him, politics and religion went 
hand in hand and he maintained that his faith is the faith for all humankind. As Fawcett 
noted, Gladstone ‘remained unshaken in that characteristically liberal mix of Enlightenment 
and Christian universalism.’119 In international politics and regarding the Balkans, Gladstone 
maintained that Christians should be first liberated and then assisted through 
Enlightenment. Therefore, by the 1860s, it became obvious that Gladstone was applying 
religious interpretation to his views on the Ottoman Empire, Balkans and Albania. 
Furthermore, in applying this view, he did not see Albania as a distinct part of the Ottoman 
Empire as most other travel writers had. Albania seemed not to exist for Gladstone. 
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However, Gladstone was not the first British personality or travel writer to see Albania 
through the prism of religion. This view was expressed decades earlier, almost in parallel 
with the non-religious view, and was linked with the town of Parga. In 1817 Ali Pasha 
bought Parga from the British government and this act did not go unnoticed by the public. 
Reverend Thomas Smart Hughes wrote on this occasion that every Englishman must ‘feel 
the blush of shame tingle in his cheeks’, and felt that delivering Parga to Ali Pasha was a 
‘cruel and impolitic’ act. Furthermore, Reverend Hughes was ‘distressed by the thought of a 
Christian power’ giving up this important town ‘to an infidel tyrant.’120 The point which 
should be underlined here is that the rejection of Parga being transferred to a ‘Muslim 
power’ was made on religious grounds and Reverend Hughes had established a pattern of 
viewing Albania from a religious point of view. In April that year, a similar view was 
expressed by Thomas Maitland, who served as High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, 
which were placed under British control by the Treaty of Paris in 1815.121 On this matter, 
Maitland wrote to the Colonial Minister, Earl Bathurst:  
here was no measure more detrimental to our character than this cession … 
Whenever may have been the diplomatic justice or policy of cession of Parga, it is 
certain that the shock given by that lamentable transaction to every Christian in 
the East, lessened the influence of England far more seriously than could be 
compensated for by any gratitude on the part of the Turks.122  
Parga was also discussed at great length in the British Parliament but it was Lord John 
Russell who brought up the religious aspect, accusing the British government of failing to 
preserve the Christian religion of the people of Parga.123 
The religious remarks of Reverend Hughes, Maitland and Russell on the topic of Parga and 
Albania did not create any immediate effect on the British government or public. Yet four 
decades later, the religious idea was to gain more weight under the patronage of 
Gladstone. It is then that the religiously-informed idea, which contained considerable anti 
Albanian sentiment, was continued by two travel writers Georgina Muir Mackenzie (1833–
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1874) and Adeline Paulina Irby (1831-1911) who introduced southern Slavs to Britain. 
Between 1861 and 1863 they made several trips to Bosnia, Albania and Montenegro but 
spent most of their time in Serbia. Their intention to advocate for liberating the Christian 
Slavs from the ‘Turkish yoke’ is seen throughout their book which was published in 1867 
under the title: Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey in Europe. The authors were so 
taken with Serbia that they suggested that Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
should belong to Serbia. They showed little consideration for non-Slavs and non-Christians 
and descended into ‘denigratory Balkanism’ when they spoke about the Muslims who were 
portrayed as ‘savages, cruel and lawless’. Albanian Catholics were even more disliked by 
the pro Slav Mackenzie and Irby, who appeared to them to be worse than their Muslim 
brethren and were accused of ‘making Judas bargains with the Turks’. 124  
Mackenzie and Irby went on to describe Albanians as being considerably less successful in 
everything when compared with Montenegrins and Serbs. They did not hesitate to describe 
Albanian women as ‘ugly and dirty’. Their work built a negative picture of Albania in Britain, 
and Andrew Hammond has noted that this denigration was made with the intention of 
‘undermining the idea of Albanian independence’.125 Their book was so appealing to the 
British public that, when the second edition came out in 1877, it was proof read by 
Florence Nightingale and prefaced by William Gladstone. Gladstone had, by now, served as 
Prime Minister, leading a Liberal Government from 1868 to 1874. The book served 
Gladstone in his repetition of the need to liberate the Christians and to call for 
overthrowing ‘the fabric of Turkish rule over a Serbian people.’126  
The popularity of Gladstone had risen considerably during 1876, when he accused the 
Porte of atrocities against the Bulgarians and criticised Disraeli’s Conservative government 
for ‘concealing the wholesale massacres’ of the Christian population in the Balkans. 
Simultaneously, he praised the Serbs for their bravery against the Porte.127 
Gladstone was not alone in spreading his liberal view on Muslim Ottoman rule in the 
Balkans. By the 1870s this view became increasingly anti-Islamic and was mainly spread by 
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those who supported the Greeks during the war of independence. The ‘Bulgarian atrocities’ 
of 1876 further heated the public debate in Britain concerning the role of the Ottomans in 
the Balkans.128 The circle of intellectuals supporting Gladstone’s religious view, widened 
and came to include Liberal politicians such as Lord John Russell, William Harcourt, the 
Duke of Argyll, John Bright and intellectuals such as Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, 
Thomas Carlyle and many others.129 In 1876 Thomas Carlyle wrote to The Times calling on 
the British and European governments for the ‘immediate and summery expulsion of the 
Turks from Europe.’ He proposed that some ‘Mongol inhabitants,’ as he called the Turks or 
probably all Muslims, should be allowed to stay if they were peaceful but he insisted that 
the ‘governing Turk should be ordered to disappear from Europe and never to return.’130 
Gladstone’s passionate political and intellectual activities inspired Oscar Wilde to write 
‘Sonnet on the Massacres of Bulgarian Christians’. It is known that Wilde wrote the sonnet 
after he read Gladstone’s essay ‘Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East.’131 At the 
same time Gladstone managed to convince Alfred Tennyson, another well-known British 
poet, to take up the role of the ‘Montenegrin’s Byron’. Neither of these poets had ever set 
foot in the Balkans, nor had Gladstone save his one-day trip to Albania. However, Tennyson 
wrote a poem which was published in the Nineteenth Century Magazine and which was 
accompanied by an ‘account of Montenegro penned by William Gladstone’.132 In the 
popular poem Montenegro, Tennyson praised Montenegrin warriors for beating ‘Turkish 
Islam.’133 In his accompaniment, Gladstone wrote that Montenegrins were intellectually 
comparable to other European nations because ‘their leaders carried the printing press into 
the mountains and used it to print laws,’ but mostly because they fought for ‘freedom and 
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Christianity’. In addition, Gladstone pleaded with the readers to show sympathy and offer 
support to Montenegrins because they were a Christian nation.134    
By praising the Montenegrins and asking the British public to support Montenegro in 1877, 
and earlier making the same call about other Christian nations such as the Greeks, Serbs 
and Bulgarians, Gladstone had completed his circle around Albania. From the fact that 
Gladstone never mentioned Albania or Albanians, we may suggest that he either ignored 
their existence or regarded them as simply being Ottoman Muslims. The Russo-Turkish War 
had started a year earlier in 1876, and all Balkan countries that were praised by Gladstone 
were advancing towards the four vilayets that the Albanians regarded as their own.   
By now Gladstone had established his Liberalism and won the support of the British public, 
but the Conservative government held a different view and applied a different policy 
towards the Balkans. At this time Disraeli, who showed little or no consideration for religion 
and some sympathy for Albanians, was in power. The political clash between Disraeli’s 
Conservatives and Gladstone’s Liberals was fierce and the Albanian question would often 
come up in the process.                         
 
Conclusion 
The Western European writers of the eighteenth century viewed the Balkans as another 
part of Europe, as the ‘East’ or ‘European Turkey’. These writers used paradoxes, 
perceptions and assumptions to create a negative image of the Balkans. In their works, the 
Balkans and within it Albania, appeared as a place which was divided from Europe and 
therefore different. A clearer picture of the Balkans and Albania was created in Britain by 
the nineteenth century travel writers, which resulted in raising interest in the region. 
The two groups of nineteenth travel writers in Britain applied two criteria, religious and 
non-religious, when creating an image of Albania. Religion played an important role and 
produced prejudices against Albania. The views of Lord Byron on Albania, the 
representative of the non-religious group, did not prevail in Britain. While these views 
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made an impact on future travel writers, in Britain Lord Byron did not become known 
because of his work on Albania, a country he loved and idealised and where he is still 
remembered and held in high regard.     
Despite this, both Liberals and Conservatives based their political ideas regarding the 
Balkans and Albania on Lord Byron’s legacy. Byron served as an inspiration for the British 
public and politicians which were sharply divided into two camps. This division created a 
reflection in British politics, which in turn contributed to further shaping Gladstone’s 
political views and initiated a debate between the Conservatives and Liberals on Albania. 
Disraeli and Gladstone visited Albania, but responded to it very differently. Disraeli visited 
Albania because he was inspired by Byron. Disraeli and his Conservative followers viewed 
Albania from the same non-religious position as Byron had. Yet because Lord Byron joined 
the war of liberation in Greece, he also became an idol of Gladstonian Liberals who 
maintained that the Balkan Christians should be freed from the ’Turkish yoke’ and they 
should follow Byron’s example. It is hard to believe that Byron would have approved of the 
liberation of the Balkans in the way that the Liberals called for. Yet it is not difficult to see 
the enormous effect that Byron had created on the British public and politics.       
As will also be seen in next chapter, the Conservatives under Disraeli, showed some 
consideration for the Albanian national cause while the Liberals of Gladstone refused to 
recognise Albanians as a nationality. Disraeli, by showing sympathy for Albania, took on the 
views of Lord Byron. Disraeli’s views did not create a long lasting impact on British public 
opinion and politics but he remained known as a sympathiser of the Albanian national 
cause. As late as 1939 The Manchester Guardian noted that in British news Albania 
‘generally recalls a few names: Scanderbeg, Ali Pasha, the Lion of Janina, and – Benjamin 
Disraeli’.135  
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                                                                      CHAPTER II 
 
The Congress of Berlin and the Albanian Question in the Governments of Disraeli and 
Gladstone 1878-1881 
 
Lord Goschen and Lord Fitzmaurice on the Eastern Roumelia Commission strongly 
favoured forming a large and independent Albania. Lord Fitzmaurice took very 
great interest in Albania and corresponded with me about it for fifteen years. He 
maintained that had an Albanian state been then formed both the Balkans and 
Europe would have been spared much bloodshed; each of the respective peoples 
would have had a fair share and balanced each other. But the prejudice against 
Muslims was then too strong. – Edith Durham.136   
      
Introduction 
The main subject of this chapter is the Albanian Question during the period 1878-1881 and 
the policies of the Disraeli and Gladstone governments in response to developments in the 
Ottoman Empire. The gradual disintegration of the Empire, which began early in the 
nineteenth century, brought the fate of Albania to the attention of the European Powers. In 
territories that the Empire was losing, new countries were being created and they all had 
support from one or more of the Powers. Greece, which was supported by most of the 
Powers but primarily by Britain and France, gained independence in 1829. Serbia and 
Montenegro were previously autonomous but became independent during the Congress of 
Berlin in 1878 and were supported unreservedly by Russia.  
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The creation of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and the territorial expansions of Greece 
alarmed the Albanians, who had felt relatively comfortable within the Empire until they 
began to feel the consequences of the Russo–Turkish war of April 1877–January 1878. In 
this war, Russia and Serbia had helped the insurrection of the Serbs in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina while their ally, Montenegro, attacked Ottoman territories of Albania. While 
the Russians helped Bulgaria, Serbia attacked the Ottomans on the southern border and 
reached the edge of modern day Kosovo. The Albanian leadership believed that their 
neighbouring countries were expanding unjustly into their territories and that the Empire 
was neither willing nor able to protect them any longer. These border changes and the 
question of Albanian nationality will take centre stage in the second part of this chapter.  
The Powers at the Congress of Berlin showed little regard for national criteria when 
deciding the new borders. As a result of the border changes, refugees flooded those 
Albanian territories which still remained under Ottoman sovereignty. This fact radicalised 
the political views of the Albanian leaders and led them to look for ways of organising 
themselves. They took steps to act as a coherent nationality by forming a League and tried 
to act as a government in order to take care of the territory and the population.  
The Albanian League, in seeking to secure a place among the new nations in the Balkans, 
asked the Disraeli government to take their case to the Congress of Berlin, where the 
creation of new states was being sanctioned. The British delegation in Berlin, headed by the 
Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, showed some consideration for the Albanian Question 
but viewed Albania as a territory which should continue its existence within the Ottoman 
Empire. The priority of Disraeli’s and Gladstone’s governments was to maintain the 
presence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, which meant no creation of an autonomous or 
independent Albanian state.  
Supporting the Albanian request for autonomy or independence would mean ending 
Ottoman rule in Europe and, for Disraeli, that was not in the interest of British foreign 
policy. Disraeli’s Conservative government maintained that the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire in Europe would bring Russia into the Balkans and consequently to the 
Aegean and Mediterranean, thus endangering the route to India, Britain’s main interest in 
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the region. While in power, Disraeli made it known that, if necessary, Britain would go to 
war in order to stop Russia’s access to the Bosphorus and the Balkans. 
So far, British involvement in the Albanian Question during the period 1878–1881 has not 
been studied. The initial part of the chapter therefore seeks to expand on previous studies 
by utilising new sources and offering new analyses and greater scrutiny. There is also a 
need, particularly among Albanians, to better understand this period of history and the 
importance of British involvement.  
 
The international context - from San Stefano to the Congress of Berlin 
In early January 1878, the most north-western coastal town of the Ottoman Empire, 
Antivari, fell into the hands of Montenegrins who had joined the war against the Porte, on 
the side of the Russians. The town was taken during an armistice agreed upon by the Porte 
on one side and the Russians and their allies on the other.137 The Montenegrin army 
refused to acknowledge the ceasefire and expelled the population of the town, whose 
inhabitants were Albanian Muslims and Catholics.138 The territories the Montenegrins 
occupied were almost entirely inhabited by Albanians, who were forced to leave their 
homes and properties behind and never to return. Towns like Shkodra could not cope with 
the refugees who grew in number as the war dragged on.  
The refugee problem soon became an international issue, causing great embarrassment to 
the Porte and some of the Great Powers. In Constantinople, the Austro-Hungarian 
ambassador, Count Ferenc Zichy, told the British ambassador, Henry Layard, that his 
government was deeply embarrassed by the entrance of some 30,000 Albanian refugees 
who had fled into Austro-Hungarian territory following the fall of Antivari and other places. 
The Austro-Hungarians were not prepared for such a situation and simply could not cope, 
yet, unable to convince the Montenegrins to take them back, the numbers of refugees 
continued to grow. Meanwhile, the Montenegrins and Serbs were moving everywhere they 
could without any regard for armistice conditions. As a result, Zichy was instructed to ask 
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the Porte if they were capable of holding their military positions on the frontlines and if 
possible not to abandon any military post.139   
On the northern border of the Ottoman Empire, the Serbian army was advancing with 
similar speed and causing the same strategic dilemma as the Montenegrins. By June 1878, 
the Serbs had expelled the Albanians from their conquered territories. At the end of 
February Rifat Pasha, the vali (governor) of Prishtina, asked the British vice consul Harry 
Cooper if he could ask his government, or even British charitable institutions, for help in 
tackling the Albanian refugee crisis, whose number, he said, was over 100,000. Cooper 
believed that the number of refugees was exaggerated, but there was little doubt the 
refugees had become an unbearable burden for the Ottoman regime. Their presence had 
worsened an already tense situation, with some of the refugees and bashi-bazouks 
(irregular or paramilitary soldiers of the Ottoman army) instigating revenge attacks on the 
Christian population with the vali unable to prevent it.140 In the vilayets of Kosovo and 
Manastir the number of refugees was over 140,000. A British investigator, Cullen, who was 
appointed by the Powers to look into the situation of the Muslims in ‘European Turkey’, 
reported a difficult situation. Other British diplomats, including Edmund Calvert, sent 
reports with horrendous news about Muslims being forced to leave their homes in places 
that were lost by the Porte.141 However, this hardly made any news in the British or 
European press, which supported Liberal ideas and continued to report mainly on the 
situation of the Christians.  
On 3 March 1878 the Porte was forced to sign the Treaty of San Stefano. This effectively 
constituted a Russian diktat and an autonomous Bulgaria was formed as a result. The 
borders of Bulgaria penetrated deep into Albanian lands. Serbia and Montenegro, being in 
the camp of the victors, gained considerable swathes of Kosovo and Albania.142 To the 
Albanians themselves, the Porte had shown little or no regard for their four vilayets, and 
the Treaty of San Stefano saw the Albanian leadership react swiftly. From Constantinople, 
Layard forwarded to London several letters that were addressed to him by Albanian 
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delegates from the affected territories and from other parts of northern Albania, protesting 
against the annexation of their lands to Montenegro. The Christian and Muslim Albanians 
of Kosovo objected to the political decisions taken at San Stefano and were not prepared to 
see their territory ceded to Bulgaria or Serbia.143 Inhabitants of Dibra dispatched a petition 
against being included in Bulgaria.144  
The British General Consul in Albania, Kirby Green, sent an advisory letter to his superior, 
the Marques of Salisbury (1830-1903), concerning the Treaty of San Stefano. Montenegro, 
a small and landlocked country, had tripled in size under the terms of the Treaty. He 
suggested that the borders envisaged at San Stefano would engender a major problem 
among the Albanians and maintained that this ominous possibility should not be lightly 
accepted by European elites. Explaining the meaning of the situation on the ground and its 
consequences, he wrote: 
The Porte has handed over, by a stroke of pen, to Montenegro some of the most 
influential and hardy of the Roman Catholic mountain tribes. […] The barrier 
which might and ought to have been raised against Slav encroachment is thus 
broken through.145   
As a result of the Treaty of San Stefano, Albanians gave up their hope of any further 
support from Constantinople. They came to believe that the Ottoman army, which 
consisted mainly of Syrian and other Middle Eastern conscripts, was not putting up a 
serious defence along the northern border of the Empire where their land touched both 
Serbian and Montenegrin territory. Albanian leaders were readying themselves to convince 
the population to resist any attempt to enforce the Treaty of San Stefano on the ground. A 
number of spontaneous meetings were held throughout northern and eastern Albania 
where demands for action were heard. Albanians, in the north-west, around the border 
with Montenegro, formed a league whose members swore ‘to resist until death all 
attempts coming from abroad or from the Supreme Government [the Porte] to change the 
present state of their territory.’146 The league took steps to establish contacts with the 
Albanians of the north as far as Prishtina, east as far as Dibra and Ohri, and south to Janina, 
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which led them to hold a far bigger meeting with greater political significance. Meanwhile, 
the British government and most of the Powers were getting ready to reject San Stefano 
and organise another peace conference.          
 
The Albanian League and the Congress of Berlin 
Until 1878 there was no political organisation claiming to represent the whole of Albania or 
demanding a political solution to their plight. Before 1878 Albanian leaders were engaged 
in three political projects. The first was the struggle of the Albanians of the north (Malësia) 
who were seeking self-governance. They refused to accept the political consequences 
announced in the Porte’s reform program and in doing so sought to preserve, or even 
extend, their traditional way of self-governance. The second project was religious in 
essence and concerned the Albanian Catholics who lived semi-autonomously in Mirdita. 
They aimed for wider autonomy or even to establish their own independent principality. 
The third political project was the demand for independence which came from the 
Albanians living in colonies abroad in Italy, Egypt, Romania and Constantinople.147  
This cluster of Albanian groups and their activities were narrow and local in character and, 
as such, did not cover the entire scope of the Albanian issue. After the Treaty of San 
Stefano this matter became more acute. The Albanian elite, who resided mainly in 
Constantinople and feared the threat of further territorial losses, believed it necessary to 
organise at the highest level in order to represent the entire national cause. When it 
became clear that the Powers of Europe would not accept the Treaty of San Stefano and 
were gathering to revise it in Berlin, Albanian leaders decided to hold a general assembly to 
discuss the matter.  
On 10 June 1878, around 300 delegates from all parts of the four vilayets assembled in the 
town of Prizren in Kosovo. The meeting, which lasted two weeks, was held in the 
compounds of a medrese (Muslim religious school) and the proceedings were conducted in 
utmost secrecy.148 The Porte did not try to stop the gathering, nor did it interfere in any of 
its activities during the assembly. After electing Ilaz Pasha Dibra as president, the assembly 
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formed a military organisation and called it Lidhja (League), which later was to be known as 
the Albanian League or the League of Prizren (Lidhja e Prizrenit), named after the town in 
which it was formed. The assembly passed both the Kararname (Resolution) of the League 
and the Talimat (Instructions) for the organisation of a government administration and the 
creation of an army. A decree of eight points was also passed which dealt with army 
organisation and its deployment.149   
For more than a week the assembly, dominated by conservative150 landlords and a sultanist 
movement, which favoured a moderate approach towards the Porte, did not tackle the 
issues related to reforms, schools or autonomy. They did not even discuss the issue of 
uniting the four vilayets into one, which was the aim of the radicals,151 led by Abdyl Frashëri 
(1839-1892).152 As a matter of fact the League was, to a great degree, an initiative led by 
activists from a group of Albanian elites and intellectuals in Constantinople represented in 
Prizren by Frashëri. Therefore, the League also represented the differences that existed 
between those Albanian intellectuals who lived abroad and powerful landlords and 
traditional clan leaders at home. However, both wings, radicals and moderates, agreed 
from the beginning to defend the integrity of Albanian lands but remain under the Ottoman 
umbrella.   
When the League ended its two weeks of sessions, the leaders of all sides agreed to put a 
request to the Porte for uniting the four vilayets into one politically autonomous 
administrative and territorial unit. British newspapers, such as The Spectator, wrote that 
Albanians were determined ‘to be governed by Albanian Committees, elected by universal 
suffrage.’153 
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Many observers, including Kirby Green, claimed that the Porte was behind the Albanian 
League. Others, mainly Slavs, believed that it was Britain who had set up the League. A 
great number of politicians, intellectuals and newspapers in Russia went even further by 
saying that the League did not really exist. According to them, not only was the League a 
figment of imagination put forward by the Sublime Porte in order to stop the 
implementation of the Treaty of Berlin, but there was in fact no Albanian nation save a few 
tribes.154 
Several weeks before the Albanian League was formed, the Powers had been preparing for 
a peace conference. In London, following his appointment as Foreign Secretary, the 
Marquess of Salisbury produced a policy statement concerning his vision for British foreign 
policy. The document, known as the Salisbury Circular of 1 April 1878, became famous in 
the world of European diplomacy. The Circular principally called for a review of the Treaty 
of San Stefano. A big and strong Slav Bulgaria, under the control of Russia, was a prospect 
that the British could not accept and the extension of Bulgaria into Greek and Albanian 
lands was considered a territorial severance of the Porte.155 It was also made clear that 
London would preserve the presence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, which left no place 
to discuss the Albanian Question as a separate issue.  
In Constantinople, Layard had suggested that the Sultan appoint a ‘credible Turk like Sadik 
Pasha’, as head of the Ottoman delegation, to which the Sultan agreed. To Layard’s 
surprise, a few days before the start of the Congress, the Sultan changed his mind. He told 
Layard that he had appointed Karatheodory Pasha and Mehmet Ali Pasha as 
plenipotentiaries who were to be joined by Sadullah Bey, the Ottoman ambassador in 
Berlin.156 Karatheodory was a Greek Christian born in Berlin and, being the son of the 
Sultan’s personal doctor, had made a successful career in Ottoman politics. At the Congress 
he was the principal representative of the Ottoman Empire and also held the position of 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. As he struggled to preserve Ottoman interests, he was 
‘constantly and rudely snubbed by Bismarck’ who told him on many occasions that he was 
there ‘only to accept what the Powers dictated’.157 Mehmet Ali Pasha was born in 
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Magdeburg, Germany, and was originally called Ludwig Karl Detroit. As a young man he 
went to Constantinople, joined the Ottoman army, became a Muslim and climbed to the 
military grade of Marshall.158 During the Congress, it was noted that Bismarck addressed 
him dismissively as der Magdeburger. The Albanians called him Ali Pashë Maxhari (Ali Pasha 
– the Hungarian). He was well-known among the Albanians and was deeply unpopular 
because he had led a mission a few years earlier to disarm them.159 A few weeks after the 
Congress, in Kosovo, Mehmet Ali Pasha became the first victim of the Treaty of Berlin. 
In Europe the Powers hurried to secure their positions before the beginning of the 
Congress. All made secret contact with each other and some signed agreements, with 
Britain signing a total of three secret agreements between March and June. The Secret 
Protocol of 30 May was signed with Russia, while the Anglo-Turkish Convention was signed 
on 4 June. Two days later, Britain signed the last arrangement with Austria-Hungary and 
with this the preparation for Berlin was complete. None of these agreements touched on 
the Albanian Question. However, Albania was mentioned in another secret agreement, the 
Budapest Convention, which was reached between Austria–Hungary and Russia, signed on 
15 January. The third article of the second convention, which was signed on 18 March 
1877, dealt with the future of the Balkans in the event of the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. If this was to happen, Russia was not to interfere directly in the Balkans, no large 
Slavic state was to be created and Albania, as well as Bulgaria, might become 
independent.160   
In Berlin the Albanian Question was not discussed as a separate or independent issue as 
there was no power to bring it to the agenda. Among the Albanians there was some hope 
that Italy might raise the question, since during 1876 Francesco Crispi, President of the 
Italian Parliament and himself of Albanian origin, had expressed to the Powers the Italian 
interest in Albania.161 Crispi visited Bismarck, who considered the Italian conquest of 
Albania a possibility. He told Crispi that Germany would not break with Vienna for the sake 
of Italy, but if Austria-Hungary were to take Bosnia and Herzegovina then Rome would be 
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free to take Albania.162 However, in March 1877 there was a change of government in 
Rome and the new Italian government decided to take a neutral position on this matter. 
The Albanian League sent a delegation to Berlin but Bismarck, then head of the Congress, 
refused to meet them. The memorandum that the Albanian League sent to Disraeli 
produced no effect. Albania was thus discussed only as a secondary question in moments 
when the borders of Montenegro, Serbia and Greece were discussed.  
During the main session of the Congress, the Albanian Question came up only in fragments. 
The French delegate, Saint-Valier, proposed to the Congress to continue securing the rights 
of Albanian Catholics of Mirdita that they enjoyed on the basis of ab antico. The proposal 
was rejected by the Porte and the British.163 Although the French and the Austro-
Hungarians insisted that the issue was linked with the traditional autonomy and rights of 
the Christian population, the proposal did not pass. Instead, a compromise was made: the 
Ottomans agreed not to make any new changes regarding the status of Mirdita and this 
was included as a statement in the text of the Treaty.164  
Austria-Hungary was behind the Mirdita issue. They had managed to mark Albania, or at 
least the northern part which was inhabited by Albanian Catholics, as their zone of interest. 
Furthermore, Austria-Hungary succeeded in winning the right to build a road and railway 
extension from Herzegovina, through Montenegro, to Albania.165 Austria-Hungary did not 
succeed in becoming established militarily near Shkodra, as it had hoped, but compared 
with her rival, Italy, Vienna had by far emerged as a winner from the Congress. Austria-
Hungary became territorially linked with Albania on the frontiers of Kosovo, through the 
Sanjak of Novi Pazar. Article XXV of the Treaty allowed an Austro-Hungarian military 
presence in Sanjak but the place was to remain part of the Vilayet of Kosovo and as such 
under the Sultan’s sovereign rights. Therefore, the administration remained in the hands of 
the Ottomans.166 However, from Sanjak the Austro-Hungarians were only a few miles from 
the railway station of Mitrovica in Kosovo. They were coming close to Salonika, the place 
they planned to occupy in the case of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.       
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Perceptions in Britain of the Albanians as a nationality 
During the nineteenth century, as we saw earlier, the Liberals managed to impose religion 
as an essential element in the British understanding of the rise of nationalism in the 
Balkans. Crucially, many politicians, historians and the public in Britain and Europe viewed 
the Eastern Question through the prism of Christians living under the ‘barbarous and infidel 
state’ of the Ottomans.167 The rise of new states was considered as a struggle of new 
Christian nations against the Ottoman Empire, which was viewed as Muslim in essence.  
Albanians did not fit easily into this framework. The majority of the population were 
Muslim, and although Albanians were integrated into the Ottoman system, some Albanian 
leaders were nevertheless looking for an exit strategy, as they felt the collapse of the 
empire was drawing near. The Albanians were the first nation with a Muslim majority to 
have risen against the Porte and demand autonomy or independence.  
As Chapter I explained, the existence of a distinct Albanian identity was noticed by British 
travellers in the Balkans long before the Congress of Berlin. Most travel writers observed 
that the Albanians constituted a separate ethnicity from those that surrounded them or 
indeed even a nation, being distinct in origin, language, tradition, religion, behaviour and 
dress. It is necessary to recall Hobhouse’s notes on this matter: 
It is certain that the Christians who can fairly be called Albanians are scarcely, if at all, to be 
distinguished from the Mahometans [Muslims]. They carry arms, and many of them are 
enrolled in the service of Ali [Pasha], and differ in no respect from his other soldiers. There 
is a spirit of independence and a love of their country in the whole people which, in a great 
measure, does away the vast distinction observable in other parts of Turkey between the 
followers of the two religions; for when the natives of other provinces, upon being asked 
who they are, will say, “We are Turks," or "We are Christians,” a man of this country 
answers, “I am an Albanian”.168  
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It is also useful to recall, once again, Lord Byron’s impressions of Albanians. Concerning 
their religion, nationality, behaviour and the position that the Albanians held in the eyes of 
their neighbouring nations, Byron wrote: 
No nation are so detested and dreaded by their neighbours as the Albanese; the 
Greeks hardly regard them as Christians, or the Turks as Moslems, and in fact 
they are a mixture of both, and sometimes neither.169 
Ali Pasha’s rule had contributed to furthering these characteristics. His role was important 
even after his death although his intention was not to create a nation state, the legacy he 
left behind was used by the Albanian elite to build their nationalist platform. After his 
death, northern Albania, together with Kosovo, gradually became the cradle of nationalist 
activities and uprisings against the Porte.170 
The beginning of what became known as the ‘Albanian National Renaissance’ or Rilindja 
(Revival) took place in the early 1830s and did not differ considerably from other national 
movements in the Balkans.171 However, the Albanians did not manage to create a single 
and united representative body before 1878 with the formation of the Albanian League. 
The League, established as a result of nationalist ideas circulating among the Albanian elite, 
became the first political organisation to be accepted by the population at large.172 As a 
result of the border conflicts with Greece and Montenegro, the League, directed from 
Prizren, became active in Janina and Shkodra. The League proved capable of threatening 
northern Greece and Montenegro militarily. In the north the League had permanently 
mobilised 30,000 armed men while in the south it was prepared to put 40,000 men under 
arms within a short time. Regarding the situation in the south, the League made it known 
that if the Powers and the Porte gave any territory in Epirus to Greece, the Albanians would 
proclaim independence and demand a protectorate guaranteed by a European Power. The 
British Consul in Corfu informed London that this menacing attitude within the Albanian 
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League came out of their sense of being a separate national group, coupled with religious 
fanaticism and secret encouragement from abroad, particularly from Italy.173  
The Congress of Berlin did not open the door for the Albanian League, although the League 
made efforts to prove it was capable of representing the entire nation. As we have already 
seen, Bismarck had previously declared that he did not recognise the existence of a distinct 
Albanian nation. Furthermore, Austria-Hungary cared only for the Albanian Catholics while 
other Powers, except Britain, remained silent on this matter. In the memorandum 
submitted to Disraeli, the League asked the British government to make the Albanian case 
at the Congress of Berlin. The memorandum, which became the political program of the 
League, explained their historical background and went on to explain and affirm both 
Albanian nationality and the country’s frontiers:  
All we want is to be Albanian. Albania cannot be united with Greece. Profound 
differences in nationality, language, customs and culture would make such a 
union untenable […] Albania will never stand the Slavic domination. Albanian will 
never be Turkish […] From Boyana [the river bordering Montenegro] to the gates 
of Janina there is one compact and homogenous core of population, with 
common characteristics and a common national identity. 174   
Explaining why Britain should undertake such a role, the memorandum elaborated: 
Only Great Britain can take up our requests and make them heard at the 
Congress. In doing so, it will not lack the support of the other Powers who have 
recognised our political existence and destiny from the moment the principle of 
nationality became the primary basis of European public law. Independent of the 
issue of justice, Great Britain has great interest in creating an impregnable 
cordon to check the Slavic invasion advancing and flooding towards the Adriatic, 
and this cordon must and can only be created by the peoples who are most 
imperilled by the inexorable threat of their neighbours [… ] Great Britain, that 
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ancient seat and mistress of liberty for all peoples, foremost among all the 
Powers has recognised the right of other nations to their independence.175 
The memorandum underlined the Russian threat as a common interest of the Albanians 
and the British. However, while the British government and its delegation to the Congress 
recognised the existence of the Albanian nationality, no steps were taken to sponsor their 
request. Whenever members of Disraeli’s government and the Conservative Party 
considered the Albanian issue, they came under strong criticism from the Liberal 
opposition. The harshest criticism was directed at Salisbury, who, as Foreign Secretary, 
received a delegation from the Albanian League. The two delegates, Abdyl Frashëri and 
Mehmet Vrioni, arrived in London after meeting high officials in Rome and Paris.176 
Salisbury saw them on 12 May 1879. Both delegates were former Deputies to the Ottoman 
Parliament from the region of Janina.  
Among other issues, these two delegates discussed the issues of language, education and 
religion which posed problems for the Albanian national cause in the south. At that time 
the Albanians lacked a unified alphabet and had adopted Greek as their language of 
education because the use of the Albanian language was prohibited by the Porte. Albanians 
in the south spoke Greek and were educated in this language in Janina. The Albanian 
delegates told Salisbury that the language issue should not confuse him, arguing that it 
would be an error to classify these Albanians as either Greeks or exclusively as Christian. 
They also stated that a large number of Christian Albanians lived in the north and the south 
of Albania but had no desire to be included in Greece or Montenegro. Of a population of 
600,000 in South Albania, about 60,000 spoke Greek, but these were only men and the 
figure excluded both women and children.177  
With regard to other points, raised during the meeting, Salisbury wrote: 
They desire to lay their wishes and their claims with all humility before the 
European Powers in the hope that justice would be done to them; but they did 
not conceal their resolution to persevere in resistance to alien domination which 
for many centuries their fathers had maintained. Whatever the results of the 
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pending discussion might be, the King of Greece would only become master of 
any portion of Albania if he was able to subdue it by the force of arms.178 
Salisbury did not express to the delegates any opinion concerning their national cause, 
remaining cautious and declaring no official position on the matter. He advised them to 
continue to provide other Powers in Constantinople with information of this kind. He 
informed Layard that he had told the two Albanian delegates that ‘it was the wish of the 
Powers to do impartial justice to all races which inhabit the Balkan Peninsula.’179  
In the House of Commons, the Liberal MP Charles Dilke argued that the members of this 
delegation could not be considered representatives of the Albanian nation, as they had 
introduced themselves. He said they were Ottoman paid functionaries and the Porte did 
not prevent their visit to Europe.180 During the meeting the Albanian delegation handed a 
memorandum to Salisbury, and from London went to Berlin in the hope of meeting 
Bismarck.181 Prince Bismarck, however, refused to see them. Back in the House of 
Commons, Dilke suggested that Salisbury should have acted the same way. 
When Janina and the border with Greece were discussed, Conservatives asked the House 
to consider Albanians a nationality. Robert Bourke, MP and Undersecretary Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs in Disraeli’s government, expressed this opinion and added, ‘there 
is a strong Albanian nationality’, and they, being ‘an ancient and historic race,’ will not give 
up their land without a fight.182 A year later, the Liberal MP Joseph Cowen asked Prime 
Minister Gladstone ‘whether, in seeking to extend Montenegrin territory in the north and 
the Greek territory in the south, regard will be had to the [Albanian] nationality in the 
centre?’  
Gladstone, although not known as a friend of the Albanians, recognised their nationality. 
He replied diplomatically: 
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We are bound to have the same fair regard to all the facts of the case, and to the 
element of nationality and to the peculiar circumstances of Albania, as we should 
do in reference to any other portion of territory.183 
Many Conservative MPs thought Gladstone’s approach towards Albania was unfair, 
believing that he had disregarded Albanian nationality. When the British government 
pressurised Albanians and the Porte to give Ulqin and its surroundings to Montenegro, 
Henry Drummond Wolf, a Conservative MP, accused Gladstone of ‘plundering Turkey’ and 
‘coercing the Albanian nation’.184   
However, it should be noted that a group of well-known Liberal politicians and diplomats of 
the Gladstone circle, consisting of Dilke, Granville, Goschen and Fitzmaurice, recognised the 
need to accommodate the Albanians within an autonomous or independent state or even 
in Personal Union with Greece. Throughout 1880 and 1881 they were active in seeking a 
solution for the Albanians and convincing the British government to apply one of these 
three options.  
From Constantinople, Fitzmaurice proposed measures to be taken regarding reforms in 
Albania, which were supported by ambassador Goschen.185 He reminded the Foreign Office 
of the unsolved Albanian issue, which was causing problems because their nationhood was 
ignored. He urged Earl Granville: 
I venture to submit to Your Lordship, as I have done before, that the Albanian 
excitement cannot be passed over as a mere manoeuvre conducted by Turks in 
order to mislead Europe, and evade its will. Nor can it be denied that the 
Albanian movement is perfectly natural. An ancient and distinct race as any by 
whom they are surrounded, they have seen the nationality of these neighbouring 
races taken under the protection of various European Powers, and their 
aspirations gratified for a more independent existence […] They see the Eastern 
Question being solved on the principle of nationality, meanwhile they see that 
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[they] themselves do not receive similar treatment. Their nationality is ignored 
and territory inhabited by Albanians is handed over in the north to the 
Montenegrins, to satisfy Montenegro, the protégé of Russia, and in the south to 
Greece, the protégé of England and France. Exchanges of territory are proposed, 
other difficulties arise, but still it is in expense of Albanians, and Albanians are to 
be handed over to Slavs and Greeks without reference to the principle of 
nationality.186   
Goschen proposed the creation of a strong Albania before the Ottoman Empire collapsed, 
otherwise Albania would disappear along with the empire. If Albania was to be created as a 
state, a balance of powers in the Balkans would prevail, otherwise no European Power 
alone would be able to subdue the Albanians. It would not be wise to break up Albanians 
and divide their lands because, he said, Albanians are a difficult race to manage. Dividing 
them into north and south would also be unwise. Therefore, Goschen had an alternative 
proposal regarding the future of Albania and advised Earl Granville to consider the 
possibility of ‘attaching Albania by a dynastic link to Greece’.187 
Charles Dilke had a similar plan ‘for combining Albanian autonomy with Personal Union 
with Greece, finding that the Albanians were willing to accept the King of the Hellenes‘.188 
The Greek Chargé d’Affaires in London, Gennadius, told Dilke that a proposal for a Personal 
Union between Albania and Greece was made to the king of Greece. The Greek diplomat, 
wishing to deny Albanians were a nationality, saw this as a predictable move because ‘the 
southern Albanians are to all intents and purposes Greeks but the initiative ought to 
proceed from the Albanians.’189  
As Gennadius knew, there had been contacts in the past between the Albanian leaders and 
Greek government officials. In 1877, Albanian leaders had secretly negotiated with Greece 
on a joint war against the Porte. However, Abdyl Frashëri had rejected the hypothetical 
union with Greece and told the Greek delegate, Skouloudis, that the Albanians were 
determined to ‘save the Albanian nationality.’ About other ideas expressed during these 
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meetings he said ‘they were not the result of hasty thinking or recent events, but the 
outcome of many years of reflection and discussion, during which Albanians had become 
aware of the dangers to which their existence as a nation was exposed.’190 
Goschen thought that the proposed union would be a solution for Europe but he was 
aware of the difficulties in convincing the Albanians, who were strong in Constantinople 
and trusted all over the Empire. However, Goschen was convinced that ‘the Albanians 
would and must have an autonomy in some shape’.191   
On 4 September 1880, the question of Albanian nationality came up again in the House of 
Commons. Cowen criticised the way the British government was handling the crisis and did 
not agree with the government helping the Montenegrins to ‘take Albanian land without 
their will or approval.’ As he characterised the Albanians as the oldest people in the Balkans 
and fighters for independence, a loud voice was heard in the House: ‘They are not a 
nationality’. To this Cowen replied: 
Not a nationality, his hon. Friend said. That was Prince Bismarck’s remark at 
Berlin. He said he did not know of the existence of the Albanian nation. Such a 
statement was not at all surprising. Prince Bismarck did not know of the 
nationality of Denmark or of Holland either. And another Prince, quite as potent 
then as Prince Bismarck is now, contended at the Congress of Vienna that he did 
not know of the nationality of Italy.192 
A small group of MPs, among them Cowen, criticised the Liberal government for having 
sympathy toward the Slav nationalities but showing no regard to their rivals in the Balkans. 
Cowen maintained that the Treaty of Berlin was being ‘carried out irrespective of 
nationalities and creeds’, while her Majesty’s Government and other European powers, by 
extending Greek and Montenegrin territories, were ‘encroaching upon the nationality of 
Albania’.193 This group argued that the government was applying the principle of nationality 
selectively because the government was playing the role of emancipator and liberator of 
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the Christians in the region. Cowen stated that the attitude of the British government 
toward Albania was the same as that shown toward Ireland but the ignorance the British 
and other European Powers showed toward Albania was greater than that toward 
Ireland.194  
 
Disraeli and Gladstone on the Eastern and Albanian Questions 
Speaking about these opinions in Parliament, it is necessary to analyse the attitude of the 
two leading political personalities of that period. Benjamin Disraeli and William Gladstone 
had been leaders of their parties since 1868. Even before 1868, and continuing until their 
deaths, they together dominated British politics. They came from contrasting social and 
ethnic backgrounds and differed in many aspects, particularly in foreign affairs and over the 
Eastern Question. For Disraeli, the Ottoman Empire was a bulwark against a Russian 
invasion of the British dominions in Asia and potential capture of the route to India. This 
made Disraeli seek to protect the territories of the Ottoman Empire in Europe against the 
Russian threat.195  
When Disraeli took office in his second term (1874–1880), Britain was in a position of 
isolation on the international stage. He used Britain’s colonial possessions and imposing sea 
power to tell Europe that nothing could happen without British approval. Proclaiming the 
Queen as Empress of India and assuming the motto Imperium et Libertas, Disraeli drew 
Britain toward interventionism. He upheld the Palmerston doctrine of the independence 
and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and supported the Porte unreservedly.196  
According to Disraeli’s strategy on the Eastern Question, Russia was an enemy and had to 
be prevented from advancing into Europe or occupying Constantinople at any cost, even 
that of war. Disraeli reminded the Queen of this position in a letter he sent from Berlin 
before the Congress began in 1878. The Congress was to deal with such ‘topics as the port 
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of Antivari’, which he thought would be insignificant, just as he regarded the borders of 
Montenegro and Serbia as having the same low importance. He continued: 
All these concern Austria […] but Austria is not going to war with Russia. Let us therefore 
deal with the great things that concern England, for England is quite ready to go to war 
with Russia.197 
Gladstone was in favour of including Russia in joint European actions and avoiding direct 
confrontation with St. Petersburg. For him, the emancipation of Christian states in the 
Balkans would be easier with Russian help and would tie into the aims of his liberalism. He 
supported the national programs of the Balkan nations, was known to be devoted to the 
Hellenic cause, and praised the Montenegrins, Bulgarians and other Balkan nations for their 
war against the Ottoman Empire.198 As we saw earlier, he did not include the Albanians in 
this list.    
In their second terms as Prime Ministers, both Disraeli and Gladstone dealt with the 
Albanian Question. Disraeli addressed it during and after the Congress of Berlin and 
Gladstone did so in implementing the Treaty of Berlin. The Albanians were the only Balkan 
people for whom Disraeli showed sympathy during the Congress and throughout the rest of 
his second term in office. Although the Albanian League pleaded with him to take their case 
to the Congress he did not answer their call, but later did bring up the need for the Great 
Powers to support the Albanians. They became, in his opinion, ‘the main guarantors of the 
preservation of the Ottoman Empire in Europe.’199  
Disraeli had gained considerable knowledge and experience of Albania before coming to 
power. He had considered Janina the capital of Albania.200 His visit had a significant impact 
on him because he came to know the Albanians and became familiar with the Albanian-
Greek problem. During and after the Congress of Berlin, his government refused to 
acknowledge Greek territorial pretensions over Albania. He was firm that Janina and other 
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southern Albanian towns should stay within Albania and should not be ceded to Greece as 
some diplomatic voices, headed by the French, requested at Berlin and after.    
Unlike Disraeli, Gladstone did not show much interest in Albania before he came to power, 
though he recognised the authority of the Albanian League. In his election campaign of 
1880 he spoke at the Music Hall in Edinburgh about the Porte’s inability to hold territories 
in Europe. ‘Albania is possessed by a League’ he told his supporters.201 However, in his 
second term as Prime Minister (1880-1885), Gladstone seemed to have more interest in 
this matter. Disraeli favoured a cautious relationship with the Albanians in order to 
maintain stability in that part of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the British government under 
Disraeli, and even less under Gladstone, had no strategy or doctrine for an official position 
toward the Albanians and their national program. Albanian interests were examined only 
when the interests of other nations in the Balkans were considered.202 
Great disagreements between Conservatives and Liberals over the Eastern Question, and 
consequently the Albanian Question, came to the surface when, in 1877, Disraeli appointed 
Henry Layard as ambassador to Constantinople. Gladstone and his Liberals expressed fierce 
disagreement to Layard’s posting to Constantinople, ‘fearing that he will bring another 
Crimean War.’203 
The Liberals continuously accused Layard of being a Turcophile. However, during his service 
in Constantinople Layard, who disliked Gladstone, managed to establish a good relationship 
with Sultan Abdul Hamid II and exercised some influence over him. He became familiar with 
the Albanian Question and on several occasions raised the importance of this question for 
Britain and other European Powers. Some of the Liberals, including Dilke, Lord Goschen and 
Lord Fitzmaurice, were convinced that Disraeli was showing too much interest in the 
Albanian Question while in opposition, but changed their mind when they came to power. 
As seen above, they realised that the Albanian Question required proper attention and 
engaged themselves seriously in solving this problem.  
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Difficulties in implementing the Treaty: The border disputes with Montenegro and Greece 
A month after the Congress of Berlin, the Porte, under pressure from the European Powers, 
decided to prepare the cession of territories. The Treaty of Berlin angered the leaders of 
the Albanian League. When the Porte took steps to implement the Treaty, the relationship 
of the League with the Porte worsened quickly.204  
The Porte sent Mehmet Ali Pasha to northern Albania to persuade the Albanians to accept 
the Treaty. As mentioned earlier, he was well-known among the Albanians and was deeply 
unpopular.205 The Sultan thought that Mehmet Ali Pasha was the best man for the job since 
he was an Ottoman plenipotentiary at Berlin and knew the region. On 19 August 1878 the 
Pasha told Layard that he was leaving for Albania, where he was being sent as a 
Commissioner to execute the Treaty in relation to the territorial cessions to Montenegro 
and Serbia, ‘and reconcile the Albanians to them.’206   
Mehmet Ali Pasha arrived in Prizren on 25 August 1878. The next day, in a meeting with the 
leaders of the League, the Pasha told them to submit to the will of the Powers and obey the 
Treaty. The reception he received was very hostile. When he tried to read the Sultan’s 
firman (imperial decree) about the Treaty, he was shouted down.207 Then he gave the 
League 24 hours to think about his proposal and come up with a positive reply. No one 
attended the next meeting the Pasha had called. News spread that the Pasha, after the 
delivery of Gucia and Plava to Montenegro, would go on to disband the League in Prizren 
and its branch in Shkodra. That day his telegrapher was killed, as he was suspected of 
secret communications with the Porte.208     
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Mehmet Ali Pasha left Prizren and continued toward Plava and Gucia, but stopped in 
Gjakova to spend the night of 1 September 1878 as a guest of Abdullah Pasha Dreni, the 
governor of Gjakova and a member of the League. The next morning, they found 
themselves surrounded by a large crowd of Albanians, believed to have been led by Ali 
Pasha Gucia, who directed the armed Albanians along the border of Montenegro and 
refused to surrender Plava and Gucia. They called on Abdullah Pasha to hand over Mehmet 
Ali Pasha. He refused, telling the besiegers that it was against traditional Albanian law to 
hand over friends and guests. Shooting began and lasted four days. Finally, Mehmet Ali 
Pasha, Abdullah Pasha Dreni, their guards, and a unit of Ottoman soldiers, were all killed.209     
This event terrified the Porte. The Powers realised that implementing the Treaty would not 
be easy. Cooperation between the League and the Porte ended and the will of the 
Albanians to resist any cession of territory grew. The episode also brought the Albanian 
Question to the attention of European governments and public opinion.210 The Albanian 
League, through Abdyl Frashëri, used this situation to put forward those demands 
previously adopted by the southern branch of the League in Janina.211  
The incident in Gjakova halted all proceedings of the Commission about the border of 
Montenegro. The British Consul in Shkodra, Kirby Green, advised the Foreign Office to 
postpone any activity of this nature. The delimitation, he said, would be used by the League 
to further confront the Ottoman authorities and to assume resistance throughout Albania. 
The assassination of Mehmet Ali Pasha created more difficulties than were ever anticipated 
in deciding on the handover of Plava and Gucia. Ali Pasha Gucia, in command of 30,000 
armed Albanians, was waiting for a signal to enter Montenegro. Albanian soldiers and other 
personnel were deserting the Ottomans en masse to join the Albanian force. The League 
had passed death sentences on some of its members who had refused to break with the 
Ottoman authorities.212 Under these circumstances the delimitation of the frontier by the 
European Commission had to be stopped. The Porte was not willing to proceed with Treaty 
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arrangements until an alternative solution for the Albanians was found. As Green had 
suggested, the Porte was having difficulties sending fresh and sufficient numbers of troops 
to Albania.213 
Keeping Plava and Gucia became a danger for the Porte. Giving these places to 
Montenegro was not a solution either. The armed forces of the League created a conflict 
between the Albanians and Montenegro. On the other side, the League brought the Porte 
into difficulties with the Powers and Albanians. It became obvious that the rectification of 
borders could not happen in the near future. 214  
The League was established quickly in the south, led by the most powerful and wealthiest 
Muslim families in Epirus. By the beginning of 1879, Albanian notables assembled in 
Preveza, coming from Epirus and the rest of Albania to monitor changes in the border. They 
declared openly that they were determined to resist by force any annexation of part of 
Epirus by Greece and were prepared to put 40,000 men under arms. It was obvious that 
they had ‘plenty of money, men, arms and ammunition to carry a long war.’215   
This situation worried Greece. The Powers, including the British, could only observe and 
think of alternatives. The national ambitions of the League worried the Porte, although the 
Porte was pleased at this delay in the cession of territory since the negotiations between 
the Ottomans and the Greeks were not moving forward. The League caused serious 
problems and ‘succeeded in defeating the attempt of Europe’ to detach areas in the south 
and north.216 The Berlin Treaty, in many ways, was dead.     
The Foreign Minister of France, William Waddington, who was also the French 
plenipotentiary at the Congress of Berlin, looked for a way out of this difficult situation. He 
favoured actions benefiting the Greek Government and wanted to reach an understanding 
with the British on the Greek question. He told the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Lyons, 
that France had received offers from the Russian and the German governments to send 
warships to the Mediterranean to execute the part of the Treaty concerning Greece.217  
However, he refused both offers because he preferred this matter be dealt with by France 
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and Britain. Waddington insisted that Thessaly and Epirus should be considered as a source 
of strength for Greece but Disraeli’s government refused these proposed annexations 
because it would have weakened the Porte and angered the Albanians. Yet the British were 
in favour of a moderate extension of the Greek border, though not including Janina and the 
surrounding region, as Waddington had advocated.  
The Ottoman government, as an answer to this situation, issued a memorandum in which 
they refused the French proposal of separating Epirus from Albania. The Porte regarded 
that the ‘Tosques’ (Albanians of the south) would be severely damaged because they would 
be denied the natural link with the port of Preveza in the Adriatic. The Porte insisted that 
Epirus was inhabited by ’Tosques’ from the Valley of Callamas to the north with Vlora as the 
centre.218  
Almost one year after the Congress, negotiations over the Greek borders were going 
nowhere. The Liberals continued to criticise the Conservative government for their 
unfavourable attitude towards Greece. The Liberals never ceased to remind Disraeli that 
ministers of England had always promoted the extension of Greece as a strategy for a 
‘solution of the Eastern Question in accordance with the real interests of England.’219 
Disraeli believed that the Greeks were a danger but the Albanians, who were neglected, 
were a greater danger. Disraeli had mainly disregarded Waddington’s plans but on some 
occasions let him know that it was the Albanians and the Porte he was worried about, 
rather than the Greeks. Disraeli had other plans and was trying to win the support of 
Bismarck. Concerned about the poor fulfilment of the Treaty, on 13 July 1879 he wrote to 
Bismarck: 
The Janina question is not one of Turkish amour propre, at which we should all 
laugh. It involves an Albanian war, which would probably be long and devastating, 
and precipitate results which it is the interest of Germany and England to 
postpone.220 
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The call from Gladstone for Disraeli to implement the Treaty of Berlin was strong. He 
criticised the government for allowing France to champion the case of the ‘Hellenic races.’ 
He held the view that the British government should co-operate with France and accept 
Waddington’s proposal because this was ‘the strong and general feeling of the British 
nation.’221  
While Waddington kept pressuring the British Conservative government on Janina, 
Salisbury instructed Lyons to tell Waddington that France did not appear as a friend of 
Greece and was endangering the Porte. Salisbury maintained that Greece, with its 
embarrassing finances and bad government, would not be able to assimilate the ceded 
territory and would be ‘exposed to the contingency of an Albanian war and retard her 
development by a half century.’222                                               
Because of the difficulties the League had created, the Ottomans approached Layard in 
September 1878 to ask if London would mediate the exchange of Plava, Gucia and Vranje 
for other territories containing Slav populations. The Ottomans suggested that a territory 
with the same size could be given to Montenegro on the border with Herzegovina. The 
Ottomans were keen for an exchange as they were convinced that the Albanians would not 
surrender any territory without a fight.223 However, the idea of territorial exchange led 
nowhere because Austria-Hungary did not agree to give up any territory under its 
administration.  
The Porte searched for alternative solutions and Italy was asked to mediate. At the 
beginning of 1879, Count Corti came up with a proposal for territorial exchange. As Plava 
and Gucia were inhabited by Muslim Albanians, Corti thought it would be easy to give 
Montenegro Kuçi Kraina, Hoti and Gruda, which were inhabited by Catholic Albanians. 
Although Montenegro indicated readiness to accept this proposal, Albanian Catholics 
refused inclusion in Montenegro. Salisbury told Layard to officially support the 
arrangement in Constantinople but not to push it if Austria-Hungary expressed strong 
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objections to it.224 The proposal further united the Albanian Catholics with the Albanian 
Muslims and Albanian armed units along the border became a real threat.  
The Great Powers shifted position and decided to give Montenegro the coastal town of 
Ulqin and its surroundings, which were also predominantly Albanian but Muslim in religion.  
During the spring of the same year, the Ottoman army began to withdraw from other 
positions to allow the Montenegrin occupation as ordered by the Treaty. But many of these 
positions, instead of being held by Montenegrins, were in fact occupied by the forces of the 
League. Clashes between the Montenegrins and the Albanian League were frequent yet 
neither side was winning, thus creating a problem for the Powers and the Porte. The 
Albanian League had not given up Plava and Gucia and when the Montenegrin army tried 
to occupy the area by force at the end of 1879 and the beginning of 1880 it was repulsed 
by the League. 
 
The Change in British Foreign Policy and the Conference of Berlin 
The British election of May 1880 brought the Liberals to power with Gladstone as Prime 
Minister. Earl Granville became Foreign Secretary with Charles Dilke as his deputy. Another 
immediate change was that of the ambassador to Constantinople. Ambassador Layard, 
whom the Liberals disliked so intensely, was replaced by Joachim Goschen. Lord Edmond 
Fitzmaurice was appointed Commissioner at Constantinople with the duty to oversee the 
reorganisation and reforms of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire as foreseen 
by the Treaty of Berlin.  
British foreign policy and its position towards the Eastern Question changed. The Porte, 
especially the Albanians who were aware of Gladstone’s liberalism, were most concerned. 
Yet surprisingly the Liberals became more active than the Conservatives had been 
previously in trying to find a solution to the Albanian Question. Through Goschen, 
Gladstone was showing the Porte that his government was determined to insist, in concert 
with the other Powers, that the time had come to fulfil the obligations of the Treaty of 
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Berlin. Goschen’s main duty was to convince the Sultan that the British would not tolerate 
further delays regarding the border demarcation of Montenegro and Greece.225   
The new government gave fresh impetus to the Treaty negotiations. As a result of this new 
British policy, the Powers became more active and pressure on the Porte and on Albanians 
was intensified. Gladstone was now in a position to push the Powers to speed up 
preparations for another peace conference and bring about an end to the border problems 
in the Balkans. In July 1880 the Great Powers gathered in Berlin once again to solve the 
problem of the Greek and Montenegrin borders. As before, the Albanian Question was not 
treated as a separate issue. Almost the entire part of Thessaly and a great part of Epirus 
were assigned to Greece, though the Montenegrin border was not discussed in great 
detail.226 The Powers considered the matter closed because Montenegro was to get Hoti 
and Gruda, or the town of Ulqin with its surrounding district. The British wanted to deal 
with the Albanian matter as they still, even under Gladstone, considered the Albanians 
important for the existence of the Ottoman Empire. However, they were not supported by 
the other Powers, with Russia and France strongly rejecting any talks about Albania, and 
Austria-Hungary and Germany taking neutral positions.227 
The Albanian League, again, did not accept the decisions of the Conference. In September it 
became known that Ulqin would be given to Montenegro and that the British, leading a 
naval blockade, would assist in the cession and complete the rectification of the border. 
The allied fleet, which had gathered in Dubrovnik, under the British flag, was ready to sail 
south and appear off Ulqin in September 1880. The appearance of the fleet was not only to 
symbolise the handover but a threat addressed to the Porte and the League, as well as an 
act of support for the Montenegrins. No result of this kind was produced. The Ottoman 
commander, Riza Pasha, who was sent to Shkodra with the task of surrendering Ulqin, did 
not obey the order. It is likely he abstained due to Albanian pressure, but perhaps more 
likely as a result of the delaying tactics applied by the Porte. On 4 October 1880 Gladstone 
proposed to the Powers to organise a naval blockade of the Ottoman port of Smyrna and to 
occupy the customs office there. Austria-Hungary did not agree to such a risky step and the 
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plan was set aside when other Powers also hesitated.228 The idea of a naval blockade on 
Smyrna, although it did not happen, frightened the Sultan who saw it as a potential 
humiliation.  
As seen earlier, Gladstone cherished a romantic affection for Montenegro. He managed to 
convince the Powers to act in concert to pressurise the Porte to hand over Ulqin and went 
as far as threatening the Porte with a blockade of Smyrna. The Powers had viewed this 
insistence unfavourably and Gladstone was left alone to deal with the Porte. Bismarck said 
that ‘Dulcigno [Ulqin] was madness and Gladstone was a crazy professor.’229 Even the 
Queen seemed to have agreed with Bismarck and continued to remind Gladstone that 
Disraeli’s policy toward the Ottoman Empire should not be abandoned, nor would she give 
her consent to a war with the Porte, whom she regarded as an old ally. Yet Gladstone 
believed that it would not be good if the Porte ‘befools Europe at Dulcigno [Ulqin]’.230  
When ships of other Powers left the British detachment alone in the Adriatic, the Sultan 
believed that the British would not act alone and refused to yield. Yet the ships were ready 
for departure the moment they received the signal. In October, Goschen presented an 
ultimatum to the Sultan in Constantinople who gave in to the demands.231 Gladstone had 
followed developments in Ulqin closely and with anxiety. One morning, Granville showed 
him a deciphered telegram. The Sultan had agreed to give up Ulqin. Gladstone was 
astonished but his success did not impress the Powers, with Bismarck regarding this act as 
Gladstone’s policy of ‘promoting Russian interest in the East and neglecting the English’.232  
As a result of Gladstone’s threat, the Porte sent more troops to Albania to convince the 
Albanians to give up Ulqin. On 22 November 1880 Dervish Pasha, Marshall of the Ottoman 
Army who replaced Rizah Pasha, the vali of Shkodra, in command of 10,000 regular troops, 
marched towards Ulqin. The following day the Ottoman troops, consisting of 8 battalions, 
clashed with the Albanians. A few hours fighting left many casualties on both sides. The 
armed units of the League were forced to withdraw and the Ottomans, with heavy artillery, 
entered Ulqin on 23 November. The town was handed over to the Montenegrins on 27 
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November and the border dispute was over. Finally, on 24 May 1881 the Conference of 
Ambassadors in Constantinople drew the demarcation line with Greece, giving the greatest 
part of Thessaly to Greece as well as part of Epirus, along with the entire region of Arta, 
which surrendered on 6 July 1881. Janina was not included. Greece got considerably less 
territory than it and its friends had asked for.233 For the League, this was a loss the 
Albanians could live with. 
Throughout 1880 the League was running the territory of modern day Kosovo, north 
Albania and northwest Macedonia, as a de facto government. In February Abdyl Frashëri 
told the Central Committee of the League in Prizren that the Porte would do nothing about 
Albania and would give part of their territory to Montenegro and Greece. The League 
started forming an army of 12,000 fighters. ‘Let us be Albanians and make one Albania,’ 
said Frashëri in a meeting of the League.234 A well-known British artist and illustrator, 
Richard Caton Woodville, registered the same spirit of independence in Shkodra. Woodville 
and his companions were allowed to attend a secret meeting of the Albanian League 
because they were British. Woodville characterised the meeting of the Albanian leaders of 
the League as resembling any European senate of that time. In an anti-Ottoman 
atmosphere, he drew a sketch and registered a speech of one of the leaders: 
What want we with matters in the land of Arbenii [Albania]? Are we babes, that 
we cannot go alone? What does the Sultanate for us? Does it protect our lives? 
No. Does it roof our houses? No. Does it feed our starving? No. Shall we be silent 
and eat dirt? […] I will tell you. What is the will of our masters? That we give it up 
to the Slavs of Kara Dagh [Montenegro]? For what? Because the Sultanet wills it? 
Because the Cuvend [Assembly] of Berlin wills it? Because the Ruski [Russia] wills 
it? […] Let us speak – but with steel and lead, with yataghan [sword] and pouska 
[gun].235 
The activities of the League were noted throughout that year by the British press, which 
had started to pay considerable attention to the Albanian Question. An article published in 
the Manchester Guardian criticised the British government for not addressing the Albanian 
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Question.236 The League’s success, which was evident by August 1880, had created 
excitement among some Albanian leaders leading them to think of independence. The 
Manchester Guardian also reported, with some exaggeration, that the League had declared 
independence and established full control over most parts of Albania and Macedonia.237  
However, after the loss of Ulqin, a military clash between the League and the Porte was 
inevitable. Fearing that the League would move toward independence, in March 1881 the 
Porte sent 20,000 troops to Skopje. Dervish Pasha moved 10,000 troops and heavy artillery 
to Kosovo and confronted 5,000 armed men of the League in Shtime. The Ottomans won 
the battle but fighting continued elsewhere. In May the Ottoman army occupied all of 
Kosovo and the hunt began for the leaders of the Albanian League. Abdyl Frashëri was 
sentenced to death along with many other leaders, though Frashëri’s punishment was 
commuted to life imprisonment and he was later pardoned. More than 4,000 people were 
arrested and hundreds were exiled.238  
This was the end of the Albanian League. Although it had prevented the annexation of 
much of the territory to Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, in general the League must be 
seen as a failure since it did not succeed in fulfilling its objective to unite the Albanians 
under one single vilayet or other autonomous administrative unit.239 With this, the British 
believed that Albania was pacified and the future of the Ottoman Empire, and indeed 
peace in Europe, were secured.              
 
Key Actors and Their Stance Regarding British Policy 
Although Disraeli and Gladstone had made up their mind and already decided on their 
position regarding the Albanian case, the decision making process in London relied on 
information from the ground. This communication circulated in a triangle between London, 
Constantinople and Shkodra. From time to time, according to the situation and 
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circumstances, other British diplomats and consular officials from neighbouring countries 
of Albania and ad hoc military missions or envoys were included in the process.  
London, the centre of the process, was occasionally influenced by facts on the ground and, 
to a lesser degree, by public opinion and political life at home. The level of pressure on the 
political actors that were involved in the decision making process remained low. However, 
both British public opinion and Liberal policy makers felt a close connection to and 
compassion for the Ottoman Christians and, in this regard, Gladstone had their full support. 
Those who were concerned with this issue always found ways to address their concerns on 
a domestic and international level.240 Yet they showed little interest in the Albanian 
Question and, as a result, the government was never seriously pressurised on this matter. 
The Albanian Question never occupied the stage as the Greek, Bulgarian, Rumanian, 
Montenegrin and Serbian national questions did. Primarily, British public opinion talked 
about the position of Christians in the Balkans and reacted only if the Albanians were 
Christian.241    
The British public and decision makers in Westminster, in general, viewed the Albanians as 
Ottomans or Muslim, and when their question was discussed, they were identified as 
“Arnauts” serving with the Ottoman armies that executed repressive measures against the 
Christians in the Ottoman Empire.242 
In the British Parliament the situation was not much different. As seen above, there were 
only a few occasions when the members discussed the matter in favour of the Albanians. 
Under these circumstances the Foreign Office and Downing Street did not feel pressurised 
when they dealt with any matter relating to Albania in foreign affairs.  
However, various reports sent by the ambassadors Layard, Goschen and Lord Fitzmaurice 
from Constantinople, did have some impact in London. They understood the peculiar 
situation of the Albanians and asked their superiors in London to find a proper solution. On 
some occasions they exercised considerable influence. For example, it is likely that it was 
Fitzmaurice and Goschen who convinced Gladstone that part of Epirus, with Janina as a 
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centre, was not to be given to Greece. To a certain degree, this was the position held by 
Disraeli who already understood the situation but, even taking into account this prior 
knowledge, Layard’s reports helped him in particular situations when dealing with the 
Powers. By 1881 Goschen’s and Fitzmaurice’s initiative, which called for creating an  
autonomous or independent Albanian state, faded away. The reason for abandoning such 
an initiative was not known for a long time and it wasn’t until decades later that Edith 
Durham, whom we shall discuss later, revealed the reason. In a lecture that Durham gave in 
February 1941 at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, she told the audience that the 
Albanians were treated with prejudice because of their religion.243   
Lord Fitzmaurice was a Liberal but on the subject of Albania he did not share the views of 
Gladstone and most members of his party. Instead, he made it known that it was religious 
biases which prevented the Albanian Question, from receiving the sympathy of the British 
public. He saw that, as a consequence, the British public did not pressurise the government 
to adopt policies in favour of the Albanians.     
The situation was different with the British diplomatic and consular representatives on the 
ground, in Albanian territory. Kirby Green in Shkodra and St. John in Prizren, because of 
their lower status, had less impact in London. They showed no sympathy for Albanians and 
their cause. In their reports they often created confusion by calling the Albanians Arnauts, 
Muslims or even Turks.  
Kirby Green was under the influence of the Austro-Hungarian consul, Lipich, who was of 
Slav origin and favoured the Montenegrins and Serbs. Albanians were aware of this fact 
and held him in no high regard. It was obvious that Green did not like the Albanians and 
their warlike attitude. His duty was to convince them to give up their ideas of autonomy or 
independence, discourage them from fighting the Porte and the Montenegrins and obey 
decisions and orders from the Great Powers. When the Albanian League was formed he 
considered it an exclusively Muslim and fanatical organisation and did not change his mind 
even after Albanian Catholics began to join it in large numbers. When a British journalist 
asked him about the political centre and the chief characteristics of the League, he 
answered:  
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Priserin [Prizren], let me tell you, the headquarter of the Albanian League, an 
organization of the most fanatical Mussulmen of the country, whose object is to 
resist the Austrian advance, and the Montenegrin claims, by force of arms.244 
Kirby Green was also convinced that the League was an Ottoman creation and changed his 
mind only when the Albanians opposed the Porte militarily. The British diplomats in 
Constantinople were not always happy with the work of Green in Albania and Montenegro. 
On 18 April 1880 Count Corti told Layard that he would complain to the British government 
about Kirby Green, who he believed had prevented successful negotiation regarding the 
border settlement with unnecessary interference. In the words of Layard, ‘Green had made 
up his mind from the first that the exchange of territory could not take place, and does not 
seem to have done anything to promote it.’245  
Green convinced London to accept his plan for the annexation of Ulqin, known as the 
Dulcigno Arrangement, and was supported by his Austro–Hungarian colleague, Lipich. Yet 
Green did not see the Albanians as organising as a nation and never agreed that their 
actions were the result of nationalism. Green had expressed his thoughts on this matter on 
several occasions. During the settlement of the Ulqin Question, Dervish Pasha had 
circulated a report in Shkodra saying that Green was behind the troubles the Albanians 
caused. At that time Green was visiting Montenegro, and as a consequence, the Pasha 
asked the Porte to object to his return to his post in Shkodra. Green, worried about his 
position and reputation, wrote to Earl Granville to explain himself: 
I have so frequently had the honour to report to your Lordship on the birth and 
progress of the Albanian League, and foreshadowed the present outcome, that I 
will merely here state categorically that Hussein and Nazif Pashas, Turkish Valis, 
and not foreigners, formed the League out of clerks and Notables in Ottoman 
employ, who were quite beyond the influence of strangers.246  
Goschen read Green’s report and could not let it go unanswered. He was strongly 
determined to discredit Green’s report and the eventual influence he may have had on this 
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matter in the Foreign Office and the wider British Government. Therefore, Goschen swiftly 
advised the Foreign Secretary: 
I am bound to state that I have not shared the opinions he [Green] has constantly 
put forward with reference to the Albanian movement. He has, in my judgement, 
failed to recognise the strong national tendencies which have been developed, 
and has been at too much pains to show that the League was due to no national 
sentiment whatever, but simply to Palace machinations.  While it is certain that 
the Palace clique at Constantinople has at times played a very dangerous game as 
regards the Albanian League, I have, from the first, been under the impression 
that a feeling of Albanian nationality existed, and must be taken into 
consideration as a powerful factor in the present crisis, differing from the view of 
Mr. Kirby Green, that if the word were only given from Constantinople all would 
be well.247   
St. John, in his dispatches from Prizren, often warned London that the Albanian League was 
about to massacre the Christian population. It was true that there were cases when 
Christians were mistreated by desperate Albanian refugees and angry bashi-bazouks. Yet 
the massacres predicted by St. John never took place and he never informed London that 
the plan of the League was to protect the Christian population. He did not recognise the 
League or its leaders, whom he called tribal chieftains. He also sent incorrect information 
about the number of Albanian villages bordering Montenegro and the religion of their 
inhabitants.248     
At the end of July 1880, Fitzmaurice complained to London about St. John, who was 
sending contradictory reports and completely disregarding the Albanians in Kosovo. In his 
reports St. John suggested that Kosovo was a Serb region and inhabited predominantly by 
Serbs. He called Kosovo ‘Stara Srbia’ (Old Serbia), a term used for Kosovo by Serbian 
nationalists in the nineteenth century.249 Contents of his reports were contrary to all other 
reports available to British diplomats and those published in the European press. In fact, his 
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reports were not much different from those of Yastrebov, the Russian Consul in Prizren, 
under whose influence St. John had fallen.  
In addition to the diplomatic representatives in the region, Lieutenant Ross of Bladensburg 
assessed the border situation of Albania with Serbia, Montenegro and Greece between 
1878 and 1881. Working on the ground, he became an expert on Albania and his reports 
were widely read by British diplomats and members of the government. He also made 
several reports on the political situation in Albania and the region. He spent several weeks 
in Kosovo and after lengthy research produced a serious report on the Albanian League for 
government use.250 
The British government, on several occasions, commissioned Captain Sale251 to produce 
similar reports. He also prepared a report on how to proceed against the Albanians if they 
continued with armed resistance and did not obey the Treaty, proposing punitive 
measures. Goschen and Fitzmaurice were upset with this ruthless plan proposed by Captain 
Sale, who suggested destroying Albanian villages as a penalty for disobedience against the 
orders of the Powers. Furthermore, he proposed that a British agent should be employed 
to influence the Albanians, spread fear among them and let them know that, by rejecting 
the will of the Powers, they would face not only political but private consequences. This 
was a setback for Goschen and Fitzmaurice. Goshen believed that Albanians, who were 
losing their territories, should not be penalised. He advised the government never to adopt 
such an attitude towards the Albanians, who were acting according to the principle of 
nationality, similarly to other nations.252 
There were also personalities from the non-governmental sector who influenced British 
policy on the Eastern Question. These included travel writers, journalists, anthropologists, 
and archaeologists such as David Urquhart and Arthur Evans (1851–1941). Both 
contributed to the fierce debate on the Eastern Question. As we saw earlier Urquhart, with 
his unreserved support for the Ottoman Empire and degree of support for Albania helped 
the political line of the Conservatives led by Disraeli, while Evans took the side of the 
Liberals and Gladstone. Arthur Evans was an archaeologist and journalist who became 
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famous for unearthing the palace of Knossos in Crete. He also unearthed artefacts 
elsewhere in the Mediterranean, including north Albania where he discovered Illyrian coins 
from the second century BC. He produced at least two reports on Albania for the benefit of 
the Foreign Office.253 Evans, with his publications as a correspondent for the Manchester 
Guardian, inspired Gladstone and the Liberals and was considered a partisan of protecting 
the Christians in the Balkans. This was appreciated by Gladstone who used Evans’ writings 
as a reference for his political speeches and as first hand evidence, to tell the public and 
voters how the Christians were persecuted.254 Being a Slavophil, some of Evan’s reports on 
Albania were similar to those of St. John, the British Council who served in Prizren.   
Evans used Serbian terminology when explaining the names of places in Albania. Like St. 
John, he called Kosovo ‘Stara Srbia’ and proposed that Kosovo be given to Serbia after the 
Ottoman withdrawal. Albanian nationalists were not pleased with his reports and ideas but 
showed some respect for him, as some parts of his work became useful during the process 
of their national renaissance. Evans brought back into use Dardania, the old Illyrian and 
Roman name for Kosovo and north Macedonia. He was also appreciated because of his 
support for the theory that the Albanians were descendants of the Illyrians, and because he 
was considered to have published fair articles regarding the Albanian League.255 During his 
visit to Albania in 1878 he changed his mind. He was impressed with the Albanian League 
and viewed the Albanians with admiration. In his Illyrian Letters, published in 1878, Evans 
wrote about his impressions while among Albanians: 
Everything reminds me that I am not among either a Slavic or a Turkish people. 
These are truly fellows – patriots of Skanderbeg and of Ali of Yanina – Albanians, 
“Shiptarë”, heirs as strong as rock, a most warlike race and altogether 
undefeated! […] The Albanian is by nature quick, energetic, sceptical, always in 
motion, impatient with supervision. For him, above everything else is freedom.256 
Evans’ works on Albania were published during and after 1878 when it was too late to 
influence the British government, the public or the decision making process of the Powers 
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in the Congress of Berlin. Before he became interested in the Albanian question he was 
very active in Croatia and Bosnia in supporting the Christian Slavs against Austria-Hungary. 
In Dubrovnik he was once arrested and accused of being Gladstone’s spy. Because of his 
anti-Austro-Hungarian activity he helped Gladstone to maintain anti-Austro-Hungarian 
feelings in Britain. When the Liberals came to power in 1880, Gladstone considered 
appointing Evans as consul in Dubrovnik or elsewhere in the Balkans but gave up as he 
could not jeopardise the relationship with Austria-Hungary.257  
 
Conclusion 
The initial demand of the Albanians was political and cultural autonomy within the 
Ottoman Empire. In Prizren, where the League was formed, it was thought that within a 
single autonomous unit or vilayet, Albania would be safe.  
British public opinion and policy makers felt a close connection to and compassion for the 
Ottoman Christians. Those who were concerned with this issue always found ways to 
address their concerns on a domestic and international level.258 Yet they showed little 
interest in the Albanian Question and, as a result, the government was never seriously 
pressurised on this matter. The Albanian Question never occupied the stage as the Greek, 
Bulgarian, Rumanian, Montenegrin and Serbian national questions did. Primarily, British 
public opinion had adopted the Liberal view on the position of Christians in the Balkans and 
reacted only if the Albanians were Christian.259 Since the British public and Westminster 
decision makers, in general, viewed the Albanians as Ottomans or Muslim, when their 
question was discussed, they were identified as “Arnauts” serving with the Ottoman armies 
that executed repressive measures against the Christians in the Ottoman Empire.260 
In the British Parliament the situation was not much different. There were only a few 
occasions when MPs discussed the matter in favour of the Albanians. Under these 
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circumstances the Foreign Office and Downing Street did not feel pressurised when they 
dealt with any matter relating to Albania in foreign affairs. 
Regarding the future of Albania after the Congress of Berlin, both British diplomats and 
Albanian leaders were on a similar track. Both saw Albania as part of the Ottoman Empire 
when autonomy was considered, but also considered independence or union with Greece 
as a solution. 
Before and during the Congress, British policy makers in London underestimated the 
political will and capacity of the Albanians to protect their territory and identity. Britain and 
other Powers in Berlin applied the principle of ‘strategic rectification of frontiers’ and, in 
the case of the Albanians, showed no regard for their national aspirations or the principle 
of nationality.261 As seen above, Salisbury told the Albanian League delegates about the 
principle of nationality when he met them in London.  
Acting on strategic principles and ignoring the principle of nationality, Disraeli and 
Gladstone did not endorse the advice of Layard, Goschen, Fitzmaurice and Dilke for the 
autonomy or independence of Albania. Helping the Albanians to create an autonomous or 
independent state meant ending the Ottoman presence in Europe and the creation of a 
new balance between the Powers, meaning Russia could have advanced towards the lands 
and seas of south-east Europe.  
Had the activities of the League resulted in a military victory against the Porte, the situation 
might have been different. Yet the fact that neither the Liberal nor Conservative British 
governments agreed to give Janina to Greece, despite the failure of the League, showed 
that the British not only recognised the Albanian nationality but also gave hope to the 
Albanians that their country would be recognised as an autonomous or independent state 
at a later stage.  
Regardless of the position of the British and other Powers, for a short while the League 
acted as a de facto government of a nation. It even managed to collect taxes, expelled 
Ottoman officials from the administration and replaced them with local Albanians. On 
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many occasions the League abrogated the Ottoman law and replaced it with the Kanun 
(Albanian traditional law). It organised an army and successfully protected the border with 
Montenegro.  
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Chapter III 
The Post-Berlin Period:  British Liberalism and the Balkans 
 
The Balkans were, like Foucault’s societal others, on the very ground of Europe, 
but this was a Europe gone horribly wrong. – Andrew Hammond.262   
 
Introduction 
This chapter will analyse British foreign policy towards Albania in the aftermath of the 
Congress of Berlin and argue that the British government supported the territorial integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire. By taking such a stance, the British government could not support 
Albanian actions against the Ottoman Empire. 
This chapter will analyse the second phase of the image building process surrounding the 
Balkans and Albania, which covers the beginning of the twentieth century and ends with 
the start of the First World War in 1914. In contrast with the first phase of the nineteenth 
century, when images were brought to Britain by occasional and rare travellers, in the 
twentieth century images were transmitted more frequently and in many forms by 
dedicated individuals considered experts on the history and politics of the Balkans. These 
experts, who were prominent personalities in Britain, believed that the situation in the 
Balkans and particularly in Macedonia, had gone wrong and needed help from Britain and 
the European Powers. Therefore, they fed the public with images and tried to influence 
British policy by pushing forward their own perceptions and views.  
Below we shall discuss the way that these experts established connections with the public 
and the manner in which they led discussions in order to exercise influence over politicians 
and the press. It will be argued that these expert writers played a special role in the image-
building process, contributed to educating the public on Balkan matters and influenced the 
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decision making process in British politics. The Balkan Committee, an organisation 
established and dominated by Liberals, conveyed its ideas and plans through these experts. 
The Albanian Question, as part of the Macedonian problem, will take a prominent place 
and will be analysed through the activities of the Balkan Committee.  
It will also be argued that the Balkan Committee campaigned for a Gladstonian solution to 
the Macedonian problem and ignored the Albanian Question. The committee aimed to 
liberate the Christians from Ottoman rule but gave little consideration to other nationalities 
or ethnic groups. For this reason, the Albanian Question in Macedonia did not receive 
sufficient attention from committee members, the British government or the Powers. 
Therefore, the activities of the committee proved ineffectual and failed to fulfil its aim of 
securing autonomy and a peaceful future for Macedonia.  
However, the Balkan Committee did try to exercise influence over the British government 
regarding international intervention in Macedonia. These international initiatives, which as 
we shall see, started in 1903 with the Mürzsteg Agreement, tried to introduce reforms in 
Macedonia. This was to be done mainly by reforming the gendarmerie, but ended 
unsuccessfully in 1908 when the Powers showed no readiness for deeper involvement due 
to the rivalry they faced in establishing their spheres of interest. International involvement 
was also stopped because the British government and other Powers believed that the 
Young Turk Revolution would bring about democratic change which would in turn solve the 
Macedonian Question. 
The positive image of Serbia, which had been built by some travel writers in parallel with 
the negative image of Albania during the nineteenth century, suffered seriously from bad 
publicity between 1903 and 1908. Yet, after 1908, due to geostrategic reasons, Serbia was 
poised to become the ally of Britain in the Balkans. At this stage many writers, Gladstonians 
among them, hurried to help the government create a good image of Serbia.  
This subject is important for the thesis because it shows the way in which the image of 
Albania was created in Britain in the early twentieth century and the way the British public 
and government policy was influenced on the Macedonian Question.  
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British Foreign Policy and the Albanian Question 1883 – 1903 
Not long after the Congress of Berlin, in the summer of 1883, the mountaineers in northern 
Albania organised an insurrection against the Porte. They approached the British consul in 
Shkodra and asked if ‘there was any hope of support from the British Government.’ The 
reply from London said: 
There is only one British interest in North Albania, and that is that the perfect 
harmony should exist between the Sultan and his subjects – a state of things 
which could not be if the mountaineers fancied they could put pressure on the 
Turkish Government through foreign aid.263   
Two years later, there was another event which attracted British attention. This time, the 
Albanian Question in Macedonia came to the British government’s attention in a strange 
way. At the beginning of 1885 a certain G. W. Leybourne, who presented himself as 
president of the Albanian Committee, started sending letters to European leaders in order 
to inform them that Albanians were preparing to liberate Macedonia. In a proclamation 
issued on 5 June 1885, Leybourne called on Bulgarian and Macedonian personalities and 
organisations to join the ‘Children of Skanderbeg’, as he called the Albanians, to rise 
together against the ‘Turkish Infidel’ and create the Republic of Macedonia.264 Austro-
Hungarian diplomats called this organisation, which was based at Corfu,265 the English-
Albanian Committee and worried that future actions of the Committee may disturb the 
region and endanger their interests in the Balkans.  
The Porte and the British government were particularly worried, as it was believed the 
troubles that would take place in Macedonia would be organised by the Albanians and led 
by a British subject. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry asked its ambassador in London, 
Musurush Pasha, to contact British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, and find out who 
Leybourne was and who was sending letters and issuing proclamations from London.266 The 
British government could not find the sender of these letters and proclamations but after a 
long investigation, on 6 October 1885, Lord Salisbury advised Musurush Pasha not to worry 
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about Leybourne and his activities because the supposed committee had ceased to exist. 
However, both British and Austro-Hungarian diplomats noticed that Leybourne had worked 
closely with two Albanians, Prenk Gjoka and Emin Bey, both on the pay roll of the Greek 
government. Gjoka and Emin Bey tried to organise an insurrection and claimed to have 
British support. Gjoka had even met the British consul in Shkodra, whom he told that ‘the 
revolution in favour of the English, and also the Greeks, is ready.’267 At the beginning of 
1883 the pair escaped to Greece as they were wanted by the Porte as ordinary criminals. 
Together with Leybourne they tried to revive the Albanian League but their efforts ended 
without success. After this failure, Leybourne moved to Egypt, since he could not go back to 
England where he had left many debts and knew that he would be thrown in prison by his 
friends who supplied him with the money to fund his Albanian adventure. In the end, 
Salisbury told the Porte that in the future such a person and others like him would be 
‘prevented from misleading the Albanians’.268 
Although Leybourn was merely an adventurer, he managed to alarm the Porte and the 
British government. This case showed that the Albanians and Macedonia would soon 
become a problem for which the British government did not have a plan and did not want 
its citizens to be involved in. The other interested party, Austria-Hungary, in contrast to the 
British, monitored the region better and knew much more about Leybourne and his travels 
around Albania and Macedonia, during which he portrayed himself as being close to 
Gladstone and other important British personalities.269 The Leybourne case, although a false 
alarm, was a strange prelude to the Macedonian crisis. 
However, it was the Bulgarians who initiated the complicated problem of Macedonia. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of creating an independent Bulgarian 
state, and particularly a Bulgarian Church (Exarchate), independent from the Greek 
Patriarchate, became a reality and brought the Macedonian Question into the view of the 
European Powers.270 The internal ethnic problems of Macedonia became an acute question 
that the Powers had to address. For some of the Powers, such as Germany and Britain, 
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interest in the Balkans, during the post-Berlin period, remained low. Livanios has noted that 
‘if for Bismarck the Balkans were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier, for 
Britain the region hardly deserved the bones of a sturdy Liverpudlian sailor’.271 This saying 
expressed quite adequately the interest of these two Powers.  
The British government continued to support the territorial integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire in Europe and viewed the Balkans as a region outside its vital area of interest. 
Within such a context, there was no need to create a separate policy for the Albanian 
Question. On the topic of the Balkans, the British government believed that ‘behind the 
Macedonian question lies the Turkish question’.272 This meant that the Ottoman Empire 
depended very much on the stability of Macedonia. The main worry of the British 
continued to be Russia which was to be stopped from reaching the Balkans or the 
Bosphorus, a move that would destabilise the Ottoman Empire. For this reason the British 
governments never entirely accepted Russia’s attitude towards the ‘sick man of Europe’ 
throughout this period.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century British foreign policy towards the region started 
to change slowly. This departure from pro-Ottoman policy took place for many reasons, the 
most important of which was that geostrategic considerations and the growing pressure from 
the British public which became more knowledgeable about the region and demanded 
more protection for the Christians.273 This pressure was channelled through the activities of 
the Balkan Committee and the press. British financiers also played their role by reminding 
the government about the Porte’s inability to repay its loans. One more reason, probably 
the most worrying to the British, was German influence over the economy and politics of 
the Porte. Collectively, these led the British government to be more cautious about the 
creation of more autonomous or independent states and to seek a closer relationship with 
Russia. Yet the British believed that Russia should not be given a ‘free hand to pursue her 
interests unimpeded’ in the Balkans and Constantinople. 274    
Although the creation of new autonomous or independent states was not favoured by the 
British government, some Albanian leaders had approached Gladstone to ask for support. 
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When Gladstone formed his new government in 1886 he appointed the Earl of Rosebery as 
Foreign Secretary, who declared that there would be a policy of continuity in foreign affairs. 
To many observers in Britain, and probably to some Albanians, this announcement may 
have been understood to mean that the Liberal government would continue to apply some 
aspects of the Conservative approach in foreign policy. As a matter of fact, what Rosebery 
meant was that the continuity, as a guiding principle, was to be Liberal as established by 
Gladstone.275  
An Albanian intellectual called Faik Konitza (1876 – 1942), who published the newspaper 
Albania in Brussels and London between 1899 and 1909, hoped to get support from the 
British government. He considered the Greeks the main obstacle to forming an Albanian 
state.276 He also felt that the British Liberal government was treating the Greeks more 
favourably than the Albanians. In 1897, on behalf of the League for Albanian Independence, 
Konitza wrote to ‘the Great Old Man’, as he called Gladstone, with the intention of 
explaining the Albanian position and, possibly, ‘correcting’ British policy. Gladstone sent a 
negative reply and instead reaffirmed his policy, which was not in favour of the Albanian 
national cause.277 As a result, Konitza wrote to Ibrahim Temo (1865 – 1945) to inform him 
that the British government has ‘refused to take Albania under protection’.278 Temo and 
Konitza were supporters of Austro–Hungarian policy and took Gladstone’s reply as a sign 
that the Albanian leaders should seek closer links with Vienna. However, the early 
twentieth century would bring changes in British public opinion which would result in a 
reorientation of British foreign policy. 
                 
The Balkan Committee’s Liberal Approach and Autonomy for Macedonia 
With the start of the twentieth century the public in Britain showed more interest in closer 
engagement with the Balkans. The rise and expansion of mass media, along with the 
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development of communications and transport, increased this interest in international 
affairs and brought Britain into closer contact with the world. Journalism became an 
important vehicle of transmitting Balkan images in Britain. With the spread of information, 
which reached a wider spectrum of the public and increased their awareness, knowledge of 
the Balkans ‘ceased being a matter of the few’ as it had been a century earlier.279 
Despite this increase in available information, media coverage of the Balkans was irregular 
and covered only those themes which were deemed extraordinary. The events that caught 
the public’s imagination and the attention of the press were usually violent ones. Two such 
situations, the murder of the royal family in Belgrade and the Ilinden Uprising in 
Macedonia, occurred in the early summer of 1903 and triggered two different responses in 
Britain. The brutal murder of King Alexander and Queen Draga in Serbia was presented with 
great interest by the press in Britain. The story had all the ingredients needed to attract a 
wide readership and this shocking, violent act fortified British preconceptions of the 
‘bloody-mindedness’ of Serbs and violence in the Balkans.280 However, this ill-feeling 
towards Serbia was temporary and its image in Britain soon improved remarkably.  
The press also showed similar attention to a second event, the Ilinden Uprising, which 
brought to the surface the multiple national questions of Macedonia, including the 
Albanian one. The Ilinden Uprising of 2 August 1903 took place while Ottoman troops were 
engaged in supressing an Albanian uprising in the vilayet of Kosovo. The Ilinden Uprising 
was supported by local Albanians who supplied Macedonian bands with arms and 
ammunition. The insurgents occupied the town of Kruševo and formed a Provisional 
Assembly which had 60 delegates: 20 Macedonian, 20 Albanian and 20 Vlahs. Two 
Albanians, Gjorgji Çaçi and Nikolla Balo, were appointed among the six members of the 
Provisional Government. The Albanian press abroad and nationalist leaders called upon the 
Albanian population to further support the uprising in Macedonia.281 At the same time, the 
press in Britain and Europe spread news that insurgents and the mob had used this 
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situation to attack non-Christians and destroy their properties in Kruševo and the region of 
Manastir.282 
In British public life, as noted earlier, pressure to involve the government in the Balkans had 
started during the nineteenth century and intensified with the beginning of the twentieth 
century. This was thanks to the initiative of the Liberals, who continued to believe that 
problems in the Balkans would disappear only when the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist in 
this part of Europe. The Liberals supported, and in many cases initiated, propaganda against 
Ottoman misrule in Macedonia because they were convinced that peace in the Balkans 
would be possible only after a settlement was accepted by all Balkan people.283 The Liberals 
continued to see the Balkans as a question of civilisation. Ottoman rule, and in some cases 
also Austro-Hungarian rule, were considered by Liberals to be preventing the progress of 
the Balkan peoples. Yet the solution offered by the Liberals did not necessarily mean that 
the Balkan people should be granted the right of self-determination, but rather considered 
various forms of autonomy. British Liberal politicians were already familiar with this matter 
as they were engaged in the ongoing debates about ‘Home Rule’ as a solution to the Irish 
question. The Liberals were willing to forgo autonomy for the Balkan people but only if the 
Porte was to undertake satisfactory reforms.284  
With this approach, the Liberals maintained that the British had reached a higher stage of 
civilisation as a result of the development of democratic institutions and the economy 
which, in return, guaranteed them liberty and prosperity. Thus, they believed that they had 
the right and obligation to rule over ‘less civilised’ populations in the British Empire and at 
home ‘over the Celtic fringe’. If British rule could not reach the ‘less civilised’ people 
outside their empire, then help would be offered to them. The historian Robert William 
Seton-Watson has described this help as conveying ‘the image of the traditional moralising 
Briton who wished to radiate civilisation among those less fortunate’.285   
In this context the Liberals felt obliged to get involved in changing the situation in the 
Balkans. To explain this commitment, the author George Bernard Shaw remarked that ‘a 
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Liberal is a man who has three duties’: to Ireland, Finland and Macedonia.286 The Liberals 
believed that these three nations, each incorporated into three different multi-national 
empires, should be granted autonomy but only as constituent nations within each 
empire.287  
A number of well-known British personalities, who were predominantly Liberal, were 
convinced that the press and the government were showing indifference towards the 
Balkans in general and the fate of Macedonia in particular. The problems of Macedonia 
made them come together in early July 1903 and form the Balkan Committee. Among the 
founding members were high profile scholars, politicians, clerics and journalists, such as 
Noel Buxton, Robert William Seton-Watson, Arthur Evans, William Miller, Arnold Toynbee, 
Harold Nicholson, Aubrey Herbert, Edith Durham, Henry Brailsford and many others.288 All 
of them, excluding Durham and Brailsford, had studied history or classics at Oxford or 
Cambridge. By 1906 the list included 64 MPs, 55 of whom were Liberals, six from the 
Labour Party and three from Conservative ranks. The membership also included the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, the bishops of Hereford, Lincoln, Worcester, and Oxford. The 
Committee also attracted radical critics of British foreign policy such as journalist Henry 
Nevinson.289 The member’s list grew long with both highly educated personalities and 
members of the ordinary public and also included Lord Herbert Gladstone, the youngest 
son of William Gladstone.  
The activities of the Committee were geared toward awakening public interest in the 
Balkan people and reminding the British government of the responsibilities it had assumed 
in the Treaty of Berlin, which included the protection of the Christian population under the 
rule of the Porte. In its first letter to the press the Committee announced that it would be 
engaged in ‘diffusing accurate information by means of lectures, pamphlets, articles in the 
press and questions in Parliament.’290 
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The publication titled “Macedonia 1903” became the Committee’s manifesto. According to 
this manifesto, the British government had ‘not only the right, but the duty, to take any 
steps in her power to put an end to the present appalling state of things.’ The Committee 
acknowledged that Britain had no direct interest in the region like Austria-Hungary and 
Russia and therefore it was suggested that the British government should restrain itself 
from taking independent actions. Consequently, the Committee argued that Britain ‘should 
endeavour to induce the other Powers to agree to a scheme’, which would help the Balkan 
people and should ask the Powers to unite in demanding the withdrawal of Ottoman troops 
from Macedonia. The appointment of a European Governor, with complete control of the 
civil and military administration and the establishment of a gendarmerie commanded by 
European officers, were other necessary measures to follow.291 
The Committee also published the “Autonomy Proposal”, a twelve-article document which 
was sent to the Sultan and relevant European governments to demand autonomy for 
Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo and Adrianople and outline details of a settlement for the 
region. It should be noted that considerable attention was shown to the Albanian Question 
in articles I and II: 
I. There shall be formed instead of the vilayets of Salonica, Bitola [Manastir], 
Kossovo, Adrianople, Scutari [Shkodra], and Janinna, four provinces, one of 
which will take the name of ‘Albania’ and the others that of ‘Macedonia,’ ‘Old 
Servia’ and ‘Thrace’. These provinces shall remain under the direct political and 
military authority of the H. I. M. the Sultan, under conditions of administrative 
autonomy; 
II. The province of Albania will include especially the vilayets of Scutari and 
Janinna; the province of Old Servia, the vilayet of Kossovo; and the province of 
Thrace, the vilayet of Adrianople.292 
It is hard to understand the reason or the criteria that led to this division of autonomous 
provinces. The ‘Autonomy Proposal’ was ambiguous and satisfied neither the Albanian nor 
the other nationalist movements in the Balkans. This ambiguity stemmed from the fact that 
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the division of the suggested autonomous provinces was not based on ethnic or religious 
principles. Albania would consist of only two vilayets (Shkodra and Janina) and not four 
vilayets as foreseen by the Albanian national programme. Kosovo, as proposed, was to 
become a separate autonomous province while the vilayet of Manastir would become part 
of Macedonia. The fact that Kosovo was to become a separate autonomous unit and called 
‘Old Serbia’ must have caused worries among Albanian leaders and the Serbian 
government, as both claimed the place for themselves. Nevertheless, from the Albanian 
perspective the proposal contained some positive elements, namely that this was the first 
proposal for the autonomy of Albania to be presented to the Porte and the European 
Powers by a British organisation, a fact which was to become important later.  
Led by chairman Noel Buxton (later Lord Noel-Buxton) who became a Liberal MP in 1905, 
the Balkan Committee started furnishing the press and government with articles and letters 
containing information about the difficulties in Macedonia and suggestions on how to deal 
with these problems. Between 29 September and 16 November 1903 the Balkan 
Committee organised around 150 public meetings all over Britain. On every occasion Noel 
Buxton and other leading members informed the public and state officials that the 
Committee’s plan for Macedonia was to remove the Sultan’s direct rule and establish a 
government which would be responsible to the Powers.293 As soon as the Committee was 
formed, Edith Durham, Lady Thompson, Henry Brailsford and the brothers Noel and Charles 
Buxton went to Macedonia in an aid and fact-finding mission. As the delegation discovered, 
the Macedonian uprising was not simply directed against Ottoman rule and local Muslims 
but was also a dangerous conflict between the idea of Greater Bulgaria and the Greek 
‘Megali Idea’. Macedonia had also become a place for religious clashes between the Greek 
and Bulgarian Orthodox churches, a conflict also known as patriarchists vs exarchists.294 
After the visit to Macedonia, Brailsford, Durham and Noel Buxton published their works and 
became known as travel and expert writers. This group, often called New Europe,295 was 
joined by Aubrey Herbert and James David Burchier of The Times, the longest serving 
British correspondent in the Balkans. However, at this time none of these writers had any 
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particular knowledge of Albania. Some members of the Committee, including Brailsford, 
were among the last British philhellenes to be disappointed with Greece. In 1897 Brailsford 
had joined a regiment of British volunteers, inspired by Byron, to fight in the Greco-Turkish 
war but he left feeling no sympathy for the Greek cause. He soon found another cause to 
support, north of Greece, in Macedonia.296 His knowledge about the region and its people 
was shown in his book, which became a reference source on Macedonia at that time.297 
Other publications continued with Noel Buxton’s Europe and the Turks and with Edith 
Durham who covered Macedonia and the wider area of the Balkans. 
With these books and other numerous academic publications and articles the Balkan 
Committee, through its expert writers, marked a new and important period in forming the 
image of the Balkans in Britain. The Balkans was presented as a region that should matter 
to the British public and government. The Committee brought together experts and 
members of the public interested in this region where previously diplomats had been the 
main source of information and debates were mainly initiated by politicians. For obvious 
reasons, the Foreign Office was not keen on the appearance of self-appointed expert 
writers and the Committee. Officials, diplomats and politicians publicly questioned their 
abilities and credentials while privately ridiculing them.298 Yet officials were also worried 
that these expert writers possessed the knowledge and the ability to exercise influence 
over the British public. To explain the power of these experts, historian A. J. P. Taylor later 
wrote that those interested in Balkan affairs would have done well to refer to Durham on 
Albania, Brailsford on Macedonia, R. W. Seton-Watson on Hungary or Serbia. Taylor 
maintained that one who reads these authors ‘would be better informed than if he had 
stuck to official channels’.299 
The Committee’s initiative for involvement in the Balkans was not a new idea. As noted 
earlier, the idea emerged during the early nineteenth century and resulted in the formation 
of the Greek Committee which went on to build a positive picture of Bulgaria and Serbia. 
According to Eugene Michail, the Balkan Committee represented a modernised version of 
the nineteenth century tradition of engagement with the Balkans ‘which was personified by 
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Lord Byron and William Gladstone’ who were ‘sympathetic to the Balkan nationalist 
movement’.300 Noel Buxton emphasised Gladstone’s role and the duty of Europe to support 
the Balkan Christians:  
As Mr. Gladstone said, the Christian who retained his faith at the price of slavery, 
when by recanting he could obtain every favour, is entitled to the name of 
martyr, and to him also Europe owes the gratitude that is due to the rampart 
which saved it.301 
In the Balkan Committee Noel Buxton represented the principal thoughts of the Liberals 
and saw the relationship between East and West as a ‘conflict of two fundamental 
principles of life’. He explained this relationship as ‘the Mahomedan principle, namely, of a 
belief in conquering power, and the Christian principle which looks to the forces of the 
spirit and the mind.’ Therefore, he suggested that this ‘reality’ is a ‘matter of foreign 
affaires’ and called for the British government to act in favour of the Christians.302  
But, the Committee, with the presence of Aubrey Herbert and a few others, also 
represented the political views of the Conservatives under Disraeli, who had shown 
sympathy for the Ottomans and for the Albanian nationalist movement. Herbert, to whom 
we shall return later, became an advocate of Albanian independence. According to Noel 
Malcolm, Herbert was engaged in supporting the weak, which put him in contrast with two 
existing traditions or schools of thought in British foreign policy: the romantic liberal and 
realist conservative approaches.303 But, until 1912, Herbert’s attitude remained 
conservative and did not differ much from the attitude held by diplomats in the Foreign 
Office and other bureaucrats in the government. However, from the outset of the 
Committee’s work all these different approaches had merged into one ‘common theme of 
a liberal, dissenting and non-conformist support for the Balkans’.304   
Although the Balkans was not a direct British interest at the beginning of the twentieth 
century the British government saw the future of the Balkans as a possible strategic 
objective. Brailsford maintained that ‘the Slav peasant has no passwords to the foreigner’s 
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heart’.305 In other words, the Slavs could not attract the attention of the British as the 
classical heritage of the Greeks had done. However, the Balkans became a place that 
managed to attract attention in Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe. Perkins wrote 
that ‘for some reason’ the Balkan nationalities managed to exercise ‘a fascination over the 
mind’ of some British politicians and intellectuals.306 Maria Todorova has linked the 
discussion of the Liberals about problems at home such as Irish Home Rule and the 
suffragettes with the problems in the Balkans. She has suggested that ‘the poor, but 
Christian’ population of the Balkans were ‘described in a discourse almost identical to the 
one used to depict the western lower classes’ and characterised this similarity as ‘a virtual 
parallel between the East End of London and the East End of Europe’.307 Along these lines, 
Perkins has added that ‘humanitarian activity in the Balkan arena was a kind of antidote to 
the guilt generated by the existence of widespread poverty at home.’308  
Edith Durham, after spending a considerable amount of time in Macedonia, working as a 
relief worker on behalf of the Balkan Committee and as a journalist, held a different view. 
She was convinced that the Balkans were not a serious concern for British politicians nor 
for the press. She compared the liberal, radical and conservative press coverage and 
concluded that the Balkans were simply being used to influence politics at home and most 
of their concern was about the future of the British Empire. On this matter, Durham wrote 
that ‘not one of the said papers cares twopenny jam about the good of the Balkan 
peoples’.309 
However, Durham was the first expert to identify the Albanian Question as the main 
problem in the Balkans and to show that this question was neglected by the Balkan 
Committee and the British government. She believed that ignoring the Albanian Question 
was a big mistake and felt the fact that the Albanian Question ‘was always left out of 
consideration was a constant source of difficulty’.310 
 
                                                             
305   Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 111.  
306   Perkins, British Liberalism, p. 16.  
307   Todorova, p. 18.  
308   Perkins, p. 21.  
309   Edith Durham, The Burden of the Balkans (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1905), pp. 205-206. 
310   Durham, Twenty Years, p. 87. 
105 
 
 
The Powers’ failure in Macedonia 
The Balkan Committee played its role in influencing the British government to organise an 
international intervention in Macedonia and in the pro-Macedonian agitation which spread 
quickly in Europe. This pressure resulted in speeding up the reforms foreseen by the 
Mürzsteg Agreement, signed on 2 October 1903 by Austria-Hungary and Russia. The 
agreement aimed to oversee the implementation of reforms designed to restore law and 
order and prevent future disturbances and massacres in Macedonia, which was to be done 
through a reorganisation of the Ottoman gendarmerie. These reforms were similar to 
several of the points adopted by the Balkan Committee since its formation, but it was clear 
that they did not focus on establishing the autonomy of Macedonia understood as the 
vilayets of Salonika, Manastir and a part of Kosovo.311 The reforms therefore emphasised 
the maintenance of Ottoman territorial integrity, despite their interference in Ottoman 
affairs. 
In January 1904, the Italian government selected General de Giorgis to supervise the 
reorganisation of the Macedonian gendarmerie as part of the implementation of the 
reform programme. Colonel Fairholme was appointed as British Staff Officer and was 
assigned to the region of Drama. Among the Powers there were discussions of including 
some of the Albanian districts such as Korça in the reforms, but these were excluded from 
the operation of the scheme.312 In reality, many other such districts were included but the 
Powers chose to ignore the presence of those Albanians who inhabited a considerable part 
of the vilayets of Manastir and Kosovo. Such was the region of Skopje, which was given to 
the Austro-Hungarians and Manastir to the Italians. In the districts of Ohri (Ohrida), Resna, 
Prespa, Kruševo, Demir Hisar and Kërçova (Kičevo), Albanian revolutionary bands made an 
appearance in reaction to Macedonian, Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian bands. Reports from 
the British consul showed that the Muslim populations (mainly Albanian) of Skopje, Ishtip 
and Kumanovo were alarmed about the more than 70 murders committed against them 
within a short time and considered organising themselves like the other Macedonian 
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revolutionary bands. The few European police officers who were there to reform the 
gendarmerie found themselves powerless. Colonel Fairholme reported that the Greeks, 
Bulgarians and Serbs were ‘allowed to cut each other’s throats with impunity and the 
Albanians were showing signs of moving’.313  
In years to come, the Bulgarian exarchist campaign against the Greek patriarchists 
continued. Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek bands who entered Macedonia carried out 
terrorist attacks against Muslims and, more often against each other.314 From 1903 to 1908 
in Macedonia, which was thought to consist of 1.5 million inhabitants, over 10,000 people 
were murdered. In most violent ways, the bands were competing to establish superiority 
and win European sympathy and support. The call of the Balkan Committee for 
intervention was ignored. The British, as well as other Powers, refused any military 
engagement on the ground. When massacres took place and properties were destroyed, 
European officers could only observe, take photographs and prepare reports.315   
In January 1905, the British Foreign Secretary Lansdowne wrote that Macedonia had 
become the most difficult and embarrassing problem for Britain and the Powers. The 
Balkan Committee had certainly exercised influence in the Foreign Office. As a result of this 
influence ‘Lansdowne lived in terror’ and made ‘efforts to stiffen the reform proposals of 
the Mürzteg Powers and to secure more influence for British officials on the reform 
commissions.’316     
Lansdowne acknowledged that gendarmes alone were not an answer to this problem and 
pointed out the need to adopt an Organic Statute in Macedonia like the one adopted in 
Crete as foreseen by Article XXIII of the Treaty of Berlin. This was also one of the demands 
made by the Balkan Committee. In a memorandum Lansdowne proposed new measures to 
be taken on the Macedonian problem317 which came close to the Balkan Committee’s 
request, but it never materialised. In December 1905 Lansdowne was replaced by Edward 
Grey, who resisted the Balkan Committee’s pressure. The new Foreign Secretary believed 
that the Balkan Committee and other organisations that pressured for British involvement 
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in the Balkans did not have the support of the public. Grey’s ‘inactivity’ was not welcomed 
by the Balkan Committee and other outside experts, who also thought they were not being 
consulted sufficiently by the Foreign Office. The Committee continued to pressure the 
Foreign Office on the progress of reforms but the answer from the government was that 
there was no unanimity among the Powers to speed the reforms and no desire for more 
engagement.318 Grey wrote to James Bryce, who was initially elected president of the 
Balkan Committee, explaining that the other difficulty was the jealousy that existed 
between the Powers and their lack of will to use force.319  
Albanian leaders had not been happy with the reform program from the start. They were 
characterised as Christians, as the majority of them were in southern Macedonia, but they 
wanted to be known only as Albanians. After the Ilinden Uprising was supressed by the 
Porte, Albanian nationalist leaders abroad gathered in their colony in Bucharest and sent a 
memorandum to the Powers. They demanded recognition as a nationality, the opening of 
Albanian schools, the establishment of an Albanian Orthodox Church and the appointment 
of a representative in the Commission of Reforms in Manastir.320 Their demands were 
ignored.  
The Porte also complained about the reforms and about European officers serving in the 
gendarmerie. The Ottoman government addressed a complaint to the Powers about Italian 
intrigues in the Albanian part of Macedonia. Morica, one of the Italian gendarmerie 
officers, who was an Albanian from southern Italy, was creating a network with Albanian 
nationalist leaders and the population of the region of Ohri, where he was stationed. 
Morica’s aim was to organise Albanians for reopening schools in their language and 
prepare them to work towards independence under Italian influence. The Porte was 
worried because Morica had become very popular among the Albanians.321   
The Porte was also aware that Italy and Austria-Hungary had reached an understanding in 
1897 on a common policy towards Albania and that both governments subsidised Albanian 
nationalist leaders. Since 1895 around 200,000 Albanians in southern Italy, under the 
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leadership of Jeronim de Rada (1814-1903), the best known Arbëresh writer in Italy and the 
main figure of the Albanian nationalist movement of the nineteenth century, had been 
pressurising their government in Rome to take actions to protect Albania. This movement 
worried that the Austro-Hungarian government, which believed that the activities of Italo-
Albanians would result in an Italian protectorate in Albania. Both governments in Vienna 
and Rome were convinced that the other was working for supremacy in the Adriatic.322 
Other rivalries and misunderstandings between Russia and Austria-Hungary culminated in 
the Sultan’s approval to construct a railway from Novi Pazar to Mitrovica. Russia and other 
Powers feared that Austria-Hungary was preparing for access to Salonika and to occupy 
Macedonia, which in turn strained relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia and, as a 
result, the Mürzsteg Agreement was abandoned in February 1908.323  
 
The success and failure of the Balkan Committee 
Similar rivalries also existed among Balkan Committee members, with each seeking to 
support their preferred Balkan country. Thus the Balkan Committee was not as 
homogenous as it had intended to be and efforts to keep up the appearance of unity were 
short lived. As noted above, the committee was dominated by Liberal politicians and 
religious leaders who continued the Gladstonian tradition of supporting Bulgaria, Greece or 
Serbia, being anti-Ottoman and disregarding the Muslim population. Brailsford and Buxton 
accepted that the Bulgarian claim on Macedonia was better founded than any of the other 
claims. Bourchier, claiming to have first-hand information, long experience and deep 
knowledge of Macedonia, firmly supported Brailsford’s and Buxton’s position on 
Bulgaria.324 This caused other members to declare their priorities: Herbert and Durham 
went on to champion Albania’s case, Alexander Devine supported Montenegro, R. W. 
Seton-Watson and Henry Baerlein were in favour of Serbia’s expansion and Pember Reeves 
advocated for the Greek cause. Whenever tensions were raised or conflicts took place in 
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the region, these committee members were ready to fight a ‘proxy Balkan war’ in the 
British press and lecture halls.325 
Nevertheless, these expert writers managed to occupy the public sphere and to decide 
which events should attract public attention. They established a trend which regarded the 
Ottoman Empire as a regime of tyranny, unmanageable and unable to reform and the vast 
majority of them held pro-Christian and anti-Ottoman (Muslim) views.326 Edith Durham, 
although being anti-Ottoman, challenged this discourse:  
When a Moslem kills a Moslem it does not count; when a Christian kills a Moslem 
it is a righteous act; when a Christian kills a Christian it is an error of judgment 
better not talked about; it is only when a Moslem kills a Christian that we arrive 
at a full-blown ‘atrocity’.327 
In general, the Balkan Committee succeeded in presenting Balkan affairs in the British 
public sphere but failed in fulfilling its main aim: to contribute to creating autonomous 
provinces by applying reforms and bringing positive changes to protect the people of 
Macedonia. The committee never attempted to overcome the prejudices against Islam 
which were created by Gladstone’s Liberal policy and this could be considered the main 
reason for its failure. Most of the members failed to recognise problems that the 
population in Macedonia faced and instead saw the situation only through the prism of 
religion – Christians suffering under the rule of the Ottomans and, by extension, Muslims. A 
significant number of the Muslim (the majority of whom were Albanian), Vlah and Jewish 
populations, were simply ignored. The situation was also complicated by the administrative 
division that the Porte had imposed in Macedonia. As a matter of fact, the Porte did not 
use or recognise the term Macedonia but used the name Rumelia which consisted of the 
vilayets of Salonika, Manastir and Kosovo. Albanians numerically dominated the western 
part of the vilayet of Manastir and most of the vilayet of Kosovo, while their presence in 
vilayet of Salonika was low. The Porte continued with this division, which was made in such 
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a way that the Muslim element was a majority in all vilayets but it partitioned the Albanians 
in order to create obstacles to the ’formation of homogenous and united Albania‘.328   
Many of the Macedonian towns, such as Manastir and Salonika, were so mixed with 
different ethnic groups and religions that it was impossible to designate a majority group. 
Albanian and Bulgarian nationalists had marked Manastir as their important cultural place 
and competed for superiority, but the Balkan Committee regarded the town as Bulgarian. 
Until 1903 Salonika was known as a multinational place where people lived a tolerant and 
prosperous life. At the beginning of the twentieth century the town had around 150,000 
inhabitants. The population was roughly 30% Muslim, including Albanians, 30% Christian, 
while the Jewish population was considered to consist the rest which comes to 40%.329 
After the Balkan Wars, First World War, and particularly after the Greco-Turkish War of 
1919-1922, when the town was given to Greece, much of the non-Christian and non-Greek 
population was expelled and the Greeks rose to 75% of the population. The non-Greek 
population continued to decline rapidly to an almost insignificant percentage.330 
Throughout these wars the British government supported Greece which was seen as an ally 
that could protect British interests in the Aegean route to India and in reshaping the Near 
and Middle East. Supporting Greece or any other country was against the Committee’s 
initial ideas and programmes and this further contributed to creating groups of interest 
within the committee.    
Herbert and Durham believed that the Committee was largely overlooking the Albanian 
national question. In a telegram that Durham sent to the British Consulate in Shkodra, 
which was forwarded to the Foreign Office, she wrote that Albanian Catholic villages which 
were burned and looted by the Ottoman army were in a deplorable state and desperately 
needed help but the Balkan Committee, as she put it, ‘only helps Bulgars’.331 Herbert called 
the committee an organisation with a ‘lot of cursed old women’ who were not able to 
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‘protest with any effectuality about massacres and who do take a ghoulish delight in 
mentioning them’.332 
The number of members of the Committee who opposed the idea of an independent 
Albania was significant and initially led by R. W. Seton-Watson. However, there were some 
members, such as Brailsford and Nevinson, who were not entirely supporters of Albanian 
nationalism but still maintained that the Albanians deserved their state. Brailsford believed 
that Albanians, particularly those of the south, were a ‘relatively civilised population’ and as 
such ‘would bring progress and prosperity’ to the Balkans if they were to establish their 
independent state. He opposed the idea of awarding Albanian territory to Serbia and 
Montenegro because these two countries could not exercise cultural superiority and 
political maturity over the Albanians. However, he believed that Greece did possess these 
qualities and therefore could obtain the Albanian part of Epirus. Hence, Brailsford 
maintained that the size and borders of Albania were ‘essentially a question of civilisation 
rather than ethnography.’333 
Brailsford, for a peculiar reason, played down the role and effect of Islam on Albanians who 
were ‘nearly all heretics’.334 He wrote that ‘Islam is never a satisfying creed to a people of 
European race’. This could be understood to mean that Brailsford, like many other 
Committee members, regarded Islam as an Asiatic religion and as such an ‘alien culture’ 
unbefitting of the European Albanians, who themselves had no similarities with the Muslim 
Turks. On this issue, he added: 
And yet they [Albanians] remain a race apart from the Turks and profoundly 
hostile to them. There is no community of blood between them and even in their 
mosques the barrier between East and West divides them. For the Albanian is 
essentially a European - a European of the Middle Ages. Alone of all races in 
Turkey, he [Albanian] has a hereditary aristocracy and a feudal system, Islam, 
among Eastern peoples, is everywhere a leveller.335 
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Brailsford, like all other Liberals, did not see Islam and Christianity as holding the same level 
of importance and considered religion, and not ethnicity, as a prime factor for Balkan 
nations. However, Brailsford believed the Albanians to have ‘the makings of a united 
people’ and therefore suggested that autonomy was the best solution for them. Autonomy 
would also solve the religious problem because ‘under a Christian Prince vast number of 
Albanians would return to Christianity.’336 Despite the emphasised religious differences and 
the fact that he was pro Bulgarian, Brailsford suggested that the British government should 
use its influence to support autonomy for Albania. This would increase British 
predominance in the balance of power in the Balkan region, and Albanians would serve as a 
‘vanguard against the dangerous invasion of Pan Slavism in the East’.337 Brailsford made an 
important point by emphasising the existence of common interest of the Albanians with 
the British and suggesting that London should adopt a favourable or separate policy on this 
matter.  However, the British government disregarded this advice and did not endorse such 
a policy.  
 
Conclusion 
The aftermath of the Congress of Berlin showed that the British government expressed no 
particular interest in Albania. In the early twentieth century, the Liberals continued to lobby 
for the protection of the Christians in the Balkans. These activities, which continued the 
Gladstonian tradition, resulted in the formation of the Balkan Committee, an organisation 
which channelled their ideas to the public and pressured the government. The committee 
succeeded in raising public awareness in Britain about the Balkans and in exercising 
considerable pressure on the British government to undertake reforms in Macedonia in 
cooperation with the Powers.  
However, the implementation of reforms, as foreseen in the Mürzsteg Agreement of 1903, 
failed because the Powers showed no willingness to become fully engaged in Macedonia. 
The Balkan Committee therefore failed to fulfil its main goals of autonomy for Macedonia 
and to prevent the violence that had erupted as a result of aggressive nationalist ideas. 
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Such ideas were promoted by various groups that enjoyed the support of those countries in 
the Balkans which had territorial claims on the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire 
in Europe.  
The Committee also failed to address the Albanian Question even though its programme 
initially gave this issue considerable priority by calling for autonomy for Albania. Much like 
in the late nineteenth century, the Albanian Question did not receive much support 
because of the Liberal view on religion and a general lack of knowledge about Albania. As a 
result of the plurality of interests among its members, the committee was not able to speak 
with one voice and present the Macedonian question in a coherent manner. Therefore, it 
split into factions that supported the Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs and Albanians. The Albanian 
Question, which competed with the Serbian Question, lost the battle for British support. 
Serbia, taking an anti-Austro-Hungarian stance, became the ally of Britain in the Balkans, a 
stance which was supported by most members of the Balkan Committee. But, Macedonia 
was left with national problems, unsolved to this day.                                                
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Chapter IV 
The Albanian national movement and the Young Turk Revolution 1899 – 1908 
 
Alongside, and yet independent of the Young Turkish movement, with which it 
appeared to be sometimes in collaboration and sometimes in direct opposition, 
there was noticeable throughout the year another Nationalist movement of which 
it seems probable that more will be heard in near future. This is the Albanian 
movement which, though known to exist as far back as the Congress of Berlin, 
had made little apparent progress up to the end of 1907. – Gerald Lowther, 
British ambassador in Constantinople.338  
 
Introduction 
The report of the British Embassy in Constantinople, which described the general situation 
in the Ottoman Empire for the year 1907, noted the rise of Albanian nationalism and its 
peculiar relationship with the secret organisation - the Young Turks.339 This report 
characterised Macedonia as the base of Albanian nationalist activists who joined the Young 
Turk Movement and succeeded in forcing the Sultan to reinstate the Constitution and 
declare free elections. Below we shall see how it came to be that the Sultan, a despotic 
ruler, accepted all the requests of the Young Turk organisation, in which the Albanians 
played a major role, and British involvement in these developments.      
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that the Macedonian crisis played a central role in 
the development of the Albanian nationalist programme and in the lead-up to the Young 
Turk Revolution. This chapter covers an important period of the Albanian Question which 
started in 1899, when Sami Frashëri (1850-1904), the most important Albanian national 
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ideologist at the time, created the Albanian nationalist ideology precisely because the 
situation in Macedonia. This period ended with the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 which 
had a significant impact on Macedonia and Kosovo.  
The chapter also shows that during this period the British government did not follow a 
separate policy on the Albanian Question. Albania was viewed within the context of the 
Macedonian Question, which itself was an integral part of the Eastern Question. Based on 
their strategic interests, the Powers pursued conflicting policies regarding how best to 
handle the gradual withdrawal of the Ottomans from the Balkans. In this respect, the 
Powers introduced the Mürzsteg Agreement in 1903 and allowed Austria-Hungary and 
Russia to lead in implementing the reforms foreseen by this agreement. The reforms did 
not prevent the campaign of terror which was waged by Bulgarian, Macedonian, Serbian 
and Greek rival bands in Macedonia, but Britain and the Powers were satisfied with their 
efforts in preventing the eruption of a wider conflict between the nations in the Balkans.  
As seen in the previous chapter, the British government, under pressure from certain 
sectors of the public, was pushed to make changes in order to protect the Christian 
population in Macedonia. By the beginning of the twentieth century, British foreign policy 
made a slow departure from its traditional pro-Ottoman policy but could not go as far as 
taking independent or separate measures, as some members of the British Parliament and 
the public requested. Further changes were foreseen in the Agreement of Reval between 
Britain and Russia in June 1908. The meeting of King Edward VII and Tsar Nicholas II in Reval 
(later Tallinn, the capital of Estonia) came after Russia and Austria-Hungary fell out over the 
implementation of the Mürzsteg Agreement. In Reval, the Russian and British governments 
reached an understanding about the pacification of the Macedonian vilayets (Salonika, 
Manastir and Kosovo) and the imposition of further reforms. They agreed to settle their 
differences and appoint a governor with the agreement of the European Powers. The Reval 
Agreement, which was opposed by Austria-Hungary, also heralded an alliance between 
Russia and Britain against the rising power of Germany.340  
The chapter also argues that Albanian nationalism took a new turn because of 
developments in Macedonia, as these had an effect on both Albanian and Ottoman political 
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life. This effect will be shown through Sami Frashëri’s work and by examining the role of 
nationalists, conservatives and local leaders in the events that took place during this period. 
It will also be argued that the situation in Macedonia and the role of the Powers in this 
region contributed to shaping the Young Turk Movement and to bringing about the 
revolution. 
This subject is important for the thesis because it covers a crucial period in the history of 
the Albanian national movement. It argues that Albanian figures played a great role in 
founding the Young Turk movement and developing it up to the revolution has been 
underestimated thus far.341 It is hard to imagine that the revolution would have succeeded 
without the involvement of the Albanian nationalists in Manastir, Ferizaj and, partly, in 
Salonika. Therefore, there is a need to explain an often overlooked element of this 
important period. 
 
British Foreign Policy and the Albanian Question 1903 – 1908 
The aftermath of the Congress of Berlin showed low interest in Albania on the part of the 
British government. This low interest can be illustrated by the fact that, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, all diplomatic and consular representations were withdrawn from the 
country. In 1903 William Miller, a historian and member of the Balkan Committee, noted 
that ‘at the present moment, when [the] Albanian Question is before the public, we have 
no British Consul […] Thus for the whole of Albania we have one at Scutari [Shkodra]’.342 
Even the representative in Shkodra, Nikollë Gjon Suma, was an Acting Vice Consul and 
native Albanian.343 The British Foreign Office did not pay much attention to Macedonia 
either, although it had the means and opportunities to do so. 344   
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Miller, a supporter of Gladstone’s policy, wanted to exert pressure on the British 
government using the people who knew the region. His aim was to show that Macedonia 
should belong to Macedonians in the same way it had been shown and accepted that 
Bulgaria should belong to Bulgarians or Serbia to the Serbs. Miller, like many other 
members of the Balkan Committee, was worried that the Macedonians were under 
pressure to assimilate by the Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians and Serbs who competed for 
national superiority in Macedonia.345 Yet they also admitted that winning the British 
government over to their way of thinking was a difficult task. 
The governments of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia continued to send their bands to 
Macedonia to work in their favour. The presence of the Serbian bands in Macedonia was 
even confirmed by Serbian diplomats in Skopje and it was known in Belgrade that a certain 
Milorad Gocevac had recruited men to join the armed bands sent to Macedonia.346 All 
armed bands fought each other and frequently massacred the innocent population. The 
Ottomans rarely intervened but when they did, they used a heavy hand. Edith Durham 
witnessed such situations while she was in Macedonia during 1903-4 and was surprised by 
the answer she received when she expressed her condolences to the Bulgarian Bishop of 
Ohri about a massacre the Ottomans committed in that region. The Bishop was 
disappointed that the Ottomans did not kill more of his flock so that the Powers would 
have intervened. Out of desperation he suggested that all foreigners and consuls should be 
killed because 'it was their own fault' for not intervening. His rival, the Greek Bishop, had 
similar views, though they both preferred Macedonia to be ruled by the Porte than by each 
other.347  
Durham also noted an increase in anti-British feelings by the bishops and Slavic population 
of Macedonia, which came as a result of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5. The Christian 
Slavs were greatly influenced by the Pan-Slav propaganda directed from Russia, and since 
the British government was not intervening in Macedonia and instead allied with Japan, 
Britain was seen as being anti-Russian and, therefore, anti-Christian. The Bulgarian Bishop 
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believed that ‘England had always been the foe of the Balkan Slavs and had attacked their 
only friend [Russia]’.348  
Such situations made Macedonia a complicated matter for the British and the other 
Powers.  Macedonian speaking Christians regarded themselves as Macedonian but some 
saw themselves as Bulgarian. Some were members of the Bulgarian Church and some 
belonged to the Greek Church. The majority of the Albanians in Macedonia were Muslim 
while the rest were Christian Orthodox who were identified by the Powers with the Greek 
Church. The situation was further complicated by the neighbouring states who had 
territorial pretensions and refused to acknowledge the existence of the Macedonians as a 
separate ethnicity or Macedonia as a territorial unit. As McCarthy notes, 'if it were not 
confusing, it would have not been Macedonia'.349 
As a result of these difficulties, but more due to lack of interest, the British government 
made the decision not to intervene. Prime Minister Arthur Balfour was blamed by the 
British press and pressure groups, such as the pro-Slav Balkan Committee, for having 
admitted the horrors but for having condemned them in words only. Parts of the British 
press believed that Balfour’s decision not to intervene went against the wish of a great 
many voters. An article published in The Spectator explained the Ottoman reaction against 
the bands and the population in Macedonia by comparing it with the actions of the British 
in their dominions in Asia: 
They [Ottomans] have burnt many villages, as we [British] are sometimes 
compelled to do in [the] Himalayas, there being no other way of teaching a wild 
people that they must live quietly.350 
From the Ilinden Uprising of 1903 to the beginning of 1908, the British government 
recognised the leading role of Austria-Hungary and Russia in implementing the reform 
programme as foreseen by the Mürzsteg Agreement. Other Powers agreed that Austria- 
Hungary had the right to be more interested in the Balkans because it was in administration 
of Bosnia and the sanjak of Novi Pazar, which was part of the vilayet of Kosovo, while 
Russia had the right to protect the Slav Orthodox Christians. However, the reforms did not 
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prevent the campaign of terror which was waged by Bulgarian, Macedonian, Greek and 
Serbian bands until 1908. However, the Powers managed to prevent the eruption of a 
wider conflict which would have engulfed them into it.351  
The British government was not happy with the slow pace of the implementation of the 
Mürzsteg Agreement and continued to put pressure on the European Powers and the 
Porte. Simultaneously it gave signs that if reforms were to collapse then two solutions 
would be sought: Macedonia might be partitioned, with the largest part given to Bulgaria, 
or become autonomous under a governor who would be independent and appointed by 
the Powers without consultation with or approval from the Sultan. Interestingly, the first 
solution would have been against the interests of Britain and the Powers because, as we 
have seen in the second chapter, the situation would be similar to that which followed the 
Treaty of San Stefano, when the government of Disraeli had refused the Treaty completely 
and brought about the Congress of Berlin as a result.352 Partition was also against the 
interests of the nationalist movements of Albania and Bulgaria, who were ready and able to 
oppose such a settlement, since they would not agree between themselves and would also 
refuse to give any part of Macedonia to Greece and Serbia.353   
During 1904–1905 Russia was engaged in a war with Japan which strained its relations with 
Britain. Britain also remained engaged in Africa as a result of the Boer War (1899–1902), 
and this also brought the risk of collision with Germany, which was moving closer to the 
Porte. These events, including the Anglo-Japanese Alliance that began in 1902, had an 
impact on relations between Britain and Russia and prevented close co-operation between 
all the Powers in creating and implementing a joint Balkan or Macedonian policy.354 After 
the Ilinden Uprising no big revolt broke out in Macedonia and so the Powers were not 
forced to adopt a new policy. Therefore, nothing came out of the autonomy plan for 
Macedonia, a result which was in fact desired by the neighbours of Macedonia who wanted 
to carve up the area for themselves. In this respect, the British government continued to 
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pressurise Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria to stop sending or continue supporting their bands, 
but their governments never officially admitted to being behind this activity.355 
Co-operation between Macedonians and Albanians might have been a solution for 
Macedonia and was an option that Britain and the Powers should have supported. As seen 
in the previous chapter both Macedonians and Albanians, who probably together 
constituted the majority of the population in most areas, had worked closely together from 
the Ilinden Uprising until 1908 and after. On several occasions they asked Britain and the 
other Powers to acknowledge this co-operation.356 Albanian-Macedonian cooperation was 
enlarged to include the will of the Vlahs and the Jews to create an autonomous Macedonia. 
This cooperation found support among some intellectuals in Britain who formed the 
London Macedonia Committee in 1913 which published its views in a newspaper called 
Autonomy.357  However, there was no recognition of their will by Britain or other Powers 
because the reform programme was designed to protect the Christians and not to promote 
inter-religious or inter-ethnic plans in Macedonia. 
On the initiative of Austria-Hungary, the reform programme had excluded most of the 
vilayet of Kosovo and most other parts of Albania. Vienna believed that the Albanians 
would benefit from the reforms and this would disturb the existing balance between 
Albanians and Serbs. This made some of the Albanian leaders see Austria-Hungary as a 
protector of the Slavs, particularly the Serbs with whom Vienna had established a close 
relationship. For this reason, the Albanian leadership preferred British dominance over the 
reform programme and aimed to gain British sympathy or a protectorate over their 
cause.358 In this respect Ismail Bey Qemali, an Albanian nationalist who we shall discuss in 
more detail below, wrote to Edward Grey in April 1908. He called on the British 
government to take action on the Albanian Question and organise a diplomatic conference 
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in which the territorial integrity of Albania would be confirmed and recognised.359 
However, nothing came of Albanian efforts to win British support.  
In Britain some interest was expressed regarding the railway and economic and political 
situation of the vilayet of Kosovo. Noel Buxton urged the British government, business 
community and the public to help the development of the Balkan railways. He 
acknowledged the importance that the Austrian railway had in being extended to the south 
to reach Greece. Buxton was particularly interested in helping Serbia to build railways and 
considered the scheme as both strategic and economic.360 However, the British 
government did not intend to get involved in any projects in the Balkans. ‘Our attitude 
towards the various railway projects in the Balkans should be neutrality’ declared Grey, and 
added that British government would certainly not support rival projects.361 
Buxton went on to report that the vilayet of Kosovo was very rich in minerals. He saw a 
necessity for British business to move in and exploit the rich mines of different minerals 
which were to be found there in considerable quantities. He also added that fresh 
discoveries of lodes were being made and called on the business community to follow the 
example of a British company which had started working in Kratova, Macedonia and which 
was soon to move to Kalkendelen (Tetova) and Prizren in Kosovo. He suggested that the 
British government, other Powers and the Porte should make changes regarding the 
political situation in Kosovo which would result in an acceptable business climate.362  
Changes would indeed be made by the British government but not to the benefit of the 
populations of Albania or Macedonia, and not in the way that Durham and Buxton had 
called for. When Macedonia was discussed in the British Parliament in 1908, Edward Grey 
was criticised for doing far less than Lansdowne had done in 1903. Grey insisted that he 
was pursuing the policy of Lansdowne and had successfully acted on this matter in concert 
with the Powers. 'The utmost was obtained from it that could be obtained,' concluded 
Grey. He also confirmed that the British government continued to leave the initiative to 
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Austria-Hungary and Russia with regard to reforms in Macedonia.363 Many members of the 
House were not happy with the ‘Concert’ and called for ‘separate actions’ in the form of 
intervention to be taken by the British government alone. Grey explained his policy: 
That is an exceedingly complicated problem. In this country, to establish some kind of order 
under such exceedingly difficult conditions, it is not enough to take separate action; it will 
throw the whole thing into confusion. I am convinced of this – that if we were to take 
separate action in the Macedonian question, separate action, which means forcible action,   
the resort to force ourselves, we might begin with the Macedonian question, but nobody 
can say with what question such action as that might end. Therefore, I rule separate action 
out of the question, both because of the consequences it might have and because it could 
not be effective.364 
What Grey did not say was that the British government was preparing an agreement with 
Russia. After being defeated by Japan in 1905, Russia returned to its earlier interests in the 
Balkans with Macedonia as the point of conflict. This raised tensions between Russia and 
Austria-Hungary.365 In 1907 Britain and Russia concluded the Anglo-Russian Entente to 
settle their disputes in Afghanistan, Persia and Tibet.366 As a consequence, this situation 
dictated another agreement between Britain and Russia which was finalised in June 1908, 
when King Edward VII and Tsar Nicholas II met in Reval and agreed to intervene in 
Constantinople with regard to administrative reforms. They aimed to fulfil the promise 
which was made by the Powers at the Congress of Berlin to the Christians of Macedonia.367 
In reality the agreement was designed to give a new lease to reforms in Macedonia, while 
the Powers were to guarantee the integrity of the vilayets of Manastir, Salonika and Kosovo 
and the reduction of Ottoman forces in Macedonia. A few days later, the Young Turk 
Revolution changed the whole situation.368   
While the European Powers did not succeed in offering a solution for Macedonia and its 
inhabitants, who often were not sure to which ethnic group they belonged, nationalism, 
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which itself came from Western Europe, developed its course.369 The aggressive use of 
nationalism in Macedonia made the situation more difficult for all parties involved. The 
Macedonian problem was becoming more and more complicated and increasingly difficult 
for the Powers to solve. This had an effect particularly on the Albanians and produced two 
results: it contributed to the radicalisation of Albanian nationalism and hastened the Young 
Turk Revolution. 
 
Creating and implementing a nationalist plan 
During the nineteenth century Albanian intellectuals were divided into two groups: 
intellectuals who lived abroad and those who lived within the territory of the Ottoman 
Empire. Those who lived abroad contributed greatly to the development of the Albanian 
national ideology. They acted abroad because the Porte prohibited the use of the Albanian 
language, for example in administration, schools and print, and because they believed that 
the battle for the Albanian national cause was to be fought and won in the hearts and 
minds of Western European governments.370 Most of these ideological writers of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century called for Albanian independence but because the 
Porte had banned the circulation of their writings in Albanian territories, their influence at 
home was extremely limited.  
The second group of ideologists, such as the Frashëri brothers and Vaso Pasha (1825-1892), 
who lived within the territories of the Ottoman Empire and mainly in Constantinople, 
became more influential. Since they lived under very different circumstances from their 
fellow intellectuals at home and abroad, they developed a different approach to the future 
of Albania which foresaw the creation of an Albanian state in two stages: through initial 
autonomy leading to independence. To the Albanians in the territories of the Ottoman 
Empire this plan seemed more reasonable and therefore the views and plans of this group 
became widely accepted.  
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In 1874 in Constantinople Sami Frashëri, known among non-Albanians as Şemseddin Sami, 
through his play, Besa Yahud Ahde (‘Besa’: Fulfilment of the pledge),371 showed the public 
that Albanians and Albania were integral parts of the Ottoman polity. Yet, as Gawrych has 
noted, Frashëri also had a hidden agenda: he wanted to inspire ethnic pride among 
Albanians and encourage the development of Albanian consciousness during the era of 
Tanzimat,372 and at a time when nationalist sentiments of other peoples in the Balkans 
were on the rise. His play also showed that Albanians maintained two distinct loyalties: 
devotion to the Empire and an ethnic attachment to Albania.373  
A similar view was given five years later by Vaso Pasha, who was a friend of Sami Frashëri. 
Together they formed the Central Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Albanian 
People in Constantinople in 1877. Vaso Pasha started his diplomatic career as a secretary in 
the British Consulate in Shkodra and later entered the Ottoman diplomatic service, being 
sent to the Ottoman Embassy at the Court of St. James in London. From 1882 until his 
death in 1892 he served as Governor of Lebanon, a position he was given because it was 
dictated by an international treaty that it should be given to a Catholic of Ottoman 
nationality but more because the Sultan wanted him away from Albanian activities in 
Constantinople. In his treatise, published in London in 1879, his view on Albania was shown 
to be similar to that which Frashëri expressed in his play. Despite giving a historical 
account, portraying Albanians as the most ancient people in the Balkans, he still saw the 
need for Albania to remain under Ottoman suzerainty and loyal to the Empire.374 
The situation of the Albanians in Macedonia led Sami Frashëri, Vaso Pasha and other 
Albanian intellectuals to change their minds, as they saw no possibility for the Albanians to 
maintain loyalty to the Empire if this meant losing Albanian territories. Thus in 1899 
Frashëri developed the concept of Albanianism, a term since used to describe Albanian 
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nationalism in Albanian and Turkish historiography, as well as by some western scholars. In 
March 1899, Frashëri secretly completed a book written in Albanian and titled Shqipëria - 
Ç'ka qënë, ç'është e ç'do të bëhetë? (Albania – What it was, what it is and will become of 
it?). The book was smuggled to Bucharest to be published the same year but without the 
name of the author.375 It was also published in Turkish, German, Italian and Greek. The 
publication of the book in multiple languages can be taken as a sign of the great interest 
that was shown by Albanians in the territories of the Ottoman Empire and in Europe about 
the content of the book. It became the very manifestation of Albanian nationalism and a 
revolutionary book in its contribution to changing the way Albanians regarded themselves 
and the Ottoman Empire.   
Frashëri created a national identity myth by claiming that Albanians, being the descendants 
of Pelasgians, were the oldest people in Europe and gave as evidence the writings of earlier 
European historians and travel writers.376 The aim of Frashëri was to present the Albanians 
as owners of the territories they inhabited by charting their ancient origin. He listed the 
ancient people of the Balkans (Illyrians, Dardanians, Epirots, Macedonians and Thracians) as 
being Pelasgians in origin and, therefore, Albanian.377  
The third part of the book was the most important and radical in character. If the Albanians 
did not detach themselves from the collapsing Empire, they would perish with it, warned 
Frashëri. Even if the Empire somehow managed to survive, in a different form and with its 
territories curbed, it would mean death for Albania as the land would be divided between 
the Greeks and the Slavs. Frashëri also warned Albanians that Macedonia was soon to 
become an international problem and that they should make their voice heard in 
demanding their rights, as other peoples of the region had done. He went on to assure the 
Albanians that they were capable of governing and defending themselves, yet emphasised 
this did not mean that Albanians should rise against the Porte. He only warned that, if the 
Empire ‘should be snuffed out, it must not take Albania with it to the grave’. He believed 
that Albanians had to unite and present their case to the Porte and the European Powers 
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and that the Sultan, willingly or unwillingly, would listen to and approve their demands. 
Meanwhile Europe would help, as it had helped other nations, to compel the Porte.378  
Frashëri, being aware of events in Macedonia and elsewhere, predicted the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire and worked to develop the national identity of other ethnic groups, 
including the Turks. With the Macedonian problem coming to a head, Frashëri’s belief in 
the Empire rapidly faded away and reached an all-time low in 1902, when the Sultan 
ordered the closure of the few Albanian schools which existed in Albania while schools of 
other ethnicities in Macedonia were flourishing. This caused Albanian political and cultural 
activity to go underground. As a Tosk of the south, he was occasionally frustrated with the 
Gegs of the north who were driven by their traditional conservatism or localism and who 
used their warlike instincts more often than he thought necessary and thus ignored the 
wider national interest. When he died in 1904 many Albanians viewed him as the father of 
Albanian nationalism while the supporters of Turkism regarded him as a Turkish 
nationalist.379 
                     
Nationalist, local and conservative leaders 
Frashëri’s desire to unite Albanian leaders under his programme was not fulfilled in the way 
that he wished. During his life and after his death, Albanian leaders could roughly be 
divided into three groups that followed three different paths. The first group were the 
nationalists who adopted Frashëri’s ideas and Macedonia became their main concern. The 
second group of local leaders consisted of those who pursued regional or their own 
personal interests. Frashëri believed that they harmed the national idea and for this reason 
he disliked them. The third group, the most powerful one until 1908, were the 
conservatives who supported the Sultan's regime and did not favour any changes in the 
Empire. Macedonia was also their concern, but they viewed it as an Ottoman rather than 
solely Albanian problem. This division became apparent by the end of the nineteenth 
century when the Porte engaged around 150,000 troops to stabilise Macedonia and 
Albania. In 1898 the commander of the Ottoman Army in the vilayet of Kosovo, Marshall 
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Ethem Pasha, backed by the Ottoman government, presented to the Sultan ‘The Project on 
Albania’.380 The ‘Project’ was backed by Albanian conservative Pashas and some notables 
who were not concerned with Albanian national aspirations and saw no national future if 
excluded from the Empire. Among them was Esat (Essad) Pasha Toptani (1863-1920) who 
backed Ethem Pasha’s ‘Project’ unreservedly. Another conservative notable and 
landowner, Syreja Bey Vlora, sent the Sultan a plan, suggesting even more drastic measures 
against the Albanians in the south and north.381 
By supporting these drastic measures against Albania, the Albanian nationalists considered 
that Esat Pasha entered the scene on the wrong side. Esat Pasha came from a powerful 
family of landowners in central Albania. After 1908 he did not belong to any group of 
Albanian leaders but would support any idea or organisation if he saw personal gain in it. As 
we shall see, he became the most hated person among the Albanian nationalist leaders. 
Nevertheless, he somehow found ways of playing a key role in Albanian politics until 1920, 
when he was killed in Paris by a young Albanian nationalist called Avni Rrustemi.382   
Ismail Bey Qemali was the best example of a liberal Ottoman politician and diplomat who 
had made a successful career and grew into an Albanian nationalist leader of that time.383 
Ismail Bey became popular among the Albanians and others in the ruling elite in 
Constantinople, but until around 1900 he was largely unknown among the masses in 
Albania.384 In 1892 he handed a memorandum to the Sultan expressing his views on 
reforming the Empire. Regarding foreign politics, a field in which he excelled, he proposed 
to seek a special understanding with the British government to be finalised in a bilateral 
treaty. The Porte was to acknowledge Britain’s special interest in the Mediterranean and 
assure the route to India. An ‘Entente’ with Britain, according to Ismail Bey, would stop 
Russia from advancing towards Constantinople and the Balkans.385 He believed that the 
                                                             
380   Anamali and Prifti, p. 274. - The aim of the project was to alarm the Sultan about difficulties in the Vilayet of Kosovo 
and Manastir and to propose new measures for pacifying Albania. The complete disarmament of the Albanians and 
centralising power in the hands of the Sultan in Constantinople were the two main points. It was hoped these measures 
would prevent the formation of an autonomous Albania and its exclusion from the Empire. 
381   Ibid. 
382   ‘The Murder of Essad Pasha: Acquittal of the accused’, The Manchester Guardian, 1 Dec, 1920 <http://0-
search.proquest.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/docview/476429073?pq-origsite=summon> [accessed 6 October 2016]. 
383   Yusuf Sarınay, Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, Sebahattin Bayram, Mümin Yıldıztaş, eds., Osmanli Arsiv Belgelerinde Arnavutluk - 
Shqipëria në Dokumentet Arkivale Otomane (Istanbul: T.C. Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri Genel Müdürlügü, 2008), pp. 43-45. 
384   Frashëri, The History of Albania, pp. 128-129.  
385   Ismail Kemal, The Memoirs (London: Constable, 1920), pp. 214-216.    
128 
 
Balkan issue, and Macedonia within it, was a big concern for the Porte. With Russia out of 
the way, the Porte would be able to stabilise Macedonia by establishing ‘an entente 
between the Balkan states’ of Romania, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro and 
creating a defensive alliance and economic accord. Then, ambiguously, he suggested that in 
the process, a kind of union or a federation between the Balkan countries and the Ottoman 
Empire could be created. He probably thought that such a union or federation would have 
absorbed the problem of Macedonia. With a strong Empire, with Britain on its side and 
Russia out of the way, the Porte ‘could serve as the centre around which the Balkan states 
should be regrouped’.386  
With this suggestion Ismail Bey probably aimed to solve the Macedonian and Albanian 
problems, although Albania was not mentioned at all in his memorandum. However, as he 
later pointed out, the Sultan ‘never had the time to reflect on these projects and 
suggestions or to give practical solutions to them’. He added that a European power should 
have induced the Sultan to carry out such an important enterprise.387 He did not mention 
which Power that should be, but he always favoured the involvement of Britain in the 
Balkans. For this reason, Ismail Bey was already labelled by Ottoman officials as being pro-
British and the Sultan’s disregard left him deeply unhappy.  
The Sultan’s answer on this matter came a few years later. Regarding the relationship with 
the British government, the Sultan explained his position in his memoirs. Writing about the 
‘ambitions of England’ of 1899, he accused the British government of ‘breaking the 
Ottoman authority’ in Egypt and meddling further in territories such as Yemen.’ He blamed 
the British press for being biased and regarded Gladstone’s Liberal policy as a ‘crusade 
against the Ottomans’. ‘Gladstone’, he added, ‘was walking in the steps of Pope Pius II’.388 
With this attitude towards the British, the Sultan showed no intention of considering the 
ideas raised in Ismail Bey’s proposal. In his memoirs, as in many talks he had with European 
diplomats, the Sultan avoided addressing the Albanian Question.   
There was another event which made Ismail Bey distance himself further from the Sultan. 
Albanian businessmen and political leaders showed great interest in the project of Albanian 
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railways which was announced in 1892. They thought that the railway, which was to 
connect the Albanian coastal towns of Vlora and Shkodra with the Albanian part of 
Macedonia, where the line already existed, would enable the movement of people and 
develop Albania economically. A British company was competing for concessions but the 
proposals were dropped by the Sultan.389 Ismail Bey was involved in trying to win 
concessions for the portion from Manastir to his birthplace Vlora, where he also had 
business interests and felt that he was deliberately deceived by the Powers and the Porte 
because of political and personal reasons. The political reason, he believed, was that the 
Powers and the Porte did not want to develop Albania. The second reason, the personal 
one, was that the Sultan, who was the ‘owner of considerable property at Salonika as well 
as the port itself, was not in favour of a line that was likely to compete with Salonika.’390  
By the end of 1899 Ismail Bey was convinced that the prospect of reforming the Empire 
and securing autonomy for Albania was practically non-existent. Therefore, he was left with 
one choice: to promote the case of autonomy or independence of Albania. Over the next 
two years he contacted important Albanian personalities in Constantinople and revealed 
his plan to them. As a matter of fact, his plan was more of a strategy of how to implement 
Frashëri’s programme, which he planned to implement by visiting European governments 
and asking for their support for an autonomous or independent Albania. The plan also 
included winning the support of the Albanian diasporas in Europe and reorganising them.391 
At the end of March 1900, the Sultan, being suspicious of Ismail Bey’s involvement in 
conspiracies, decided to send him as far away as possible from Constantinople. He called 
Ismail Bey and told him that he was appointed governor of Tripoli in Libya with a doubled 
salary.392  
On 1 May 1900, against the Sultan’s will but in agreement with the British Embassy, Ismail 
Bey boarded a Khedive393 ship, flying under the British flag and left the Bosporus for Europe 
in order to escape his new appointment. The Sultan asked his diplomatic representations to 
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block Ismail Bey’s contacts with European governments and sent envoys to Albania to 
discredit him. A special mission against him in Albania was led by Esat Pasha and other 
Albanian conservatives, which backfired on the Porte, since Ismail Bey in fact became more 
popular among the masses who had previously known very little about him. Within a few 
months Ottoman diplomatic missions sent reports to Constantinople informing the 
government and the Sultan that Ismail Bey was ‘scoring positive results in his mission on 
Albania in Europe’.394 
Meanwhile, Albania became almost ungovernable due to the troubles which were created 
by local Albanian leaders. Their actions were derived from personal, local or regional 
interests, but had the potential to force Ottoman troops to relocate from troubled 
Macedonia deep into Albanian territories, a situation that neither the Porte nor the Powers 
wanted. Albanian rebellions of this nature appeared frequently in the south and the north. 
The most dangerous local leader who disturbed the region was Isa Boletini (1864-1916) 
who gave signs of rebelling against the Porte. Boletini was a controversial character, whose 
actions in the beginning were difficult to categorise as either brigandage, local or 
nationalist in character. However, he would go on to become one of the main leaders of 
the Albanian armed struggle for independence, organising his followers to reject the 
Porte’s decision which allowed the opening of the Russian Consulate in Mitrovica.395  
As a result of the ongoing problems in Macedonia, security issues continued to rise in 
Albania which further emphasised the need to address the Albanian Question. The Sultan 
still refused to acknowledge this reality. He took measures towards ‘moulding Albanians 
into a pillar of Ottoman rule’ based on Islamism. After he crushed all insurrections and 
closed the few existing Albanian schools, he decided to put Albanians, who remained loyal 
to him, in several high positions of power in Constantinople. This gave conservative 
Albanians the opportunity to gain more power. The Sultan thought that Ferid Pasha (1851-
1914) was one such conservative and appointed him as Grand Vizier in January 1903. He 
hoped that in his new position of power Pasha would be able to stop the Albanian 
opposition to the reforms in Macedonia and improve their relations with the Porte.396 Ferid 
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Pasha gave his word (Besa) to the Sultan that he would make sure the Albanians remained 
loyal to the Empire.397 However, the Sultan had misjudged the political convictions of his 
Grand Vizier. Ferid Pasha cared for Albania more than the Sultan had wished or hoped. 
During his mandate, the Grand Vizier, favoured two other Albanians in his government, 
Tefik Pasha (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Turhan Pasha (Minister of Religious Estates) 
with whom he seemed to have shared a common cause on the future of Albania. At the 
same time Ferid Pasha suppressed Albanian conservatives, or at least stopped or delayed 
their promotions. Such a conservative was Hayredin Bey, Introducer of Ambassadors, 
whose promotion was stopped by the Grand Vizier. According to a British diplomatic 
report, Hayredin Bey denounced the ‘Grand Vizier as a leader of the Albanian nationalist 
movement’.398 Considering this case, we may conclude that there were tensions between 
Albanian nationalists and conservatives in the Ottoman government and probably also in 
the Palace.   
Tensions between Albanian conservatives and nationalists in Macedonia and Kosovo had 
also risen and become more public two years earlier when in 1901 the Sultan had 
appointed General Shemsi Pasha, another conservative Albanian from the region of Peja, as 
a commander of the army in Kosovo. His duty was to act as the Sultan’s trouble-shooter 
and guard the entry from the northern border with Serbia and Austria-Hungry into Kosovo. 
He was a darling of the Palace in Constantinople and so Albanian nationalists, as well as 
army officers from the Young Turk ranks, hated him. While he was able to restore some 
peace, he could not rule the part of Kosovo which remained under the control of local 
leaders.399  
Where Shemsi Pasha did not succeed with arms, the Sultan helped with money and 
rewards and had given military posts to emerging leaders like Riza Bey and Bajram Curri. 
The Sultan also had a plan for Isa Boletini who proved able to mobilise the masses. In 1902 
Boletini, under the pretext of stopping a Russian and Austro-Hungarian invasion, organised 
5000 armed men and threatened the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. He also proved decisive in 
stopping the opening of the Russian Consulate in Mitrovica. Seeing the danger, the Sultan 
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managed, through Shemsi Pasha, to persuade Boletini to leave Kosovo for Constantinople 
where the post of commanding officer in the Albanian Guard was given to him.400   
However, these measures did not prove sufficient to bring lasting peace and order. Boletini 
left behind a fear of invasion among Albanians and the idea of rejecting the Russian 
Consulate. Other nationalist leaders, who regarded Russia as their main enemy, took the 
decision to kill the Russian Consul, Grigorije Stepanovič Šcerbin.401 In March 1903, 
thousands of armed Albanians entered Mitrovica to attack the Russian Consulate, clashing 
with the Ottoman army. On 18 March one of the Ottoman soldiers, an Albanian conscript, 
shot the consul who died ten days later.402  
This was a big blow for the Porte which had tried to bring peace and offer security in the 
region. It also contributed to further worsening the relations between Albanians and Serbs 
in Kosovo, who saw the Russian Consul as their protector. A few months later, on 8 August 
1903, another Albanian Ottoman soldier killed Aleksandar Arkadievich Rostkovski, the 
Russian Consul in Macedonia based in Manastir. Although not initially intended as a 
political murder, the event had highly political consequences.403 Russia demanded and got 
an apology and reparations from the Porte. Russia used this case to portray the Albanians 
as troublemakers and anti-Christian. However, the Porte and Albanian nationalists were 
worried about the chaotic situation which engulfed most of Macedonia and Albania. Many 
Ottoman army officers, as well as Albanian nationalists, were convinced that the present 
regime was not able to deal with such problems and therefore began to seek a new form of 
organisation which would change the regime in Constantinople. Such an organisation was 
the Young Turk movement which attracted the support of Albanian nationalists and some 
of the local leaders, while conservatives continued to support the regime of the Sultan. 
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The birth of the Young Turks 
In early April 1896 British diplomatic reports from Constantinople spoke about signs of 
dissatisfaction that parts of Ottoman society expressed against the autocratic regime of the 
Sultan. ‘From the peasants to the Palace’ and within all classes, including the military and 
the navy, dissatisfaction almost went public. There were different organisations working in 
favour of spreading agitation for a liberal government but one important organisation was 
formed three years after the British diplomatic reports.404  
Young Army cadets were attracted by western political ideas and secretly debated the 
possibility of applying them in their country. In May 1889 a group of four students of the 
Military Medical College in Constantinople, among them Ibrahim Temo, an Albanian from 
Macedonia, gathered to form a clandestine organisation aiming to depose the Sultan. The 
organisation was named Ittihat Osmanli Cemiyeti (Ottoman Union Society).405 Within a 
short time the group was rapidly enlarged with members from other schools, bureaucratic 
institutions and the military. Members were organised in secret cells and identified with 
personal numbers. Ibrahim Temo took the number 1/1, meaning that he was the first 
founding member or “Young Turk number one” and was to play a leading role in the future 
of the organisation.406  
The organisation, later named the Young Turks by the European Press, aimed to reinstate 
the constitution, centralise governmental power and unify the Empire under strong 
Ottoman nationalism. This was contrary to what the majority of Albanians wanted, with the 
promise of schools in the Albanian language the only appealing element that the Young 
Turks were offering.407 However, many Albanian personalities with nationalistic 
backgrounds and many army officers saw the Young Turk organisation as a way of 
advancing their national cause and joined the movement without much hesitation. Temo, 
avoiding arrest, escaped to Romania and there he worked with Nikolla Naço (1843 - 1913) to 
include among the Young Turk Movement their fellow Albanians already active in secret 
nationalist organisations. Temo managed to recruit Nexhip Draga (1867 – 1920), a member 
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of an influential Albanian family in Mitrovica. Local Young Turk committees sprang up in 
many towns in Macedonia and Kosovo among the population and in army garrisons and by 
1908 were dominated by Albanians. As Malcolm notes, ‘Kosovo should have been a 
bulwark against the Young Turks’ but in reality the Albanians of Macedonia and Kosovo 
played the ‘main role in bringing them to power’.408 
Nationalist Albanians also played an important role among the Young Turk societies in exile. 
Ismail Bey was among the most prominent members in the Congress which was held in 
Paris in 1902, organised by Prince Sabahudin, to unite the various Young Turk factions.409  
Ismail Bey proposed making a plea to the Powers for intervention but many Young Turks 
disagreed with Ismail Bey and told him that foreign powers were the greatest enemy of the 
Ottomans and seeking help from them ‘is not an honour but a disgrace’. They argued that 
he was opening a way for the European imperialist designs to move and occupy territories 
of the Empire.410 Nevertheless, the Albanian national cause was such an issue among the 
Young Turks in exile that the Porte used these facts to declare that Dahmad Mahmud Pasha 
and his sons were supporting the Albanian nationalist movement. This prompted Dahmad 
Pasha to deny these claims and affirmed his disapproval with the ideas of autonomy or 
independence for Albania.411 
At that time, it became obvious that Ismail Bey was not in a position to lead Albanians 
abroad, as both the Young Turks and Albanian nationalists considered him to be pro-British 
and pro-Greek. He was also seen as favouring a diplomatic solution leading to the 
independence of Albania which was a slow process and, as such, rejected by many who 
favoured a guerrilla war against the Porte. The Greek members from Macedonia and other 
parts of the Ottoman Empire were also against Ismail Bey, as they did not like his ideas of 
foreign intervention and an independent Albania.412  
Regarding foreign assistance, Prince Sabahudin and Ismail Bey decided to involve the British 
government in the plans to dethrone the Sultan. Ismail Bey acted by using his diplomatic 
experience and the ties he had established during his career with British diplomats and the 
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Foreign Office. For their part, the British could have had reasons to endorse an attempted 
coup d’état. The Foreign Office was losing the influence it once exercised over the Porte  
while Germany was winning it. The Sultan had given the Baghdad railway concessions to 
the Germans and the British did their utmost to block this scheme during 1902 and 1903.413 
However, Ismail Bey’s attempt to secure British backing and bring radical change in the 
Ottoman system of government proved unsuccessful because the British refused to get 
involved.414 The failure of executing a coup d’état caused the authority of Sabahudin and 
Ismail Bey to fade among their supporters. It was for this reason that Ismail Bey decided to 
distance himself from the Young Turks and showed more consideration for the case of the 
future of Albania.  
The Congress of Paris in 1902 also showed that the Young Turks and Albanian nationalists in 
exile were more an intellectual than a political organisation. They had not established 
strong connections with the organisations and the people within the territories of the 
Empire. The revolution was brewing in Macedonia and exiled Young Turks, among them 
Albanian nationalists, were out of touch with the situation on the ground. However 
Albanian nationalists and army officers, who had joined the Young Turks in Macedonia and 
Kosovo, were better placed to change the situation.  
 
The Young Turk Revolution: an Albanian tale of three cities 
The development of the Young Turk Revolution is, to a considerable extent, an Albanian 
tale involving three cities: Salonika, Manastir and Ferizaj. The revolution was born, 
developed and erupted in these three places, which were culturally and strategically 
important for the Ottoman Empire in Europe.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century the multi-ethnic city of Salonika became a centre 
of plotting against the rule of the Sultan. A branch of the Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP) had existed in Salonika since 1896, but the city was only to become more important a 
decade later. The transfer of the central CUP to Salonika in 1906 and its unification with the 
Paris branch a year later, made the port city into a breeding ground for the revolution. The 
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support of the population for the CUP was strong and was seen as a joint Jewish–Muslim 
movement. The Muslim middle class and part of the aristocracy, together with Jewish 
intellectuals and businessmen, gave the movement a high level of political power.415  
The Albanian population of Salonika was significantly lower in comparison with the Jewish 
majority and those who were known as Muslims or Turks, but their influence in the army 
was important. Many of the army officers and important personalities from the civil 
administration were also organised in free masonic lodges and planned to achieve their 
goals by removing the Sultan from power and bringing back the constitution.416 
Dissatisfaction was growing among the officers of the Third Army, stationed in Salonika. 
The Empire, which had lost vast territories following the Congress of Berlin, was now about 
to lose Macedonia. Enver Bey (1881-1922), an Albanian officer, was among many officers 
who were worried about the Empire whose fate was intertwined with that of Albania. 
Enver Bey played an important role in the movement and ultimately became the most 
famous Young Turk of all.417 Another active army officer of Albanian origin was Salonika-
born Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938).418 However, Mustafa Kemal did not show much regard 
for the Albanian cause, but rather went on to become Atatürk, the father of the Turkish 
Nation.  
The activities of the Young Turks in Salonika were intensive, but the revolution could not 
break out in this city. In 1903 a group of Young Turks told Richard Graves, the British Consul 
in Salonika, that they would be leading a revolt against the Sultan and asked for British 
support. The consul told them that if they had no support from the army and the police 
they should forget about such a revolt.419 The consul was right. Salonika could feed the 
Young Turk movement but could not start the revolution.  
Manastir was another multi-ethnic and multi-religious city, situated further north in 
Macedonia, which offered better conditions for the outbreak of the revolution. In Manastir 
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the army, the police and, to a degree, the administration, were three important institutions 
in which the Albanians had considerable influence and some control. The existing Albanian 
guerrilla bands and the local Albanian population were two valuable elements that the 
revolution needed. The Sultan believed that too many Albanian soldiers could be 
dangerous if left to serve in Macedonia or Albania, as there were signs that they may be 
used by the Albanian nationalists for their own ends. Therefore, he wanted to change the 
Albanian composition in the army and so in 1905 ordered parts of the 11th brigade of Janina 
and a battalion of Prevesa, dominated by Albanian soldiers, to be sent to Yemen. Even after 
this move the rest of the army in Macedonia still consisted of a high number of Albanian 
soldiers which were known to be disobedient if they did not fight under Albanian 
command. They also refused to fight in Albanian areas. For this reason, Hairi Pasha, 
commander of the Third Army, did not want Albanian battalions in Macedonia and 
complained that Albanian soldiers were too anti-Christian to be suitable for intervention in 
Macedonia. He asked the Porte to move the remaining Albanian soldiers elsewhere but his 
request was denied.420 
While the discipline and morale of the Ottoman army was low, the activities of the Young 
Turk officers increased. Albanians dominated the ranks of the Young Turk officers. Among 
them was Nijazi Bey (1873 – 1913) of Resna, Macedonia, who became as prominent as 
Enver Bey and together became two of the main heroes of the revolution. Two other 
important personalities, Muzahir Bey, the brother of Nijazi Bey and Nedim Bey were also 
active in spreading Young Turk ideas among the population in the area of Manastir. Ejup 
Sabri, another Albanian, was a commander of the Redif battalion and had enormous 
influence over the Albanian population of Ohri, which was his native town.  
At the same time the Albanian nationalist movement, mainly directed against Greece and 
Serbia, was growing rapidly in the vilayet of Manastir.421 The Ottoman authorities were 
aware of this movement but on many occasions tolerated it because Albanian nationalism, 
in the circumstances of Macedonia, was often in favour of the Porte. Nijazi Bey and his 
followers therefore tried to win over the Albanian nationalist guerrilla bands which were 
formed in response to the difficult situation in Macedonia. Although initially they were 
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formed for the defence of their national rights and as counter force to the other bands 
operating in Macedonia that attacked Albanians, they later fought against the Ottoman 
regime. The Committee for the Liberation of Albania was formed in Manastir in 1906 by 
Halil Bey, Georgi Qiriasi, Fehim Bey Zavalani and Bajo Topulli. All were from different parts 
of south Albania and developed a network which spread from south to north. The 
Committee was especially successful in Kosovo where they recruited some influential 
people, and while in Gjakova they founded a branch with the same name.422  
The increased activities of the Albanian nationalist movement were noticed by British 
diplomats. As seen earlier, in a report for 1907, regarding the cooperation between the 
Albanian national movement and the Young Turks, the British Embassy in Constantinople 
observed that the Albanian nationalist movement was very active and was on the rise.423 By 
the beginning of 1908 Nijazi Bey, with the help of Galip Bey, the commander of Skopje 
garrison, managed to get the support of most Albanian nationalist leaders and members of 
their movement. Before June 1908 it was believed that in Kosovo two thirds of the officers 
in the army and the gendarmerie had become members of the Young Turk movement.424 
This meant that almost the entire Albanian nationalist movement in Macedonia and 
Kosovo, as well as the majority of Albanian army officers, joined the Young Turks.  
As the British and Russian monarchs discussed the question of Macedonia at their meeting 
in Reval on 9 June 1908, tensions were increasing among Albanians in the vilayets of 
Kosovo and Manastir. Nationalist Albanians felt that their national question was ignored 
and other foreign powers were about to move in.425 Here, the Young Turks and the 
Albanians had a strong common interest as both wanted to save the territory of the 
Empire. The Reval Agreement gave the signal for the revolution. On 3 July 1908 Nijazi Bey, 
accompanied by some Ottoman officials and a few soldiers, most of them Albanian, 
proceeded to the mountains. There he joined other companies and formed a Young Turk 
band which numbered 100 to 200 members.426  
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In their reports the British diplomats did not give much weight to this event which, within a 
few days, sparked great changes. The first report about the event was dispatched from 
Manastir to Constantinople on 5 July and reached the British Foreign Office on 8 July. A day 
later, the report was read by Hardinge, the under-secretary, and Grey, but they saw no 
importance in it. More reports arrived on 14 July but they were ignored once again. One of 
the reports from early July said that an Ottoman army officer told British diplomats that the 
revolutionary movement would break out in the course of a day or two and wanted to 
know the British attitude towards the Young Turks. The British vice-council, Heathcote, 
refused to discuss the issue.427 By 18 July the Foreign Office started considering whether 
the movement would stop or spread. It was only around the end of July that they realised 
the progress made by the Young Turks was resembling a revolution.428 
While British diplomats failed to recognise the signs of the revolution in time, the Porte was 
alarmed immediately and ordered Shemsi Pasha to proceed from Kosovo to Macedonia 
and deal with the insurgents. Shemsi Pasha, with a contingent of 3000 Albanian soldiers, 
arrived in Manastir on 6 July. Upon their arrival, the Albanian soldiers declared openly that 
they would not fire on the Young Turks, whom they viewed as Albanians. Pasha found 
himself in a very difficult position and asked the Sultan to activate those conservative 
Albanians to whom he had long given privileges. He thought it was about time they should 
put their weight against Young Turk officers.429 Shemsi Pasha was killed the same day while 
Albanian bodyguards offered little or no protection and the assassin escaped and was never 
caught.430 This prompted suspicions of an Albanian plot executed against Shemsi Pasha by 
those nationalists who had hated him so much and who had now become Young Turks.   
A week later, in Manastir, an attempt was made by an Albanian on the life of Sadik Pasha, 
the Sultan’s aide-de-camp, who was believed to have come to Macedonia on a spying 
mission. Three days earlier a ‘regimental mufti’ was also killed by Albanians in Salonika.431 
On 17 July, major-general Osman Hidayet was severely wounded while reading a telegram 
from the Sultan to the officers in the barracks in Manastir. Niazi Bey issued a proclamation: 
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‘The object of the rising is to revive the 1876 Constitution’. The Porte realised that this was 
a very dangerous movement as it had engulfed the army. The British Consul in Manastir 
wrote that majority of the officers of the Third Army were in ‘favour of the Young Turks 
movement, and fully resolved to do their utmost for the realization of its objects.’432  
The movement in the vilayet of Manastir reached wide proportions but it was still a military 
rebellion and could not be complete without the participation of the people. This happened 
further north of Manastir, in Ferizaj, Kosovo, just outside the borders of Macedonia. 
Salonika and Manastir were old cities, ethnically and religiously mixed, while Ferizaj was a 
small and relatively new town, almost entirely inhabited by Albanians. The town grew fast 
after 1874 when the railway line began to pass through it and a station was built. The 
railway came from Salonika, via Manastir and Skopje and continued to end in Mitrovica 
where Austria-Hungary aspired to build links from Bosnia in order to reach the port of 
Salonika.  
In spring 1908 Austria-Hungary initiated the old plan of extending the railway from Bosnia 
to Mitrovica in Kosovo, while the Serbian government announced plans to build a railway to 
reach the coast of Albania through Kosovo. Albanian leaders viewed these initiatives with 
hostility. At the beginning of July rumours spread fast throughout Kosovo (probably by Serb 
agitators and Young Turks) that Austria-Hungary was about to invade.433 When it was 
announced that a special train, bringing students of the Austrian-German railway training 
school from Skopje would arrive, people started gathering in Ferizaj, thinking that that was 
the first step of an Austro-Hungarian invasion. On 5 July a large crowd of Albanians 
gathered in Ferizaj to protest.434 Although initially there were some 5000 armed men 
gathered by 23 July the number grew to 30,000.435 This event was not linked with the 
insurrection in Manastir, which had started at the same time but created the effect which 
was aimed in Manastir.  
Albanian leaders hurried to Ferizaj to hold an assembly which lasted more than two weeks. 
Among them was Isa Boletini, who had come back from Constantinople in March 1906 and 
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had been awarded the title of Bey and given land in Kosovo by the Sultan. Within two years, 
Isa Bey had become powerful and changed from a local leader to a conservative opposed 
to the Young Turks. 436 He left the meeting when he realised that his proposals would not 
pass. The meeting was also attended by Young Turks such as Nexhip Draga and Bajram 
Curri (1862 – 1925). Although initially they were in the minority, this composition would 
soon change in favour of the Young Turks.  
Galib Bey, the Albanian commander of the Ottoman troops in Skopje, received orders from 
Constantinople to disperse the Albanians in Ferizaj. He was happy to receive the order but 
would not execute it. Galip Bey, being a Young Turk, went to Ferizaj with his army to take 
part in the assembly and to push forward Young Turk proposals.437 He was accompanied by 
other Albanian members of the Skopje branch such as Colonel Vasfi Bey and Salih Bey. A 
number of respected and popular personalities from Prishtina, including Haxhi Shabani and 
Sherif Efendi, also joined him.438  
More Albanian leaders and military personnel who were members of the Young Turk local 
committees from the region, rushed to Ferizaj. They felt that this opportunity was simply 
perfect to initiate changes and come to power. Leaders of Albanian guerrilla groups also 
supported them. On 18 July the Young Turks, predominantly consisting of Albanian 
nationalists, outnumbered conservative Albanians who favoured different decisions.439 This 
created high tensions in the mosque where the meeting of the leaders of the two parties 
was held. Eventually, on 20 July, all the Albanian leaders decided to support the Young 
Turks,440 but only after the Young Turks promised that, once in power, they would 
implement a programme of Albanian language in schools. The Young Turks promised many 
more national rights, including privileges the Albanians had enjoyed before and for a long 
time. Then, the Kosovo leaders addressed the masses, telling them they had achieved all 
their objectives including the ‘abolition of prisons, the cancellation of all innovations and 
reforms’.441  
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After receiving the support of the masses, the Young Turks sent a telegram to 
Constantinople asking the Sultan to reinstate the constitution. The Sultan did not reply as 
he was busy taking steps to consolidate his power. A few days earlier he had ordered his 
Grand Vizier, Ferid Pasha, to act against the Albanians and calm the situation in Kosovo and 
Macedonia. The Pasha told the Sultan that this was not the duty of the Grand Vizier and 
resigned on the evening of 22 July.442 The Albanian Grand Vizier could not keep his Besa as 
he ‘failed’ to maintain the Albanians’ loyalty to the Sultan.  Austro-Hungarian diplomats in 
Constantinople also observed the Grand Vizier’s support for the Albanian nationalist 
movement in Macedonia.443  
As the Sultan did not respond to the first telegram, another was sent on 22 July. This time 
the Sultan was threatened. He was told that 30,000 armed Albanians would be joined by 
more Albanians in Macedonia and Ottoman troops stationed in Manastir and Salonika, and 
together they would march to Constantinople. The Sultan gathered the Council of Ministers 
and discussed the issue in long and difficult meetings. Some of the ministers and advisers 
suggested ‘half measures,’ but the majority succeeded in persuading the Sultan that 
resistance would be useless since movements like the one in Ferizaj were expected 
elsewhere in the Empire and in other sections of the army. Describing the moment the 
decision was taken, the British ambassador wrote that ’the fact that the Albanians had 
declared themselves in favour of the Constitution, made the Sultan listen to counsels of 
moderation’.444  
At midnight on 23/24 July 1908, the Sultan issued an Irade (imperial decision) approving 
the constitution and allowing the formation of an Ottoman Parliament.  
Unprecedented jubilation followed all over Albania and in Manastir a military parade was 
organised. Nijazi Bey entered the town triumphantly, together with Çerçiz Topulli, the 
Albanian guerrilla leader and Apostol Mihajlovski, a Macedonian guerrilla leader to 
symbolise the Albanian-Macedonian co-operation in the revolution.445 The city of Salonika 
was illuminated and received with ‘wildest enthusiasm’ Enver Bey, who had gone north to 
Macedonia to organise Young Turk bands and now returned in triumph. He addressed a 
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large crowd, telling them ‘we are all brothers’. Europe no longer had a mandate over the 
Ottoman Empire and the state no longer belonged to the Sultan but to its citizens, he told 
the cheering crowd.446 However, within a few months joy turned into huge disappointment 
for the Albanians and other ethnicities in Macedonia who had believed in the Young Turk 
promises and in the revolution. To the Albanians, the Young Turks never fulfilled the 
promises they made at Ferizaj.  
  
Conclusion 
After the Congress of Berlin, the British government showed little interest in Albania. The 
Foreign Office had no separate policy towards Albania and reacted only when events with 
broader implications occurred. In general, British interest in the Balkans also remained low. 
This attitude started to change slowly with the appearance of the Macedonian crisis and 
after pressure from the public and the press grew steadily. The British government 
acknowledged that the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia had more interests in the 
Balkans but wanted their involvement and influence in the Balkans and in Constantinople 
to be limited.  
Although the British government supported the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, 
Albanian leaders still attempted to win British support. The Macedonian crisis also played 
an important role in the development of Albanian nationalism. As a result of the situation in 
Macedonia, Albanian ideologists developed the idea of Albanian nationalism while their 
nationalist leaders, seeking to find a solution to their question, joined the Young Turks and 
played a decisive role in the formation of this organisation and the events that led to the 
revolution.   
The Young Turk programme had two common points with the Albanian national 
programme: the introduction of the Albanian language and the preservation of the 
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. These commonalities convinced most of the 
Albanian nationalist leaders to join the Young Turks as a means of achieving their national 
aims. However, a considerable number of Albanian nationalists who lived abroad stayed 
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away and viewed the movement with great suspicion. Conservatives, who supported the 
Sultan’s regime, were opposed to the Young Turks. Albanian leaders were frustrated with 
not being able to gain international or British support for their cause, which fed into their 
decision to support the Young Turk Movement. Whenever the Albanians became worried 
about the future of the Ottoman Empire, they turned to the British for support. Here there 
is a clear situation in which support from the British was not forthcoming, leading the 
Albanian nationalists to turn towards trying to bring about changes within the Empire. 
The Young Turk Revolution brought back the 1876 constitution and the Ottoman 
Parliament. Britain and the Powers hoped that the changes in Constantinople would create 
a positive effect in Macedonia. The hopes of the Albanian leaders to resolve their national 
question through the democratic process was also high.  
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Chapter V 
 
Language, Nationalism and Counter-Revolution, 1908-1910 
 
I cannot help being impressed by the decision, purpose and discipline, and 
strength which have characterised the [Young Turk] leaders of the Army which is 
now in power. It is clear that we have greatly underestimated the strength of the 
force at the disposal of the Committee. No doubt they have made plenty of 
mistakes. But it seems clear to me that the best elements in Turkey are on their 
side, and we must back up those elements and be sympathetic to them [...] I 
should like you to do everything in your power to keep in touch with the best men 
and to retain their confidence. – Edward Grey.447 
 
I am an Albanian. This is the most important fact in my life. It is more important 
than my family because the conscience of this fact had awoken within me ideas, it 
taught me what to do and gave me the meaning of life. – Sevasti Qiriazi, Director 
of the School for Girls in Korça.448 
 
Introduction 
This chapter has two objectives. The first objective is to analyse British foreign policy 
towards the Porte between 1908 and 1910 and to argue that the British government and 
the press fully supported the Young Turks and, in the process, disregarded the Albanian 
Question.  
During the period under discussion, the British government continued to regard the 
Albanian Question as part of the Eastern Question. After the Young Turk Revolution of 
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1908, the British government made efforts to improve its position in Constantinople which 
had been weakened in the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin. The Young Turks brought 
changes in Ottoman politics that initially won them sympathy and support among British 
politicians and the press. The British hoped that the new regime of the Young Turks would 
solve the problem of Macedonia, in which the British government had been engaged for a 
long time but with no apparent success. The British also hoped to regain their influence in 
the Ottoman Empire, which had been surpassed by the Germans. Yet at the same time, the 
change of regime as a result of the reinstatement of the constitution also raised concerns 
for the British, who were not sure how this would impact upon their Muslim dominions in 
India and Egypt.   
The second objective is to assess the unification of the Albanian alphabet and to argue that 
language played a pivotal part in the Albanian national movement during this period. 
Furthermore, it will be suggested that language was the cause of the sudden conflict that 
arose between Albanian nationalists and the Young Turks after the reinstatement of the 
Ottoman constitution, which led to the counter-revolution of April 1909. The second part 
of this chapter will also assess the support of the British and the Foreign Bible Society for 
the Albanian language and nationalism, arguing that this factor was crucial to its 
development.  
The conflict between Albanian nationalists and the Young Turks will also be analysed 
through the relationship between the two parties. When the Young Turks began to depart 
from Ottomanism by introducing the idea of Turkism, this quickly brought them into 
confrontation, and later armed conflict, with the Albanian nationalists. As a result of this 
change in ideology, the Albanian leaders were quickly disappointed with the Young Turks.    
The following analysis of British involvement in the Albanian Question as part of the Young 
Turk question has so far been overlooked. In all studies or publications, relations between 
the Albanians and the Young Turks are explained as a struggle of the Albanians against the 
Ottoman Empire, thus ignoring the role of Turkish nationalism. Therefore, the aim of this 
chapter is to explain the ideological clash and the armed conflict of the Albanians with the 
Young Turks as a confrontation between two nationalisms. So far, the role of language in 
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the Albanian national movement has not been acknowledged as a main element in the 
process of building the Albanian nation. 
 
British policy towards the Young Turks, 1908 – 1910 
With the departure of Disraeli and his pro Ottoman policies in 1880, relations between 
Britain and the Porte had worsened. The new British Liberal policy, which was introduced 
by Gladstone, was considered by the Porte as unfavourable towards the Balkans. By the 
beginning of the twentieth century the Macedonian question had caused further 
deterioration in relations between Britain and the Porte. During this period the Sultan was 
attracted by the ascendancy of Germany and its growing economic and military power, 
thus giving the German government an opportunity to replace British influence in 
Constantinople. At the beginning of 1908 there was no hope that the Anglo-Ottoman 
relationship would improve soon. About a month before the Young Turk Revolution took 
place, Gerald Fitzmaurice449 sent a private letter to Edward Grey’s private secretary, 
William Tyrell, to explain the British policy in Constantinople. He wrote: 
During the last few years our policy, if I may so call it, in Turkey has been, and for 
some time to come will be, to attempt the impossible task of furthering our 
commercial interests while pursuing a course (in Macedonia, Armenia, Turco-
Persian Boundary &c.) which the Sultan interprets as being pre-eminently hostile 
in aim and tendency. In a highly centralised theocracy like the Sultanate and 
caliphate combined, with its pre-economic conceptions, every big trade &c. 
concessions - is regarded as an Imperial favour to be bestowed on the seemingly 
friendly, a category in which, needless to say, we are not included.450 
Fitzmaurice believed that the Porte’s attitude would not change before the death of the 
Sultan or a change in the regime, which would come as a result of some unforeseen 
troubles that could ‘spell disaster to British interests and prestige.’451 But, significant 
changes arrived within a few weeks, not years. When the Young Turks triumphed, the 
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British press and public opinion were sceptical, but this soon changed and the new 
government in Constantinople started to receive compliments from London. The British 
government was convinced that the situation in the Balkans would change and the 
Macedonian reforms, together with the armed bands and the Albanian Question, would 
melt away once the problems were addressed properly by the new constitutional and 
elected government. This led British diplomats in Constantinople to justify their previous 
policy toward the Young Turks: ‘sympathy has always existed between the people of Great 
Britain and the population of Turkey’, adding that grievances or misunderstandings of the 
British government ‘were against the Turkish Government only.’452  
Therefore, the revolution that brought about the change of government in Constantinople, 
was quickly welcomed with enthusiasm by the British government. The Foreign Office 
issued a memorandum explaining that this enthusiasm stemmed from three reasons: 
1. From the abstract love of liberty; 
2. From the traditional friendship with Turkey which begun in [the] days when 
Russia was our traditional enemy; 
3. From the belief that the Muhamedan [Muslim] population of India is 
particularly loyal to England and can be still propitiated by kindness to Turkey.453 
As noted above, the third point of the memorandum alludes to both the satisfaction and 
concern held by the British about the outcome of the revolution. If the Young Turks, with 
the help of the British government, were able to create a strong government and a strong 
empire, then the Muslims of India and other parts of the British dominions might 
appreciate Britain’s help. Yet there was also a possibility that this could inspire the Indian 
Muslims to create their own government and constitution, something the British did not 
want. The situation could also have an effect on Egypt and it was for this reason that Grey 
told his ambassador Gerald Lowther: 'I should say as little as possible to the Khedive about 
a constitution for Egypt’. If the Young Turks could create a strong government, this reality 
‘must have a great effect in Egypt and upon our policy there’, wrote Grey.454 
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Despite these concerns, the British were optimistic about the new Ottoman government, 
hoping to reassert their influence which had been overtaken by the Germans in the 
aftermath of the Congress of Berlin. British diplomats in Constantinople, who were 
predominantly Gladstonians, were convinced that German diplomats were at great pains to 
prove the Young Turk Revolution was the result of British intrigues and, as such, was 
doomed to fail.455 If this is what the German diplomats thought, they were mistaken but 
they were right to express fear that the new Young Turk government, under the influence 
of the British, may abolish capitulations which offered suitable trade conditions to the 
Germans. The British also hoped that Vienna, because it administered Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, had a good reason to be sceptical about the Young Turk government. The 
Russian government viewed the changes with sympathy but its diplomats in Constantinople 
believed that the revolution was doomed to failure.456 
For these reasons, the British government believed that the revolution offered new and 
favourable opportunities to improve their weakened position in Constantinople. To achieve 
this goal, Grey told Lowther to advise the Young Turks not to move too fast in 
implementing their political program because they may create confusion or provoke 
unwanted reactions. The most important thing for the Young Turks was first to get the 
government into their hands by employing honest and able politicians, advised Grey. He 
also believed a good Young Turk government should be built on sound finances and the 
British would use all their ‘influence to prevent their being interfered with from outside’.457 
While Grey believed in reforms, his diplomats in Constantinople expected British business 
to acquire parts of various economic projects throughout the Ottoman Empire. Grey 
emphasised that he was ‘distressed’ when he became foreign secretary because the British 
were ‘ousted from commercial enterprises in Turkey and how apparently hopeless it was to 
get any footing there’.458 With the old regime gone and the Young Turks in power, there 
were hopes in London that British businessmen and financiers would strengthen British 
interests and influence in the Ottoman Empire. However, British diplomats in 
Constantinople expressed some scepticism. The situation changed when, on 5 October 
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1908, Bulgaria proclaimed independence, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia, and Crete 
declared its unification with Greece. This was a serious blow to the Young Turks. In order to 
help the Porte, the British had taken a diplomatic lead before Bulgaria proclaimed 
independence. On 2 October 1908 the Foreign Office issued a circular urging the Powers to 
prevent the Bulgarian government from declaring independence. Most of the Powers, 
including Russia, agreed with the British and reminded the Bulgarian government about the 
dangers a declaration of independence would bring.459  
Edward Grey, like the Ottoman government, pointed out to the Austro-Hungarians that 
with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Treaty of Berlin was violated. Vienna 
had also violated the Convention of 21 April 1879, which stated that the occupation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina should not affect the rights of the sovereignty of the Sultan. Vienna 
did not argue with the essence or the meaning of the Treaties but stated that the real 
reason for the ‘immediate necessity of annexation was the Serbian propaganda’ in which 
even the Serbian King Petar was involved.460 The Austro-Hungarian Emperor told the British 
ambassador that annexation was inevitable and complained about British public opinion 
being very severe against Vienna’s policy towards the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. In 
reply, the British ambassador said that there is a strong sympathy ‘for [the] Young Turks in 
England’.461 
This crisis, particularly the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought Serbia onto the 
international scene. Austria-Hungary had traditionally supported Serbia’s aspirations 
against the Ottoman Empire. Serbia’s growing nationalist ambitions had regarded Austria-
Hungary as a protector and hoped to extend towards her neighbouring territories. But the 
annexation turned Austria-Hungary from a protector into a potential enemy of Serbia and 
frustrated Serbia’s nationalist aspirations. This brought Serbia closer to Russia, therefore 
making it a threat to Austria-Hungary and vice versa. As Russia got closer to Belgrade, 
Vienna felt that it was being pushed away from the spheres of interest in the Balkans.462 
After the annexation, Serbia mobilised its troops and launched a protest to the Powers, 
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demanding an extension of its territory across the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, in order to reach 
the Albanian coast.463 After the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the Sanjak of Novi Pazar was returned to the vilayet of Kosovo. 
The British ambassador in Belgrade, James Whitehead, sketched with sympathy the 
‘aspirations of the Servian [Serbian] Nation for eventual union with the people of the same 
race and language’ who were under Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian rule.464 He believed that 
the transfer of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary was a ‘crushing 
blow to the most cherished aspirations’, leaving the Serbs to hope for an increase in 
territory towards ‘Old Serbia’, as Kosovo was known. As a result of the annexation, Russia, 
assisted by Britain and France, supported Serbia’s aspirations against the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, which was firmly backed by Germany. Russia was forced to back down, leaving 
Serbia deeply hostile towards Austria-Hungary, a situational which became an important 
feature of European politics in the lead-up to the First World War.465  
As the situation in the Balkans was changing, the Foreign Office asked Fitzmaurice to 
prepare a memorandum which would examine the possibilities of Serbian and Montenegrin 
territorial extensions. Spizza (Shpica), an Albanian town, had been given to Austria-Hungary 
by the Treaty of Berlin to be administered, as was Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now, the town 
could be ceded to Montenegro, which could get more territory in Dalmatia to the north 
and in Albania and Kosovo to the south east. Compensating Montenegro with Albanian 
territory was always difficult, as the Ulqin problem had shown in 1880 and could lead to a 
resurgence of armed Albanian resistance which the Foreign Office wanted to avoid. 
However, the extension of Serbia was more complicated. The memorandum explained why 
Serbia wanted part of Kosovo:  
They want it firstly on practical grounds, in order to improve their frontier, and 
for reasons connected with roads and railways; secondly, because it contains the 
so-called Amselfeld, or Field of Sparrows, where Servia lost her independence in 
1389 and the united Christian armies were destroyed in 1448. […] An appeal to 
                                                             
463   Richard C. Hall, ed., War in the Balkans: An Encyclopedic History from the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Breakup 
of Yugoslavia (Santa Barbara, Denver, Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2014), p. 41.  
464   Whitehead to Grey, 13 October 1908, NA FO, 371/399.  
465   Carl Cavanagh Hodge, ed., Encyclopaedia of the Age of Imperialism 1800 - 1914, Vol. 1 (London: Greenwood Press, 
2008), p. 38. 
152 
 
the Battle of Kossovo invariably excites the Servian imagination. […] The cession 
of this district to Servia, would probably be met with resistance by the Albanians; 
they would also resist the cession of the north-western part of the Vilayet to 
Montenegro, which would very much like to have it.466 
The author of the memorandum, influenced by both Serbian propaganda and British Liberal 
thought, went on to explain that the majority of the population were once Christian Serbs 
but were converted into Muslim Albanians. However, if the Albanians were to resist Serbian 
territorial expansion into their lands, then Serbia could try to expand towards Bulgaria.467 In 
the end, Fitzmaurice did not consider these suggestions helpful but the Foreign Office had 
no other proposal and so this memorandum became the document upon which British 
foreign policy regarding Serbia and its extensions towards Albania and Macedonia was 
based. The European Powers were divided concerning the right of Serbia to expand 
following the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the memorandum illustrates, 
Britain was slowly taking the side of Serbia.  
By the end of 1908, when the Ottoman Parliament was formed in Constantinople, the 
Young Turks received more support from the British government. At the same time, the 
honeymoon period between the Albanians and the Young Turks was over and both parties 
became fierce enemies. The British government, by supporting Serbia’s future plans as well 
as the policies of the Young Turks, was not seen as a friend of the Albanians. On these two 
matters the British government was fully supported by the majority of the public at home. 
Just before Christmas of 1908, Edith Durham returned to England from Albania where she 
had witnessed the difficult situation between the Albanians and the Young Turks. She 
wrote: 
I arrived in London, and was amazed to find for the first time people who 
believed in the Young Turks. They would listen to no facts, and would not believe 
me when I said that the Turkish Empire, as it stood, would probably barely 
survive one Parliament.468   
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Durham's prophesy was almost exactly fulfilled. Disappointment with the Young Turks, 
which initially started in Albania, spread widely throughout the Ottoman Empire. On 3 April 
1909 a counter-revolution against the Young Turks and the constitution broke out in 
Constantinople. On this occasion, as we shall see below in more detail, Ismail Bey played a 
prominent role. The counter-revolution against the Young Turks created some 
controversies in British Ottoman relations. Some historians, such as Ahmad Feroz, have 
wrongly suggested that the British supported Ismail Bey and Kiamil Pasha's activities to 
bring down the Young Turks.469 
Before looking at the role the British played in this event, it is necessary to understand that 
there were factions which produced differences of opinions within the Young Turks, the 
government and the parliament. There were three main personalities representing three 
different opinions. Ahmed Riza, president of the parliament, represented the hard line of 
the Young Turks, Ismail Bey Qemali was the leader of the Ahrar (Liberal) Party and the 
opposition in parliament, while Kiamil Pasha was trying to find a compromise between the 
opposition and the Young Turks. Both Ismail Bey and Kiamil Pasha were known as being 
pro-British. Although the British attitude towards the Young Turks was supportive, some 
historians suggested that Ahrar, led by Ismail Bey and supported by a section of the 
Albanian troops in the Ottoman army, succeeded in staging a counter revolution because 
the British were behind him. The British were also suspected of having been involved in 
fomenting the counter-revolution and even supplying the opposition to the Young Turks 
with funds through their embassy in Constantinople. The British supposedly took this action 
because of their commitments to Russia, which originated in the Anglo-Russian Convention 
of 1907, and as such it was an anti-Ottoman policy.470 In his memoirs, Ismail Bey alleged 
that it was he who had convinced Lowther to offer some support to the counter revolution. 
On another occasion, when it became clear that the CUP was about to regain power, Ismail 
Bey asked Lowther for British intervention. It is not clear what exactly Ismail Bey meant by 
intervention, but his proposal was not considered by the Foreign Office. On this matter, 
Ismail Bey wrote: 
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He [Lowther] did not entirely reject my suggestion that the British Government 
should intervene, but asked me who would propose such interference. When I 
replied that I would ask the Sultan to do so, he said such a demand from His 
Majesty would no longer carry weight. In that case I said I would see to it that the 
request came from the Grand Vizier, and the Ambassador’s reply was that in that 
case he would see what could be done. When I saw the Grand Vizier, Tewfik 
Pasha, on the matter same evening, he was too upset by the situation to be able 
to take any resolution.471 
It was known that Lowther did not have much sympathy for the Young Turks, a position he 
had expressed several times to Grey. There were other diplomats in the British embassy 
who did not agree with the Young Turks, Fitzmaurice being one of them. His influential role 
in British diplomatic circles, good connections with newspapers and the fact that he was an 
an important personality among the power-brokers of the Ottoman world led some 
diplomats to indicate that he was in some part responsible for the counter-revolution.472     
Aubrey Herbert, who supported the Albanian cause and had worked in the British embassy 
in Constantinople in 1904-5, blamed Fitzmaurice for leading an anti-Young Turk policy. Like 
many Albanian nationalists, Herbert too, believed that there would be a solution for the 
Albanian question under the Young Turk democratic rule. Herbert was a well-known 
supporter of the Young Turks and a friend of Enver Bey and other leading members of the 
organisation, most of whom, including Talaat Pasha, regarded Fitzmaurice as being hostile 
to the CUP.473 However, none of these suspicions or allegations were true and there are no 
documents to support the involvement of the British in the counter revolution. Lowther, 
although he disliked the Young Turks, executed British policy as advised by the Foreign 
Office.  
Ismail Bey Qemali seemed to have exaggerated his role in the counter-revolution because, 
as a politician, he wanted to portray himself as being important and having the British 
behind him. As a matter of fact, as we shall see below, the British embassy helped him to 
escape from Constantinople after his plan failed, but that was all they did for him. There is 
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further evidence to show that Ismail Bey was not fully supported by the British. Lowther 
had told Grey that he did not trust Ismail Bey and when Ismail Bey went to the Foreign 
Office in autumn 1909, he was met by Tyrrell (Grey's secretary) rather than by Grey 
himself.474 These facts demonstrate that Ismail Bey was not trusted by the British for a 
venture such as bringing the Young Turks down from the power.  
After all, there was no reason for the British to turn their backs on the Young Turks. With 
the Young Turks in power, British diplomats saw themselves as once more becoming an 
important factor in Constantinople. Grey was pleased with the Young Turks’ dethronement 
of Abdul Hamid II. Grey had some doubts about the Young Turks being corrupt, but they 
impressed him with the way they returned to power. In a letter that Grey sent to Lowther 
after the Young Turks came to power, he explained the situation and put aside all doubts. 
Grey advised Lowther not to be pessimistic, as he once was, but to continue to support the 
Young Turks.475  
The Foreign Office continued to support the Young Turks even after they promulgated the 
Law of Association in August 1909 which sought to abolish national differences in the 
Ottoman Empire. It was with these intentions that the Young Turks had organised the 
Congress of Dibra in July of that year, seeking to suppress Albanian nationalism by attacking 
the language and its Latin alphabet. The Congress, which was supposed to convince the 
Albanians to drop their idea of a Latin alphabet, had failed because all the Albanian leaders 
and intellectuals boycotted the event. Yet Grey supported the Young Turk idea of 
Ottomanising the Albanians and other nationalities. On this matter he wrote to the Russian 
diplomat, Count Izvolski, expressing his support for the actions undertaken by the Young 
Turks.476  
The Young Turks were also supported by the British press. When the Albanians rose against 
the Young Turks in April 1910, The Times published a communication which was sent to 
them from the Ottoman Embassy in London. The readers could only get the official view 
which stated that the Albanians in the vilayet of Kosovo rose against the Empire 'because 
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they did not want justice, liberty, equality, schools...’477 From their perspective, the 
Albanians wanted exactly that. The event attracted the attention of the press in Europe and 
beyond. Reporting on the same event, a South African newspaper The Natal Mercury wrote 
that 30,000 armed Albanians rose against the Porte. 'At any rate, the ugliness of the crisis 
can no longer be concealed’, it was said in the article. Yet this article, like many others 
published in Britain, argued that the cause of the crisis that the Albanians had created in 
the Balkans was unclear.478   
There were only a few people in Britain who knew or cared about the true cause of the 
Albanian rebellions and insurrections against the Young Turks. George Frederick Abbott479 
explained that information from Albania was missing because the public and the 
government, being on the side of the Young Turks, were not interested in knowing the 
truth. Based on a letter he had received from 'a credible source from Shkodra' he wrote in 
the Saturday Review: 
In the accounts published in the press – accounts inspired partly by ignorance of 
the real conditions and partly by the Turkish authorities – there is a bewildering 
confusion regarding the true causes of the Albanian insurrection, to say nothing 
of the true state of affairs in the field of operations.480 
Abbott explained that the Young Turk government was worse than any that had come 
before it. He considered their governance in Albania ‘military despotism’. Explaining the 
situation further, he added that Young Turk officers had only one idea in their heads: ‘the 
reconstruction of the Great Ottoman Empire and the triumph of Islam,’ but ‘the Albanians 
will not be Ottomanized’. Abbott was also in favour of British engagement in the Balkans 
and specifically in Albania. He criticised the British government for adopting mistaken 
policies towards Albania, on which he wrote: 
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Our prestige has fallen low. We have persistently backed the wrong cards. Austria 
holds the right ones. We were made to look foolish the year before last, when 
Bosnia was annexed by saying ‘England will not allow the Berlin Treaty to be 
violated’ and then saying ‘All shall be forgotten and forgiven – help yourself 
gentlemen’. It is folly to bark if you don’t mean to bite.481  
Abbott not only criticised the British government for their non-involvement, but also 
pointed out that the desire for autonomy was the main reason for the conflict between the 
Albanians and the Young Turks. However, at this point the Foreign Office was ignoring the 
Albanian Question and was not interested in understanding the cause of the conflict. Yet 
there were cases when the British diplomats in Constantinople had given some importance 
to the Albanian Question. At the beginning of 1909 Mansuell, an army officer and former 
military attaché in Constantinople, recommended the formation of an independent Albania 
and a greater Bulgaria in order to create an obstacle to Austro-Hungarian and German 
expansion in the Balkans.482 But Lowther, even by 1910, still believed that the ‘thorny 
Albanian question’ could be solved by bribing, decorating or by granting land to the 
Albanian leaders. This method of rule in Albania was applied by the Sultan himself but was 
about to collapse. Fitzmaurice’s reports began to be read with more interest by Grey, 
Morley and even Prime Minister Asquith. Fitzmaurice, in more than one report, warned 
that discontent in Macedonia and Albania would cause the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire.483 The Foreign Office disregarded such warnings and continued to believe in the 
Young Turks and the constitution.  
 
Unifying the language and the nation 
The reinstatement of the Ottoman constitution in Constantinople was regarded as an 
Albanian triumph in northern Albania. Edith Durham, who was in Albania at that time, 
noted that diplomatic and consular representatives in Shkodra, including the British, were 
‘sceptical and contemptuous’ about the changes the constitution may bring. Yet regarding 
                                                             
481   Ibid.  
482   Heller, p. 24. 
483   Ibid, p. 40. 
158 
 
the atmosphere in Shkodra, Durham wrote that ‘all North Albania was wild in joy ‘and ‘it 
was believed that Europe had intervened, and the Turk would rule no more.’484  
Elsewhere in Albania, as in Shkodra, the meaning of the constitution was rather 
misunderstood. The majority of the population were illiterate and had lived for a long time 
under Ottoman rule which had prohibited education in the Albanian language. As a result 
they had little idea what the constitution really meant. Nevertheless, the constitution 
introduced a considerable degree of liberty which made some Albanian intellectuals return 
home from exile. The first issue they hurried to address was opening new schools in order 
to educate the population. Immediately after the proclamation of the constitution, 
Albanian intellectuals started establishing national clubs throughout Albania and elsewhere 
in the Ottoman Empire or where they resided abroad. Through these national clubs they 
aimed to raise the national awareness of Albanians through education. The first club 
Bashkimi (Unity) was established in Manastir on 31 July 1908. Fehim Zavalani, who 
returned from exile, became president with Gjergj Qiriazi as his deputy, while Naum Naçi 
became secretary.485 Within a short time Bashkimi sent emissaries to propagate the 
Albanian cause and spread its branches throughout Albania. Within a few months, 66 clubs 
were established and started to spread ideas of education and nationalism.486 The result 
was noted by a British diplomat:    
More important in that [nationalist] connection is the educational activity which 
displayed itself throughout Southern Albania immediately after the proclamation 
of the constitution. Early in August an Albanian school, founded and supported by 
voluntary contributions, in subscribing to which the population displayed a 
remarkable liberality, was established in Elbassan [Elbasan], two schools in 
Korytza [Korça], which had been closed under the old regime, were reopened, 
and the example of these two places was rapidly followed by all the principal 
towns throughout the south.487  
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To a lesser degree, schools were also established in northern parts of Albania. The national 
and cultural awakening, or Rilindja (Rebirth) which started at the beginning of nineteenth 
century and grew after 1878 was entering the last phase and achieving positive results. 
Albanian intellectuals were giving the last push to the idea of uniting the Albanian people 
under one linguistic identity, one culture and one nation living in one territory.488 
However, establishing Albanian schools proved to be a difficult task. Until 1908 writing of 
the Albanian language was banned and schools were organised according to the religious 
division of Albanians: Muslim, Christian Orthodox and Catholic. Muslims were taught in 
Ottoman Turkish with Arabic letters, the Orthodox went to Greek schools, while Catholics 
used the Latin alphabet and Italian language. Therefore, these schools nurtured pro-
Ottoman feelings for the Muslims, pro Greek sentiments for the Orthodox and pro Italian 
or pro Austro-Hungarian tendencies for Catholics. Another problem was the lack of text 
books and teachers for the newly established schools that opened in August 1908.489  
The teaching of the Albanian language became a patriotic duty and this brought into view 
the need to create a unified alphabet. During the summer of 1908, Albanian linguists 
started preparations to organise a congress and make a decision on this matter. This 
initiative disturbed conservative Albanians, most of whom were Muslim clerics, who 
declared that their official language should remain Turkish and that they would not 
recognise Albanian. This group was soon to be supported by the Young Turks, who saw the 
Albanian language as an important element of Albanian nationalism, and, as such, contrary 
to their idea of Ottomanism. The Greek Orthodox Church feared losing its influence over 
southern Albania and continually threatened Albanians, especially those students in Greek 
schools, with excommunication.490 Apart from religious and political complications, there 
were also practical obstacles which were soon to be imposed by the Young Turks.  
Before we discuss the unification of the Albanian alphabet, in order to have a better 
understanding of the situation that the Albanian nationalist intellectuals found themselves 
in by end of 1908, it is necessary to see how foreign support, mainly British, for the 
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language developed and became important to the Albanian national cause during the 
nineteenth century.   
Significant support for the emergence of the Albanian national awakening came from the 
Arbëresh - the Albanians of Italy. Migration to Italy had begun in 1272 but settlements 
were mainly created during the fifteen century as a result of the exodus that followed the 
Ottoman invasion and particularly after the death of Skanderbeg in 1468. In 1889 Lucien 
Bonaparte, Napoleon’s nephew, who studied their dialect, noted that Albanian was still 
spoken in 69 provinces of ‘Terra d’Otranto’.491 With their attempts to discover their roots, 
the Arbëresh gave a significant push to the Albanian cultural and national awakening.  
There was also help or influence which came from abroad. Such help, given particularly to 
the development of the Albanian language, and later nationalism, was rooted in Britain and 
connected with the Bible. The idea of translating the Bible into Albanian came from Jernej 
Bartolomeu Kopitar (1780–1844), a Slovenian linguist and philologist who worked for the 
British and Foreign Bible Society (BFBC). Kopitar believed that the translation of the Bible 
into Eastern European languages would help the process of national revival among the Slav 
nations. He included Albanians in this group, although he knew they were not Slavs.492 
Reverend Pinkerton, who was put in charge of Albania, wrote that furnishing the Albanians 
with the Bible was ‘an object highly worthy of the attention of the British and Foreign Bible 
Society.’ The BFBC considered Albanians as a ‘nation which occupies a great part of ancient 
Illyricum and Epirus, and speaks a language which seems to have no grammatical affinity 
with the Slavonian, Turkish, Greek, or Latin languages.’ Therefore, the society, with ‘most 
zealous efforts,’ decided to give to the Albanians a New Testament in their tongue.493 
Although this was done primarily for religious purposes, the BFBC, as a British organisation, 
became instrumental in helping the Albanian national movement to spread its national 
awareness.    
After many difficulties, 500 copies of the book of Matthew were published in 1824. Finally, 
in 1827, the whole New Testament was published in British ruled Corfu and 2000 copies 
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were printed.494 Although the Greek Orthodox Church tried to prevent its distribution, this 
version of the Bible became popular and until the end of the nineteenth century it saw 
several further publications. The Bible Society continued to regard Albania seriously and 
believed that ‘furnishing the Albanians with the Bible was a worthy work’.495 Translations 
continued with Konstandin Kristoforidhi (1827 1895) who worked for the BFBC and 
translated the New Testament into both the Toskë and Gegë Albanian dialects. His Bible 
translations served as the basis for the modern Albanian language.496 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Bible played a crucial role in the 
development of the Albanian language and nationalism. ‘The Albanian was invaluable to 
the Bible Society, and the Bible Society was invaluable to the Albanians’, wrote Durham in 
1904 while she was employed in distributing the Bible. At that time the Porte had banned 
the distribution of books in Albanian, but the Bible was distributed from the main depot in 
Manastir, which was practically in Albanian hands. On this Durham wrote:   
The director of the Bible Depot in Monastir was an Albanian of high standing both 
as regards culture and energy. Grasping the fact that by means of these 
publications an immense national propaganda could be worked, he spared no 
pains, and by carefully selecting and training Albanian colporteurs, whose 
business it was to learn in which districts the officials were dangerous, where 
they were sympathetic, and where there were Nationalists willing themselves to 
risk receiving and distributing books, succeeded to a remarkable degree. […] The 
Greeks, of course, opposed the work. A Greek Bishop is, in fact, declared to have 
denounced the dissemination of the New Testament and other works contrary to 
the teaching of the Holy and Orthodox Church.497  
The Bible was such a popular book that it was even bought by Albanian Ottoman soldiers, 
Albanian Muslims who served in the Ottoman administration and Muslim school boys. The 
Bible became popular simply because it was a book in Albanian. Durham travelled 
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throughout Albania with the colporteurs and observed that the Albanian nationalist 
movement was spreading. Their leaders welcomed the Bible and supported its distribution 
because they saw this as a help against the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church and, as 
such, part of developing their national cause.498   
Yet the cultivation of the Albanian language and the advancement of the national 
movement could not go far without schools. As Hroch noted, schools of the nineteenth 
century were important in developing a national identity for two reasons: they provided 
room for the transfer of nationally formative information to the wider population and 
paved the way for a strong communication network by being an essential tool for attaining 
literacy.499  
As the Porte did not envisage any ideas for Albanian schools, the first initiatives to open 
Albanian secular schools were taken during the 1830s by a group of Albanian intellectuals. 
They tried to establish schools in urbanised centres of northern Albania, including Kosovo. 
Several small private schools were set up in Shkodra and were financially supported by local 
businesses, but could not last long because of insufficient funds and the negative attitude 
of the local Ottoman administration. These schools revealed the concept of the national 
character which aimed to unite Albanians by excluding religious or regional distinctions.500  
However, opportunities to open schools grew with the formation of the Albanian League in 
1878. On 12 October 1879, a number of Albanian intellectuals called the Istanbul Society 
gathered in Constantinople to launch an organisation they called Shoqëria e të Shtypurit 
Shkronja Shqip (Society for Printing Albanian Books). This was the first Albanian national 
organisation to have ever been registered legally in the Ottoman Empire. The goal of the 
Society was to establish a standard language and publish books, journals and newspapers 
to be used and understood by all and to be distributed throughout Albania. The Society also 
aimed to translate important books into Albanian.501  
If we add other activities, such as preparing teachers and opening new schools which were 
sanctioned in the Society's constitution, then we may conclude that this organisation acted 
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as a sort of Ministry of Education of the Albanian League. The Istanbul Society was not 
under the dependency of the Albanian League in Prizren though they shared the same 
interest in education. The relation of the two organisations was explained in a letter that 
Sami Frashëri sent to Jeronim De Rada in 1881. Frashëri wrote that the work of politically 
unifying Albania was the work of the League, while the Society's work aimed to develop and 
refine the Albanian language, unify dialects and enlighten the nation.502 
Unifying dialects, printing books and opening schools is a primarily cultural activity, but in 
the Albanian case it was also a political matter of national interest. However, the activities 
of the Istanbul Society were short lived and ended after 1881 when the Porte subdued the 
Albanian League and all other nationalistic activities. Among the immediate measures taken 
was the banning of literature from entering Albania. Then, the Ottoman authorities turned 
against the Istanbul Society and disbanded it. Many members were prosecuted, some were 
interned in other places in the Empire and some escaped punishment. The Patriarchate 
supported the actions of the Porte against the Albanian movement. Through local churches 
in Albania, the Patriarchate cursed and considered as heretics those Orthodox Albanians 
who used Alfabetare and any other book in the Albanian language. On several occasions 
the Patriarchate had warned the Porte about the 'dangers' the leaders of the Istanbul 
Society were creating for the Empire.503 
With these measures, once high hopes of establishing Albanian schools were now lowered. 
The situation worsened after the brutal intervention of Dervish Pasha in northern Albania 
to subdue the Albanian League. Drita (Light) newspaper, which was published in Sofia 
wrote:  
When he [Dervish Pasha] returned to Istanbul, he said to the Sultan: If permission 
is given to Albanians to learn their language together with the Christians, then 
not only shall Albanians and Albania escape from your hand, but Istanbul, too, is 
in danger. Not only must the Albanian language not be written and read, but 
every memory of this nation must also be erased and forgotten.504 
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It is hard to confirm if these were the exact words of Dervish Pasha spoken to the Sultan, 
but it is certain that this was how Rilindja activists wanted his actions to be perceived by 
Albanians. After 1881 the right to use and teach the language became a more nationalistic 
goal and therefore took a more aggressive attitude towards the Porte and neighbouring 
countries. At the same time the Albanians, their language and history were praised by 
Albanian writers. These writings were mainly poetry praising the Albanians as fighters for 
their freedom and out of love for their country. Vaso Pasha and Naim Frashëri were among 
the many poets who aimed to raise the national feeling and love for Albania.505  
The Albanian school in Korça which was opened in 1887 was a result of many efforts by the 
Albanian intellectuals in Constantinople. It was soon followed as an example in some towns 
of south and central Albania. In the north it was not easy to open new schools before 1889, 
when only one was established in Prizren. However, the Austro Hungarians took a step that 
satisfied, to a degree, the leaders of the Albanian national movement. On the initiative of 
Theodor Anton Ippen (1861-1935), the Austro-Hungarian consul in Shkodra, Vienna took 
over all of the elementary schools and replaced the Italian language with Albanian.506 Lajos 
Thallóczy, an adviser on the Balkans in the Austro-Hungarian court, wrote to the Minister of 
Finance Béni Kállay and proposed to cover the expenses for a project of Albanian 
education. The project aimed to print a new alphabet book, a series of books and to fund a 
newspaper. This plan aimed to diminish Italian influence and establish a firm pro-Austro-
Hungarian feeling among the Albanians. Other plans were also proposed and some were 
approved by the Austro-Hungarian government.507    
In the south, schools functioned with difficulty because of the opposition which came from 
the Greek Church and Ottoman government. However, in 1891 the brothers Naim and 
Sami Frashëri managed to get another licence from the Ottoman government for the 
opening of Shkolla e Vashave (School for Girls) in Korça. The Frashëri brothers also 
mentored and supported the education of future nationalist teachers such as Sevasti Qiriazi 
(1871-1949) who graduated from Robert College in Constantinople in 1891. On her 
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graduation day, she wrote in her diary to describe herself and her feelings using nationalist 
vocabulary.508 
When the School for Girls was opened in Korça on 23 October 1891, Sevasti became a 
director. This was probably the most important school in the long history of Albanian 
education and was the only school which was not closed down by the Porte in 1904 when 
the Sultan, alarmed by the rise of Albanian nationalism, ordered the closure of all other 
schools. In 1909 the Young Turks again tried to close it down but did not succeed. The 
School for Girls was supported financially and morally by British and American Protestant 
Missions and it is likely this fact which induced the Porte to leave it open.509 
Most of the Rilindja writers agreed with Sami Frashëri and held that the origin of the 
Albanian language and the Albanians was Illyrian. Most of them had written on Skanderbeg 
and agreed in their regard for him as a national hero.510 In only a decade the education 
system and national movements had made an impact on a considerable number of the 
urban population, but more remote rural areas remained untouched. Yet still this was some 
progress. By now a network of writers, readers, educational and political activists had been 
created not only in Albania but throughout the Ottoman Empire and European countries 
where Albanians resided.  However, one major problem remained unresolved. Schools, 
although functioning, were using different alphabets. Regional and religious divisions were 
also obstacles which made the national movement slow. The reinstating of the constitution 
in 1908 offered a chance to the Albanian national movement to narrow these differences 
and standardise the alphabet. For a long time, the alphabet was a concrete expression of 
Albanian nationhood, while schools were regarded as an appropriate place for taming 
differences between groups.511  
During the summer and autumn of 1908, Albanian intellectuals agreed to hold a congress 
and make a decision on unifying the alphabet. On the initiative of the Bashkimi club, it was 
agreed that a congress should be held in Manastir and delegates from the four vilayets of 
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Albania, other parts of the Ottoman Empire and from important Albanian cultural 
communities in Europe and the United States were invited.512                                    
On 14 November 1908 hundreds of writers, journalists, teachers, language experts, 
publicists and clerics gathered in Manastir to take part in discussions about the Albanian 
alphabet. There were also students and ordinary members of the public who were 
interested in influencing the decision making process. During the first and second days of 
the meeting, which rather resembled a big assembly, many participants gave speeches but 
as a matter of fact they spoke little about language or the alphabet. In their patriotic 
speeches, all expressed the need to create unity between the north and the south, Gegë 
and Toskë, Muslim and Christian, in order to create a single culture. This served the 
nationalist idea of one nation, one language and one alphabet. The meeting was opened by 
a Franciscan priest, pater Gjergj Fishta (1871-1940) who was a fierce nationalist. Pater 
Fishta had, until then, written extensively on national themes aiming to awaken Albanian 
nationalist feelings and was to become the ‘national poet of Albania’ or the ‘Albanian 
Homer’. He gave an ‘artistic expression to the searching soul of the Albanian nation’.513 
Because of these qualities, Fishta was chosen to give the opening speech which was, as 
expected, predominantly nationalistic.514  
Of course, the alphabet was not an issue which was to be decided by the masses, yet even 
among the experts discussions were of a nationalist tone. The object and the importance of 
the congress was noted by a British diplomat:  
In November an Albanian National Congress assembled at Monastir, attended by 
fifty delegates, representing every section of the Albanian people – Musulman 
[Muslim], Catholic and Orthodox. The ostensible object of the meeting was 
apparently [an] elementary one of agreeing upon the adoption of a common 
alphabet, and the discussions were mainly literary; but the importance of the 
subject from a nationalist point of view is incontestable, the passion of a common 
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medium of inter-communication being absolutely essential to the formation of a 
real national sentiment.515  
As the report noted, the importance of the congress was not only to be seen in the context 
of education. It also had the political effect of further forging the bond of unity among 
Albanians and advancing their nationalist aims. The fact that the town of Manastir was 
chosen for the congress, was political and laden with nationalist meaning. With this, the 
organisers of the congress wanted to transmit a message to Bulgarians, Macedonians and 
others that the town and the region was Albanian. The same message was sent to the 
Greeks when it was announced that the Second Congress of Alphabet would take place in 
Janina in 1910. The other importance was that during the congress participants also held 
secret meetings in order to organise against the Porte and those neighbouring countries 
that had territorial pretensions in Albania. In secret sessions, a national program of 18 
points was approved. Shahin Kolonja, who was elected a member of the Ottoman 
Parliament, presented a program for the autonomy of Albania which was widely supported 
by participants of the congress and intended to be presented to the Ottoman 
Parliament.516  
The political achievement of the congress was arguably more important than its linguistic 
achievement and was in fact the primary goal of all participants who held nationalist ideas. 
However, this was not what the Young Turks expected nor desired. The Latin alphabet,  
adopted by the Congress of Manastir, caused new confrontations between Albanian 
nationalists and the Young Turks.  
 
Counter-Revolution: Albanian nationalism vs Young Turkish nationalism 
The Congress of Manastir initiated a conflict between Albanian nationalists and the Young 
Turks, who saw the activity around the development of the Albanian language as a way of 
advancing Albanian nationalism. As a matter of fact, from now on Albanian nationalists 
were not only struggling against Ottomanism but were faced with a new nationalism in the 
form of Turkism.  
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As we have seen previously, the Young Turk movement was established as a multi ethnic or 
multinational organisation with Ottomanism as a strong bond between its members. In this 
regard, CUP leaders made efforts to win over intellectuals, but many rejected the idea 
because they saw within Ottomanism the presence of Turkism which aimed to dominate 
the movement. From the start the Young Turk movement showed some presence of 
Turkish nationalist idea and it was for this reason that some Albanian nationalists, including 
Ismail Bey Qemali, never fully cooperated with the Young Turks or only did so with doubts. 
Turkish nationalists gained the upper hand in the movement after the Congress of Paris in 
1902. Ahmed Riza, the CUP leader, increasingly replaced the term 'Ottoman' with 'Turk' 
and this further shifted attention from Ottoman to Turkish nationalism. By the end of 1908 
the Young Turk movement had undergone this transformation and in the process changed 
its policies and even its symbols become increasingly Turkish.517 
As a result of this increase in Turkism, Sami Frashëri’s work on defining the nation as an 
‘ethno linguistic category based on historic primordial races’ became increasingly attractive 
for Albanian nationalists. Frashëri called for the revival of the literary works that were 
written, using the Latin alphabet, between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries by 
Albanian priests. In this vein he characterised Pjetër Bogdani’s work as important and 
described it as ‘written in a very clean literary language’ which should be considered as the 
‘basis of the [Albanian] language’.518  
Frashëri also influenced Yusuf Akçura (1876-1939) who was working on developing Turkish 
nationalism. Frashëri and Akçura believed that multiple ethno-linguistic nations were in 
conflict with each other and must fight for their survival. This theory, which was based on 
‘proto-Darwinian understanding,’ rejected Ottomanism as an outdated ideology.519 
Contributing further to the theory of national ideology in ethno-linguistic terms, Licursi 
stated:  
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Albanians and Turks needed to adopt similar nationalist strategies for their 
survival as nations, even if that meant abandoning Ottomanism and the Empire, 
as such.520 
Although it is likely that Frashëri and Akçura wanted a peaceful relationship between 
Albanians and Turks, their ideas led to an inevitable confrontation between the two 
nationalities. However, there was a point on which both thinkers disagreed. Frashëri 
advocated for an autonomous or independent Albania, while Akçura insisted that the Turks 
could fit into the Ottoman state by applying Turkist aims and ideas without rejecting Islam. 
Since religion was not a unifying factor for Albanians, Frashëri promoted a secular Albanian 
nationalism but, as Keiser stated, both ideologies went on to ‘undermine the notion of 
Ottoman citizenship’.521  
It is not clear if Akçura and other Turkish ideologists regarded Albanians as a nationality 
that could embrace their pan Turkish ideology, but it was obvious that Albanian nationalists 
were not going to entertain such ideas. This theoretical development had an impact on the 
relationship between Albanian nationalists and Ottoman or Turkish nationalists, which 
came into view in the debates of the Ottoman parliament. Even before the elections and 
the Congress of Manastir took place, relations between the Albanians and the Young Turks 
had started to deteriorate.  
The CUP became the dominant actor in Ottoman politics after the Young Turk Revolution 
which marked a strong shift in the organisation of elites from many ethnic groups or 
nationalities in the Ottoman Empire. The Albanian conservative elite had benefited from 
the Sultan’s regime. However, the Young Turk Revolution changed this situation by 
replacing conservatives with an intellectual nationalist elite with leaders such as Hasan 
Prishtina (1873–1933), Mufid Libohova (1876–1927), Nexhib Draga and many others. 
Regarding this change, Hanioğlu noted: 
All of these aimed at uniting Albanians of three different faiths under the flag of 
Skënderbeu [Skanderbeg] and called for reforms for the benefit of all Albanians.522 
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It should be noted that Albanian nationalism and the Young Turk movement were elitist 
ideologies and did not make a fast or significant impact on the masses. The unrest in 
northern Albania started immediately after the Young Turk Revolution and had little to do 
with nationalism. A British diplomatic report noted that the restored constitution was not a 
‘fortnight old’ when the Porte had to dispatch the army to Kosovo in order to suppress the 
‘reactionary movement’ of Isa Boletini.523 Boletini, along with a group of conservatives, was 
committed to fighting the Young Turks out of fear that they would lose benefits given by 
the Sultan. Albanian nationalists took the side of the Porte or the Young Turks because they 
wanted to get rid of conservatives such as Boletini, who was becoming an obstacle not only 
to the Porte but also to the Albanian nationalist idea. Boletini, along with other 
conservatives such as Hasan Budakova, Hasan Shllaku and Rrustem Kabashi, rose again 
against the Young Turks in November 1908. They expelled the judicial authorities, the 
police and the rest of the administration and announced that they would not accept the 
constitution. A considerable force was sent against them and their movement was 
promptly suppressed.524   
Isa Boletini, although a conservative and a fierce Ottomanist, was becoming a hero simply 
because he was seen as a fighter against the Young Turks who, by this time, had turned 
against Albanian nationalism. Where Albanian nationalists and Young Turks could not ‘sell’ 
their ideas because the population was widely illiterate, Isa Boletini could raise an army 
against the Porte. Therefore, Albanian nationalist leaders had no choice other than to co-
opt Boletini for their own aims and bring him into their midst. In the years to come, Boletini 
became the commander of the Albanian army that fought for autonomy and later 
independence, with Kosovo and Macedonia as the battle ground.  
For Albanians in Shkodra, Esat Pasha Toptani was one of the many reasons they became 
disappointed with the Young Turks. Esat turned out to be a secret member of the Young 
Turk movement and maintained the position of the commander of the gendarmerie. There 
was no change of local functionaries and all hopes and faith of Shkodra inhabitants in the 
new regime were shattered. A Shkodranes told Edith Durham: ‘The Young Turks are the 
                                                             
523   Lowther to Grey, 17 February 1909, NA, FO, 371/581 Nr. 105. 
524   Ibid. 
171 
 
sons of the old ones’.525 On another occasion, on the subject of the new regime of the 
Young Turks, Durham was also told that ‘the Turk is always a Turk’.526 
The situation in the vilayet of Shkodra led an Albanian delegation, comprised of both 
Muslims and Christians, to travel to Salonika to confer with the CUP leaders but there was 
no mutual understanding in their discussion of the situation. There were also problems 
with those Albanian Young Turks who returned from exile. Ibrahim Temo was surprised 
when he returned home and was told by a Young Turk activist, Ahmet Cemal Bey that the 
CUP had changed and was creating a society which was not something he had worked for 
abroad.527 When Dervish Hima, also a well-known nationalist intellectual and a Young Turk, 
returned from exile, he delivered a nationalist speech at a banquet given in his honour by 
the Young Turk Committee. In his speech he said that ‘the Albanians would never unite 
with the Turks’. The next day he was arrested.528  
Meanwhile, national problems in Macedonia resurfaced again. The Bulgarian Internal 
Organisation of the vilayet of Manastir held a congress to demand ‘autonomy for 
Macedonia as a whole’ but proclaimed to respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.529 
The Bulgarian initiative caused worries among Albanian leaders because they were not 
seen as an important element in Macedonia. Difficulties were mounting and the Young 
Turks, as well as Albanian nationalists, were hoping that their problems would be solved by 
the parliament in a democratic way.   
In September 1908 a British army officer, together with two Albanian Young Turk heroes, 
Enver and Nijazi Bey, toured the city of Salonika in a coach followed by a huge cheering 
crowd. Being aware of the serious problems that the ethnic groups or nationalities were 
facing in Macedonia, Enver Bey asked the crowd to aid the CUP by not putting obstacles in 
their way and 'await[ing] the assembly of the parliament to settle their grievances'. He 
added that the ‘CUP was one body’.530  
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Elections and the parliament would prove that this was not the case. Before the elections 
were held, the CUP revealed its political program which appeared to be committed to 
Ottomanism but in reality was further promoting Turkism. Their political program revealed 
that Turkish would become the official language of the Empire, a plan which had a negative 
impact on Albanians and led their language to be attacked by the CUP. 531 
The debates of the first sessions of the Ottoman parliament brought into view the efforts of 
those deputies who wanted to differentiate themselves from other nationalities or 
ethnicities by language, culture, religion and historical importance. They saw this act as a 
way of advancing their nationalist ideology as it was important for nationalist 
representatives of the Albanians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Macedonians to prove that they 
were not only different from each other but moreover that they were not Turks. Thus, the 
Ottoman parliament became a venue in which the nationalist movements of the Empire 
expressed themselves.532   
The fiercest debates fought and the harshest language used in the parliament was between 
Albanians and those who regarded themselves as Ottomans or Turks. Mufid Libohova, later 
to become foreign minister of Albania, mentioned the word Arnavutlar (Albanians) while 
speaking in the parliament.533 At that moment Ahmed Riza, the president of the 
parliament, interrupted Libohova by shouting: Arnavutlar Yok. Hepimiz Osmanliyiz (There 
are no Albanians. We are all Ottomans). ‘Var, efendem, var!’ (There are, Sir, there are!), 
answered Libohova, together with other Albanian deputies who rose from their seats to 
protest against Riza. The phrase “There are, Sir, there are!” became popular and was used 
by Albanian nationalists as a slogan.534  
At the beginning of 1909, the Young Turks started to act against the result of the Congress 
of Manastir. Since the Young Turks were against the Albanian Latin alphabet and general 
use of the language, they took actions to try to convince the Albanians to retain Ottoman 
letters. On 4 February 1909, the Young Turks organised an assembly in a Bektashi 
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monastery in Tepelena, southern Albania. In order to gain Albanian support, the CUP 
portrayed itself as a guarantor of Albanian territorial integrity against Greek expansionist 
intentions. To the surprise of the Young Turks, the only question the Albanian leaders 
wanted to discuss was the autonomy of the four Albanian vilayets. In the end, the 
organisers of the assembly did not endorse the proposal. The assembly was conducted in 
secret and so the British, who had no diplomatic representation in south Albania, had no 
information about the agenda and outcome of the meeting. Lamb, the British consul in 
Salonika, asked Stranieri, the Italian consul at Prevesa, for information. When Lamb was 
informed, he interpreted Albanian actions as nationalistic. He added:  
They [Albanians] are working by every means in their power, including the formation of 
bands, to affect the ‘Albanianisation’ of the Christian population.535  
It is not clear what Lamb meant by the ‘Albanianisation’ of the Christians but one may 
presume that he wanted to explain that Albanian nationalists were working against the 
process of Hellenization of the Albanian Orthodox population. However, it was obvious that 
the Assembly of Tepelana had shown, yet again, the problem which existed between the 
Albanians and the Young Turks. The political position of the Albanian leaders ‘diluted Young 
Turk illusions' and brought back 'the implications and particularities of the Albanian 
question.’536  
The Ottoman parliamentary democracy was barely three months old when dissatisfaction 
against the Young Turks in Constantinople became public and increased significantly. Of all 
the nationalities the most dissatisfied were the Albanians, who now became a target of the 
Young Turk’s anti-Albanian policies. In March the press campaigns for and against the 
Young Turks increased rapidly. One of the fiercest enemies of the Young Turks was the 
newspaper Serbesti. The editor in chief was an Albanian called Hasan Fehmi Bey (1874-
1909) who was killed on 6 April by a Young Turk officer acting on behalf of the CUP.537 
Fehmi Bey was assassinated under similar circumstances and most likely for the same 
reason as another Albanian nationalist, Ismail Mahir Pasha. More than 5000 mourners took 
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part in Fehmi Bey's funeral and expressed their anger at the CUP's efforts to restrict the 
liberty of the press. Among them were not only Albanians but many liberal deputies, 
Muslim clerics and a great number of theological students. The agitation did not end with 
the funeral but continued to manifest indignation with the new regime.538 Many mourners 
wanted revenge which then served as a cause of important upcoming events. Fehmi Bey's 
work against the CUP may have been the result of the anti-Albanian policy of the Young 
Turks, but his death was taken by a wide population of Constantinople, mostly conservative 
and religious, as cause to launch a counter-revolution.   
The CUP also showed open hostility towards Ismail Bey and other Albanian deputies. Acting 
out of fear of the Albanians, the CUP dismissed the Albanian Imperial Guard. The CUP 
declared that they had to take such a decision as they had information that the Guard was 
plotting to kill Ahmed Riza and his supporters.539 In reality the CUP wanted to strip the 
Sultan of his powers and simultaneously to weaken Albanian influence in the Palace. The 
Imperial Guard had been an important Albanian institution in Constantinople so their 
dismissal came as a big blow to the Albanians and contributed another reason for the 
Albanians to join the counter-revolutionary movement which had already begun.  
On 13 April a unit of Albanian soldiers and officers, probably acting at the request of Ismail 
Bey Qemali, seized the House of Parliament. A group of deputies, dominated by liberals of 
the Ahrar Party and religious exponents, which also became known as the Counter 
Revolutionary Group, gathered in the parliament and, headed by Ismail Bey, issued a six-
point demand. Points 3 and 4 were of essential importance: 3. Ahmed Riza, President of the 
Chamber, should be dismissed and replaced by Ismail Bey; 4. The expulsion of leading 
members of the CUP from Constantinople.540   
However, it was time for Enver and Nijazi Bey to protect their regime and the constitution 
they had contributed to reinstating a few months earlier. They mobilised Albanian troops 
and volunteers and joined the commander of the Third Army based in Salonika, Mahmud 
Shevket Pasha, the former vali (governor) of Kosovo. The constitutional army of 20,000 
regulars and 15,000 volunteers entered Constantinople on 24 April and easily secured the 
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city. As Ismail Bey had played a prominent role in the counter-revolution, the CUP accused 
him of being 'privy and accessory to the reactionary movement' and demanded his head. 
As before, Ismail Bey turned to his friends, the British embassy and the Khedive dynasty, for 
help. He was swiftly evacuated to Greece but returned within a few weeks when the 
parliament reassembled and resumed the role of leading the opposition.541 
The counter-revolution and the evacuation of Ismail Bey to Greece exposed a problem 
which existed between Albanian conservative and nationalist leaders and which was noted 
by British diplomats who monitored Ismail Bey’s activities. The British consul in Salonika 
reported that a delegation of Albanian conservatives had travelled to the city to confer with 
CUP leaders when it became known that the counter-revolution was about to fail. Albanian 
conservatives demanded assurances that no harm would be caused to the Sultan and to 
Ismail Qemali’s liberals who had led the counter-revolution.542 On the other side, Albanian 
nationalists and Young Turks members, who opposed the counter-revolution, believed that 
Ismail Bey had taken the side of the conservatives and feared that he was about to travel to 
south Albania to organise an insurrection. Political activists of the Bashkimi club in 
Manastir, among them Abdyl Frashëri’s son, Mit’hat Frashëri (1880-1949) sent telegrams to 
all the clubs in south Albania asking Albanian patriots to be aware of Ismail Bey’s activities 
and not to entertain his suggestions. The British consul wrote that Albanian nationalist 
leaders regarded Ismail Bey as a ‘noxious abominable individual who has associated himself 
with enemies of his country.’ Furthermore, from Lamb’s dispatches it can be seen that 
Ismail Bey tried to cross to into Albania from Greece but gave up, probably because of fear 
of reinforced Ottoman troops and Albanian nationalists who mobilised to block his 
activities.543  
However, in Constantinople the Sultan was probably delighted with the short lived result of 
the counter-revolution. He was at the centre of the conflict and the Young Turks, being 
aware of this fact, decided to take drastic measures against him. On 27 April the CUP took 
the decision to dethrone the Sultan. A group of four CUP members was sent to inform the 
Sultan about the decision: two Albanians, a Jew and an Armenian.544 One of the Albanians 
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was Esat Pasha, who had found a way to enter the group and even managed to be 
appointed as the one who would communicate the bad news to the Sultan. Finally, Esat 
Pasha found himself in front of the terrified Sultan and spoke the words: ‘Abdul, the nation 
hath pronounced thee deposed’.545 The Sultan had favoured him and the entire Toptani 
family with positions and privileges. No other Albanian had benefited from the Sultan more 
than Esat Pasha and the Toptani family. Terrified and betrayed, the Sultan was heard 
whispering 'you are a wicked man'.546 This case could serve as proof that the Sultan’s policy 
of ruling Albania by favouring powerful Albanian families was a failure.  
In a hasty ceremony and in extreme simplicity, Mahmud V (Abdul Hamid's brother), was 
appointed as the new Sultan. The street the new Sultan passed from the place of the 
ceremony to the Palace was lined with a battalion of Albanian soldiers, commanded by 
Nijazi Bey,547 who wanted to show that Albanians still mattered in Constantinople. In 
reality, with the departure of Abdul Hamid II, the Albanians had lost their power and 
influence in the Ottoman Empire for ever. Abdul Hamid was sent into exile with his family 
to Salonika.548  However, as we shall see later, Albanian conservatives made plans to rescue 
and return him to power.  
Only a few days after Abdul Hamid was deposed at the end of April 1909, the Young Turks 
turned against the Albanians in Kosovo. The Albanians had rebelled against the Young Turks 
who imposed new taxes and armed men gathered in Ferizaj to demand the abolition of 
these new taxes. As the Young Turks had broken their promises, Albanians took the 
decision to fight their regime.549 A force of 5000 Ottoman soldiers was sent to pacify them 
under the command of Cavit Pasha. After two months of fierce fighting and the destruction 
of many villages, Cavit declared a victory. In reality, he had not achieved his goal and as 
such a new campaign was started in September. The resistance of armed Albanians grew 
intensively and he was forced to retreat from Kosovo.550   
The Albanians were rejecting the Young Turks whom they had helped come to power, a 
fact which caused some confusion and worry among British diplomats. The British 
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ambassador in Vienna, Fairfax Cartwright, asked the Greek diplomat Manos for information 
regarding the ‘attitude’ the Albanians had adopted against the Porte. Manos told 
Cartwright that his government was monitoring Albania with great interest. He added that 
Albanians had no sympathy for the Young Turks and the Albanian movement for autonomy 
‘would spread like wildfire throughout that Province’.551 
The Greek diplomat hoped that the Albanians would turn towards Greece and favour the 
creation of an autonomous government under the personal suzerainty of the Greek king. 
He also told Cartwright that the Greek government, through their schools, ‘has built a 
strong link of sympathy between the two countries.’ The Greek diplomat expressed the 
view of his government and pointed out that the autonomy of Albania was to become a 
serious problem for Greece and other Balkan countries. This information did not seem to 
have been taken seriously by Cartwright or Grey, with Cartwright even writing that the 
‘Greeks open their mouths wide.'552   
However, in Kosovo and Macedonia the campaign of Cavit Pasha caused the majority of 
Albanians to stop believing in the Young Turk's policy. Yet at the same time, the Young 
Turks strengthened their relations with the Serbs, their new ally in Kosovo. In 1908 in 
Skopje, under the leadership of Bogdan Radenković (1874-1917) and with Young Turk 
approval, the Serbs established the Organisation of Ottoman Serbs. This organisation 
spread its branches in Macedonia and Kosovo and also published a newspaper named 
Vardar with the purpose of supporting the Young Turks. Vardar unconditionally supported 
the Young Turk policy against the Albanian Latin alphabet. The Organisation of Ottoman 
Serbs kept an open relationship with Serbian paramilitary forces553 and in August 1908 the 
Austro-Hungarian consul in Prizren reported that the local Serbs were actively taking part 
as members of Young Turk organisations in the town and the region.554 Another report 
spoke of the Srpska Demokratska Liga (Serbian Democratic League) being formed in Skopje 
and spreading quickly throughout the vilayet of Kosovo.555   
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When the punitive mission of Cavit Pasha failed, another Ottoman force was sent to Kosovo 
in spring 1910 when a revolt broke out, again because of taxes, under leadership of Isa 
Boletini and Idriz Seferi (1847–1927) who had gathered 9,000 armed men. The Porte sent a 
strong army under the command of Shevket Durgut Pasha, which clashed with Albanian 
insurgents who had blocked the railway from Macedonia. But the biggest battle took place 
in Carraleva, central Kosovo, where the Ottoman army was repelled. In difficult moments, 
the Ottomans were helped by the local Serbs who knew a short cut over the mountains 
which forced the Albanians to withdraw before becoming encircled.556 Boletini and Seferi 
escaped capture but many thousands were killed, imprisoned and interned. Durgut Pasha, 
now with a force of 40,000, continued westwards to Shkodra to disarm the Albanians and 
destroy northern parts of Albania.557  
When the campaign was over, the Young Turks proclaimed martial law. They closed down 
Albanian schools and prohibited publications in Albanian. With this, the Young Turks broke 
the last and most important promise they had made in Ferizaj two years earlier. This 
enraged the few remaining Albanians who might have still believed in Young Turk policies. 
The CUP annual congress in October 1910 was held in Salonika. No Albanian delegate was 
present.558 With their absence, the Albanians demonstrated the belief of many, that 
reaching a peaceful agreement with the Young Turks was impossible. 
 
Conclusion 
The British government, hoping to regain influence in Constantinople, firmly supported the 
Young Turks between 1908 and 1910. Simultaneously, this meant less active engagement 
by the British in the Balkans and in the Albanian Question. The fact that the British stood 
behind the Young Turks and disagreed with the Austro-Hungarians on the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina produced a new situation in the Balkans in which Serbia emerged 
as an important player. The British gave signs of supporting the Serbian extension to the 
south, to the territories now known as Macedonia and Kosovo which at that time the 
Albanians considered belonged to them. Support for the Young Turks and for Serbian plans 
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for extension also meant that the British did not give much consideration to the national 
cause of the Albanians. The British government still believed that the Albanian Question 
and other problems in the Balkans, specifically in Macedonia, would be solved by 
democratic or good governance by the Young Turks.  
The Albanian nationalist leaders, like the British government, believed in the Young Turks’ 
promises. They supported the movement because they hoped that the reinstatement of 
the Ottoman constitution and parliament would offer the possibility of overthrowing the 
Sultan’s autocratic regime and solving the national problem by democratic means. As it 
turned out, the Young Turks kept none of the promises they had given to the Albanians. 
The Young Turks believed that schools and language were promoting Albanian nationalism 
and after they returned to power in 1909 broke their promise by closing down schools. 
However, the Albanian leaders managed to unify their alphabet and, in doing so, 
strengthen their nationalist program. The Revolution also empowered Albanian nationalists 
and weakened the conservatives. The strand of Albanian nationalism which aimed for 
autonomy was an obstacle for the Young Turks, who initiated the centralisation of power 
with which they hoped to strengthen the Ottomanisation of the Empire and solve the 
problems in the Balkans. Thus, the Young Turks adopted an anti-Albanian policy which, as a 
result, hastened the confrontation between the Porte and Albanian nationalists. With the 
introduction of new taxes and the abolition of privileges, the Young Turks also turned the 
Albanian conservatives, who were traditionally pro-Ottoman, against them. After 1909 the 
policies of the Young Turks came to be the cause that united the whole Albanian political 
spectrum against the Porte. 
The confrontation between the Young Turks and the Albanians which came as a result of 
new developments of the Albanian language brought to light a new problem which would 
result in major changes and bring into question the very existence of the Ottoman Empire. 
The growing and increasingly consolidated Albanian nationalism was now battling a new 
nationalism: Turkism. Therefore, disagreements between the Albanians and the Young 
Turks that started over language and initially manifested as confrontations in the press, 
parliament and other forums, mutated into armed conflict and produced consequences for 
the entire Balkan region.   
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                                                Chapter VI 
 
Albania’s last efforts for autonomy and independence, 1911-1912 
 
The East depended upon the West and in the past an Englishman in Turkey who 
was a disinterested friend of any of the nationalities within the Ottoman Empire 
really had his own unassailable niche. All the people in Turkey, including the Turk, 
were in chronic state of shipwreck; the English were in permanent possession of 
the lifeboat, though often that boat could not put out to sea. – Aubrey Herbert.559  
 
Introduction 
After the Congress of Berlin, the perseverance of the increasingly weak Ottoman Empire 
depended on the position that the European Powers took on the Eastern Question. The 
Porte had particularly counted on British support. Other nationalities, especially the 
Albanians, continued with efforts to win the British over to their side. Although for different 
reasons, both Ottoman officials and Albanian nationalists wanted British support. The 
Ottomans believed that British support would strengthen their empire. The Albanians 
maintained that with British support they would gain autonomy or independence, a move 
which would weaken the Ottoman Empire and consequently would end the Porte’s rule in 
Europe. 
This chapter presents the British government’s position towards both the Albanian 
Question and the Ottoman Empire in the lead-up to the Balkan War. The main purpose of 
this chapter is to discuss the change in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire, which 
was made as a result of the Albanian insurrections of 1911 and 1912 and the growing 
influence of the Germans in Constantinople.  
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As will be shown below, the insurrection of 1911, which took place mainly among the 
Catholic population in north Albania, gained considerable publicity in the British and 
European press. As a result, the British attitude towards the Porte started to change, a fact 
which was assisted by Edith Durham’s reports to the Foreign Office and the pieces she 
wrote for the British press. Further important changes came as a result of actions by a 
number of Serbian officials who influenced the policy of the Foreign Office.  
Until 1911 the Young Turks had enjoyed the full support of the British government and 
showed no interest in solving the Albanian Question. Therefore, most of the Albanian 
leaders who were members of the Young Turk organisation abandoned its ranks and sought 
new ways of securing autonomy, namely by organising an uprising. Albanian leaders 
needed the support of the Powers and decided to put more effort into internationalising 
their national question. The internationalisation of the Albanian question meant that the 
involvement of the Powers, especially Britain, and of neighbouring states should work in 
favour of finding a favourable solution for the Albanians. 
In 1912 Albanian leaders initiated another, better organised uprising which was ultimately 
more successful than that of 1911 because it opened the way for the process of autonomy. 
However, such plans for Albanian autonomy were against a mutual agreement achieved 
between Serbia and Bulgaria in March 1912 which sought to divide Macedonia and Kosovo 
between the two countries. Examples such as this demonstrate that autonomy, even 
though never implemented, became a concern for those neighbouring countries with plans 
for territorial expansion into territories that Albanian leaders considered their own. It will 
therefore be argued that even though the demand for autonomy was a success for the 
nascent Albanian nationalism, the friction it caused in the region quickly became the main 
cause of the Balkan Wars. 
Amid the First Balkan War of October 1912 - May 1913, when most areas of the four 
Albanian vilayets were occupied by the armies of the Balkan League, Albanian leaders, with 
the support of Austria-Hungary, declared Albania an independent country on 28 November 
1912. The Balkan Wars showed that by the end of 1912 the “friendly” British policy towards 
the Porte had become “unsupportive,” a change which also affected Albania when the 
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British government announced that it would support the advancement of the Balkan 
League armies.  
 
The insurrection of 1911 
In January 1911, under the initiative of the Albanian nationalist writer Nikollë Ivanaj (1879–
1951), an organisation called the Albanian Republican Committee was formed in Podgorica, 
Montenegro. The aim of the Committee was to organise a general uprising which would 
include Albanian organisations abroad. Ivanaj moved to Bari in southern Italy to continue 
his attempts to attract the help of local Albanian communities and the support or sympathy 
of the Italian government. Hopes increased when another committee called Pro Albania 
was formed a few weeks later by Albanians and Italian supporters of the Albanian national 
cause. Ivanaj’s initiative was supported by Italian Albanians and soon attracted the 
sympathy of republicans, socialists and other Italian politicians who joined Pro Albania, 
which was soon able to gather the backing of 60 members of the Italian Parliament. The 
Committee also collected money, arms and registered thousands of volunteers who 
expressed readiness to cross the Adriatic under the command of Ricciotti Garibaldi, 
Giuseppe Garibaldi’s son, and help Albanian insurgents in the north. Albanians in Italy also 
lobbied for the support of the Italian government, but the initiative was cut short. The 
Italian government was planning an invasion of Libya and was not interested in helping 
anyone with the intention of intervening in Albania because it could jeopardise relations 
with Austria-Hungary. Therefore, within a short time, the Italian government ordered all 
activities of Pro Albania to be stopped.560 
Meanwhile, Albanian leaders who resided in territories of the Ottoman Empire continued 
with preparations for a general uprising and attracting the attention of the Powers in order 
to involve them in solving the Albanian Question. Ismail Qemali contacted European 
Powers to inform them about their plans.561 The Powers, particularly Austria-Hungary, on 
whom Albanian leaders counted the most, were not pleased with this initiative. When it 
became clear that there would be no help from the Powers, Albanian leaders turned to 
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their neighbouring countries. Ivanaj kept in touch with Garibaldi but moved to operate 
from Belgrade and tried to get support from the Serbian government.562 After a short time 
Ivanaj moved to Sofia, from where he tried to bring together the Albanian leaders. His 
intention was to revive Shqënia e Zezë (the Black Society) which had been formed in 1878. 
From Sofia Ivanaj, together with five other activists, issued a declaration announcing the 
formation of the Komiteti Qendror i Shqipërisë (Central Committee of Albania) and asked 
other leaders to join.563 Throughout 1911 there were high levels of communication 
between many Albanian leaders but they did not succeed in creating a single body to 
represent the whole country as they had planned but rather acted in several small groups 
or individually.      
Ismail Bey Qemali contacted the Greek embassy in Constantinople and sent a message to 
the Greek government about the insurrection, which was expected to take place in the 
spring. The Greek government promised Qemali money, arms and ammunition.564 
However, none of these were ever delivered to the Albanians.  
Isa Boletini went to Montenegro and received Serbian delegations on several occasions 
with the aim of forming an alliance with Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. Boletini 
continually met Serbian officials and army officers until late August 1912 when he hosted a 
delegation headed by Colonel Apis who, a few months earlier, had formed the secret 
organisation ‘The Black Hand’ (Crna Ruka). Apis was sent by Serbia’s Prime Minister Nikola 
Pašić with the proposal that Serbia would fully support an Albanian insurrection against the 
Porte if they agreed to join Serbia after the region was liberated.565  
The Serbian and Montenegrin governments agreed to supply the Albanian insurgents with 
a certain amount of arms, but no political agreement or military alliance was reached. 
Although they did not manage to secure the support of the Great Powers, the Albanians of 
Malësia (the northern mountains) began their insurrection in March 1911. Their 
proclaimed aims were self-government, for Albanian schools to be maintained by the Porte 
and for Albanian soldiers to serve only in Albania566 but the insurrection failed to spread 
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across the country and as such did not achieve its goals. Although the Albanian leaders did 
not succeed in widening the insurrection, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro increasingly saw 
the Albanian efforts for autonomy as a threat to their own national aspirations. For this 
reason, these three governments saw the Albanian efforts for autonomy as a common 
problem and would soon take joint action.567  
The Young Turks sought to show the Powers that the Porte was in control of its Balkan 
territories and that the situation in most parts of Albania was peaceful. To this end, the 
Sultan visited these two regions in June 1911 in an effort to restore Ottoman prestige, stop 
the uprising and reach a reconciliation with the Albanians.568 
The Sultan and the Young Turks were aware that the internationalisation of the Albanian 
Question would create a problem for the Porte and they were therefore determined to 
demonstrate that the Macedonian and Albanian Questions were simply internal matters. 
When the Sultan arrived in Skopje, he praised the Young Turks for their contribution to 
bringing ethnic groups closer. However, as was revealed in Skopje, the main aim of the 
Sultan’s visit was to tend to the Albanians and the territories inhabited by them. The Sultan 
was pleased to see around 5000 Albanians cheering his visit in Skopje, yet historian Erik 
Zürcher notes that the Young Turks made a considerable effort to ‘engineer this Albanian 
enthusiasm’.569  
Visiting dominions was not part of the Ottoman monarchic tradition, but the time had 
come to make exceptions.570 The CUP propaganda had widely publicised the visit 
beforehand. The CUP press published a statement reminding the population that the Battle 
of Kosovo in 1389 was a Christian crusade against Muslims which aimed to expel the 
Ottomans from Europe. Now the Muslims were asked to show up in great numbers to 
honour and follow Sultan Murat’s example. The CUP press announced that 300,000 
Albanians were expected to take part in the prayer ceremony which would be led by the 
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Sultan. The British consul in Skopje guessed that the number of participants would be 
100,000. In reality the number of Albanians that attended the ceremony was several times 
lower than the British consul predicted. After the ceremony a declaration by the Grand 
Vizier was read out but, since it was not translated into Albanian, few seemed to have 
understood it.571 
The Young Turks had hoped to rebuild their damaged ties with the Albanians and reach a 
reconciliation with their leaders but none of the Albanian leaders attended the ceremony 
or wished to meet the Sultan. The Sultan’s visit took place without incident. According to 
the British Embassy in Constantinople it ended as ‘an unqualified success’.572 Yet, the 
Sultan’s visit did not achieve its political purpose. However, at the same time, the visit also 
showed that some Albanians still believed in the Young Turks and were faithful to the 
Sultan. One such example is Nijazi Bey, the Young Turk hero, who had organised the entire 
journey and was in charge of the security of the Sultan.573  
Despite the political failings of the visit with regard to the Albanian Question, the Sultan 
and the Young Turks did manage to strengthen relations with the Serbs. Although it was 
expected that the visit would anger the Serbs, who considered Kosovo as sacred and 
important to their national identity, on this occasion they saw the Ottomans as friends and 
the Albanians as the source of danger. The Sultan’s visit seemed to have attracted the 
interest of the Serbian crown prince and he planned to hold a meeting with the Sultan in 
Skopje. However, the meeting did not take place as the Serbian prince had to go to London 
to attend the coronation of King George V. In Prishtina, under the organisation of the 
Serbian consul Milan Rakić, a large crowd of local Serbs had gathered to honour the Sultan. 
Even the choir of the Serbian Orthodox seminary sang for the Sultan.574 On his way back, 
the Sultan stopped in Manastir to visit the base of the Third Army and during the three 
nights of his stay the town was illuminated by the Serbian community. In Salonika the 
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Sultan hosted an official dinner in order to ‘honour the Serbian delegation which had come 
to pay its respects’.575  
Serbia publicly appeared as a friend of the Porte but secretly was preparing for war. Only a 
few months after the Sultan’s visit to Macedonia and Kosovo, Serbia and Bulgaria reached a 
military agreement against the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. The mutual 
agreement, signed in March 1912, recognised Serbian interests in Kosovo and Albania, and 
Bulgarian interests in Thrace, demonstrating that interest in Macedonia and Albania was 
increasing. If the programme of autonomy for Macedonia was to fail, then both countries 
would partition the region. Bulgaria would take southern Macedonia while Serbia would 
take the north. Skopje, then the capital of the vilayet of Kosovo, was considered as a 
disputed zone on which the Russians would act as arbitrators.576 This bilateral 
understanding was later supported by Montenegro and Greece and, after another series of 
agreements, the Balkan League was formed by the end of 1912.   
From the perspective of the Young Turks, the uprising and the failure of the Sultan’s visit 
made them consider the Albanian national requests more seriously. During the CUP Annual 
Congress, which was held in Salonika at the end of September and beginning of October 
1911, the Young Turks made a secret decision regarding the Albanian Question. In the 
future the Albanians were to be allowed to use their language but it was also decided that a 
number of hojas (Muslim priests) would be sent to open schools in Albania and propagate 
against the Latin alphabet that the Albanians had adopted. The Young Turks decided to 
help strengthen Albanian nationalism but they only did this in order to weaken Greek 
nationalism, evidence of which can be seen through their decision to support Christian 
Orthodox Albanians wishing to separate from the Greek Church. Prayers in Albanian, which 
were not allowed in Greek Churches, were to be promoted. The list of decisions taken 
during the Congress regarding the Albanian Question was long and was regarded by a 
British diplomatic report as a way of ‘fostering and spreading hatred’ against the Greeks 
and their Orthodox Church.577 
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Although the Albanian leaders failed to organise a general uprising, their attempt alarmed 
the Powers and neighbouring states. The failure of the uprising demonstrated that the 
Albanians lacked a strong and united leadership but Albanian leaders did manage to draft 
and distribute their political program to the international arena. On 23 June 1911 in Greça, 
a village in northern Albania, under the leadership of Ismail Qemali and Luigj Gurakuqi 
(1879-1925), an intellectual and patriot, a memorandum was distributed to the consular 
and diplomatic representatives of the Powers in Montenegro. Two of the main requests of 
the memorandum were autonomy and the recognition of Albanians as a nation.578 The 
memorandum, which became known as the ‘12 Points Memorandum’, had considerable 
resonance in the European and British press.  
 
Changes in British and Austro-Hungarian policy 
At the beginning of 1911 the British government continued to disregard Albanian efforts to 
fulfil their national ambitions and instead paid considerable attention to the situation which 
reappeared in Macedonia. Noel Buxton, the Chairman of the Balkan Committee, had visited 
Macedonia and in an interview published in the Daily News gave a grim outlook for the 
region. Noel Buxton also published a letter with similar views in The Times.579 As a result of 
several more articles of this nature, Macedonia came up as a matter to be discussed in the 
British Parliament. Macedonia also became a subject matter between Ottoman, Austro-
Hungarian and British diplomats in London. Although these incidents created a bad 
impression about the Porte’s rule, Ottoman diplomats hoped that this would not change 
Britain’s ‘positive attitude towards the Sublime Porte’. The Ottomans also hoped that the 
situation would not give a pretext to any of the powers wishing to ‘exploit incidents’ in 
Macedonia.580 However, Albanians in Macedonia and their activity in northern Albania, 
where they were engaged in preparing an insurrection, were not seen as dangerous acts 
and, therefore, not discussed in the British Parliament nor by the diplomats.   
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In London, the press gave priority to British-Ottoman trade relations which were also of 
concern to the British government. After the Baghdad railway concessions were given to 
the Germans, Edward Grey was not happy but told the press that he expected a fair trade 
treatment within the Ottoman Empire and to safeguard the dominant position in the 
Persian Gulf.581 The British and Ottoman members of both parliaments believed that the 
two countries were nourishing a good relationship. In June 1911 an Ottoman parliamentary 
delegation led by two well-known politicians and intellectuals, Riza Tevfik Bey and Suleiman 
Bustani, took part in the Universal Races Congress held in London. The Ottoman delegation 
was hosted by the Eastern Association whose aim was to promote inter race relations.582 
The guests were welcomed by Lord Weardale, chair of the Association, who said that they 
had every sympathy for the efforts being made to improve the Ottoman Empire and 
praised the work of the Young Turks. Admiral Fremantle spoke about the support that the 
British government had offered to the Ottomans during the past century and added that 
the Ottomans could still count on British assistance. 583   
Earlier, in mid-June 1911, a British parliamentary delegation had visited the Ottoman 
Parliament and both parties agreed that the Young Turk policy was on the right track. In the 
House of Commons, the British delegation reported that the Albanian Question ‘ought to 
be dealt with promptly and in the spirit of conciliation’. Although the Muslims, Catholics 
and Orthodox had joined in resisting the Porte, the speaker of the House of Commons did 
not believe that the Albanians desired separation from the Ottoman government and 
‘under no circumstances could the [Ottoman] government submit to the dictation of 
others’. The Ottomans assured the British that the Albanian Question was not religious in 
nature since there was no fanaticism and Albanians were good Ottomans. When this 
sentence was heard in the House of Commons all members cheered loudly.584 However, 
Lord Weardale, Admiral Fremantle and both parliamentary delegations were not aware 
that the Foreign Office and the British Government had started to change their policy 
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towards the Porte. This change started to take root during the Albanian insurrection of 
1911.  
Initially, the Albanian insurrection of 1911 did not receive much attention in London. The 
reports that were sent to the Foreign Office from the British Embassy in Constantinople 
expressed hope or indeed confidence, that the Porte would be able to crush the Albanian 
insurgency. This view was similar to the one expressed in the Young Turk press which 
ignored the scale of the Albanian uprising. Tanin, the main Young Turk newspaper, argued 
that ‘to speak of an Albanian question today is wrong’ because the number of insurgents 
and the affected area was small compared with the whole of Albania and its total 
population.585    
Initially the British government did not take a stance on this matter because it waited to 
see the reactions of Austria-Hungary and Italy. However in May 1911, when the uprising 
seemed to be spreading and reports began to appear in the press, the Foreign Office 
started to view the ability of the Porte with doubt and pessimism. The British view of 
Ottoman policy started to change, but not entirely in favour of the Albanians. The British 
government believed that the Young Turks should change their policy of Ottomanisation 
out of fear that Albanian rejection of the policy could spread the insurrection to other 
regions, thus threatening the empire with disintegration. When the uprising spread further 
to northern Albania, the British government started to show more attention to the reports 
being sent to the Foreign Office by Edith Durham. Their attention grew further still when 
reports were published by newspapers such as the Manchester Guardian, many of which 
caused some trouble within the Foreign Office when some officials expressed their belief 
that Durham was deliberately spreading ‘Turcophobia’.586  
After the ’12 Point Memorandum’587 had reached the Foreign Office at the end of June, 
Albanian insurgents sent a letter to Edward Grey. Durham later wrote that ‘I had not so 
much faith as they in British unselfishness, but said at any rate it could do no harm’.588 In 
fact, the letter was actually drafted by a French journalist to which Durham made no major 
alterations, but suggested that it should not only be sent to Edward Grey but to all 
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European newspapers. Despite her recommendation, the letter was sent to Grey in the 
form of a petition signed by the Albanian leaders and explained the difficult situation in 
Albania after the latest Ottoman actions. The petition called for international intervention 
and for a ‘large autonomy’ but was sent only to the British government, leaving the Powers 
to be informed through the press.589  
Two other dispatches that were sent to the Foreign Office from Montenegro by British 
diplomats earlier that month seemed to have put pressure on Edward Grey. Grey was 
informed that the Albanian insurgents, advised by Ismail Qemali, would not surrender to 
the Porte without a guarantee from the Powers.590 Other sources showed that the 
Montenegrin government was worried about the spread of the Albanian insurrection and 
did not favour the involvement of the British government in the Albanian case. On this 
matter Grey pointed out that ‘the alternative of doing nothing may lead to a situation in 
the Balkans that may be very disagreeable.’591 
Therefore, Grey decided to act and deal with the Albanian request believing that the 
petition which had been addressed to the Foreign Office was public property. He saw no 
need to conceal it from the public. He maintained that the Ottoman government should 
express readiness to meet the wishes of the Albanians. Yet he also thought that it was 
possible that other Powers, specifically Austria-Hungary, may not be pleased by the fact 
that the Albanians had appealed to the British government for help. Hence, Grey felt that 
the British government should not deal with this matter on its own and decided to involve 
all the Powers. He ordered his ambassadors in Vienna, Paris, St. Petersburg, Rome and 
Berlin to ask the respective governments for a joint representation to the Porte.592 
Ambassadors were also told to inform the foreign ministers of these Powers that the British 
government agreed with the Albanian request for limited autonomy, but, in order to make 
things easier for the Powers, emphasised that the Albanians did not request independence. 
However, Grey also wrote that the British proposal was limited to ‘an endeavour to induce 
the Powers to obtain guarantees of non-molestation in the event of the Albanians 
surrendering their arms’. Grey added: 
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We might go a step further and suggest that the Porte should be asked to give 
assurances that the amnesty will be general and that the requests of the 
Albanians in respect to the language and school questions as well as to 
improvement of communications be granted.593  
Somewhat surprisingly, the Russians supported Grey’s plan. Neratow, the acting Russian 
foreign minister, told O'Beirne, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, that he doubted 
whether the Albanians would be satisfied with less than full autonomy but agreed to join 
the British proposal. O'Beirne suggested that Vienna might take actions on its own if the 
Albanian insurrection continued because of the pressure which was being built by the 
Austro-Hungarian press. Neratow, claiming to have further information, assured O'Beirne 
that the Austro-Hungarians would not take up arms on behalf of the Albanians and would 
rather employ diplomatic means.594  
While Austria-Hungary and Italy also joined Britain and Russia, this was not the case with 
Germany and France. The German government thought that Grey’s proposal was based on 
‘good grounds tending to preserve peace’ but felt that such a proposal constituted an 
interference in internal Ottoman affairs which would lead to a ‘policy of intervention which 
died out with the old regime’. Thus, the Germans maintained that collective interventions 
would harm the Porte and would encourage ‘unruly elements in Albania’ and so the answer 
from Berlin was negative.595 By early July, Lowther told Grey that the French ambassador in 
Constantinople expressed strong disagreement with the British proposal. The French 
rejected the proposal for the same reasons as the Germans and, in addition, maintained 
that there was little point supporting the British initiative if the Germans had already 
refused it.   
Lowther also had reason to believe that the Germans had informed the Ottomans about 
Grey’s initiative for Albanian autonomy, even though it was supposed to be secret.596 
Despite the fact that any joint representation of the Powers did not intend to request full 
autonomy for the Albanians, it was interpreted as a step towards such goal by the Porte 
and was therefore greeted with annoyance. More importantly, this moment was a pivotal 
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step in the British government’s abandonment of its friendly policy towards the Porte. The 
initiative on behalf of the Albanians led the Ottomans to distance themselves from the 
British and seek closer relations with the Germans.  
Meanwhile, during the summer of 1911, when the insurrection was about to collapse, 
some of the Albanian leaders, headed by Hasan Prishtina, did not give up their hope. 
Prishtina, like all other Albanian leaders, was not aware of Grey’s secret diplomatic efforts 
that had ended without success. Therefore in late July, Prishtina approached the British 
consulate in Skopje for help telling vice consul Hugh that Albanian leaders were about to 
widen the insurrection and would listen to any advice the British government would 
offer.597 The British advice for Hasan Prishtina was that the Albanian leaders should 
approach the Porte to address their problems by ‘peaceful means’. ‘A general uprising,’ as 
Lowther wrote, would be unfavourable to the Albanians.598 
In autumn 1911 the chairman of the Macedonian Relief Fund, the well-known British 
journalist and war correspondent in the Balkans, Henry W. Nevinson, visited north Albania 
and published an article about the villages which had suffered under the latest Ottoman 
military intervention. Not counting the victims, he estimated that 1,800 houses were 
destroyed, which in turn meant that around 15,000 people were made homeless.599 
Articles describing the difficult situation in north Albania and the mistreatment of Catholic 
Albanians by the Young Turk government were numerous and seemed to have created an 
impact on governments.600 It is worth emphasising that European governments and the 
press showed an interest in such events primarily because the Albanian Catholics were 
Christians who were seen as suffering from Ottoman persecution. The religious dimension 
of the situation was still considered important, following the longstanding trend of 
interpreting Balkan affairs through the prism of religion as outlined in chapter 1. 
The Albanian uprising was not interpreted as an Ottoman or Albanian victory but it changed 
the British position towards the Near Eastern question. This change meant that, in the 
future, pessimistic reports about the Porte would become more acceptable by the British 
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government.601 However, such reports did not necessarily help the Albanian national 
movement. Apart from Durham’s reports, there was other pessimistic information which 
originated in Serbia and was influencing opinion in the Foreign Office. One such example 
was the ‘prognosis’ of the Serbian Prime Minister Milovanović, who maintained that the 
internal collapse of the Ottoman Empire would come soon.  
Throughout 1909 Milovanović had developed an idea with regard to the ‘Sanjak and the 
Albanian problem’, as he called it, and had informed British diplomats about it on many 
occasions. On this subject Milovanović told Cartwright, the British ambassador in Vienna, 
that ‘the Ottoman power has disappeared in Europe.’ Milovanović was hoping to obtain the 
consent of Austria-Hungary to a cession to Serbia of the ‘Sanjak with a strip of territory to 
the sea to the north of Albania.’602 A year later, in 1910, Milovanović told Cartwright that 
public opinion in the Balkans was in a ‘state of fermentation, and that a general 
restlessness existed among the various races.’ Milovanović had also revealed a plan which 
bore some resemblance to the attack later on the Ottoman Empire. On this Cartwright 
wrote:  
Milovanovitch’s policy, if not very noble, is prudent. It consists in truckling to 
Turkey in spite of all the barbarity which the Turks may inflict on Servians in 
Macedonia, until the moment arrives when, Turkey being in difficulties with 
Greece, Servia with Bulgaria and perhaps Roumania, can fall on her flank and 
despoil her of Macedonia. He has no high opinion either of the Turkish army or of 
the new regime.603 
In 1911 Milovanović went further by suggesting that the break-up of the Ottoman Empire 
should be ‘followed by a general attack upon the European provinces’. Arthur Nicolson, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, accepted Milovanović’s ‘prediction’ and 
wrote to Lowther:  
I daresay it is not far from what may take place. Personally I should view with 
great equanimity the break-up of the Turkish regime and Turkish Empire in 
Europe. I have no desire to see either consolidated, for I consider that were they 
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to become strong they could be a menace to every Power with Muhamedan 
subjects, and specially to us who hold Egypt and India.604  
As Heller pointed out, Nicolson was contributing greatly to the Foreign Office’s rapid 
change of position by imposing the most pessimistic view about the future of the Ottoman 
Empire. Influenced by Milovanović, it was obvious who Nicolson and the Foreign Office 
would favour in the future. This change in British policy was also seen in September 1911 
during the Italian invasion of Libya. Nicolson expressed the official British view in a private 
letter that he sent to Cartwright: 
It seems to me exceedingly foolish that we should displease a country with whom 
we have always been on the friendly terms and whose friendship to us is very 
great value, in order to keep well with Turkey, who has been a source of great 
annoyance to us and whose government is in one of the worst that can well be 
imagined. I should far prefer having Italy as a neighbour to Egypt than the 
Turks.605  
Nicolson wrote that the British attitude towards the Italian invasion of Libya ‘will be one of 
complete neutrality’. With such a step he explained the intention of preserving Egypt as a 
dominion of the British. He considered it a disastrous step if Italy or Austria-Hungary were 
to decide to land on the Albanian coast without mutual agreement. He did not want to 
speculate on such a situation because he felt that things were moving too fast and affecting 
the status quo in the Balkans.606  
The change in policy was noted by the annual report issued at the end of 1911 by the 
British Embassy in Constantinople. According to the report, the relationship between the 
Ottomans and the British during 1911 ‘was not a very friendly one’.607 The report also 
recognised that the Baghdad railway and the Albanian question were the two main issues 
that characterised relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Regarding the 
troubles and brutalities that occurred during the insurrection in Albania, Lowther wrote: 
‘we were not slow to point them out, and, did not minimise them‘. It seemed that Ottoman 
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officials were not happy with the British, who criticised the manner in which the Porte had 
dealt with the Albanian uprising. ‘It is difficult for Turks to understand that they cannot use 
their weapons they choose to exact taxation and to punish the rebellion’, added Lowther. 
In this regard, a prominent Ottoman statesman told Lowther:   
From a recent journey in England I came to understand your attitude more than I 
had done hitherto. You do not so much resent our using strong measures against 
a recalcitrant population [the Albanians] which refuses to pay taxes and do 
military service and you realise that in quelling the rebellions that ensure 
innocent people must suffer and villages may be burned. But, what you will not 
tolerate is that when your eye witness have seen these things occur we should 
deny that they ever took place.608  
However, the British diplomats marked the relations between the Porte and Serbia as being 
excellent, although the report also noted that the ‘doctrine of equality of races’ was 
constantly affirmed by the Young Turk government in theory but ‘constantly ignored in 
practice’.609  
Although Vienna was keeping its distance from the Albanian uprising, most of the European 
Powers, including the Balkan countries and specifically Serbia, expressed concerns about 
‘Austrian intrigue in Albania’. In September 1911 Milovanović told Edward Goschen, the 
British ambassador in Berlin, that he was convinced ‘that Austria was at the bottom of the 
Albanian troubles’.610 A few months later, Milovanović also told the British consul in 
Belgrade that Austria-Hungary was to be blamed for the uprising of the Albanians against 
the Porte. As a matter of fact, it was Serbia that was heavily involved in causing troubles 
around the border of Albania. Serbian officers were killed on many occasions at the border 
by Ottoman troops, but Milovanović denied the involvement of his government. A British 
diplomat, explaining Serbian involvement, wrote:   
Servian [Serbian] authorities have connections with some of the leaders and 
there are many Servian [Serbian] emissaries at work in Old Servia [Kosovo]. The 
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idea seems to be to prepare the ground and to establish relations with the bands 
and people in case events should lead to a Servian [Serbian] advance.611  
Earlier, during the Macedonian crisis, the Serbian government had sponsored armed 
Serbian bands in Macedonia and Kosovo. However, the support that Serbia offered to the 
Serbs during 1912 was not only to create obstacles to reforms in Macedonia but also to 
prepare an invasion, as suggested by the above report.  
The Austro-Hungarian government did not support the Albanian insurrection of 1911 and 
this had angered the Albanians, particularly the Catholics. The Austro-Hungarian consul in 
Shkodra ‘begged the Albanians to remain quiet only for two more years’. He promised 
them that they would be free if they would wait. Although this promise was encouraging, in 
a letter which was delivered to the Foreign Office through Henry Nevinson, Durham noted 
that most of the Albanians had ‘had enough of Austria’.612 Even the Archbishop was very 
bitter with the Austro-Hungarian consul stationed in Shkodra because he believed that 
Vienna had betrayed the Albanian Catholics more than once.613  
The diplomats in Cetinje and Shkodra were convinced that the Porte was trying to satisfy 
Albanian demands out of fear that they would appeal to Vienna for intervention.614 In 
reality, at this stage, most of the Albanian leaders had ceased believing in Vienna. 
Furthermore, in the region of Shkodra, the arrival of many refugees from Bosnia led anti-
Austro-Hungarian feelings to grow strong. At the beginning of 1912, northern Albanians 
were ready to rise against the Porte again and were waiting for the rebellion to start in 
Kosovo, Macedonia and southern Albania. However, the beginning of 1912 also brought 
changes in Austro-Hungarian policy, and Vienna would soon assume a supportive role 
towards the Albanians. Although it is likely that the changes came because, by the end of 
February 1912, it was becoming more evident that Albanians would soon renew conflict 
with the Porte, the plans of the Balkan League were arguably a more important factor in 
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bringing about such changes.615 Vienna believed that the Albanian Question was becoming 
an international issue and one in which they had to take part.  
In November 1897, Austria-Hungary and Italy had agreed, in principle, to support an 
autonomous or independent Albania if the Ottoman Empire collapsed.616 Regarding this 
agreement, at the beginning of 1910 the British ambassador in Paris told Grey that there 
was ‘some form of agreement between Austria and Italy relating to Albania’ and added: ‘It 
is, I believe, a self-denying protocol.’617 Due to the importance of the Adriatic Sea, both 
powers were competing to prevent the other from gaining a dominant position in Albania. 
In this agreement they had reached an understanding not to occupy Albania and not to 
allow any other power to set foot on Albanian soil. Both governments agreed that if the 
Porte was to lose Macedonia, they would create an autonomous Albania under the 
sovereignty of the Porte or as an independent principality.618   
The question was, when should Vienna and Rome consider that the Ottoman Empire was 
collapsing? Since the moment of collapse was not certain, neither Vienna nor Rome 
approached Albanian leaders to notify them about their agreement in support of an 
independent Albania. Until spring 1912 Austria-Hungary and Italy, as well as all other 
European Powers, did not think that the frequent rebellions of the Albanians would bring 
the collapse of Ottoman rule. They considered the Albanian insurrections to be local in 
character and directed only against taxes, despotic rule or changes of specific functionaries. 
The uprising of 1911 was viewed in the same way, even though the rebels’ main request 
was autonomy.  
 
From Autonomy to Independence 
After the failure of the uprising of 1911 and when it became clear that the Porte was not 
endorsing the ‘12 Point Memorandum,’ two of the most prominent Albanian leaders and 
members of the Ottoman Parliament, Hasan Prishtina and Ismail Qemali, met secretly in 
Constantinople to discuss the situation. At the beginning of January 1912, they agreed to 
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organise a general uprising against the Porte with the aim of securing autonomy for 
Albania. They also agreed to engage several Albanian personalities in drafting and 
implementing the plan.619 Thus they invited Esat Pasha Toptani, Myfid Bey Libohova (1876–
1927), Aziz Pasha Vrioni (1859–1919) and Syrja Bey Vlora (1860–1940) for a secret meeting 
which was held in Taksim in Constantinople. All were prominent Albanian personalities and, 
most importantly, they came from different parts of Albania so that through them the four 
Albanian vilayets were represented. The four agreed to start a general uprising and all 
shared the role of finding money, buying arms, as well as forming and leading armed 
groups in their regions. Ismail Bey Qemali took the duty of presenting the Taksim decision 
diplomatically by contacting the foreign ministries of European governments and asking for 
their political and diplomatic support.620  
The Ottoman government seemed to have discovered some aspects of this plan and, in 
order to diffuse the situation, sent Interior Minister, Kyoprolu, to Kosovo. Kyoprolu arrived 
in Skopje on 10 March 1912 but no Albanian leader came to meet him, nor did anyone 
receive him when he proceeded further north to Kosovo. The Ottoman minister was 
mysteriously ambushed on three occasions on his way from Prizren to Shkodra and, though 
he survived all three attempts on his life, several of his armed escorts were killed.621 
However, the Young Turk press in Constantinople, as well as the Minister’s telegrams, said 
that the Albanians had given him an excellent reception.622   
After several other armed incidents occurred, the four leaders decided to publicise their 
plan and ask for foreign support. The first power to be approached was Britain. In April 
1912, Hasan Prishtina went again to the British Consulate in Skopje. Prishtina revealed the 
'Taksim Agreement' to the British Consul who reported to London: 
He aspired to complete fiscal and military separation and to an Albanian republic 
whose connection with the Porte should be merely nominal [...] He cited the 
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parallel of Bulgarian population since the Treaty of Berlin. The suzerainty of the 
Porte would be accepted.623  
The British Consul received the new plan with scepticism. He reminded Prishtina that on 
previous occasions the Albanians of the north ‘did not show much national cohesion,’ but 
Prishtina assured him that this time the situation was different and Albanians had come 
under ‘complete organisation from Shkodra to Janina’. To the consul’s amazement, Hasan 
Prishtina also said that this time the Albanians were so well prepared that Kosovo and 
Macedonia would fall into their hands within weeks, while Salonika would follow within a 
month. When the consul asked if the Albanians had arms and artillery, Prishtina answered 
that they had none, but they would capture these from the Ottoman Army. This prophesy 
almost proved to be true, as Kosovo and most parts of Macedonia did fall under Albanian 
control by August 1912. However, Hasan Prishtina was wrong to predict international 
involvement in the plan and misread the intentions of the Powers and neighbouring 
countries. He had hoped that Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary would 
abstain from interference by regarding the Albanian insurrection not as an international 
problem but as an internal matter of the Porte. However, in the event that things went 
wrong, Hasan Prishtina said that Austro-Hungarian rule over Albania would be preferable 
but ‘the most desirable of all would be British.’624 As in many other cases before, Hasan 
Prishtina once again showed that Albanian leaders preferred British patronage over that of 
all other Powers.  
Hasan Prishtina asked for political support from the British government and said that 
financial support would also be needed after the start of the uprising. Prishtina told the 
consul that the Albanians would not start the uprising before they received an answer from 
London. A few days later the British government responded to Prishtina’s request: ‘England 
had no interest in Balkan issues’. In his memoires, Prishtina interpreted the British response 
as meaning that ‘England was neither for nor against an Albanian uprising’.625 However, the 
Albanian leaders believed that the Ottoman and Serbian mail system was not secure, and 
so the British consulate in Skopje offered some help in communication between Albanian 
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leaders. The vice consul agreed to receive a letter from Hasan Prishtina and to deliver it to 
Ismail Qemali.626 
The meeting between Hasan Prishtina and the British consul took place almost a month 
after Serbia and Bulgaria had signed their secret treaty of alliance and friendship on 13 
March. Bax-Ironside, the British ambassador in Sofia, had warned the Foreign Office about 
secret talks between the two countries but the British government did not pay much 
attention to this information. For about a month, even Lowther in Constantinople had no 
information about this important event. Only in May 1912 did Nicolson discover, through 
the British Embassy in St Petersburg, that the Bulgarian-Serbian treaty was a serious matter 
and that the two signatories intended to carve up Macedonia. Even then, Nicolson was 
confident that no trouble would occur in the Balkans in 1912,627 an opinion which most 
likely contributed to his response to Hasan Prishtina that ‘England had no interest in Balkan 
issues’.   
It is hard to confirm whether the Albanian leaders knew about the details of the Bulgarian-
Serbian alliance, but it is certain that they had some information because they hurried to 
start the insurrection in May 1912. Yeni Asr, a newspaper in Salonika, published a manifesto 
which was sent by Ismail Qemali who was active in helping to organise the insurgency in 
south Albania. The manifesto contained the demand for autonomy and was directed at the 
Ottoman government and at readers in Macedonia.628   
At this point the Russian government supported the Albanian request for autonomy 
because it was seen as a good opportunity for introducing further reforms in Macedonia. 
The Russians even asked for the support of the British for a new scheme of reforms, hoping 
that this would keep Serbia and Bulgaria quiet. Grey did not agree to this proposal as he 
still believed that ‘justice and good government’ was all that Macedonia needed. Although 
the British government had started to change its supportive policy towards the Porte, it still 
favoured a non-interventionist approach in Ottoman internal affairs.629 The existing 
situation and the British government’s position was further supported by the British press, 
                                                             
626   Zekolli, p. 58. -The vice consul told Grey that he received the letter although he did not know the whereabouts of 
Ismail Bey Qemali and what the letter contained.   
627   Heller, p. 57. 
628   Peckham to Lamb, 24 May 1912, NA, FO, 195/2406, Nr. 36. 
629   Heller, pp. 58-59. 
201 
 
with The Times and The Spectator praising the initiative to reorganise the gendarmerie in 
Macedonia and supporting the Porte’s proposal to appoint five British officers who would 
contribute to keeping law and order. Furthermore, the British press ignored the Albanian 
uprising that started in 1912 and believed the uprising of the previous year to be highly 
exaggerated. It was only reforms that Albania and Macedonia needed, and according to The 
Spectator:  
If all those reforms are honestly put into execution, Albania and Macedonia will 
be better countries to live in from the point of view of the higher civilisation. But 
the higher civilisation seems as yet to be little valued by those whom the 
[Ottoman] Minister of the Interior is anxious to win over. What is most esteemed, 
because most threatened, in Albania and Macedonia to-day is a much more 
elementary matter. It is a reasonable amount of protection for life and person.630   
This article was published at a time when most Albanian towns were being attacked by 
Albanian rebel forces who, like all other Balkan nations, were not interested in reforms but 
in advancing their national aspirations. By that time, Kosovo had become the main 
battlefield, firstly because the majority of Ottoman troops were concentrated there and, 
secondly, because the entire vilayet of Kosovo and most of the vilayet of Manastir were 
marked by Albanian leaders as their territory and where the eastern border of the future 
Albanian state had to be placed.  
In June 1912, a considerable part of Albania fell under the control of the Albanian 
insurgents. The leaders of the insurrection believed that it was time to further 
internationalise their cause by publically explaining their aims to the Powers and the Balkan 
countries. They issued a memorandum and sent a copy to the British consulate in Manastir 
explaining that: 
- Albanians are firmly attached to the Fatherland; 
- The flag of revolt is raised not only in the interest of Albania but to save the 
Fatherland from the fearful pit into which it has fallen; 
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- The Albanians have taken up arms because they see that the Young Turk 
Government and their policy will end sooner or later in a hostile invasion of the 
virgin soil of the Fatherland.631  
The memorandum was signed by 19 leaders, mainly from Kosovo, including Hasan 
Prishtina, Bajram Curri, Isa Boletini and Riza Gjakova. The aim of the leaders was to show 
that not only Albania but the whole Ottoman Empire was facing an invasion by Balkan 
armies. The leaders, some still loyal to the Porte, used the term 'Fatherland' for the 
Ottoman Empire because they still needed political support from Constantinople and from 
the army stationed in Kosovo and Macedonia. The memorandum seemed to have created a 
positive effect. By the end of June, desertions of Albanian soldiers and officers from the 
Ottoman army were rife in Kosovo. In Macedonia the majority of Ottoman officers may 
have not shared the Albanians’ nationalistic views, but they supported Albania’s demands. 
Sympathy for the Albanians within the army was growing steadily while morale was 
declining.632  
Another memorandum followed from Shkodra, demanding an Albanian National Assembly 
and a government which would independently control its finances and its territorial 
(armed) force. With this, it looked like the Albanians had put forward three different sets of 
political demands, coming from three different organisations and different areas of Albania. 
But, the demands showed a degree of consistency among the Albanian nationalists in their 
request for autonomy. However, the leaders, being anti-Young Turk, also accommodated 
requests from those conservatives who supported the Hamidian regime such as 
reinstituting old privileges, were in fact demands for reversing the situation. Lowther, 
explaining this ‘confusion’ to Grey, wrote: 
A common theme also is the recognition of Albanian nationality to be attained 
through the establishment of Albanian schools, the case of Albanian language, 
the recognition of local customs, and the practise of regional military service. If, 
however, the unanimity of the purpose shown in the three sets of demands is 
illustrative of a real unity in Albanian nationalism, the divergences which exist 
                                                             
631   Enclosure in Vice Consul's Report, 28 June 1912, NA, FO, 195/2406, Nr. 43.  
632   Ramiz Abdyli, Kryengritja e përgjithshme e vitit 1912 dhe lëvizja e oficerëve (Prishtinë: Arkivi Kombëtar i Kosovës –
Vjetar XXVII-XXVIII, 2002), p. 199. 
203 
 
between them are equally indicative of the different interpretations put upon the 
meaning of their nationality.633        
While the insurrection was taking place in July, Grey wrote that in London Ismail Bey 
Qemali met Grujić, the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires, whom he told that ‘Albania was solid’ and 
the Albanians were ‘determined this time to see the thing through.’ Grujić must have met 
Ismail Qemali elsewhere, as there is no evidence of Qemali visiting London or Britain in 
1912. Nevertheless, Grujić told the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord 
Onslow, that the Serbian government was not inclined to share Ismail Qemali’s view. Grey 
added that the Serbs regarded the Albanian insurrection as a primarily anti-Young Turk 
movement and, therefore they ‘were not inclined to attach a great deal of importance to 
it.’634 This was the line taken by Serbian diplomats in public who would not hesitate to deny 
the existence of the Albanian nationality, but in reality the Serbian government was 
seriously worried about the Albanian insurrection against the Ottoman regime. 
At the same time, the insurrection in Kosovo was spreading widely and with great speed. 
Since the leaders in Kosovo were playing the main role in the uprising, they were able to 
impose their own conservative views upon the movement, a factor which represented an 
obstacle for the nationalist majority. By end of July, the town of Prishtina became the 
centre of the movement with a force of 30,000 armed Albanians led by Hasan Prishtina, Isa 
Boletini, Bajram Curri and Riza Gjakova. As they grew stronger, they put forward more 
demands, including the resignation of the Ottoman government and the dissolution of the 
Parliament. A section of the movement even demanded the abdication of the Sultan. By 
the beginning of August, most of Kosovo was controlled by the insurgents and out of a total 
of 67 Ottoman battalions stationed in the area, 38 joined the insurgents. New Ottoman 
troops were brought from Asia but it was too late to change the situation, many began 
joining the Albanians or deserted and went back home.635  
Under the pressure of events, the government in Constantinople resigned on 22 July 1912. 
The resignation proved that Albanian leaders were well organised and had achieved 
success. Explaining the effect of this successful organisation, Lowther wrote:  
                                                             
633   Gillard, Vol. 20, pp. 393-394.  
634   Grey to Paget, 15 July 1912, NA, FO, 29599/2031/12/44, Nr. 10. 
635   Enclosure in Consul-General Lamb's Dispatch, NA, FO, 195/2407, Nr. 97; Peckham to Lamb, 5 August 1912, NA, FO, 
195/2407, Nr. 62.  
204 
 
The 1912 rising is, moreover, exceptional, in that its conspicuous success was due to the 
fact that it was organised by men of far greater ability than were the leaders of former 
movements, by men who succeeded in affecting a combination with the military elements 
opposed to the Committee Cabinet - a combination which paralysed the action of the 
government and in the end effectively secured its fall.636  
However, at this stage, the change of government in Constantinople did not mean much for 
the insurgents in Albania. Albanian autonomy, being the main request, was not considered 
an option even by the new government. The insurrection was also complicating the 
situation in Macedonia and this in turn caused worries in Vienna, leading the Austro-
Hungarian foreign minister, Count Leopold Berchtold, to contact the British government 
and propose the ‘political decentralisation of Albania’. The British rejected the proposal and 
Grey, again, reaffirmed his position that Albania needed a ‘good government with special 
arrangement’.637  
The denial of autonomy led the insurgents to move southwards to Macedonia, to occupy 
more territory and intensify the pressure. On 11 August, a group of 200 Albanian fighters 
entered Skopje and occupied the main town square. There was no reaction from the 
Ottoman army or administration. The next day 6000 more insurgents arrived. By 15 August, 
the number of insurgents that had entered Skopje reached 30,000. The Ottoman army did 
not even come out of its barracks, meaning there was no opposition to the takeover. In the 
national history of Albania, 15 August 1912 has entered as the date of the liberation of 
Skopje.638  
This fact forced the Porte to endorse most of the Albanian terms which were known as the 
‘14 Points Demand’. Macedonia was now at the mercy of the Albanian insurgents. There 
was nothing to stop them if they decided to move to Salonika since the Third Army 
stationed at Manastir, as well as other barracks on the way to Salonika, were ready to join 
the Albanians. But, a major misunderstanding occurred between those Albanian leaders 
who went to Skopje. Some of them, unsatisfied with autonomy, insisted on declaring 
independence, with Skopje as the capital. Conservatives, such as Isa Boletini and Riza 
                                                             
636   Gillard, Vol. 20, pp. 390-391.  
637   Heller, p. 67.  
638   Frashëri, History of Albania, p. 491.  
205 
 
Gjakova wanted to proceed to Salonika in order to occupy it, release the deposed Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II from his house arrest, and march to Constantinople to change the 
government and the Sultan.639 This was unacceptable for Hasan Prishtina and the majority 
of the leaders who believed the occupation of Salonika and the replacement of the Sultan 
were not national concerns. Hasan Prishtina, who became the main figure of the 
movement, and the remaining followers of the Taksim Group, reached a compromise: to 
accept the offer of the Porte for partial autonomy and meanwhile to work towards 
independence, which would be declared at a later date. The plan was to be better 
organised within three or four months, during which period some of the conservatives who 
were 'creating obstacles would be eliminated.’640 By ‘eliminated,’ it is likely that Prishtina 
intended to isolate or remove the loyalists from influential positions. Meanwhile, the 
Albanian leaders were convinced that they would continue to build upon the partial 
autonomy offered by the Porte.  
Meanwhile, in September 1912, Grey seemed ready to change his mind about Albanian 
autonomy but with one condition. He agreed that whatever autonomy the Ottoman 
government would grant to the Albanians, the same had to be applied to the Christian 
population in Macedonia.641 Other powers maintained the same position. Thus, the 
Ottoman Grand Vizier informed the Austro-Hungarian ambassador that the ‘reforms 
granted to the Albanians would be extended to the Christian races’ and his government 
would be encouraged to ‘pursue this policy.’642 
 
The First Balkan War and Independence 
Any form of autonomy would mean a decentralisation of power which was contrary to the 
political philosophy of the Young Turks, who aimed for a strong and centralised state.643 Yet 
autonomy would satisfy, at least temporarily, most of the Albanian leadership who saw it as 
a compromise that would eventually lead to independence. As a matter of fact, this is what 
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happened although in a manner contrary to the plans that were made in Taksim and 
Skopje. The plan had been to build autonomy in cooperation with the Porte and probably 
with the help of the Powers, while independence would come in the process. However, the 
situation in the Balkans developed unfavourably for the Albanians and the Porte, as there 
was no opportunity to start the process of autonomy because the neighbouring countries 
had different plans.644 Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro intervened in the Porte 
and complained to the Powers about Albanian autonomy, arguing that their interests were 
endangered. Russia and France warned the Porte that there would be serious 
consequences if the borders of Albania were re-drawn, with both countries emphasising 
that they would not allow any Slavs to remain within any form or shape of Albania. Barclay, 
the British ambassador in Sofia, summed up the situation: 
It is hardly necessary to point out the anxiety caused in Bulgaria as well, doubtless, as in 
Servia [Serbia] and Greece, by the success of the Albanian revolt, these three States would 
view the autonomy of Albania as a total blow to their aspirations. They wish to see Albania 
remain a thorn in the side of Turkey – a source of Weakness – and not become a semi-
independent Mohammedan State, a strong pillar of the Empire.645 
Barclay also noted that because of the situation in Macedonia, Albanian autonomy had 
caused ‘considerable anxiety’ in the Bulgarian government. Albanians in Sofia were seen as 
acquiring ‘an entirely new sphere of influence’. Hence, the Bulgarian government 
maintained that such a development could produce ‘grave consequences for the 
Macedonian peoples’ who would not allow ‘their national claims to be overridden by the 
Albanians in this way’.646  
Even Austria-Hungary maintained that autonomy, as perceived by the Albanians, was not 
acceptable. Instead, Vienna urged the Porte to implement a plan for the decentralisation of 
the Ottoman administration in a way which would address the needs of the ethnic 
distribution of the population. With these actions, Vienna was attempting to keep both the 
Albanians and the Porte happy and also prevent the intervention of the Balkan countries.647  
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By late August 1912, an atmosphere of war was felt everywhere in the Balkans, with 
Albanian autonomy acting as a key reason for this atmosphere. Now Albania was to be 
defined territorially in an agreement with the Ottomans, according to which it was to 
include the four vilayets previously desired by the Albanian leaders. The governments of 
the neighbouring countries resolved to resist the creation of Albania along these lines, 
arguing that it was too large in size and ‘would encroach heavily on their expectations’.648 
The neighbouring states believed that, if the Albanians were to achieve their national 
aspirations, it would help to stabilise the balance of power in the Balkans, a situation which 
was not desired under their national aspirations.649 Historian Mark Mazower explains that: 
The Albanian rebellion presaged radical changes in the balance of power in the Balkans. It 
showed that armed revolt against the Turkish authorities could succeed, spurring the 
Balkan states to assert their own claims to Ottoman territory. It marked the emergence of 
organised and militant Albanian nationalism, to the intense alarm of Serbia and Greece, 
both of which claimed territories with substantial Albanian-speaking populations. And it 
encouraged both Austria and Italy to dream of new footholds in southeastern Europe, 
which alarmed the Balkan states still more.650   
Another reason for the atmosphere of war was the invasion of Libya by Italian forces. This 
meant that the Ottoman army was busy elsewhere and thus considerably weakened in its 
capacity to control the Balkan situation. Nazim Pasha, the war minister, contributed further 
to weakening the Ottoman side by purging the army of what he thought to be unreliable 
elements. He dismissed the troops in Macedonia which had completed their last year in 
active service and when the new mobilisation took place in autumn 1912, it went at a slow 
pace and under low discipline. Around 50,000 untrained soldiers were called up to serve in 
Macedonia meaning that the Ottoman army was not ready to face new hostilities in the 
area. This fact would not have been difficult to note by those Balkan countries preparing for 
armed conflict.651 
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Montenegro tried to force the Porte to declare war by provoking the Ottoman army near 
Kolashin and Andrijevica, on the border with Kosovo. The Montenegrin army was 
positioned along the border with heavy artillery while the Serbian and Montenegrin 
governments distributed arms and ammunition to the Montenegrins and Serbs of the 
border region.652 At the beginning of September, the British press reported that the 
Montenegrin army was approaching the region of Berane, the western part of the border 
of the vilayet of Kosovo. There was fear that Serbia was also moving towards the northern 
border of the vilayet of Kosovo. By the end of August, students in Serbia organised a 
massive demonstration calling upon the government to take measures regarding ‘Old 
Serbia’ [Kosovo].653 
Albanian leaders also asked the Porte to provide 50,000 rifles for their people with the 
pretext of defending their borders, but the Porte provided no arms. However, arms were 
entering Kosovo from Serbia, some of which were given to Albanians in the area of Gjilani 
(east Kosovo) even though most were intended for the local Serbs. The Serbian consul in 
Skopje denied the involvement of his government and maintained that Belgrade had no 
power to stop this traffic of arms. Regardless of the Serbian consul’s official stance, 
everyone knew the purpose of such supply. As confirmed by a British diplomat, Serbia was 
‘perusing the favourite Balkan policy of encouraging outrages in order to secure European 
intervention or provide a casus belli’.654  
The Serbian consulate in Skopje also distributed a memorandum to all the diplomatic 
missions in the city. The content of the memorandum detailed mistreatment of the Serbs 
by the Ottoman regime and particularly by the Albanians in Kosovo. Although some cases 
of such mistreatment were true, as the British vice-consul explained ‘it was possible that 
the Serbs might invent outrages to act as a counterbalance to the Bulgarian atrocities at 
Kochana’.655 It is likely that what worried the Serbian government most was the easy 
occupation of Skopje by the Albanians and their prospects for gaining autonomy.    
All hope for the autonomy of Albania was shattered on 8 October 1912 when Montenegro 
declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The aim of the Montenegrin army was to occupy 
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Shkodra, the biggest and most prosperous Albanian city at that time. Montenegro had 
started the war and Serbia, which was making final preparations close to the borders of 
Kosovo, would soon join in. In March 1912, Vojislav Tankosić, a Serbian army officer and a 
member of the ‘Black Hand,’ was transferred to the headquarters of the border troops near 
Kosovo with the task of training Serbian volunteers. On the eve of the First Balkan War, a 
young man called Gavrilo Princip (1894-1918) arrived at the recruiting centre as a volunteer 
but was refused on medical grounds being ‘too weak and small’.656 He was sensitive and 
felt humiliated that he had not been given a chance to fight for the Serbian national cause 
within ‘comitadjis’ ranks, the irregular Serbian military force which was commanded by 
‘Black Hand’ officers’.657 However, this humiliation did not prevent him from continuing 
with other nationalist activities and further radicalisation. Princip’s war was yet to come.658 
The Serbian army attacked northern Kosovo on 14 October at Merdare. The disorganised 
Ottoman army withdrew and left the battlefield but Albanian resistance continued. On 18 
October 1912, four days after the Serbian army entered Kosovo, King Petar of Serbia, in 
accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, issued a declaration ‘To the Serbian 
People’, proclaiming: 
The Turkish governments showed no interest in their duties towards their citizens 
and turned a deaf ear to all complaints and suggestions. Things got so far out of 
hand that no one was satisfied with the situation in Turkey in Europe. It became 
unbearable for the Serbs, the Greeks and for the Albanians, too. By the grace of 
God, I have therefore ordered my brave army to join in the Holy War to free our 
brethren and to ensure a better future.659 
This was in effect a declaration of war. Albanians continued to offer resistance in several 
other areas but they were no match for the well-armed and powerful Serbian army. On 24 
October the territory of what is today Kosovo was occupied by the Serbian army.660 The 
Serbian First Army continued towards Macedonia, while the Third Army moved across 
                                                             
656   Clark, Sleepwalkers, p. 52; Alexander J. Motyl, Encyclopaedia of Nationalism – Leaders, Movements and Concepts, 
Vol. 2 (London: Academic Press, 2001), p. 422.  
657   Rodney P. Carlisle, Eyewitness History, World War I (New York: Facts on File, 2007), p. 17.  
658   Vladimir Dedijer, ‘Sarajevo Fifty Years After’, Foreign Affairs, 42. 4 (1964), pp. 569-584 (p. 579).  
659   Leo Freundlich, ‘Albania's Golgotha: Indictment of the Exterminators of the Albanian People’ 
<http://www.albanianhistory.net/texts20_1/AH1913_1.html> [accessed 10 May 2016]; Robert Elsie, Gathering Clouds 
(London: Centre for Albanian Studies, 2015), pp. 37-72.  
660   Anamali and Prifti, pp. 505–506. 
210 
 
Kosovo towards north Albania in order to reach the Albanian coast. Before the Serbian 
army proceeded towards Macedonia, Albanians joined the Ottoman forces in order to 
protect the part of Macedonia they regarded as their own territory and grouped around 
Kumanovo and elsewhere. Albanian leaders such as Hasan Prishtina, Nexhip Draga and 
Bajram Curri issued a declaration to explain to the Powers that the Albanians had joined 
the Ottoman army to protect the land which was inhabited by Albanians and not the 
Ottoman Empire.661 The decision to join forces with the Ottoman army was taken on 14 
October in Skopje by Albanian leaders who were organised within a patriotic society called 
Shoqëria e Zezë për Shpëtim (Black Society for Salvation).662 Before the meeting in Skopje 
took place, the newspaper Liri e Shqipërisë (Freedom of Albania), published in Bulgaria, 
called upon all Albanians to take up arms to defend the borders of Albania and raise the 
Albanian flag as a symbol of claiming national rights. These developments led Austro-
Hungarian diplomats to report to Vienna that the Albanians had decided to serve on the 
fronts of the Balkan War. Their reports painted a picture of Albanian engagement in the 
theatre of the Balkan War: Albanians of the vilayet of Janina were fighting against Greece, 
those of Kosovo against Serbia, those of Shkodra against Montenegro and the Albanians of 
Manastir against Bulgaria.663 
Between spring 1908 and August 1912, the Ottoman army and Albanian insurgents had 
exhausted each other in almost continuous clashes. Yet now Albanians and Ottomans were 
allies once again. However, the battle of Kumanovo ended after two days (23–24 October 
1912) and the Ottoman army was heavily defeated.664 With the victory at Kumanovo, the 
Serbs took control of northern Macedonia and were in a position to move south, towards 
Manastir, and west towards inland Albania and the Adriatic Sea. The Ottomans also 
suffered defeat elsewhere in Macedonia by the Bulgarian and Greek armies. On many 
occasions the Ottomans used Albanian detachments to protect their retreating army. This 
angered the Albanians and made them desert the front.665 The Ottoman army, on whose 
protection the Albanians counted and relied, was practically destroyed. Some Ottoman and 
Albanian units continued to resist the Balkan armies moving towards Albania, but to no 
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avail. The moment the Albanian leaders feared most had come. There was no force to 
protect their country or their people.  
However, Albanian leaders still hoped to save the prospect of autonomy. As agreed in 
Taksim, Ismail Bey Qemali continued to visit European foreign ministries. When the Balkan 
War started, he went to meet Austro-Hungarian officials and ask for their support. Vienna’s 
policy had regarded the Porte as the main factor in the Balkans but the swift victory of the 
Balkan armies had ruined this policy, leaving Vienna forced to make changes and abandon 
its old attitude. The new Serbian territorial gains in Macedonia were acceptable, to a 
degree, by Vienna, but the Habsburgs insisted that Belgrade was not to move towards any 
Albanian port in the Adriatic.666  
This was a vague policy by Vienna, but within it, there was hope for the future of an 
Albanian state. After all, Vienna and Italy, as seen earlier, had already agreed to an 
independent Albania to be recognised only when the Ottoman Empire collapsed. Now that 
the collapse had finally arrived Ismail Bey Qemali was about to remind Vienna of this fact. 
Before visiting Vienna, Ismail Bey Qemali stopped at Bucharest, where a large and 
influential Albanian colony existed. He held a meeting with prominent members of the 
community and revealed his plan to declare Albanian independence. Some decided to 
accompany Ismail Bey Qemali on his tour of Europe and to return to Albania. He also 
telegraphed to all important cities in Albania and asked for delegates to be sent to the 
convention where independence would be declared.667  
On 10 November 1912 Ismail Bey Qemali met Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian 
Foreign Minister. In his memoirs Ismail Bey wrote: 
His Excellency [Count Berchtold] approved my views on the national question, and readily 
granted the sole request which I made him, namely, to place at my disposal a vessel which 
would enable me to reach the first Albanian port before the arrival of the Serbian Army.668  
That was all he wrote about the meeting and, as seen above, he did not explain his views 
on the ‘national question’ nor the answer of Count Berchtold. As it became known later, 
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Count Berchtold told Ismail Bey Qemali that Vienna supported autonomy and not the 
independence of Albania. It is also not known what answer Ismail Bey Qemali offered in 
return but his actions, which were taken a few days later, showed that he considered 
independence to be the only answer. Qemali also visited Trieste, Italy, and proceeded to his 
birthplace, the Adriatic town of Vlora.669 The Austro-Hungarian vessel could not approach 
Vlora as the port was blockaded by Greek warships, so instead, on 21 November, he 
disembarked in Durrës only to find the town and the area in chaos. The population, 
deceived by the Ottoman authorities, believed that the Ottoman army had been victorious 
in the war. ‘They did not even know that the Serbs were at their very gates’, wrote 
Qemali.670  
The Ottoman authorities still showed hostility to the idea of Albanian independence being 
declared in Durrës. Therefore, Ismail Bey and his group of notable supporters, which grew 
again in Durrës, took the land road to Vlora which was being held by armed Albanians. 
Before the Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek armies invaded the Albanian territory without 
encountering any serious resistance, some of the Albanian cities proclaimed independence 
and elected their delegates to attend a national convention which was announced by Ismail 
Bey from Bucharest.671  
Between 22–25 November, Qemali announced a National Convention to be held in Vlora 
and invited many Albanian political activists to take part. On 28 November 1912, 83 
delegates, representing most of the towns of Kosovo, Macedonia and what was later to 
become Albania, opened the first Albanian National Assembly. Most of the delegates were 
intellectuals, politicians or diplomats who until then had served the Ottoman Empire.672 
The time to end their service to the Empire had finally come. They symbolically lowered the 
Ottoman flag and raised the Albanian flag. After signing the Declaration of Independence 
the formalities were over. They formed a provisional government to be headed by Ismail 
Bey Qemali while the ministers (two Catholics, three Orthodox and five Muslims) were 
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chosen according to the principle of national distribution and covering the four vilayets 
they believed belonged to Albania.673  
The very first duty of the government was to send telegrams to the European Powers and 
neighbouring Balkan countries in order to inform them that Albania, from now on, was 
independent and had taken a neutral stance in the Balkan War. The first day of work of the 
first Albanian government had ended, and this was in fact all they could do for some time in 
the future. The government had no organized army and the territory they controlled did 
not extend far beyond the surroundings of the town of Vlora, which itself was besieged and 
blockaded by the invading Greek army.674 This was a very different Albania from what 
Albanian leaders had envisaged in Taksim and Skopje. The provisional government 
appealed for international recognition or for any form of help. For instance, a telegram was 
sent to the ‘Government of His Britannic Majesty to recognise the change of the political 
life of the Albanian nation.’675 London did not respond.  
The British government avoided any contact with the Albanian provisional government as it 
still regarded the area as an Ottoman dominion. However, the relationship between the 
British government and the Porte had by now gone through significant changes. At the end 
of 1912, British diplomats in Constantinople confirmed that the attitude of the British 
Government towards the Porte throughout that year was ‘one of reserve’ and caused a 
‘feeling of profound disappointment’ among Ottoman politicians. The Ottoman officials, in 
moments of crisis, had traditionally looked to the British government for help but it would 
no longer offer assistance to the Porte. British diplomats believed that Ottoman officials 
had ‘completely closed their eyes’ to the fact that London had modified its relations with 
Russia. A decade later Talaat Pasha, a prominent Young Turk and by then a Grand Vizier, 
spoke about this matter. He told Aubrey Herbert that the Young Turks had made a big 
mistake in not decentralising the Empire and in not granting autonomy to the Albanians 
when they came to power.676 Talaat Pasha also blamed the policies made in London and 
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the British embassy in Constantinople for worsening Ottoman–British relations. He told 
Herbert: 
There was nothing in those days which we would not have given if you had asked it from 
us. But you wanted nothing of us, and gratitude cannot live on air. The Ambassador 
[Lowther] was cold; Fitzmaurice was hostile; we had to find means to live. But even after 
our estrangement, we still tried to regain your friendship. We accepted Kiamil Pasha, our 
determined opponent, as Grand Vizier, to please you. You drove us into the arms of 
Germany. We had no alternative: anything else was political death and partition.677  
Talaat Pasha also hinted that autonomy would have been granted to the Albanians if the 
British had pressurised the Porte. This information came in 1921. However, in 1912 London 
had made it known that the Porte could not rely on British assistance or on their sympathy 
any longer. By this time the Ottoman Empire in Europe had turned into a sinking ship and 
the ‘English lifeboat’ was nowhere near to be seen. This was made clear on 9 November 
1912 when the Prime Minister Herbert Asquith spoke at The Guildhall. Speaking about the 
Balkan War and having in mind the progress of the Balkan armies into Ottoman territories, 
he confirmed that ‘the victors were not to be robbed of the fruits which cost them so 
dear’.678 This was not good news for Albania, either. Asquith declared that the British 
government was to recognise the occupation of Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania by the 
armies of the Balkan League. A few days later, Winston Churchill, then the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, confirmed the success of the Balkan League which, to him, was in line with 
Gladstonian Liberal ideas and thus a satisfactory outcome. On 30 November 1912 in his 
speech at the Eighty Club, Churchill praised Gladstone ‘that great man who predicted the 
course of events in extraordinary precision and detail.’679 An international conference was 
soon to be held in London to deal with the Albanian question demonstrating that, by now, 
the Albanian question was entirely internationalised, albeit in a manner contrary to that 
which the Albanian leaders had worked and hoped for. 
 
                                                             
677   Ibid, p. 313. 
678   C. J. Lowe and M. L. Dockrill, Mirage of Power - the British Foreign Policy 1902-1914, Part 1 (London: Routledge, 
2002), pp. 107-108. 
679   Heller, p. 74.  
215 
 
Conclusion 
The British government expressed concern about the Albanian insurrection of 1911, yet 
because of the broader absence of major interests in the Balkans would not take 
independent action or assume the role of the protector of Albania. Instead, Grey favoured 
collective action so that the British government would not jeopardise its relations with the 
Porte. The Albanian insurrections from 1909 to 1912 also revealed that the British 
government had left the Balkans in the hands of the three most interested Powers: Austria-
Hungary, Russia and Italy.  
However, throughout 1911 the British government started to abandon their supportive 
policy towards the Porte as the ‘Germanisation of Turkey’ gathered pace. From this point 
onwards, the British government became aware that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
was nearing, but took no action to prevent it. The British government distanced itself from 
the Porte but still did not change its neutral position on the Balkans. This position was 
reconfirmed as late as April 1912 by Peckham, the British consul in Skopje, who told the 
Albanian representative that Britain had no special interest in Balkan issues.680  
The Albanian uprising of summer 1912 forced the Young Turk regime to consider the 
autonomy of Albania. By now the Ottoman army was exhausted and overstretched by 
constant battles with the Albanians, with campaigns against rebellions in Yemen and war in 
Libya. All these factors, and in particular the campaign for Albanian autonomy, pushed 
Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro to move against the weakened Porte and start 
the First Balkan War, marking the end of Ottoman presence in Europe. 
Although the Albanian insurrection of 1911 became a cause of the changes in British policy 
towards the Porte, this change was not in favour of the Albanian national movement. By 
the beginning of November 1912, when the Ottoman army had collapsed in Macedonia, 
Albanian leaders had no choice other than to proclaim the independence of Albania on 28 
November 1912. 
The beginning of the First Balkan War showed that the British were not interested in the 
Ottoman Empire. This also meant that the British were no longer neutral, as they made no 
                                                             
680   Peckham to Lamb, 28 April 1912, NA, FO, 195/2406, Nr. 31. 
216 
 
attempts to deny the advance of the Balkan armies or build any obstacles to their future 
military operations in the remaining European parts of the Ottoman Empire. Before any 
international peace conference took place, Prime Minister Asquith had confirmed the 
British position which favoured the Allied Balkan countries that had occupied Macedonia 
and Albania.681 
In doing so, the British government applied the Gladstonian or Liberal approach to events 
in the Balkans. In line with this approach, Edward Grey maintained that the Christian Balkan 
states had no alternative other than to combine their strength and turn against the Sultan. 
In London, the Balkan League’s military engagement against the Porte was considered as a 
reasonable act. Grey declared that the cause of the war was just and as such it was seen as 
the ‘emancipation of the Christian subjects of Turkey in South-East Europe.’682   
Since 1878 the Albanian leaders had been active in finding a solution to their national 
question but the Porte and the Powers had repeatedly ignored their efforts. The Balkan 
War finally brought the Albanian Question to the consideration of the Powers. By the end 
of 1912 Albania had become a dangerous spot with the potential of spreading conflict 
throughout the Balkan and perhaps the whole continent. Hence, it could no longer be 
ignored.    
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Chapter VII 
 
Edith Durham: The Balkans for the Balkan People 
 
The Constitution was proclaimed, Scutari [Shkodra] was wild with joy. Thousands 
of mountain men in finest array marched into the town, were feted and feasted. 
We fired revolvers (I had one in each hand) into the air till not a cartridge was left. 
Not an accident nor disorder occurred. – Edith Durham.683 
 
Introduction 
Edith Durham arrived in the Balkans for the first time in 1900. By 1908 Durham had ‘gone 
native’ and in an ‘Albanian manner’ she celebrated the promulgation of the Ottoman 
Constitution reinstated following the Young Turk Revolution. Until 1912 Durham held a 
Liberal Gladstonian view of Balkan matters and was a supporter of all Balkan national 
movements against Ottoman rule. Yet with the start of the Balkan Wars, Durham took sides 
and became a fierce supporter and lobbyist for the Albanian national movement.  
This chapter aims to show Durham’s role and contribution to the Albanian national 
movement from the Balkan Wars of 1912 to the start of the First World War in 1914. In 
order to build a clear picture of her political profile and her contribution to affairs in the 
Balkans and Albania, it will be necessary to examine some of her activities that took place 
from 1900 onwards. Durham's work and her political activities will be discussed through 
her commitment to the national principle of 'the Balkans for the Balkan people', the motto 
of those Liberal Gladstonians who were members of the Balkan Committee. Durham, who 
was a member and activist of this Committee, believed that the phrase ‘the Balkans for the 
Balkan people’ perfectly encapsulated the principle of nationality, and as such, the two 
notions will be treated as complimentary in this chapter. Edith Durham arrived first in 
Montenegro, where she spent most of her time in the region, but her engagement in the 
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Balkans came as a significant help to the Albanian national movement. Durham had no 
significant knowledge, perceptions or prejudices about the Balkans and, like many other 
Gladstonians, knew only that the suffering Christians of this part of Europe should be freed 
from Ottoman rule. 
Durham's efforts to win the support of the British government and the public take central 
stage in this chapter. Durham’s work was unique in that, unlike any other Balkan 
Committee members or Liberals who worked to influence the British government from 
London, Durham undertook her work primarily from the Balkans. Most of her letters to the 
Foreign Office, as well as her articles that were published in the British press, were sent 
from the Balkans. The same can be said of her books,684 which were all based on her 
personal experience or knowledge that she gained while travelling or working in the region 
for British organisations such as the Macedonian Relief Fund, Albanian Relief Fund, British 
Foreign Bible Society or the Royal Anthropological Institute. Durham also sought to 
influence the British diplomats and consuls who were stationed in the Balkans. As this 
chapter illustrates, Durham’s efforts in trying to win the support of the British consuls in 
the Balkans and the Foreign Office in London, ended with some success. Although not 
entirely satisfied, she had contributed to introducing the Albanian Question, together with 
the question of other Balkan nations, to the British establishment. The beginning of the 
First World War changed this situation, leading the British government to adopt 
unfavourable policies for Durham and Albania.    
Durham’s work and her affectionate connection to the Balkans has remained as a 
monumental legacy which cannot be ignored. Although Durham is tremendously popular in 
the Balkans, especially among Albanians, in Britain she remains almost unknown to the 
public. Durham’s efforts to influence and win the support of the British public and  
government for the Albanians have so far not been examined by an academic work. 
Durham’s efforts in influencing British policy and in trying to apply the principle of ‘the 
Balkans for the Balkan people’ are to be found in many of her letters, as well as published 
and unpublished writings, which are stored in the archives of the Royal Institute of 
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Anthropology, the University of Leeds Library (Special Collections), the Surrey History 
Centre Archives and the Somerset Heritage Centre Archives. Hence, by addressing 
Durham’s influence on the Albanian national cause, this chapter makes a significant 
contribution to the literature in the field and forms an important part of this thesis.  
 
A Gladstonian view on the Balkans and placing Albanians among the Balkan people 
Edith Durham was born in London to Arthur and Mary Durham and was the eldest of nine 
children. Her father was a senior consulting surgeon at Guy’s Hospital in London. Her 
mother was the daughter of the well-known economist William Ellis, a close friend and 
colleague of John Stuart Mill. Ellis was also known as a pioneer of technical schools in 
England and as a friend of Giuseppe Garibaldi, whom he helped in early clandestine work 
towards the unification of Italy. Edith Durham’s brother conducted research into malaria 
and her sister Frances was the first woman to become assistant secretary in the civil service. 
Edith Durham attended Bedford College (1878–82) and later studied art at the Royal 
Academy of Arts in London. Until 1900 Durham exhibited her drawings and illustrated 
publications, including a volume of the Cambridge Natural History published in 1899.685   
Aged 37, Durham went to Montenegro for medical reasons, as advised by her doctor, to 
spend some time in a warm-climate country. She arrived in Cetinje, then the capital of 
Montenegro, where she discovered a taste for Balkan life that would have great impact on 
her future.686 At first, Durham did not like Montenegro, a small country of around 100,000 
inhabitants. Cetinje seemed to her like a village yet strangely, the tiny capital housed 
consular representatives of the Powers, leading Durham to wonder why they had found an 
interest in this small country. Since at that time she was not interested in international 
politics, Durham wrote to her mother to describe the strangeness of Montenegro ‘as Gilbert 
and Sullivan opera’.687  
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Durham also described this unusual situation in an unpublished story titled International 
Episode. Together, foreign diplomats dined in a two-story hotel in Maligrad (Smallville), as 
she named Cetinje in this story. The hotel symbolically represents Montenegro, while the 
waiter represents the government or the ruler of the country. The most important 
diplomat is the Austro-Hungarian representative, a character so important that the waiter 
must always apologise to him, even for the delay of food which he did not order. 
Montenegro, a country which cannot protect itself, should serve, with a smiling face, the 
Ministers Plenipotentiary whose business it is to plan its ‘absorption’.688 At the dining table, 
England, as a ‘non-annexing Power,’ is an ordinary guest. France, Italy and England engage 
in daily conversation about ‘a question of international interest, namely which of the local 
laundresses got up shirt fronts the best’, leaving Austria-Hungary to extend his ‘sphere of 
influence in his own way’. England is happy with the Austro-Hungarian representative who 
offers him ‘a good deal of information as to the advisability of firmness in dealing with 
semi-civilised people’.689 Furthermore, the representatives of Austria-Hungary, Italy and 
France observe developments in Albania. Russia, in turn, keeps an eye on Austria-Hungary, 
Italy and France. This was the local and international situation in Montenegro as Durham 
viewed it in 1900.   
In 1902 Durham visited Serbia and wrote Through the Land of the Serbs in which she gave 
an account of the situation in the country, emphasising that it was full of military 
personnel. Everyone spoke about expansion towards the south, an area which was still part 
of the Ottoman Empire. She sent the manuscript to many publishers but none of them 
were interested in publishing it since the Balkans, and particularly Serbia, was not 
considered an interesting topic at that time. Above all, Durham was a woman and had no 
prior published books. Unexpectedly, a historic event helped her situation. In 1903 King 
Alexandar and Queen Draga Obrenović of Serbia were assassinated and replaced by Petar 
Karađorđević. The assassination was executed with a merciless barbarity which had 
culminated after a long rivalry between the Karađorđević and Obrenović families for the 
Serbian throne.690 A few years later, Durham would write about this subject on many 
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occasions.691 The British and European public were shocked by the regicide in Belgrade and 
the British government, in protest of such barbarity, withdrew its diplomatic mission from 
Belgrade. Suddenly, interest in Serbia grew in Britain and Durham found a publisher for her 
first book.692 
In Through the Land of the Serbs, Durham exposed her belief in the doctrine of the 
Gladstonian Liberals which was optimistic about the future of the Balkans but showed little 
regard for its Muslim population. Based on this doctrine, Durham believed that the Balkan 
people should be left to work out their separate destinies but soon discovered that this 
doctrine was 'unworkable and inappropriate'. Based on experiences she had gained in 
Serbia and later in Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Montenegro, she became convinced 
that the borders, which had been imposed by the Treaty of Berlin, were artificial and 
created ethnic tensions. In another unpublished manuscript, Durham described how the 
Powers met in Berlin to settle the Near Eastern question and make peace, yet practically 
each Power was there only ‘to out-wit the other’.693 The land was there to be divided for 
the benefit of the dividers and with no respect for ethnic lines. Her story was about Gornji 
Bunar and Donji Bunar (Upper and Lower Well) in which the village was given to 
Montenegro but the well was given to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. ‘Three men had died 
and undying hatred had been born’, she wrote, adding that ‘the truth had died and many 
more people would die, because of the united wisdom and the split differences of the 
Berlin Congress’.694 The story emphasised Durham’s disagreement with the lack of 
consideration shown for the principle of ethnicity when drawing borders in the Treaty of 
Berlin. The story did not create much impact as it remained unpublished, most likely due to 
the lack of interest the British press showed in this matter.  
However, the published book Through the Land of the Serbs did make an impact. Durham 
warned that the Balkan system, imposed by the Powers at the Congress of Berlin, was 
about to collapse together with the Ottoman Empire.695 The book strengthened the 
perceptions of those who believed the Treaty of Berlin had failed to satisfy the Balkan 
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states' demands and further encouraged British Liberals to continue lobbying against it. 
These Liberals were grouped in the Balkan Committee and, as we have seen earlier, the 
members were mainly Gladstonians who agitated against the Ottoman regime and 
supported Christian minority rights in the Balkans. However, Durham, at this stage, 
appeared as a supporter of the Serbian national cause. This can be seen throughout her 
book, particularly in her support for Serbian claims over the town of Shkodra, a town which 
was almost entirely ethnically Albanian, as she admitted herself. She maintained that the 
Serbs were entitled to this north Albanian town on historical grounds but less than a 
decade later changed her mind and protested against the Serb and Montenegrin attack on 
Shkodra, now convinced that the town, as well as the entire vilayet of Shkodra, should 
belong to Albania.696 
With her first book and the many other articles she published consequently about the 
Balkans, Durham joined the ranks of other Balkan experts and, in early 1904, was sent to 
Macedonia by the newly formed Macedonian Relief Committee to help with humanitarian 
work.697 In Macedonia, Durham equipped herself with knowledge and experience about 
the region. Although she greatly disliked the regime of the Porte, she maintained that 
demonising the Ottomans unreasonably, as other Liberals did, was not something she 
would support. As a result of her family background she did not give much consideration to 
religion, an attitude very different to that of most Gladstonians. Divisions between her and 
other Liberals of the Balkan Committee widened but at that time she was not strong 
enough to enter in direct conflict with them. After all, at this stage, it was the Liberals who 
had enabled her to go and work in Macedonia. However, as time passed, she began to 
enter into fierce conflict with Committee members Henry Noel Brailsford and R. W. Seton-
Watson, who were known supporters of the Bulgarian and Serbian cause respectively. 
Durham strongly supported her own opinions which were based on the principle of ‘the 
Balkans for the Balkan people’ and, because of this, she made many other enemies among 
Balkan specialists, academics and politicians in Britain.698 Within the idea of ‘the Balkans for 
the Balkan people’ Durham believed it possible to apply the principle of nationality which, 
as time passed brought her close to the Albanian national cause.  
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Soon after her arrival in Macedonia in 1904, she was disappointed by the difficult situation 
she found there and was underwhelmed by the Christian people of Slav origin. In one of her 
first articles on Macedonia she characterised the peasants of this region as backward, 
‘slow-minded, ignorant, and inferior to any other race of the Balkans’, adding that they had 
no hope for the future. Poverty was not the only reason for such an unpleasant situation. 
Durham, as a Gladstonian, blamed Ottoman rule and neglect by Europe for the difficulties 
in Macedonia, urging that the region be put under a ‘Christian ruler’ with the supervision of 
the Powers.699  
In the Macedonian conflict that had started in 1903, Durham observed the Christians 
(Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs and Macedonians) committing unspeakable massacres against 
each other in the name of Christianity. The uprising in Macedonia was seen in Europe as a 
process of liberation of the Christians from the Muslim Ottoman Empire. Yet in seeking to 
liberate themselves from the Ottomans, the Christians also fought and killed each other in 
order to create a national advantage. This situation disgusted Durham, who wrote in 1904 
that ‘such was the Christianity which at that time was being prayed for in English 
Churches’.700 
Through her work Durham also sought to explain the source of tensions which led to the 
Balkan Wars. She pointed out that Western ideas, which were forced upon the Balkan 
states, were incompatible with the reality that she saw on the ground. She also dismissed 
the idea, which was widely maintained in Britain and other European countries, that 
religion was the main factor causing the conflicts in the Balkans. Rather she explained that 
it was in fact nationalism that was causing conflicts and which would, ultimately, end 
Ottoman rule in Europe.701 In holding such a view, Durham had already started to distance 
herself from mainstream Gladstonian Liberalism. 
The article 'From an Albanian’s point of view', published by Durham in March 1903, could 
be considered as her first attempt to present the Albanian national aspirations to the 
British public.702 Durham’s intention in this article was to place the Albanians among the 
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Balkan people and show that they had the same national problem and the same request for 
recognition as others. Describing the ‘Tame Albanian’, Durham sought to explain that the 
Albanians had some understanding and knowledge of and indeed respect for Great Britain. 
To the Albanian, this knowledge and respect was not mutual because the British did not 
show much consideration for the Albanians in return. ‘Englishmans, silly mans! No 
understand my people’ said the ‘Tame Albanian’ to Durham.703   
Becoming more familiar with the Albanian national cause, Durham discovered that the 
principle ‘the Balkans for the Balkan people’ was not as inclusive as most British Liberals 
believed. In reality, this principle excluded the Albanians from the future of the Balkans 
which was envisaged once free from Ottoman rule. Durham criticised the Powers, 
particularly Britain, for not supporting the Albanian national cause which, according to her, 
was central to the Balkan problem. However, supporting the Albanians did not mean that 
she abandoned her support or sympathy for other Balkan nations. ‘I should like each of the 
Balkan peoples to be left to work out its own salvation in its own national way, with fair 
play and no favour’,704 she wrote in her 1905 book The Burden of the Balkans. The 
publication received wide and fair reviews in the British press, but all reviews noted and 
concentrated upon the difficult situation of the Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule. 
Although it noted that Durham’s aim was to present the Macedonian conflict as a product 
of nationalist movements, and not as a question of religion as most Balkan experts and the 
British public presumed,705 the press failed to see the principle of ‘the Balkans for the 
Balkan people’ as the book had intended. 
In 1904 Durham was employed by the British Foreign Bible Society which was based in 
Manastir, Macedonia. As we have seen earlier, Durham journeyed to Albania to sell Bibles 
and came to know the Albanian population, encountering Albanian intellectuals who were 
mostly nationalist in their outlook and who hoped to find a solution to their national cause 
within the principle of the ‘Balkans for the Balkan people’ and sought British support. 
Durham was fascinated with Albania, particularly with its northern part. Albanians too, 
were fascinated by the foreign woman who liked them, respected their heritage, helped 
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them and who was travelling, on most occasions, alone through Albania. It was not long 
before she was approached by some of the Albanian leaders and asked to advocate on 
behalf of their national movement to the British, European Powers and the press. In some 
ways she had already taken such a role before being asked to do so.706  
After 1905 a picturesque Albania and idyllic Albanians were not only the subject of her 
drawings but she gradually started to show more intensive support for the Albanian 
national cause. However, from the Liberal perspective, she had chosen to support the 
‘wrong’ people, the majority of Albanians being Muslim and viewed in the West as 
supporters of the Ottoman Empire. Durham’s efforts to present the Albanians in the same 
manner as all other Balkan peoples caused trouble among Gladstonian Liberals in Britain. 
However, with strong determination, great experience and knowledge, Durham secured a 
respectable place among the members of the Balkan Committee, academics and the 
Foreign Office.  
In 1905, after spending considerable time in Macedonia and Albania, Durham went back to 
Montenegro which had become a sort of ‘residential’ country for her. By now, among 
Montenegrins she had become a ‘strange English woman’ who dared to travel to Albania, 
lived in a hotel in Cetinje and dined regularly with foreign consuls assigned to this small 
capital. Apart of Montenegro, Durham had visited Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia, Macedonia and Albania. She had written books and published articles in the British 
press, which was a good reason why the foreign consuls and diplomats in Cetinje and 
Shkodra wanted to talk and dine with her. Her reputation also grew in London among 
diplomats in the Foreign Office and the press. In 1908 Durham was asked by the Royal 
Anthropological Institute to speak on the Balkans at Fitzwilliam College in Cambridge. After 
an impressive lecture, the Institute also asked her to visit north Albania and conduct 
anthropological research there. Durham accepted the proposal gladly. After she spent a 
considerable time among the mountaineers of northern Albania, the book High Albania 
came out in 1909.707   
High Albania was reviewed by a dozen or so British newspapers and magazines, with 
probably the best review which explained Durham’s work and intentions, being published 
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in Pall Mall Gazette. The position of Albania was explained as a result of Austrian intrigue 
and Italian ambition. It was also noted that the Albanian efforts ‘to receive reconsideration 
at the hands of Great Britain’ would be dangerous as it would ‘be accompanied by 
interminable complications’.708 The ambition of the Albanians for autonomy was regarded 
as ‘an experiment which would be provocative and even more disastrous’. The book, apart 
from its political message, also contained studies on the customs and folklore of Albania. 
Therefore, the reviewer suggested that ’the unofficial character of this book will be clear to 
the Albanians themselves’and would ‘appeal to a limited circle’ of readers.709  The angle 
taken by the review was close to the official position held by the British government on 
Albania at that time and, as such, did not achieve Durham’s purpose of making the 
Albanian question popular among the government and public. This was a disappointment 
for Durham but did not discourage her from developing further her interest in and support 
for Albanians, nor from trying to win British support for their cause. 
Nevertheless, the book confirmed Durham’s authority on the Albanian question in Britain. 
By 1910 she had also become widely known and popular in Albania where she was 
recognised as their ‘protector’ in the West who worked tirelessly to publicise their cause 
and get support. Therefore, the mountaineers of the north ‘proclaimed’ her as ‘Krajlica e 
Malevet’ (Mountain Queen). This honorary title gave her the will and authority to represent 
them before the world.710 Durham also became popular among the Albanian diaspora in 
Europe and the USA. In August 1911, Durham received a letter from a group of Albanians in 
the United States, saying that the Albanian colony there held her in high regard and 
informing her that she should be ‘enshrined in history as the Albanian Joan of Arc’.711 
Durham wrote about this to the British consular representatives in Albania and 
Montenegro, probably because she wanted to show them that she enjoyed wide popularity 
and authority among the Albanians.  
As a Liberal Gladstonian, Durham supported the Albanian rebellions against the Porte, 
including the insurrection of 1911. Before the insurrection started she wrote to the Foreign 
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Office with the aim of gaining British support. She was aware that the British government 
still believed the Young Turk government to be democratic, and as such, able to deal with 
the Albanian question. She wrote that Albanians, Catholic and Muslim, were resolved to act 
together against the Young Turk regime because they saw in it no hope for the progress 
and development for Albania. Explaining the Ottoman state institutions which were run by 
the Young Turks she wrote: 
He [the Ottoman] is a good soldier and nothing more. Parliament is merely a 
piece of European goods stuck in the front window to hide what is going on 
behind. The government is really a military tyranny. The Turkish pretence that the 
Albanians do not wish for law and order is false.712  
As Austria-Hungary and Italy were not interested in helping those Albanians preparing the 
insurrection of 1911, she suggested that the British government should offer to help. To 
this end she wrote to the Foreign Office to show her readiness to help the Albanians and to 
express her thoughts about the future of Ottoman rule in the Balkans: 
The whole thing now is in ferment. I am afraid I am no longer strong enough to 
go and help shoot Turks myself, but I certainly hope to live to see them cease to 
rule in Europe.713 
The governments of Britain and the other Powers were not pleased with such a move by 
the Albanians. Their response worried Durham, who wished to see London and Vienna 
applying the principle of ‘the Balkans for the Balkan people’ together and supporting the 
Albanian national cause. Durham helped the Albanians in drafting the ‘12 Point 
Memorandum’ and wrote that the Austro-Hungarian consul in Shkodra tried to convince 
the Albanians not to rise against the Porte and made it known that there would be no help 
if they acted against his advice.714 
The Albanians of the north, most of whom were Catholic, had lost the little faith they had in 
Austria-Hungary and the other European Powers. Most of the Albanians that Durham met 
seemed to have believed that the Powers were interested only in occupying foreign land 
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and were pleased with the attacks of Italy on Libya in 1911. When Durham tried to 
convince them that this was not true, she was told: ‘We know the Powers. They are like 
brigands. They quarrel by day - but by night they go out robbing together’.715  
Such was the opinion of many Albanians on Austria-Hungary and the Powers just before the 
start of the Balkan Wars. After the insurrection of 1911 Durham was the only authority to 
whom Albanian leaders would turn for help and advice. Austria-Hungary was not happy 
with the ‘leeway it had lost’, a point Durham noted when she wrote that the mountaineers 
came to her for advice ‘in preference to the Austrian consul’. She added that the Austro-
Hungarian consul ‘used to be king; but they [the Albanians] call me Queen.’716 By now she 
was gaining wide popularity among the Albanians thanks to her personality and the fact 
that she was British.  
As a result of Durham’s work and activity, the popularity of Britain grew among the 
Albanians. She wrote to the Foreign Office, emphasising her importance and hoping to gain 
sympathy for Albania: 
England is enormously popular. I keep getting grateful deputations and letters 
about districts and villages who are supposed to have been priority saved from 
destruction by ‘Grande Bretagne’ and the ‘Krajlica’ [Queen] which is myself.717 
King Nikola of Montenegro knew that Durham was an important woman because she was 
writing for The Times and The Manchester Guardian. Though Durham had no direct links 
with the British government, it was not farfetched to presume that some of her reports 
would end up on the desks of the Foreign Office. For this reason, the Montenegrin king 
showed hospitality to her and sought to use Durham’s prestige among the Albanians; he 
had tried to use the influence she had over the Albanians but she had refused to get 
engaged in such a relationship. Once King Nikola asked her: ‘Miss Durham, why are you 
wearing the jewellery of my worst enemies?’ to which Durham replied: ‘because, Your 
Majesty, they are my best friends’.718   
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In 1911 Durham’s authority was known by all British consular and diplomatic 
representations serving in the Balkans and beyond. A British diplomat in Constantinople 
noted that ‘the singular devotion of Miss Edith Durham has won general respect in all the 
Western Balkan States’.719 Durham’s importance could also be seen through her 
correspondence with Bowring Spence, who served as Consul General in Trieste, Italy. When 
Durham wrote to inform Spence about the situation in Albania, she also told him that she 
was writing the letter from a hospital bed in Shkodra where she was lying very ill. Spence 
immediately wrote to Lord Dufferin to ask if the Foreign Office could send ‘some suitable 
and energetic person out to Miss Durham who is ill and in great need of a lady help’.720 
Durham’s popularity grew particularly high among the diplomats representing their 
countries in Cetinje and Shkodra.  
In March 1912, signs of general insurrection for autonomy appeared in Kosovo and 
Macedonia about which Durham, being in contact with Albanian leaders, had information. 
During that time Durham was in Shkodra and observed attempts by foreign diplomats to 
find out what exactly was happening. These diplomats knew that no one was better 
informed about Albania than Durham and so approached her for information. She wrote: 
‘they ask me, and I say I don’t know’.721 This may show that Durham was determined to 
provide the diplomats with only the information she regarded as useful for the Albanian 
cause. Despite this, there were two British diplomats with whom she established very close 
cooperation and to whom she did provide information. 
Durham often wrote to the British Consul in Shkodra and to others who served in 
Macedonia to keep them informed about and influence their opinion on Albanian matters. 
One of the consuls she targeted was Harry Lamb (1857-1948) who served as General 
Consul in Salonika, the main consular centre in Macedonia. When Lamb was transferred to 
Durrës and Vlora in Albania in 1912, Durham intensified her letters to him. Lamb 
despatched many of these letters to the Foreign Office. In one report he told Grey that 
Durham’s ‘interest in and knowledge of Albanian affairs is well known’.722 In the same 
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letter, Lamb wrote that ‘after consultation with myself’ Durham had gone to Vlora in order 
to form a reliable estimate about the situation and ‘work out a possibility of relieving it’.723 
Decades later in a letter Durham sent to her friend Edward Boyle,724 who at that time was 
the chairman of the Balkan Committee, spoke about another cooperation between her and 
Lamb. ‘I was in a spying mission’ she wrote about one of the journeys she made during the 
summer of 1914 to south Albania. She described the ‘Greek invasion and the savage 
devastation’ and added ‘I spied the position of the Greek Army and of the relief work I 
undertook at Sir Harry Lamb’s request.’725 This correspondence shows that there were 
occasions on which the British consulate relied on Durham’s information and actions as a 
trusted person, even though her information seemed to be mainly of a humanitarian 
character. 
From further correspondence it could also be confirmed that by 1913 Durham and Lamb 
had established a friendly relationship and met often for lunch and tea. Likely as a result of 
frequent meetings with Durham, Lamb adopted a more positive approach towards the 
Albanian question in many of his reports to the Foreign Office and also reported to the 
Foreign Office about the atrocities of the First Balkan War. As a matter of fact, Lamb was 
not alone in reporting on this matter. Other disturbing reports reached the Foreign Office 
from British diplomats in Macedonia, mainly from Charles Greig’s despatches from 
Manastir, though the Foreign Office seems initially to have believed and endorsed only the 
reports sent from Belgrade by Dayrell Crackenthorpe, who was as ‘a man of pronounced 
Serbophile sentiment’.726 It was only when the number of reports grew and the 
international and British press published details of the atrocities that the Foreign Office was 
persuaded to act. The British contacted the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić, about the 
atrocities that the Serbian army had committed in the area of Manastir. Pašić replied by 
saying that he had no comment because ‘he did not know the prefect there personally’.727  
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Lamb went further than reporting about atrocities that were committed throughout 
Kosovo and Macedonia. He criticised the Foreign Office for lacking courage and dignity and 
for not warning the Balkan League about the atrocities they had committed. Lamb 
maintained that it was not proper for the British government to conceal the bitter reality of 
atrocities out of fear of the reaction of the Muslims in India and other dominions.728  
It is not easy to conclude whether Lamb fully supported Durham’s political activity and her 
position on ‘the Balkans for the Balkan people’, but it is most certain that Lamb and 
Durham showed great respect for each other’s work and agreed on most points regarding 
Balkan matters. The importance of Lamb to Durham was shown when she and Aubrey 
Herbert suggested in 1917 that the Foreign Office should form a group of diplomats and 
experts who would be consulted on and engaged in the reconstruction of the Balkan states. 
Durham put Harry Lamb on top of the list, considering him to possess the best knowledge 
on the Balkans and Albania and as someone ‘whose qualifications are of the highest’.729  
In her efforts to win British diplomats to her side, Durham also befriended Count de Salis, a 
prominent British diplomat who served in the Foreign Office in London from 1901 to 1906 
and in several diplomatic missions as ambassador. De Salis also served as the British 
representative in Montenegro from 1911 to 1916.730 It was during this period that Durham 
established contact with de Salis, with whom she maintained a friendly relationship until his 
death in 1939. When de Salis died, Durham revealed her close cooperation with him. She 
wrote to Edward Boyle: 
A more upright, honest and clean minded man never existed. I always felt that 
Foreign Office did not make so much or such good use of him as it should have. 
We had a lot of men sent out there I paid no particular attention to him at first. 
But the Count when he found out I had been long in the Balkans asked me for 
information and at last used to entrust me with the task of finding out for him 
various things; what was going on up country; who was so & so, etc. When the 
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Balkan War broke out I was continually in touch with him and giving all the facts I 
could get.731 
De Salis and Durham held identical views on the Balkans and from their correspondence it 
could be concluded that Durham had some influence on him. During and after the Balkan 
Wars they both rejected Pan-Slavism, Serbia’s expansionist policy and disliked R. W. Seton– 
Watson. De Salis’ views about the Balkans are to be seen from the official reports he sent 
from Montenegro to the Foreign Office732 and from his private correspondence with Lord 
Onslow.733 De Salis, like Durham, maintained that the region of Shkodra and the town itself 
was Albanian and was unjustly attacked by the Serbian and Montenegrin armies. In 
December 1912 de Salis wrote to Lord Onslow to find out the position of the Foreign Office 
on Shkodra and Albania. De Salis suggested that the idea of the Serbs and Montenegrins to 
rule over Albanians should not be approved.734 In 1924 de Salis told Durham: ‘I hold no 
brief for Orthodoxy’.  
Durham also befriended Sir Maurice de Bunsen, another prominent diplomat who served 
as British ambassador in Vienna during the Balkan Wars and the beginning of the First 
World War. De Bunsen had informed Grey that Austria-Hungary was preparing a plan to 
attack Serbia but, according to Durham, Grey did not take de Bunsen’s reports seriously. 
However, both de Salis and de Bunsen continued to support Durham morally. After the 
First World War they urged Durham to ‘work out Serb guilt & publish it’.735 On her side, 
Durham also urged de Salis and de Bunsen to publish their experiences or memoirs about 
the Balkan Wars and the First World War which would have exposed Serbia’s guilt of 
aggression towards Albania and their ‘responsibility for the Sarajevo crime’. Both abstained 
from expressing their opinions and experiences publicly out of ‘some idea of loyalty to the 
FO [Foreign Office]’. To this Durham added: ‘And now what might have been a very 
important book will never be written’.736 
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Harry Lamb and de Salis had played an important role in alarming the Foreign Office about 
the situation in Albania at the beginning of the Balkan Wars. When the Conference of 
Ambassadors was convened in London in December 1912, Albania was the subject about 
which Edward Grey was well informed and was urged to find a solution. However, Durham 
preferred to inform the public at home through the British press and thus to influence 
politicians. Being aware of the lack of knowledge on Albania in Britain, Durham was ready 
to speak to the people in any sort of conferences or meetings and continued to do so well 
after the Balkan Wars had ended.737  
Observing closely the developments in Montenegro during autumn 1912, Durham could 
predict that the outbreak of war was a matter of days away. The Powers had not supported 
the request of the Albanians for autonomy or independence and the neighbouring 
countries were about to move into those Albanian vilayets ruled by the Porte. She also 
believed that Albanians had no leader like Giuseppe Garibaldi to unite them against the 
threats of their neighbours. As a result of these factors, Durham changed her previous 
position on the Ottoman Empire in relation to Albania and just before the outbreak of the 
Balkan Wars started to think that the immediate expulsion of the Ottomans from Europe 
was not necessary. When the Ottomans considered granting autonomy to Albania in 
August 1912, Durham suggested that the presence of the Ottoman regime should be 
continued for a couple more years. Within that suggested period, the Porte would have 
served 'as a kind of protective incubator' for the new Albanian state.738 Only a year earlier 
Durham had criticised the Young Turks for exiling and imprisoning the majority of the best 
Albanian political activists and intellectuals and now, when educated Albanians were 
needed, even by the Young Turks, they were not available.739  
 
The Balkan Wars and the rejection of the principle of nationality 
With the start of the Balkan Wars, Durham discovered that the countries of the Balkan 
League had no intention of applying the principle of nationality or implementing the motto  
‘the Balkans for the Balkan people’. Until this point Durham had supported the Balkan 
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League as she wished to see all Balkan nations freed from Ottoman rule. Durham was, most 
probably, the first female war reporter and in this capacity she witnessed the very start of 
the Balkan War, when the Montenegrin artillery fired towards Albania. At dawn on 9 
October 1912, Durham went to Mount Gorica, near Podgorica and watched King Nikola 
ordering his heavy artillery to fire the first shot towards Albania. The First Balkan War had 
begun and Durham hurried off to send the news to England and made headlines for The 
Manchester Guardian and The Chronicle.740    
As a Liberal Gladstonian she initially held an anti-Ottoman view and sided with 
Montenegro. She wrote in The Nation to say that ‘Gladstone was right when he said that, 
bag and baggage, the Turk must go’.741 On 15 October 1912 she went again as a reporter 
with the Montenegrin Army to witness the fall of Tuzi, an Albanian border town. She even 
congratulated Prince Danilo of Montenegro on the speedy victory which was achieved by 
his army. During the late afternoon, after the battle and war formalities between the 
Montenegrins and the Ottomans were over, Durham observed the sun going down and 
compared the end of the day with the end of the Ottoman Empire in Europe: 
Then the slender crescent moon shone softly in the heavens – the only crescent 
now above the land, for the Turkish emblem has been howled down, we hope for 
ever.742 
That evening she went back to Cetinje seated courteously in one of the government cars 
reserved for Montenegrin royalties and state functionaries. The day had ended in complete 
satisfaction for the Liberal Gladstonian that she was. To explain her feelings further, she 
added: 
For many years I have given all my energy to the task – as far as one woman can 
help it – of releasing the European peoples from the Turkish yoke, and it seems 
that at last the goal is in sight.743  
From the start of the Balkan Wars, Durham was also engaged in humanitarian relief work 
with the Montenegrin Red Cross, where she came to know about atrocities committed 
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during the war. The start of the war marked a turning point in Durham’s beliefs and political 
activities in the Balkans. In December 1912 she wrote in The Nation to explain that Albania 
was the reason for the eruption of the Balkan War. By giving testimonies of Serb actions, 
she also explained that atrocities were announced before the war had started. She gave the 
example of a Serb in Plava, Montenegro, who told her: 
Last year [1911] the Maltsori of Maltsia e Madhe revolted. They fought fair; they 
never assaulted a woman, nor burnt a mosque, nor mutilated a body. They 
hoped Europe would intervene and protect them, and recognise that they had 
fought as civilised people. What did Europe do? She hurled those people back to 
the Turks who burnt, mutilated, and assaulted. This has taught us a lesson. 
Europe likes horrors. Very well - she shall have them. This war that is just going to 
begin will surpass all others. We will take eye for eye – head for head. Then 
perhaps Europe will be satisfied!744  
Durham did not seem to believe in such ‘announcements’. When the war started she was 
working as a nurse helping the Montenegrin army but subsequently left with many foreign 
doctors serving with the Red Cross. She believed that her work prolonged the unjust war 
and gave the Montenegrin army reinforcements once the soldiers recovered. The 
intentions of the wounded soldiers and the thoughts and actions of the Montenegrin and 
Serbian establishment, made her change her opinion of the situation. In a long and 
unpublished report about her relief work, she wrote: 
The man of this last batch wanted only to be sufficiently cured to be able to be 
present at the looting of Scutari […] The Montenegrin doctor under whom I was 
working said that he considered they were justified in cutting the throats of every 
woman and child in Scutari [Shkodra]. The King’s cousin told me that in two years 
they would have stamped out the Albanian language. The Catholic Albanians 
resident in Podgoritza were continually insulted and threatened with the 
torments that would be shortly inflicted on their relatives in Scutari.745 
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Durham was terrified when a Serbian officer told her about his ‘heroism’ in Kosovo and 
‘nearly choked with laughter’ as he told how he had ‘bayoneted the women and children of 
Ljuma [Luma]’. Other officers told her that within a short time ‘no one would dare speak 
that dirty language [Albanian]’ in the newly occupied lands. They openly spoke about the 
violence which was being used in converting Muslim and Catholic Albanians into Christian 
Orthodox. Durham was also told that ‘in one generation we shall thus Serbize the lot’.746  
A day after Tuzi had fallen, Durham went to the town as a medical worker with the 
Montenegrin Red Cross. The mutilated bodies of the Ottoman soldiers terrified her. She 
reported this problem to the Montenegrin authorities with some strong comments. As a 
result, all newspaper correspondents were prohibited from going to Tuzi. After she made 
this discovery, the attitude of the Montenegrin authorities towards her changed. She saw 
many other unacceptable cases in hospitals. ‘The war was to be one of the terrorism and 
extermination’, she wrote in The Nation. It was not the liberation of the Balkan people she 
had expected but rather a war underpinned with religious character that she had believed 
would not happen. On this she wrote: 
Tsar Ferdinand spoke the truth when he said the war was one of Cross vs 
Crescent. The Orthodox Cross drips red with blood of victims. They are not all 
Muslims. Orthodox fanaticism has not spared the Roman Catholics.747   
Not long before the start of the First Balkan War, Durham was approached by Serbian 
diplomats in Montenegro who hoped to win her over to their side. She received a letter 
from the Serbian Legation which considered her as ‘the greatest hope of the Serbs, the 
dearest, the darling and a lot more such stuff’.748 She thought that the Serbs wanted to use 
her as a ‘cat’s paw for Serbia’s ambitions’. She told Edward Boyle: 
So I made no reply and never again communicated with that Legation. I was glad I 
did so, as the Serb atrocities in that war opened my eyes to what they were really 
up to with their Velika Srbija [Great Serbia].749 
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Durham did not approve of this policy which directly contradicted and violated the principle 
of ‘the Balkans for the Balkan people’ in which she believed and on which her activity was 
based. She finally broke with British Gladstonian Liberalism which, according to her, had 
helped to produce the violence in the Balkans. On this, Durham wrote: 
What a humbug all that talk about ‘freeing Xtians from the Turkish youke was!’ 
that fanatic old Gladstone started in England. Never having lived out there he did 
not know what he was talking about.750    
Defending this principle, she would soon change her mind about Austria-Hungary and the 
Balkan League. By the beginning of December 1912, the Balkan armies had complicated the 
situation in Albania and the Powers believed that it was time to intervene in order to avert 
a wholescale European war. On 17 December 1912, on the initiative of the British Foreign 
Secretary, Edward Grey, the Powers and the Balkan countries gathered in London to find a 
solution. During the Conference of Ambassadors, Austria-Hungary and Italy were 
determined to show that Serbia, Greece and Montenegro were becoming a danger to 
peace in Europe because of their occupation of Albania. Vienna, aiming to check the 
territorial expansion of Serbia, proposed to create an independent Albania which would 
include most of the territory of what is today Kosovo.751 This also meant that Greece, 
Serbia and Montenegro would not be able to divide Albania in the way they wished. 
Austria-Hungary kept insisting on the continuation of its established policy in the region 
under the principle of ‘the Balkans for the Balkan people’. Vienna used this policy as a 
‘back-up for the interdiction of a Serbian land-grab on the Adriatic,’ which meant that 
Serbia would not be allowed to keep a port in the middle of a country inhabited by 
Albanians.752  
Finally, the principle of ‘the Balkans for the Balkan people’ brought together Durham and 
the Austro-Hungarians. Strangely and unexpectedly, Durham’s idea also received the 
support of R. W. Seton-Watson and a few other Gladstonians. R. W. Seton-Watson 
expressed disapproval with the Serbian government which was seeking a port at Durrës or 
Shën Gjin on the Albanian coast. In this regard he wrote that ‘the Balkans for Balkan 
                                                             
750   Durham to Boyle, 8 September 1943, MS 405/120. 
751   Frank Maloy Anderson and Amos Shartle Hershey, Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia, and Africa 
1870–1914 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918), pp. 333–334.  
752   Clark, Sleepwalkers, p. 282.  
238 
 
people’ was his ‘reason for approving of this war’ but he disapproved of the Serbian 
occupation of the Albanian coast ‘because it would make Albanian independence 
impossible’. R. W. Seton-Watson added that the Albanians should be counted as a Balkan 
people who deserved independence.753  
However, this did not mean that Durham and R. W. Seton-Watson became friends. The 
very first disagreement between them was about the geographical size of independent 
Albania. Disagreements continued because R. W. Seton-Watson could not abandon his 
commitment to the pro-Serb or pro-Slav policies which Durham considered to be anti-
Albanian. R. W. Seton-Watson’s support for the Serbian government was shown in the 
correspondence he kept with a Serbian diplomat Stanoje Mihajlović. In a letter, dated 23 
August 1913, Mihajlović thanked R. W. Seton-Watson and his wife for the ‘warm feelings 
which were shown for Serbia’ during the Balkan Wars. Mihajlović also thanked R. W. Seton-
Watson ‘in the name of the Serbian people’ for his supportive writings in the British press, 
including the ‘wonderful article’ titled ‘New Phases of the Balkan Question’ that was 
published in The Contemporary Review, in which Serbian aims were ‘explained properly’.754  
When the Second Balkan War was over and peace was temporarily restored, the national 
question of the Balkan countries came up again for discussion among Gladstonians of the 
Balkan Committee. This discussion continued even after the First World War was over. 
Durham still supported the ‘principle of nationality’ and the ethnic distribution of Albanians 
which led the conflict with R. W. Seton-Watson to continue. In the Albanian case, R. W. 
Seton-Watson and Brailsford were in favour of applying the ‘principle of civilisation’ but 
differed in their reasons for supporting such an approach. Brailsford supported 
independence for Albania because he was convinced that the Albanians were ‘equipped 
with a sufficient foundation of civilisation’, yet R. W. Seton-Watson, supporting the national 
cause of the Slavs under Austro-Hungarian rule, maintained that Albanians should not 
enjoy more rights than the ‘civilised subjects of Austria-Hungary’. 755 
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During the Balkan Wars, the principle of ‘the Balkans for the Balkan people’ was overlooked 
by most of the Powers and by all countries of the Balkan League. Hence, from this point on, 
Durham showed full support for Austro-Hungarian plans and actions in the Balkans. This 
also meant that, from now on, Durham fully identified herself with the Albanian national 
cause and regarded as ‘our enemies’ all those who were against the Albanian national 
movement.756 This could also be seen in how Durham referred to Esat Pasha Toptani by 
using the same language as any other Albanian nationalist. She regarded Toptani as a 
traitor when he surrendered Shkodra to the Montenegrins on 21 April 1913 and also saw 
him as the main obstacle to the establishment of the independent Albanian state.757 
However, in 1913 she viewed Italy as another obstacle to the independence of Albania and 
as a power friendly to Montenegro. On the occasion of the Shkodra crisis and, regarding 
the role of Italy, Edith Durham wrote: 
Italy played an oddly double game. She was bound by Treaty to assist Austria to 
preserve the integrity of Albania. But she did not object to King Nikola-father of 
the Queen of Italy, taking the town if he could. Italy was striving for influence in 
Montenegro, out of hatred of Austria, and failed to see that the South Slav, not 
the German-Austrian, was her real danger.758 
While the Conference of Ambassadors was in session during summer 1913, Durham went 
to south Albania, accompanied by Henry Nevinson, to report on the Greek occupation and 
atrocities in order to influence the decision making process in London. At one point, while 
entering the Albanian town of Korça, a Greek officer whose government claimed that the 
town was Greek ordered Durham to stop or he would shoot if she preceded further. She 
continued walking and told him: ‘You can’t, I’m English’.759 She wrote about this event, 
pointing out cynically that she was ready to risk her life for her principles and to show to 
the occupying armies, in this case the Greeks, that some people who belong to a particular 
European Power cannot be killed like the Albanians in Albania. Durham and Nevinson sent a 
telegram to Edward Grey, informing him and the Conference about Greek atrocities in the 
area. They also informed Grey that the town was entirely Albanian and refused the 
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presence of Greek troops. The telegram had an effect. The diplomats of the Conference 
approved this information and, as a result, it ‘helped to save Koritza [Korça]’ which 
remained within Albanian territory.760  
The difficult situation of those Albanians who found themselves living in territories which 
came under Montenegrin and Greek occupation after 1913 led Durham to complain to the 
Foreign Office. Lord Vansittart, who later became the Permanent Undersecretary from 
1930 to 1938, replied to Durham on behalf of the Foreign Office. His reply said that during 
the London Conference, the British government and the Powers made a commitment to 
guarantee equal religious and national rights as ‘guaranteed by Treaty of Berlin’.761 ‘These 
rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Berlin simply do not exist’, wrote Durham in reply. One 
important fact to be noted from this correspondence was that Durham had identified 
herself fully with Albania and the Albanian provisional government. In her reply to 
Vansittart, she blamed the Powers for not taking responsibility for Albania and asked for 
more British support: 
Europe is greatly to blame in leaving us for so long time in an unsettled condition 
[…]. Can’t you work so that our Albanian Government can be put on its feet an 
hour sooner? This delay and suspension will kill us. No country seems to me to 
take real interest in us. 762    
However, Durham’s commitment to the principle of ‘the Balkans for the Balkan people’ 
distanced her from the Montenegrins and the Serbs because she did not approve of their 
disregard for this principle and the violence that they applied against the Albanians. The 
‘liberation’ turned into the occupation of Albania and this made Durham strengthen her 
support for her principle. Because of this principle, Durham decided to end her friendship 
with the Montenegrin and Serbian regimes. In October 1913, she packed up the Gold 
Medal which was given to her by King Nikola of Montenegro and returned it to him. 
Regarding this decision, she wrote: 
I had often expressed surprise at persons who accepted decorations from Abdul 
Hamid, and that now I knew that he and his subjects were even more cruel than 
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the Turk I would not keep his blood-stained medal any longer. I communicated 
this to the English and Austrian Press. The order of St. Sava given to me by King 
Petar of Serbia, I decided to keep a little longer till some peculiarly flagrant case 
should occur, and this I expected soon.763 
From this point on, Durham’s work can be characterised as lobbying exclusively on behalf 
of Albania. Lobbying was underpinned with efforts to publicise atrocities that were 
committed against the Albanians. The Carnegie Report, produced by the International 
Commission to inquire into the causes and conduct of the Balkan Wars which came out in 
1914, confirmed the objectivity of Durham’s writing on this subject. The Report proved that 
the Albanian civil population and their property suffered severely at the hands of the 
Serbian army.764 Soon after this report, Durham wrote in The Struggle for Scutari that ‘the 
destruction of the whole Albanian race was the avowed intention of both Serb and 
Montenegrin’.765  
This led the Albanian leaders to use Durham’s writings as strong proof to reinforce their 
nationalist discourse and argue against the violence of the invading or occupying armies. 
When the war was over, King Nikola of Montenegro, with whom Durham had ended a long 
friendship without any regret or hesitation, delivered a speech to his returned soldiers: 
Your hands are stained with blood, my blessed soldiers, because you have broken 
the chains of slavery to your dearest brothers. The hopes of millions of living and 
dead Serbs are realised. […] You took revenge for the failure in Kosovo and 
brought back and raised the honour of the Serbian arms. […] Let us not forget 
that Europe took Shkodra from our hands [and] after 20 days we captured and 
lowered our flag there. We have not given away Shkodra because we do not give 
away our historic rights.766  
The Montenegrins were angry with Britain since the international force which forced them 
to leave Shkodra was composed mainly of Britons and commanded by Admiral Cecil Burney 
(1858-1929). Burney, at the request of the London Conference, had blockaded the 
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Montenegrin coastline and threatened to attack the Montenegrin army. The threat 
produced an effect and the Montenegrins left Shkodra,767 but hatred against Austria-
Hungary and Albania only rose in Montenegro. The Russian, French and Italian diplomats in 
Cetinje expressed similar feelings. Describing the feelings of Montenegrin officials and 
people in Podgorica, Edith Durham wrote: 
Furious at losing Scutari [Shkodra], they swore they would retake it and take 
Bosnia, too. I told them not to talk so foolishly. They cried: ‘We – the Serb 
people- have beaten the Turk. We are now a danger to Europe. We shall take 
what we please. The Serbs will go to Vienna. We shall go to Sarajevo. We have 
the whole Russian army with us. If you do not believe it – you will see. We shall 
begin in Bosnia!’ This was in May 1913.768 
This was how Durham wanted the world to see the atmosphere among the Serbs and 
Montenegrins after the Balkan Wars. Durham went on to underline that the Serbs and 
Montenegrins were dissatisfied and angry with the result of the Balkan Wars because they 
did not get enough territory from Albania, and Austria-Hungary was to be blamed. 
According to Durham, Albania, which became independent during the Balkan Wars, also 
became a prelude to another big war which would start within a year. When the First 
Balkan War ended, Durham’s belief in the principle of ‘the Balkans for the Balkan people’ 
was shattered. The war had produced a result she had never imagined. On this regard she 
wrote: 
And miseria is the price of war. ‘The Balkan land for the Balkan people’. But the 
Balkan lands were but sparsely populated, and the victims are innumerable.769  
When the armies of Montenegro and Serbia retreated from Shkodra in April 1913, an 
international force of nearly 2,000 soldiers and marines was dispatched to occupy the 
town. Admiral Burney was appointed President of a Provisional Administration whose 
jurisdiction extended only six miles around Shkodra.770 In October that year Burney was 
replaced by General George Fraser Phillips (1863-1921). Durham was quick to establish 
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contact with Phillips and also discovered that her pro Albanian friend Dr. Cunningham was 
also a friend of Phillips. After exchanging a few letters, Cunningham told Durham that 
General Phillips had ‘changed his mind about the Serbs’ and now ‘we should stick out for 
complete independence under international guarantee’.771 In one of her letters sent to 
Herbert, Durham wrote that ‘Phillips had taken a much more helpful view of the 
situation’.772 This meant that Phillips was supporting the Albanians, at least regarding the 
Shkodra issue. Until many years later Durham kept sending her books to Phillips and 
included other relevant books, such as Byron’s works on Albania and Brailsford’s on 
Macedonia.773  
The importance of Harry Lamb grew when he was appointed as representative of the 
British government in the International Commission of Control, which was established on 
29 July 1913 by the London Treaty of the Conference of Ambassadors. The headquarters of 
the Commission were in Vlora and its aim was to take care of the administration of Albania 
until permanent political and administrative institutions were established.774 Harry Lamb 
pressured the Foreign Office on three points; 1. Nominating a civil governor for Shkodra; 2. 
Recognising the Albanian Provisional Government, and; 3. Considering an economic plan 
for the future of Albania. Lamb made this proposal with the purpose of exercising control 
or influence over the Albanian Provisional Government and improving the British position 
which, according to Lamb, was ‘beginning to suffer loss of prestige’. By the end of October 
1913, the Foreign Office had expressed its consent on all three points. ‘I was from the 
beginning of [the] opinion that we ought to enter into official relation with Ismail Kemal as 
the “Autorité Existante” at Valona [Vlora]’, wrote Lamb.775  
Having in mind these developments, it could be concluded that the British policy was slowly 
taking a positive stance on Albania and Durham had certainly played an important role in 
this change. In spring of 1914 Albania was still in a state of devastation that was brought 
about by the Balkan Wars, but there was hope that things would be improved with the help 
of considerable British engagement. However, this situation was soon to change.  
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The debate about two principles 
Durham left Albania in August 1914, a few days after the First World War had started. The 
way that the war had begun was against Durham’s principles and all her expectations: 
I learn to my amazement that not only had Britain declared war, but to my shame and 
disgust had done so on the side of the Slav. After that I did not really care what happened. 
The cup of my humiliation was full. […] Had I had any money I should have gone to the 
Pacific islands, or anywhere out of the dirty squabbles of Europe.776   
After arriving in London, the first thing she did was to send back to King Petar of Serbia the 
Order of St Sava he had given her. On 30 August 1914 she wrote a letter to consider him 
‘guilty of the greatest crime in history’ because of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 
Sarajevo, which she considered as an attack on Austria-Hungary and on Europe.777  
The situation in Albania was now similar to that of October 1912, when the First Balkan 
War had begun. Although greatly disappointed, she started again the same activity of 
saving Albania as the situation was reversed. To Durham this was a repeated episode of the 
Balkan Wars on which she wrote: 
I hoped that when once Albania’s independence was gained in 1913 I should 
never again have to wallow in these dirty Balkan politics. Then came the war of 
1914-18 & it all had to be fought again.778 
After she left in 1914 she visited Albania only once, in 1921. ‘Tired. Don’t feel as if my 
Albania existed any more’, she wrote in her diary during the visit.779 Durham’s Albania was 
to include all Albanians in one state but she felt that the principle of ‘the Balkans for the 
Balkan people’ was only partially applied in this case. In London, defending this principle 
and on behalf of Albania, she never stopped debating with supporters of Serbia and later 
Yugoslavia, usually with R. W. Seton-Watson, Wickham Steed, Rebecca West and other 
Gladstonian Liberals.   
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Although the Balkan Wars and the First World War were over, the debate about the causes 
and conduct of the war intensified in the British press between Durham on one side and R. 
W. Seton-Watson780 and Henry Wickham Steed, a foreign correspondent from Vienna and 
foreign editor for The Times, on the other side. Albania and Serbia, and particularly the role 
of the Serbian state in atrocities against Albanians and the assassination of Franz 
Ferdinand, were the key themes of the debate. R. W. Seton-Watson and his friend Steed 
were better placed in the academic world, the press and British politics but Durham was far 
more knowledgeable than the two about the Balkans. She couldn’t win the fight against 
them but the debate helped her to keep the subject of Albania alive.781 Debating R. W. 
Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed, Durham is remembered to have invented a jingle about 
them which became popular and she was very keen of using it often when writing on this 
matter:  
SW, WS.  
The two of them made  
the hell of a mess!782 
Durham asked R. W. Seton-Watson many times to debate the Balkan matters in person and 
publicly but he refused. ‘I have never had any respect for him since I first met him in 1906 
in Dalmatia,’ wrote Durham about Steed’.783 Durham, R. W. Seton-Watson and Steed 
continued to be members of the Balkan Committee despite the fact that they had different 
opinions on countries in this part of Europe. Durham held them responsible for the events 
that had taken a wrong turn during the Balkan Wars and First World War. She considered 
that they contributed to spreading the flame of war: ‘Seton-Watson & Wickham Steed 
were like children who played with matches, throughout they had made a nice blaze and 
burned the house down’.784  
The debate continued and Durham used all opportunities to put Albania in the centre of it, 
emphasising that the principle of nationality was not applied to Albanians and as a result 
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the Balkans will remain destabilised.785 However, Durham is today far less known for her 
humanitarian work, another principle that she applied to all victims of war. Even when she 
wrote articles of a political nature she was keen to emphasise that she was also engaged in 
humanitarian work in the Balkans and asked for donations. In an article published in The 
Manchester Guardian, she thanked contributors to the Albanian Relief Fund and gave 
details of how the fund was distributed.786 When Dr. Morant, the head of the publishing 
council of the Royal Anthropological Institute, asked Durham if she had collected poems or 
songs in Albanian and if she wanted to publish them, she replied:   
You see so much of my strength was used up in relief work, feeding starving 
villages after the Balkan wars, getting houses reroofed, distributing seed corn, 
looking after wounded. Often 10 to 12 hours in the saddle & sleeping on ground 
with saddle under my head. Far too exhausted to remember words & grammar. 
And the wretched people were far too depressed to sing.787  
Durham also expressed the value of humanitarian principles in an exchange of views with R. 
W. Seton-Watson. Regarding the appalling conditions of Albanians and others who were 
displaced and became refugees after the Balkan Wars and First World War, she wrote to R. 
W. Seton-Watson:  
You seem to regard these populations as mere pawns to be shifted on the board 
according to political needs. To me they are all suffering human beings with 
whom I have been under fire - for whose sake I have risked enteric, smallpox & 
have wrestled with poisoned wounds. And with whom I have hungered and been 
half frozen. I feel it a duty to show the means by which they have been annexed 
and trampled on.788 
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Some members of the Balkan Committee had supported Durham’s views and activities 
throughout. On 30 October 1944 some, including Noel Buxton and Edward Boyle789 
undertook an initiative to establish a fund as an expression to their grateful appreciation 
for Durham’s ‘distinguished scientific and political work in the Balkans’.790 They planned to 
pass the fund to Durham, as a birthday present, to be used for a purpose she would choose 
herself. Durham died two weeks after this initiative was undertaken.  
Several weeks after Durham’s death, L. G. Whickham-Legg, editor of The Dictionary of 
National Biography asked R.W Seton-Watson if he could possibly write about Durham in 
this publication which had reserved 400 words for her. R. W. Seton-Watson never 
replied.791  
 
Conclusion 
Durham’s work showed that Liberal Gladstonians had artificially constructed an idea about 
the Balkans which was based on religion and, as such, reflected negatively on the 
Albanians. The Liberal’s idea of ‘illuminating’ and liberating the Christians was not 
acceptable for Durham. Durham was among rare experts, travel writers and political 
activists who recognised that the conflict in the Balkans was in fact of a nationalist 
character. Therefore, the essence of her work was to correct this misguided approach of 
the Liberals. Durham’s approach was inclusive as she insisted that both Christians and non-
Christians should be supported in their efforts to liberate themselves from Ottoman rule.    
Of all the British experts and travel writers on the Balkans of the twentieth century, 
Durham became the most important one. Durham, as a woman but also through her work, 
made a great impact on the countries she came to know and love. Within less than a 
decade she earned a reputation as an ethnographer, anthropologist, journalist, political 
activist, lobbyist and relief or humanitarian worker. She identified herself with the land and 
the people of the Balkans. Her views and support for Montenegrins, Serbs, Macedonians, 
and Albanians changed as a result of the historical developments that led to the Balkan 
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Wars. More precisely, the expansionist policies of the countries of the Balkan League, the 
violence and the policy of the Powers, were the reasons that made Durham change her 
mind and her support for differing Balkan nations.792  
Although she changed her views and the movements she supported, she continued to 
believe that the principle of 'the Balkans for the Balkan people' should be applied to all 
nations, including the Albanians. This was the reason that pushed Durham into 
confrontation with most of the Liberal Gladstonians who were members of the Balkan 
Committee and supporters of Slavic nations. The conflict intensified during the First World 
War and continued until the Second World War.  
Durham’s work showed that Liberal Gladstonians had artificially constructed an idea about 
the Balkans which was based on religion and, as such, reflected negatively on the 
Albanians. The Liberal’s idea of ‘illuminating’ and ‘liberating’ only the Christian population 
in the Balkans was not acceptable for Durham. She was among the rare experts, travel 
writers or political activists who recognised that the conflict in the Balkans was nationalist 
in character. Therefore, the essence of her work was to correct the Liberal approach which 
she thought was erroneous.  
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Chapter VIII 
 
Aubrey Herbert, the Albanian Committee and Albanian Statehood 
 
Sir Edward Grey was always courteous and listened to facts and figures that were 
not official and did all in his power to mitigate the sufferings of the Albanians. In 
the face of strong opposition, he recognised publicly that the Albanians had the 
same right to nationality and autonomy as any other people in the Balkans. The 
Greeks had been helped by Byron, and the Slav nations had Russia behind them. 
The Serbs and the Bulgars had the liberal inheritance of Gladstone’s speeches and 
the active support of the Buxtons and the Balkan Committee, and the Albanians, 
who were the smallest in population and the most ineffectively equipped, received 
their title-deeds, which their neighbours would have stolen from them, at the 
hands of Lord Grey. - Aubrey Herbert793 
               
Introduction 
Aubrey Herbert arrived in the Balkans for the first time in 1904. Landing at Salonika, 
Herbert visited most of the region and, by 1912, Albania had become his principal interest. 
In 1913 he went to Vlora, the seat of the Albanian Provisional Government. There a large 
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crowd of people gathered in front of the house where he was staying and cheered for 
Britain. Herbert gave a speech and explained to them the work of the Albanian Committee, 
the organisation he had formed in London to lobby on behalf of Albania. They cheered 
again, saluted and called him the ‘Paladin of Liberty’. Historian Larry Wolf wrote that this 
‘scenario resembled R. W. Seton-Watson’s triumphal voyage’ a year earlier, in Dalmatia, 
Croatia, where he was saluted and cheered for representing the Slavs to Great Britain.794  
Given Herbert’s immense popularity among Albanians, the aim of this chapter is to examine 
British involvement in the Albanian question through his support for and contribution to 
championing Albania’s right to statehood. Herbert’s contribution during the crucial period 
1912 1914 will be illustrated through his engagement as a travel writer and politician and 
his work with the Albanian Committee. The knowledge and experience that Herbert gained 
by spending considerable time in the Ottoman Empire, Macedonia and Albania led him to 
disagree with Britain’s foreign policy, which was still considerably affected by Liberalism. He 
therefore entered politics in 1911 with the intention of changing the existing policy towards 
the region and, by 1912, his main interest became the creation of an Albanian state. 
The activities of the Albanian Committee, which was formed on Herbert’s initiative in 
December 1912, will be central to this chapter. The aim of the Committee was to influence 
the British public and policy-makers to adopt a favourable approach towards the Albanian 
national cause and support the establishment of an Albanian state. It will be argued that in 
order to achieve these aims, the Committee rejected the Liberal approach that had 
formerly dominated foreign policy thinking. Despite some difficulties, the Committee 
managed to bring the Albanian question into the public sphere and achieved some success 
in pursuit of its aims.  
The official view of the British government towards the creation of the Albanian state was 
best represented by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. Grey’s position will be 
examined through his work as foreign secretary and the proceedings of the London 
Conference, which he chaired from December 1912 to August 1913. Although the London 
Conference was convened to decide the future of Albania and has since been studied in 
great detail, this chapter will only deal with the part the British government played in it, 
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which has not been properly explained thus far. From an Albanian perspective, Grey played 
a positive role by supporting the establishment of an independent state, for which he was 
praised by Herbert. In contrast, Grey himself maintained that he played only a neutral role 
throughout the Conference but, as will be shown, he often took sides by supporting or 
rejecting proposals made by the Powers. By promoting a balance between the Powers, it 
could be argued that Grey’s work was in fact detrimental to the creation of an Albanian 
state along ethnic lines, as Herbert and the Albanian Committee had advocated.  
In addition, this chapter will argue that while the British government did not show much 
interest in the state building process other actors did play a positive role. This can be seen 
namely in the actions of British officials in Albania and members of the International 
Commission of Control, which was created following the London Conference of 
Ambassadors in 1913 to oversee the creation of the new Albanian state, and the 
International Force which was dispatched to Shkodra.  
Aubrey Herbert is author of the following books: Mons, Anzac & Kut: a British Intelligence 
Officer in Three Theatres of the First World War, 1914-18; Eastern Songs; and A Record of 
Eastern Travel. These works are explored in this chapter in order to understand Herbert’s 
activities. By 1923 Herbert had become an important personality in British political life and 
overseas service but, after his premature death that year, he faded from memory and 
within a decade was almost entirely forgotten. It is possible that the marginality of the 
Albanian question in Britain contributed to his subsequent anonymity, despite the 
important role he played in British diplomacy during his lifetime. Yet the lack of writings 
about Herbert stem mainly from the reluctance of his widow, Mary Herbert, for people to 
document his work. She regarded the practice of biography writing as a ‘vulgar breach of 
privacy’. When Mary died in 1970, Herbert’s papers were deposited in different archives.795 
This chapter, in most parts, is based on these documents which today are to be found in 
the Somerset Heritage Centre and British National Archives. 
In 1983 Aubrey Herbert’s niece wrote the biography The Man Who Was Greenmantle and 
brought to light aspects of Herbert’s work. Another important book on Herbert’s life, 
Albania’s Greatest Friend – Aubrey Herbert and the making of modern Albania, was 
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published in 2011. The book is a compilation of documents and, as the title suggests, shows 
Herbert as Albania’s greatest friend in the English speaking world.796  
In many ways Herbert was a hero to Albanians and, in 1913, they even offered him the 
crown of their kingdom. Three years after he died, an Albanian newspaper published a 
front page article on his life and contribution to Albania under the title: ‘Albania will never 
forget its friends and their names in our history will be written in gold’.797 Yet, as Noel 
Malcolm noted in the preface of Albania’s Greatest Friend, after 1945 nobody in Albania 
knew who Aubrey Herbert was. This was the result of the official ideology of the 
communist regime which made Herbert, a member of the British ruling class and 
descendant of a family of landowners, politically unwanted and rarely mentioned. Herbert 
and his work continue to be relatively unknown in Britain, Albania and Kosovo even today 
and this chapter therefore aims to fill this gap. 
 
                 Aubrey Herbert’s developing interest in the Albanian national cause 
Aubrey Herbert was born on 3 April 1880 at Highclere Castle in Hampshire, the son of 
Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, 4th Earl of Carnarvon.798 As the second son, Aubrey 
would follow the tradition of aristocratic English families by serving in British diplomacy 
while his older brother, George Edward Stanhope Molyneux Herbert (1866–1923), would 
retain the title of 5th Earl of Carnarvon. Their father had twice served as Colonial Secretary, 
as well as Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland and was also known as a classical scholar.799  
After Eton, Herbert went to Balliol College, Oxford and joined a generation of Etonians 
recorded as the ‘most brilliant and wild Balliol men,’ of which ‘Herbert was the extreme 
example’. At Oxford he maintained the highest grades but remained a famously riotous 
member of the Annandale Club, a dining club used as a forum for debating political 
issues.800 Herbert became close friends with Raymond Asquith, son of Herbert Asquith 
(1852-1928), who later served as Prime Minister from 1908 to 1916. His friendships with 
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future politicians George Lloyd and Mark Sykes, which started at Oxford, continued 
throughout their parliamentary careers. At Oxford Herbert also befriended the novelists 
Compton Mackenzie801 and John Buchan, with the latter describing Herbert as ‘a man of 
genius’ who would ‘take more than mortal risks’ in his life.802 
Coming from the British ruling class and with such a wide circle of important friends, 
Herbert was guaranteed to have a bright future. Buchan, the author of Thirty-Nine Steps, 
used Herbert’s autobiography Ben Kendim to construct Greenmantle, a famous novel 
published in 1916 in which Herbert is understood to be Sandy, the main character.803 The 
structure of Greenmantle was also based on Herbert’s activities as described in his war 
diaries, the first of which was written in a hospital in Mons; the second focused on the 
Dardanelles and Gallipoli and the third dealt with the fall of Kut.804  
Herbert was also portrayed in the film Lawrence of Arabia as a secondary character to T. E. 
Lawrence. In reality, T. E. Lawrence was sent to Mesopotamia in 1916 on a secret mission 
as an assistant to Aubrey Herbert, who was at that time head of naval intelligence in the 
region. A year earlier, Herbert had arranged a truce between the Ottoman Empire and 
Great Britain to bury the dead at Gallipoli and was respected on both sides, while in 
Constantinople he was seen as a Turcophile. In Britain his wife often dined at 10 Downing 
Street.805  
So, how and why was Aubrey Herbert interested in the Albanian national question? 
In 1904, after spending a few months at the British Embassy in Tokyo and visiting Cyprus 
and Athens, Herbert reached Salonika, a multi-national city that he liked and where he met 
‘a wild Albanian highlander’ named Kiazim [Qazim] Kukeli. Herbert employed Kukeli as a 
body guard and servant and he became Herbert’s long term companion, instilling in 
                                                             
801   Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 36.  
802   Ibid, p. 75.  
803    John Buchan, Greenmantle (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. xii. 
804    Aubrey Herbert, Mons, Anzac and Kut – A British Intelligence Officer in Three Theatres of the First World War, 1914-
18 (London: Leonaur, 2010), p. 3. 
805    Harold Orlans, T.E. Lawrence: Biography of a Broken Hero (London: Mc Farland & Company, 2002), p. 27.  
254 
 
Herbert an interest in Albania through his ‘edifying stories’ about Albanian komitadjis 
(rebels or guerrillas).806  
In Salonika Herbert enjoyed spending time with Ottoman intellectuals, including Riza Tewfik 
Bey (1869 – 1949), an Albanian poet, philosopher and statesman who liked discussing John 
Stuart Mill. While in Greece and Crete, Herbert had held anti-Turkish prejudices, but began 
to change his opinion while travelling in Macedonia with Kukeli. Herbert wrote to his 
mother from Macedonia saying that Christians were unattractive and inferior compared to 
‘the genial, polished Turk’.807 Herbert, like Edith Durham, despised Macedonian Christians 
but was convinced that they were put to this position as a result of the cruelty and injustice 
of the Ottoman regime.808 
In Constantinople, as honorary attaché, Herbert was quick to make friends in high Ottoman 
society and was even presented to the Sultan. Herbert found Constantinople a very 
pleasant city and liked the Turks, but told his mother that he ‘can’t understand anyone 
being a Turcophile’. In 1908 Herbert supported the Young Turks and their revolution, 
hoping that they would bring about changes in the Ottoman Empire. 
Despite his forays into Ottoman and Albanian society, Macedonia remained Herbert’s 
primary interest at this time. From early on Herbert understood that the problem in 
Macedonia was not one of religion, as Liberals had consistently argued, but was of a 
nationalist character.809  
This insight was reflected in Herbert’s involvement with the Balkan Committee, where he 
held an opinion different to those Liberal Gladstonians who constituted the vast majority of 
members. Almost a decade later, during the Balkan Wars, his position on the Balkans and 
the Ottoman Empire at large was completely changed and had become broadly anti-
Liberal. This change could be seen in a note he wrote to his brother, Mervyn, in July 1913: 
Ten years ago I went to Turkey, strongly anti-Turk, ready in fact to write pamphlets on its 
government in Macedonia, and it was only the fact that I was able to compare, in the 
archives of the Embassy, the way in which Turks and Bulgars behaved in Macedonia that 
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completely changed my sympathies. For the Turk is the one man in the Balkans whom I 
have known who is a gentleman.810    
As a traveller and journalist, Herbert had visited the Albanian part of the Balkans in 1907 
and acquired further knowledge about the place and its people. After witnessing the 
solemn opening of the new Ottoman Parliament in December 1908, Herbert travelled 
through Macedonia to Kosovo, a visit that would bring him close to the Albanian national 
cause. On 2 January 1909 he went to Mitrovica and discovered that many Albanians who 
had supported the Revolution were now expressing doubts about its success. In June 1909 
he went to south Albania and published a few articles under his pen name Ben Kendim. 
Most of his articles from that time, which were dedicated to the British public, contained 
basic, informative knowledge about Albania and the Albanians. However, there was an 
article with a political message which he titled ‘Southern Albania and Epirus’.811 A seen 
from the title, Herbert sought to distinguish the Albanian part of the south from Greek 
Epirus or northern Greece. This was done deliberately in order to reject the term Epirus, 
with which the Greeks had named the entire area of what was later to become south 
Albania. For unknown reasons the article remained unpublished, but its significance in 
indicating where Herbert’s sympathies lay is clear.812 
By 1910, British politics and diplomacy were beginning to diverge from the views Herbert 
had formed about the Ottoman Europe and so he decided to play an active role in changing 
this course. In a by-election in November 1911, Herbert won the South Somerset seat for 
the Conservatives against the Liberal candidate Edward Strachey, and from 1918 to his 
death in 1923 he represented the Yeovil constituency.813 In his first speech to the House of 
Commons of 14 December 1911, Herbert criticised British policy towards Ottoman reforms 
for being ‘stonily indifferent,’ adding that the Young Turk Revolution was ‘an experiment 
that deserved more sympathy than it got from the Liberal Government’. Making an appeal 
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for a ‘cordial consideration of the whole Turkish question’, Herbert’s criticism of Liberal 
policy can be seen as indicative of his Conservative approach to the matters at hand.814 
When speaking of troubles in the Ottoman Empire Herbert did not specifically mention 
Albania, seeing their question as part of the broader Balkan problem. However, Herbert did 
speak about the insurrection which had started in Albania in September 1911, for which he 
blamed the British government’s apparent indifference to events. This gave Hugh 
Alexander Law (1872-1943), who represented the Irish constituencies of County Donegal, 
chance to speak and hail Herbert’s speech as ‘extremely brilliant’. Law added that while it 
was true the British government reigned over many millions of Muslim subjects, it was also 
true that Great Britain was ‘a great Christian country – a country which both naturally and 
by actual treaty obligations owes certain duties to the Christian subjects of the Turkish 
Empire’.815 Though Herbert found some supporters for his views, the vast majority of the 
House shared Law’s favouring of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire.  
In August 1912, when the Albanian nationalist movement had successfully influenced the 
Porte’s attitude towards granting it autonomy, Herbert went to Kosovo. His aim in doing so 
was to collect information from Albanian leaders about their future intentions, coordinate 
plans with them and influence public discourse in Britain. He wrote about his journey to the 
Sanjak of Novi Pazar, a region which he called the ‘Albanian borderland’ in a bid to 
demonstrate to the British public the northern border of Albania, as he had done earlier 
with the southern border with Greece.816 In private Herbert held a different opinion. In his 
diary he described Novi Pazar as a ‘no man’s land, occupied by the Turks, held precariously 
by the Albanians, ruled by none’.817 He also emphasised that there were indications that 
‘with the growing feeling of nationality among the Albanians’ the responsibility of Albanian 
leaders was taking steps towards championing the cause of the Christians in this part of 
Albania. This fact was also recorded by Ottoman officials. A report sent from Kosovo to 
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Constantinople noted that Isa Boletini was enlarging his group of Albanian fighters and was 
planning either to include Serbs among their ranks or to protect them.818  
In another article, published in The Morning Post, Herbert explained the Albanians’ belief 
that they needed foreign protection.819 By now a Turcophile, it is likely Herbert believed 
autonomy would satisfy Albanian nationalist needs and that they would feel comfortable 
within the new Young Turk regime. However, within less than a month, the First Balkan War 
of October 1912 markedly changed this situation and Herbert began to advocate the 
independence of Albania as opposed to autonomy. One of his immediate actions was to 
distance himself completely from the Balkan Committee, which he believed was only 
looking after the national interests of the Christian Slavs and thus ignoring the Albanians.  
The lack of interest in Albania shown by the Balkan Committee can be seen in its activities 
throughout the Balkan Wars. Towards the end of July 1913, the Balkan Committee issued a 
resolution asking the Powers to intervene to end the conflict between the Balkan Allies and 
free the Christian population from Ottoman rule. The resolution stated that there was no 
other solution for the Balkans except the ‘bag and baggage – the Turk out of 
Constantinople and the Turk out of Europe’. The resolution also stated that the Christian 
Allies should be permitted to ‘reap fruits of their handsome victory’ because ‘they were not 
ashamed or afraid to appeal to force’.820 
On 1 August 1913, the Committee sent a letter to the Foreign Office, regarding the 
‘recognition of nationalities’, asking the Powers and the British government to recognise 
the occupation of Macedonia by the Allied armies. The Albanians of Macedonia were not 
mentioned at all. The Committee asked the British government, which had accepted the 
leadership of the Concert of Europe, to impose an active policy in ‘promoting humane 
government’.821 A few weeks later, Arthur Symonds, the Secretary of the Balkan 
Committee, wrote a letter to The Times criticising the British press for publishing items 
about atrocities that the Allied armies committed against non-Christians: ‘What good can 
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come of repeating and publishing them?’, asked Symonds.822 The actions of the Balkan 
Committee, as a Liberal Gladstonian organisation, can thus be seen as positioning 
themselves against the Ottoman Empire, favouring the Allies in the outcome of the First 
Balkan War, and ignoring the Albanian national question. Herbert, being simultaneously pro 
Turkish and pro Albanian, could not continue being a member of this Liberal organisation. 
He therefore resigned from the Committee, stating its support for the claims of the Balkan 
Allies, the Serbian massacres committed against Albanians and the Bulgarian massacres 
committed against Muslims, none of which were condemned by the Committee, as his 
reasons.823 
 
The Albanian Committee 
When the First Balkan War started, Herbert was concerned that Albanian lands would be 
partitioned. As a result, he decided to campaign against the occupation of territories by the 
Allied armies and formed an alternative organisation to the Balkan Committee designed to 
support the Albanian national cause. On 9 December 1912 Herbert sent invitations 
informing interested personalities that: 
The question of Albanian Autonomy differs considerably from the questions of other Balkan 
States, as it is one of nationality, not of religion. The Albanians, as an ancient race (the 
original Macedonians), are surrounded to-day by people who threatened their national 
ideals with destruction. As Albania may be sacrificed at any moment to the exigencies of 
diplomacy, an immediate effort is called for. In view of the urgency of the Albanian 
question and the importance of the Anglo-Muhammedan situation, the Committee, which 
has no party ties, invites you to join it.824 
On 17 December 1912, the same day that the Conference of Ambassadors convened in 
London, Herbert held a meeting with those who answered his call and agreed to form the 
Albanian Committee.825 All became members of this new organisation, although the 
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reasons for their decision to join varied widely. Many were more interested in opposing the 
new situation in the Balkans created by the advance of the Allied armies than solving the 
Albanian question specifically. Some were Turcophiles, and as such, against any enemies of 
the Ottoman Empire. Some were supporters of the principle of self-determination and 
wanted this principle to be applied to Albania as it was to other Balkan nations. The 
Albanian Committee also attracted Muslims and British imperialists who were concerned 
about the reaction of the Muslim dominions of the British Empire. The Committee was 
particularly attractive to Jews, whose brethren had suffered persecution at the hands of 
the Allied armies and who hoped for tolerance in the future Albanian state.  
Hostility towards Russia, the force behind the Allied armies, also brought to the Committee 
the ideological heirs of Disraeli as well as radicals and socialists who opposed Russia’s pan 
Slav policy. There were also members of various pressure groups who favoured the 
independence of small countries, many of whom had no previous knowledge of or 
connection with the Albanian national cause but now showed an interest in seeing Albania 
as an autonomous or independent country. Above all, the Albanian Committee brought 
together all those who held anti-Liberal views and who opposed the effects of this policy in 
the Balkans. Those who took principal interest in the work of the Committee were C. F. 
Ryder, Mark H. Judge, J. C. Paget and Major Paget. Herbert recalled later that it was only he 
and Major Paget who had lived in Shkodra and who had ‘actual acquaintance’ with Albania, 
while ‘the others were prompted by a generous love for freedom’.826 Two other important 
personalities, Edith Durham and Captain MacRury, joined the Committee later.  
Aubrey Herbert was elected President of the Albanian Committee, while Lord Lamington 
(1860-1940), a Conservative MP and former Governor of Queensland and Bombay, was 
elected Vice President. Mark H. Judge (1847-1927), founder of the University Extension 
Guild and chairman of the British Constitutional Association, was elected Treasurer while 
John C. Paget, also from the British Constitutional Association, was elected Honourable 
Secretary. The Executive Committee included personalities such as Dr. Moses Gaster (1856-
1949), Chief Rabbi of the Sephardic Jews in Britain from 1887 to 1919 and a well-known 
British intellectual. ‘Had he not been a rabbi, Gaster might have succeeded Theodor Herzl 
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as the leader of the World Zionist Organization upon Herzl’s untimely death in 1904’, - 
wrote Michael Berkowitz, a Jewish historian.827 Gaster joined the Albanian Committee in 
search of a solution for the Jews in Macedonia, but he also had an interest in Albania as a 
scholar linguist and known collector of books on Albania.  
Other Jewish members of the Committee shared Gaster’s search for a solution for the 
Jewish population of Macedonia who were opposed to Greek and Bulgarian rule. They 
increasingly pushed the idea of an autonomous Macedonia which coincided with Herbert’s 
aims, albeit for different reasons. Although Herbert’s aim was to focus the Committee’s 
activity on the Albanian question, the influence of the Jews grew so great that Herbert told 
his wife they ‘have made a desperate effort to get hold of the Albanian Committee’.828  
The Liberal policy of supporting only Christian groups in the Balkans had contributed to 
worsening inter religious relations in the region. Though the aim of the Albanian 
Committee was to assist in the establishment of an autonomous Albania, their members 
also identified the lack of knowledge about the Balkans as an obstacle to their future 
activities. Therefore, the Committee also aimed to ‘develop a wider knowledge of the 
Balkan problem and to promote a good understanding’ between Christians and Muslims. 
Mark H. Judge believed that the Committee should ‘send a much-needed message of good 
will’ to the Muslims of the world and assure the Muslims of the British Empire that the 
British still ‘upheld the principle of freedom as necessary for the maintenance of the 
Empire’.829  
The counter-Liberal view of the Committee was manifested by all members including 
Gaster who maintained that Muslims and Jews were ignored by the British government and 
the public. Gaster complained about the Greek suppression of stories detailing atrocities in 
their occupied territories, adding that the Greeks could not ignore the fact that the 
Albanians were most cruelly treated and this ‘treatment should certainly be brought to the 
public knowledge’.830 Samuel Levy Bensusan (1872-1958), also a Sephardi Jew, journalist 
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and travel writer,831 saw the work of the Albanian Committee as a way of helping the 
Muslim, Christian and Jewish worlds to understand each other. He believed that if the 
Committee succeeded in its objectives it would not only be doing a service to Britain, but to 
the world at large.832  
Most of the speakers maintained that it was necessary to win over the British public and 
government in order to reverse British Liberal policy but winning such support proved 
problematic. The Committee prepared a report explaining the result of the meeting and the 
aims of the Committee and sent it to most of the newspapers in Britain. None of the 
newspapers published it. The future state of Albania, with a Muslim majority and Christian 
and Jewish minorities which would serve as an example of religious cooperation was 
apparently not an interesting subject for the British press. The report did appear on the 
front page of The Times but only as an announcement paid for by the Committee. The 
Albanian Committee would soon intensify the pressure for their cause, leveraging their 
impressive list of twelve MPs, a Lord Justice of Appeals, a Privy Councillor, two peers, a 
Chief Rabbi and many other dignitaries. Despite this list of influential figures, however, the 
group was not as powerful as the Balkan Committee which for a decade had cultivated the 
Gladstonian tradition.833    
The Committee worked in close collaboration with the Albanian Provisional Government 
and organised a visit by an Albanian delegation, consisting of Filip Noga, Mehmet Bey 
Konitza and Rashit Bey Dino, which arrived in London in January 1913. Since the Albanian 
Provisional Government was not officially recognised, these delegates could not participate 
in the work of the London Conference. However, Herbert and other members of the 
Committee assisted the delegation in presenting a memorandum on Albanian claims to the 
Conference and the Foreign Office.834 They also distributed a map of Albania, lobbied to 
influence British politicians and diplomats at the Conference, publicise the Albanian 
national cause represented by the delegation and raise funds for refugees in Albania.835  
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In early May, Ismail Qemali attended a meeting of the Albanian Committee and told 
members that his government and the Albanian people ‘have preserved the hope that the 
English nation would not forget us’.836 Herbert made efforts to arrange meetings between 
Ismail Qemali and Edward Grey, though this ended without success because the British 
government still did not recognise the Albanian Provisional Government at this stage. The 
Foreign Office wrote to Ismail Qemali to explain ‘with regret’ that Grey was ‘busy with 
parliamentarian work’.837 
The press likewise continued to show no interest in the Albanian question. The visit of the 
Albanian delegation led the Committee to intensify its work and find ways of reaching the 
British public. Gaster emphasised the need to ‘stir up public opinion in order to make 
people realise the claims of the Albanians’ whose aim was to ‘establish themselves 
according to their race, faith and customs’.838 Gaster believed that in order to do so reports 
of atrocities committed against Albanians should be made known to the British public, 
together with emphasising the need to create an ethnic Albania. Questions were asked 
about the atrocities in the House of Commons, but Gaster regarded the replies as 
unsatisfactory. Speaking further on this matter in a Committee meeting, he added that it 
was essential for the Albanians to be included within borders on an ethnic basis and 
irrespective of religion.839 
In many respects Gaster’s speech became important for the future work of the Committee. 
The Committee published several documents by May 1913 on the subject of influencing 
the public.840 The Plea of Albania was one such work created on behalf of the Albanian 
Provisional Government and submitted to the London Conference to counter the Greek 
claim in southern Albania. This publication aimed to present the fact that, during the 
Conference, the Greek government did not distinguish between the question of religion 
and that of nationality.841 Unwilling to recognise separate nationalities, the Greek 
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government, like the Ottoman government, divided the Albanians into two distinct 
categories: Muslims and Christians. As a result of this ambiguity the number of inhabitants 
and the percentage of Greeks and Albanians in south Albania was grossly disputed by both 
sides.842  The Committee believed the Greek approach was a mistake and aimed to correct 
it. 
The most important publication following Gaster’s speech, Albania for the Albanians, came 
from Leeds in the form of a letter to the press written by C. F. Ryder on behalf of the 
Albanian Committee. The letter was in fact a criticism of Liberal ideas in Britain and their 
impact on policy in the Balkans.843 Ryder explained that the problem of the Albanian 
question in Britain was primarily the result of a lack of knowledge about Albania on the part 
of the British public. He further explained that, if there was some knowledge on this 
matter, the problem was in fact even greater. Ryder believed that the religious prejudices 
held by the Powers, the British government and the public led them to ignore the Albanian 
question on the grounds that they were a non-Christian population. Ryder criticised the 
Powers and the British government for supporting the ‘stronger races over the weaker 
ones’. He pointed out that in the Albanian case, contrary to the position it had adopted in 
the case of Montenegro, the British public and government regarded the formation of the 
Albanian state along ethnic lines as impracticable. On this matter Ryder also criticised the 
press, politicians, and above all intellectuals, for not adopting the same position towards 
Albania as they did towards other Balkan nations. Ryder elaborated: 
Men whose fathers applauded and supported Mazzini and Garibaldi in the fight 
for freedom, and who themselves would shrink with horror from the idea of 
restoring the Papacy to the territories torn from it by Italy, are loud in their 
demands for the suppression of Albanian liberty, for the forcible ‘restoration’ of 
Albanian towns and the surrender of Albanians to the tender mercies of their 
hereditary enemies. Inconsistent though it may be, the very same men who will 
write with enthusiasm of the Switzer’s struggle against Hapsburg oppression long 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
nationality according to the Church they belonged. As the Albanians did not have such a bond, they were classed 
according to the religion they belonged to. Albanians were considered to be Greeks if they were Orthodox or they were 
taken for Turks if they were Muslim. Therefore, this fact gave the Greeks an opportunity to try and pass Orthodox 
Albanians as Greeks.  
842  The Future of Albania, Reply of the Albanian Delegates to the Greek Claims, DD/DRU 31.  
843  Albanian Committee Publications 1912-1913, DD/DRU 31. 
264 
 
ago will tell you that Albanian mountaineers have no right to freedom and ought 
to be quite content to-day, in the twentieth century, to put their necks beneath 
the yoke of Montenegro.844 
Furthermore, Ryder criticised the British establishment for ‘being happy that England was 
fascinated by Russia’, as he put it, and yet did nothing to promote the independence of 
‘one of the most ancient races in Europe’. Therefore, Ryder continued to make it known 
that the Albanian Committee was entitled to work towards establishing an Albanian state 
and preventing the Albanian nation from being sacrificed to the political intrigues of the 
Powers. ‘Albania for some mysterious reason has no claim upon its good offices’ added 
Ryder. He went on to explain the ‘mysterious reason’ for this: 
The truth is, however, that with many freedom is cursed in Albania while it is 
blessed in Switzerland, because a large portion of Albanian people have the 
misfortune to belong, by the heritage of centuries, to the Muslem [Muslim] faith. 
Had these people been of any other religion or of non like so many of our rulers 
in England to-day, their misfeasance might have been overlooked, but since they 
are Muhammedans [Muslims] the prejudice of almost every ecclesiastic in the 
kingdom is against them, while national tradition ignorantly attributes to even 
the poorest of them the possession of a patriarchal quantity of wives.845 
Ryder went further in examining the cause of this problem, seeing the religious prejudice 
which existed in Britain against Jews until the beginning of the twentieth century as a key 
factor. In this respect, Ryder added that one great objective of the Albanian Committee was 
to ‘mitigate this aversion and to ensure that no man shall be prejudiced by his religion in 
Albania any more than elsewhere’.846 
Despite Ryder’s letter, to Herbert’s dissatisfaction the press, the government and public 
discourse continued in their prejudice against Muslims. In February 1913, Herbert visited 
Constantinople and was disappointed to learn at the British Embassy there that the Powers 
continued to approach the Balkan Question ‘very ignorantly’ and that the ambassador was 
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not consulted at all by London on the questions of the Ottoman Empire and Albania.847 
When Herbert returned to London he tried to publish his views on this matter, but anti-
Turk feeling ran deep in the press and most newspapers would not publish his views. In 
anger and bitterness, Herbert expressed his views in a poem he wrote: 
 
Intrigues within, intrigues without, no man to trust, 
He [the Turk] feeds street dogs that starve with him; to friends who are his foe 
The Greeks and Bulgars in his lines, he flings a sudden crust 
The Turk who has to go. 
 
The Turk worked in the vineyard, others drunk the wine, 
The Jew who sold him plough shares kept an interest in his plough. 
The Serb and Bulgar waited till King and Priest should sign, 
Till Kings said ‘kill, kill now’. 
 
So now the twilight falls upon the twice betrayed, 
The Daily Mail tells England and the Daily News tells God 
That God and British Statesmen should make the Turk afraid 
Who fight unfed, unshod.848 
 
The poem particularly emphasised the power that the media exercised over the public and 
politics, a fact which Herbert had experienced first-hand Liberal public opinion and the 
press were strongly against Herbert’s views and continued to have a strong influence over 
                                                             
847    Destani and Tomes, Albania’s Greatest Friend, p. 83. 
848   Fitzherbert, pp. 115-116. 
266 
 
the British position regarding the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans, a fact which was 
admitted by Edward Grey.849   
 
Edward Grey, the British position on Albania and the London Conference of Ambassadors 
When the First Balkan War started on 9 October 1912 the British government had no clear 
idea of how to deal with the situation. The Foreign Office thus hoped that none of the 
Allied armies would achieve a clear victory. ‘The prospect of a Turkish ‘débâcle’ and the 
complete victory of the Balkan States makes things more difficult’, wrote Grey on 30 
October 1912.850 Contrary to the hopes of the British, the Ottoman army was defeated 
sooner than anyone could have imagined. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the 
massacres committed against its Muslim population by the Balkan armies, whose advance 
the British army had initially supported, caused worries among the British government. 
Their key consideration was the feelings of the Muslims in India and elsewhere in the 
Empire about the treatment of their brothers in the Balkans.851   
By late November the situation was complicated even further when the Serbian, 
Montenegrin and Greek armies invaded Albania. The advance of the Balkan armies was 
supported by the British public and even cheered by most politicians. As seen earlier, on 10 
November 1912 Asquith expressed support for the Balkan armies in his Guildhall speech. A 
few days later, Winston Churchill made an even more extreme speech and praised 
Gladstone for predicting the course of events in the Balkans.852 Edward Grey believed that 
Albania was about to spark a European war. Whatever was to happen in the Balkans, the 
British made it clear during the Conference that they would remain neutral and would not 
go to war, and certainly not to ‘secure an Adriatic seaport for Belgrade.’853 However the 
fact that all the Powers had interests in the Balkans meant that, in reality, none truly 
remained neutral.  
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The Conference of London, or the Conference of Ambassadors as it is known in Albania, 
started on 17 December 1912. In seeking a post-war settlement the Conference was ‘not of 
justice but of force,’ wrote Grey in his diary, adding that ‘the point of friction and danger 
was Albania’.854 Most historians of the Balkan Wars, including Ernst Helmreich and 
Christopher Clark, have maintained that during the Conference the only Powers that 
supported the creation of Albania based on ethnic principles were Austria-Hungary and to 
some extent Italy. However, the German ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, wrote in his 
memoirs that Germany also supported Albania in order to fall in line with the position 
prescribed by Vienna.855 As a result, Germany took the side of Austria-Hungary and Italy on 
the problem of Shkodra, the Serbian port on the Adriatic and on the delimitation of the 
frontiers. 
Despite German rhetorical support, it was only Austria-Hungary which gave signs of being 
prepared to go to war over Albania. Austria-Hungary also pushed for the new state to be as 
large as possible, a position Russia vehemently opposed. Under the banner of ‘Albania for 
Albanians’, Vienna was carrying out its policy of supporting Albanian nationalism and the 
creation of an Albanian state. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador managed to impose his 
proposal that Albania should border Greece in the south while bordering Montenegro in 
the north. This ended the question of Serbian expansion to the Albanian Adriatic coast but 
introduced many border problems in the north-east and east of Albania.856  
The British government was not concerned with the ethnographic composition of 
independent Albania, its primary concern being to protect its direct interests by 
maintaining the balance of power in the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas. Since Albania 
held a strategic location in this respect, it became a matter of concern for the British. The 
main aim of the British government was to ensure that the territories of the Ottoman and 
Austro-Hungarian empires, after their eventual dissolution, would not fall under Russian 
rule. Therefore, the British were ready to support the creation of an independent Albania 
or enlargements of existing Balkan states if this would help to achieve their objective, and if 
not the principle of compromise would be applied.857 During the London Conference the 
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British government declared that this policy was pursued in line with the principle of 
neutrality.   
In his public appearances and later in his memoirs, Grey was keen to emphasise that he had 
not taken sides in negotiations during the Conference because the settlement ‘did not 
touch British interest’.858 While it is true that Albania was not within the scope of direct 
British interests, Grey was not as neutral as he publicly declared. Elaborating on Grey’s 
“neutrality”, Lichnowsky gave a conflicting account when he wrote that Grey ‘supported 
our group in order not to give a pretext like the one a dead Archduke was to furnish later 
on’.859  
At the beginning of the Balkan Wars, Grey was among the first European statesmen to 
recognise the need for Albania to become autonomous. Although this recognition was the 
result of strategic not ideological aims, it was nonetheless useful for the Albanian national 
cause and led Herbert to show respect and sympathy for Grey. On 28 October 1912 Grey 
told Edward Goschen, the British ambassador to Germany, that ‘Albania could hardly be 
absorbed’, because ‘Albanians both Christian and Moslem would combine against the 
Serbs’.860 Another letter Grey sent to Francis Bertie, the British ambassador to France, 
emphasised that British foreign policy would not go against British public opinion. This was 
fundamental to his policies, and his respecting for Liberal public opinion led to his support 
of the Balkan Allied armies. Speaking on this matter, Grey laid out the framework that he 
was to follow during the Conference: 
Public opinion here will be dead against turning the Balkan States out of what 
they may show their ability to conquer by their own forces. If Russia and Austria 
do agree upon a settlement, public opinion here will not push its own views and 
force the Government to assert them. But if Austria were to attack the Balkan 
States, and Russia said “Hands off”, it would be impossible for a British 
Government, even if it desired, to side diplomatically with Austria against Russia. 
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I propose to work for agreement between Russia and Austria, but it will have to 
be with the limitation that Austria is reasonable.861   
Grey also expressed the “neutral position” of the British government to the Serbian Chargé 
d’Affaires, who informed Grey that Serbia was claiming the Vilayet of Kosovo, the Sanjak of 
Novi Pazar, part of the Vilayet of Shkodra, and the ports of Durrës and Shën Gjin. Grey 
repeated that it was public opinion which would not allow the British government to 
‘deprive the victors of the fruits of their victories’.862 In doing so Grey indicated that the 
British government would not object totally to Serbian claims on Albania. However, Grey 
did not give in entirely to public opinion and acted between the pressure of this and the 
strategic interest of the British government. In taking this position Grey had partly satisfied 
Albanian nationalism, but also encouraged Serbian ambitions to continue their military 
advance and attempts to occupy as much Albanian land as possible.863    
On 7 April 1913 Edward Grey made a statement about Albania in the House of Commons, 
claiming that the British government had maintained its neutrality. He told the House that 
an agreement, which was a compromise between the Powers, had been reached about the 
north-east borders of Albania. It was decided that most of the Vilayet of Kosovo would not 
be included in Albania but rather divided between Serbia and Montenegro. Grey also said 
that this agreement was essential for Europe as it was ‘accomplished only just in time to 
preserve the peace between the Great Powers’.864 Preserving the peace thus proved more 
important than applying the principle of nationality in the case of Albania.  
The Albanian Committee had hoped for a better decision. However, in Albania the situation 
was worsened as Montenegrin and Serbian forces ignored the decision of the Conference 
and continued to attack Shkodra.865  
Shkodra was eventually handed to the Montenegrins by Esat Pasha but the London 
Conference, just before the start of the Second Balkan War, decided to return the city to 
Albania. On this occasion Herbert told the House of Commons that Shkodra was to remain 
within the borders of Albania ‘thanks to great extent to England’. Yet Herbert also added 
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that by and large the Conference had decided to give to Albania only ‘rocks and gorges and 
mountain torrents’ and stripped it of ‘rivers and fertile plains’. Speaking about the territory 
that remained outside Albania, Herbert told the House: 
Towns that are most Albanian and that she needs - like Ipek [Peja], like Dibra, 
which stands in the same relationship to Albania as Yorkshire does to England; or 
Prizren with its fertile plain and beautiful cypresses - have been taken from 
her.866  
Herbert was supported in his view by Walter Guinness, a conservative MP and Committee 
member, who criticised the “neutrality” of the British government which he saw as an 
erroneous approach towards Albania. Since the war was not over, Guinness suggested that 
the British and other governments in Europe should adopt a different approach, applying 
the principle of ‘Balkans for the Balkan people’ in Albania and fully disclosing and 
condemning atrocities committed against the Albanians.867  
Herbert was also supported by several other MPs, including John Annan Bryce, a Liberal 
MP, but the number of MPs who supported Montenegro and Serbia was far greater. 
Though none objected to the Albanian right to statehood, they favoured the decisions 
taken thus far by the Conference and denied the number of Albanian refugees and 
atrocities which were committed by Allied armies.868  
Although the decision of the Conference was regarded as unfavourable by the Committee 
and Albanians, Herbert saw the role of the British government and Grey as positive for 
Albania. It is likely that Herbert knew the situation would have been much worse for 
Albania without Grey’s engagement in the Conference. The difficult situation in Albania was 
far from over and Herbert, as a cautious politician, had no intention of jeopardising his 
relationship with Grey and closing the door to the British government. At this stage it could 
be suggested that the Albanian Committee, and particularly Herbert, needed a good 
relationship with the British government as he might have had pretensions to the Albanian 
throne. Another reason Herbert needed Grey’s support was his and the Committee’s 
humanitarian engagement with Albania. Herbert led several relief missions to help the 
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refugees who had flooded Albania, escaping persecution from the lands which were given 
to Montenegro, Serbia and Greece. Largely thanks to the work of Herbert, these 
humanitarian activities were supported by Grey and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd 
George.869 Herbert continued his fundraising through different events organised by the 
Committee and other British humanitarian organisations, among the donors to which there 
were royal family members. Herbert’s humanitarian activity did not go unnoticed in 
Albania. Filip Noga, a minister in Ismail Qemali’s government, sent a telegram to thank 
Herbert and the Albanian Committee and also praised the British government for their 
humanitarian support.870  
Grey was convinced that the Conference had managed to avoid the worst: endangering the 
peace of Europe. He believed that ‘the things that had threatened the relations between 
the Great Powers in 1912-13’ had been successfully avoided.871 However, the decision of 
the London Conference was met with fierce criticism in the British Parliament and the press 
by Herbert and other members of the Albanian Committee. During the Conference, as Clark 
notes, Grey had adopted ‘a latent pro-Serbian policy’. Clark maintains that Grey favoured 
‘Belgrade’s claims over those of the new Albanian state, not because he supported the 
Great Serbian cause as such’, but because he regarded Serbia as an important factor for the 
‘durability of [the] Entente’.872 As a result of Grey’s “neutrality”, Clark added that over half 
of Albanian territory and half of the population remained outside the newly created 
Kingdom and most of those who fell under Serb rule ‘suffered persecution, deportation, 
mistreatment and massacres’.873  
Needless to say, Grey's hopes for keeping Europe out of a wide armed conflict were not 
fulfilled. The First World War began less than a year after the Conference of London had 
ended. It could be concluded that the main reason that peace did not last long after the 
Balkan settlement was that Serbia was not satisfied with the extent of its territorial 
expansion and its lack of access to the Albanian coast. The London Conference and British 
neutrality left Serbia with a desire for further expansion in the shape of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina. Grey’s aim during the Conference was to prevent the Powers from falling into 
two camps. R. W. Seton-Watson argued that if Grey had revived the Conference of 
Ambassadors in 1914 the great catastrophe would have been averted.874  
However, in his memoirs, Herbert did not criticise the British press either:  
The Albanian Committee did not have to complain of the way in which it was 
treated by the Government or the Press. Those pre-War days were Christian, and 
the howling cannibals of 1919 had not yet been loosed upon the suffering world. 
[…] In spite of the intrigues of the Great Powers, the world was not too bad a 
place, and the Albanians, in England at any rate, received a fair hearing through 
the Albanian Committee, which tried to be, if not impartial, as moderate as 
possible. Very little was known about Albania. The general impression was that 
the Albanians were another branch of the Armenian family, and indeed, as far as 
massacres were concerned, this was most understandable, for the unarmed, 
pastoral Albanians of the South were massacred by the Greeks in 1913, while the 
Albanians of the North-West received the same treatment at the hands of the 
Serbs.875  
Keeping in mind this situation, Herbert criticised the Powers but congratulated Grey for the 
part he played in the creation of the Albanian state. In this regard Herbert said that ‘if Lord 
Byron and Garibaldi could have looked down upon this struggle’, they would have helped 
Edward Grey. Herbert saw the efforts of the Powers in building an Albanian state as akin to 
‘starting a young man on his career with his legs amputated and his arms truncated, and 
the same time you pick his pockets’.876 However, British officials went on to play an 
important and constructive role within the International Commission of Control, British 
Consulate and the international troops that occupied Shkodra.    
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The Quest for a Monarch of Albania 
The London Conference of Ambassadors concluded its work on 11 August 1913. The 
Powers agreed to establish the International Commission of Control which would oversee 
the creation of the new Albanian state. The work of the Commission was to decide an 
outline of the borders between Albania and Greece. The Conference issued a final decision 
by which Albania was recognised as an independent, sovereign, neutral and hereditary 
principality. A monarch was to be designated by the Powers and all ties between Albania 
and the Porte were to be cut off. The Powers would organise a civil administration, police 
and military forces under the authority of the International Commission of Control with a 
mandate of ten years.877    
When the Conference decided that Albania was to become a kingdom, many royal names 
from Europe were mentioned as potential candidates. Many Albanian leaders were in 
favour of a British sovereign. Herbert had become a hero in Albania with his humanitarian 
work and his political contribution to the establishment of the Albanian state was seen as 
second to none. Thus Ismail Bey Qemali, on behalf of the Provisional Government, offered 
the Albanian throne to Herbert. Herbert did not respond to the offer immediately but did 
not refuse it completely since he could not decide to take the offer of the crown without 
the agreement and support of the British government.878 He therefore put the proposal to 
Edward Grey, whom he met several times to discuss this matter. However, Grey and Prime 
Minister Asquith, although a close family friend, did not support Herbert’s candidacy for 
King of Albania. The neutrality of the British government meant that none of its nationals 
should acquire such a high position, since appointing a British national as King of Albania 
meant that Great Britain would be expected to intervene in support if a crisis were to occur 
in the future.879 The British government had no such plans to support the new Kingdom.    
Another problem that Herbert saw in the offer was the Albanians themselves. From 
experience he knew that the Ottoman Empire had never managed to collect taxes from 
Albania and he believed that the Albanians were likely to continue with their resistance to 
such policies. Even if the Albanians were to pay taxes, they could not contribute much with 
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a weak economy and a country destroyed during the war. Had Herbert been the eldest of 
Carnarvon’s sons, he would have inherited the title of Earl and the money attached to such 
a position, which would probably have led him to accept the offer even without the 
support of the British government. ‘If I had fifty thousand a year, I think I should take 
Albania’, wrote Herbert to his brother, adding that there was ‘quite a decent chance of 
making something of it, if it is properly treated’.880  
Another British personality the Albanians considered for their throne was Colonel George 
Phillips (1863-1921), who was appointed President of the International Administration of 
Shkodra in 1913-14 and Head of the British Military Mission to Albania. In replacing Admiral 
Burney in Shkodra, Phillips became very important for the Albanians. Explaining this 
relationship Herbert wrote that Phillips had ‘fallen completely under the spell of Albania 
and loves the people, with whom he gets on extremely well’.881 Phillips’ success as 
governor of Shkodra was remarkable, his influence extending beyond the assigned 
perimeter of Shkodra and his authority reaching the most remote parts of Albania in the 
north. Where the Ottomans, Serbs and Montenegrins had not succeeded with their policies 
and troops, Phillips did so single handedly and restored authority among the warring 
Albanian highlanders.882   
Herbert established direct contact with Phillips for political reasons and humanitarian 
purposes. The humanitarian relief – both money and goods – would be sent to Phillips by 
the Albanian Committee to be distributed around Shkodra. Phillips also established contact 
with Albanian leaders in Kosovo and asked for their help in dealing with a variety of 
problems, not least the fact that the town had already received 16,000 refugees who were 
starving and had no possibility of housing or feeding them. Phillips, through Herbert, 
passed this information to Grey and asked for more humanitarian support.883     
Among the major tasks of the international presence in Shkodra was to improve the 
infrastructure of the town and the region now they had returned to normal life. For this 
reason the population respected Phillips, who also made efforts to organise cooperation 
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between local authorities, elders and town councils and tried to rebuild local self-
government.884 He also managed to create a harmonious relationship between the five 
military contingents of the International Force in Shkodra.885  
Phillips enlarged his administrative and humanitarian activities and requested from London 
more money and officers to assist him.886 By March 1914, Phillips acquired more power 
from the International Commission and gained more respect from the Albanians. Explaining 
Phillips’ work, Lamb wrote to Grey: 
Phillips, besides being Civil Governor of the town, is also virtually responsible for 
the whole of Northern Albania, for, although his authority is nominally limited to 
the ten kilometres zone, he is really referred to and consulted by the tribal chiefs 
of all the mountains and Alessio [Lezha] and Medua [Shën Gjin].887 
Phillips’ respect among the Albanians grew further when, on 19 March 1914, he officially 
hoisted the Albanian flag on the citadel of Shkodra in the presence of thousands of 
Albanians, both Muslim and Christian, alongside their political and religious leaders.888 All 
parties had jointly celebrated the event as a way of forging their national feelings and 
enjoying the symbolic nature of their new state. It is likely this was indeed the intention of 
Colonel Phillips. Many Albanians increasingly saw Phillips as a just and able man who could 
solve their problems and his good reputation reached all parts of Albania. Therefore, a 
deputation of Albanian notables asked Phillips if he could assume the Crown of Albania. 
Phillips, knowing that he would lack the support of his government, preferred to continue 
his career with the British Army and refused the offer.889   
Edith Durham has noted another option explored by the Albanians in order to find a Briton 
for their king. Durham wrote in Contemporary Review that Albanian leaders had explored 
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the possibility of appointing Prince Arthur of Connaught (1850-1942), the third son of 
Queen Victoria, as King of Albania, though nothing came of this initiative.890  
Meanwhile, the Powers’ were also looking for a suitable monarch for Albania. Herbert, 
being familiar with the situation in Albania and the Power’s attitude towards it, wrote to his 
younger brother, Mervyn: 
I don’t think they [the Albanians] are likely to get a good Prince. Any prince would 
be an ass to take it if he knew the difficulties and more of an ass if he didn’t.891  
Herbert’s prediction was almost entirely true. Until October 1913 the Powers could not 
agree on an Albanian sovereign. The British did not want to play any part in this project but 
agreed that the Austro-Hungarians should take the initiative of recruiting a monarch. 
Vienna would not accept Italian or French candidates, nor a British prince or aristocrat. The 
Italians, who wanted to gain influence in Albania, preferred a Protestant king. There were 
signs that the Russians would object to a Catholic prince and favoured a Muslim. Muslim 
members of the Albanian Committee, such as Amir Ali, head of the All Indian Muslim 
League and Dusé Mohamed Ali, a playwright, historian and journalist who also became 
known for his African nationalism, advocated for a Muslim monarch. They were in favour of 
the candidacy of Prince Ahmad Fuad of the Albanian Khedive dynasty of Egypt.892 However, 
most of the Albanian leaders rejected Muslim, Catholic or Orthodox candidates because 
each of these choices would have led to some part of the population being alienated. In 
light of these limitations and the fact that their desire for a British monarch could not be 
fulfilled, the only option seemed to be a Protestant king.893  
By late October 1913, the Powers had narrowed their choice to one candidate called 
William Fredrick Henry of Wied (1872-1945). He came from minor German royalty, was a 
Protestant by religion and connected with the Romanian, Dutch and Prussian royal families. 
William, later to become Prince Wied of Albania, was acceptable to all Powers. He was also 
acceptable to the Albanians, although they were not asked their opinion and played no role 
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in the selection process. William initially hesitated in accepting the offer, but behind the 
scenes his wife Sophie and his aunt Queen Elisabeth of Romania continuously strove to 
persuade him, while the Austro-Hungarian authorities insisted he accept the offer. In 
November the Powers announced that William Fredrick Henry of Wied was selected to be 
the future sovereign of Albania. During the selection process the German government had 
not shown any interest at all in Wied, while the Austro-Hungarian Emperor was understood 
to be ‘hostile to the whole adventure’. Prince Wied, supported by his uncle King Carol of 
Romania, negotiated with the Powers a loan of 10 million francs but no military force was 
assigned to him. Finally, on 7 February 1914, Prince Wied wrote to the Powers to state that 
he would accept the throne of Albania.894  
Before leaving for Albania Prince Wied, on his tour of visiting the capitals of the Powers, 
went to London on 18 February and lunched at Buckingham Palace with the royal family. 
The British government and the Foreign Office did not show much interest in him. While in 
London, the Prince met Herbert and discussed the situation in Albania and leading Albanian 
personalities. The Prince thanked Herbert and the Albanian Committee for its work on 
behalf of Albania and in return Herbert and the Committee expressed hope that Prince 
Wied would succeed in restoring peace and prosperity in Albania.895  
When Prince Wied arrived in Albania on 9 March 1914 Harry Lamb was impressed by him 
but wrote that his courtiers and advisers, both European and local Albanian, were not of 
much use to him. Prince Wied’s arrival in Albania was greeted with great enthusiasm by 
Albanians. A nationalist newspaper Perlindja e Shqipëniës (Albania’s Rebirth), that 
supported the Albanian Provisional Government, used its front-page article to call Wied 
Mbret i Shqipëtarëvet (King of the Albanians) and published a poem titled Salve Caesar. The 
article went on to say that the dream of the Albanians was coming true and Wied’s picture 
was published alongside Skanderbeg’s portrait.896 
Despite this initial enthusiasm the Albanians would soon become disappointed with their 
Mbret who was only a minor royal, had no army, little money and little knowledge on the 
country or his subjects. He arrived in Albania eight months after the decision had been 
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taken by the London Conference and some political forces had already started to 
undermine his power. One of the first letters that Wied sent to Herbert from Albania 
revealed his lack of knowledge about the country. ‘We feel almost like children learning 
geography and all sorts of things one has not learnt for centuries‘.897  
This lack of knowledge would result in mistakes. On 18 March 1914 Prince Wied formed his 
new government, which consisted of powerful landlords and some other important 
personalities. He appointed Hasan Prishtina as a minister, the only politician to come from 
the ranks of the nationalists. The vast majority of other ministers and government 
functionaries were either born abroad or had lived there for a long time but had no real 
connection to or feelings for Albania. Wied’s private secretary, Duncan Heaton–Armstrong, 
wrote that the first meeting of the government was held in the Turkish language because 
some of the ministers could not even speak Albanian. For most of them Turkish was the 
most appropriate language because they had studied it or lived in Constantinople or 
elsewhere working as functionaries of the Ottoman Empire. This act enraged nationalists 
who were excluded from the government. The population did not accept such a 
government with its members who were regarded as ‘foreigners.’898 Wied’s governance 
quickly resembled Abdul Hamid’s failed strategy of ruling in Albania since Wied, like Abdul 
Hamid, relied heavily on Albanian pashas and beys, chief among who was Esat Pasha who 
was chosen as Minister of Internal Affairs.  
The Powers, including Britain, showed no serious intention of supporting the new 
principality of Albania. The Italians, through Esat Pasha, were active in undermining Wied’s 
rule. As the unity of the Powers disintegrated with the onset of war, so did Wied’s power 
and popularity. Lamb and Phillips made numerous appeals for help to the British 
government, but there was no positive response from London.899    
Wied’s rapidly deteriorating situation meant more international troops in Albania were 
required because, as Lamb explained, the British government had a ‘responsibility to the 
Prince’.900 Edward Grey refused Lamb’s request.901 The lack of will to help Albania was also 
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seen on numerous other occasions, including when Phillips supported the initiative of the 
Powers’ representatives in Shkodra on the training of an Albanian force. He proposed more 
support from the British government, but Grey warned that no force should be established 
if there was no money to pay the soldiers.902  
This lack of money was a serious problem for Albania and one which Grey had addressed a 
few months earlier. In January 1914 the Italian ambassador to London had asked Grey if the 
British government would join the initiative in guaranteeing a loan for Albania. Grey said 
that the government had first to authorise such an initiative which required the consent of 
Parliament. This process took a long time and the money was nowhere to be seen. In 
addition, Grey told the Italian diplomat: 
I could not feel quite the same attachment to Albania as some other Powers did; 
indeed, more than once we had all but parted from Albania.903   
Grey was at least sincere in admitting this failure, but he also made it clear that his interest 
was only in the creation of the Albanian state and not its development. It is this creation of 
the Albanian state and his sincerity that were the things Herbert appreciated about Grey. In 
March 1914 the British government finally contributed £5000 to the cause, a quota that 
other Powers did not follow because they preferred to give a loan through a bank. In an 
article published in The Morning Post, Herbert argued that such a loan was a political act by 
the Powers which, as a consequence, would produce political requests and 
complications.904 
 
Albania: A Failed Project 
The British military staff, headed initially by Admiral Burney and later by Colonel Phillips, as 
well as the diplomatic staff in Albania, played an important and constructive role in the 
state building process of the new country. From their despatches it can be seen that they 
were committed to making Albania a successful project but their centre in London did not 
endorse the advice they passed on. Admiral Burney was largely unsuccessful in his difficult 
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task because in Britain ‘people knew very little about the Albanian question and were chary 
of coming to decisions on a very thorny subject’.905 In Shkodra, the Admiral had often asked 
his headquarters and the British government for more political and military support. He 
also proposed that more organisations and personalities from Britain such as the Lord 
Mayor of London should use their influence to obtain more money for Albania.906    
In order to improve the position of the Provisional Government and the economy of 
Albania, Herbert made efforts to establish a regular line between British and Albanian sea 
ports which would have established trade relations with Britain. Herbert wrote to his friend 
Lloyd George, asking him and his office to study this matter and come up with a proposal. 
Trade experts came up with the conclusion that none of the British lines were interested in 
sailing to Albania and that Albanian goods were instead destined for Austrian and German 
markets.907  
However, while other Powers and Albania’s neighbours all entered into some kind of 
agreement with Esat Pasha only the British never entertained his ambitions. For many 
Albanians, supporting Esat Pasha was tantamount to being against their Provisional 
Government, Wied’s administration and the new-born state. However, British diplomats in 
Albania, mainly Phillips and Lamb supported the Provisional Government, later Prince 
Wied, and kept Esat Pasha at a distance.908 This was a good reason for Albanian nationalists 
to see Britain with more sympathy. When Esat Pasha was prepared to become a governor 
of Shkodra, it was Phillips and Lamb who blocked Esat’s efforts to assume such an 
important position.909 Phillips and Lamb also warned the Foreign Office that Esat Pasha, 
after being blocked from gaining the position of governor of Shkodra, was allowed to get 
too near Prince Wied and gain too much power.910  
Lamb and Phillips undertook several initiatives for normalising the difficult situation and 
improving the position of the Albanian provisional government and later Prince Wied’s rule. 
They both kept asking the British government for further support but there was a limit 
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which was put by Grey. Lamb had noted that the Albanian government was in great need of 
specialised people to be employed in the administration and asked Grey to intervene to the 
Ottoman government for an agreement which would have enabled them to come and join 
the government in Vlora. Grey refused to undertake such a task.911 When Phillips asked for 
more authority in using his troops, Grey warned that British troops should not be employed 
in operations against Montenegro or Serbia without authority from London.912 
The refusal of the British government for greater engagement in Albania marked a change 
in relations between Herbert and Grey. Since the arrival of Prince Wied, Herbert believed 
that Grey was ignoring the difficulties that the Greek government created in south Albania. 
Contrary to the decisions of the London Conference, the Greek government continued to 
keep its troops in Albanian territory. After some pressure the Greek government 
announced that the troops were withdrawn but reports that Lamb sent from Albania 
showed that this was not entirely true. Even if the Greek army withdrew, they left behind 
bands of irregular forces to create trouble. Lamb reported that during 1914 both Christian 
and Muslim Albanians were ‘subjected to persecution as they were during 1913’. On many 
occasions the Serbian and more often the Greek army and irregulars attacked the Albanian 
Gendarmerie.913 Lamb also reported that Greek officials exercised violence, particularly 
against the Albanian Muslim landowners of Çamëria.914 
Francis Elliot, the British ambassador to Greece, painted a different picture of these events. 
He mainly echoed the Greek view and this meant that the Foreign Office was receiving 
conflicting reports about the situation in south Albania and the Albanian parts that were 
awarded to Greece. On 17 February 1914 the situation worsened when a group of Greeks 
in Gjirokastra, under the leadership of Christakis Zographos, announced the formation of 
the ‘Provisional Government of Autonomous Epirus’, a region that consisted of southern 
Albania. Zographos was the Foreign Minister of Greece in 1909, a post to which he would 
return in 1915.915 Zographos sent a letter to Elliot to explain his position to the British 
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government. The letter, accompanied by Elliot’s report of much sympathy for Zographos, 
was sent to the Foreign Office.916  
Lamb sent a different report from Albania. He considered that Zographos was acting 
against the sovereignty of Albania with the knowledge and ‘connivance of the Greek 
authorities’. Lamb also added that all these activities were against the decisions of the 
London Conference and against the authority of the International Commission and as such 
he proposed to arrest Zographos and his supporters.917   
The complication of the situation and Greek atrocities in southern Albania led Edward Grey 
to make a statement in the House of Commons during parliamentary questions: 
Northern Epirus is, by international agreement, to form part of the new State of 
Albania; Greek authority, as far as it exists in that region, is based on military 
occupation of recent date, and will shortly be terminated by the withdrawal of 
the Greek forces there.918 
This was an encouraging answer but the problem still remained acute as the Greek 
government was not withdrawing its forces and continued to commit atrocities against 
Albanians. As a result, Grey denied the involvement of the Greek government and accused 
Greek irregular forces. Using this situation, Herbert tried to initiate changes in the British 
policy. On March 1914 he exposed the problem that he thought that British policy was 
facing in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. He also criticised the government’s policy and 
the press for not adopting a friendlier approach towards Balkan Muslims and for letting 
Serbia take Albanian land and Greece take Salonika where the vast majority of the 
inhabitants were Jews and Muslims and not Greeks or Christians. He believed that this 
attitude was a result of a wrong established policy which produced weaknesses for British 
power and influence in the Mediterranean. Hence, Herbert, supported by a good number 
of MPs, suggested that the British government should be present in the Mediterranean 
with a strong fleet. ‘You cannot have a strong policy unless you have a strong Fleet’, 
Herbert told the House and added: 
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We mean the Fleet to protect our Empire, and in all circumstances to guarantee 
the food supply of the people of these islands. The Mediterranean is the wedding 
of our Imperial and our foreign interests. It is the marriage ring of the Empire. It is 
as important to us as Adriatic was to Venice, for it is by the Mediterranean that 
we feed London and that we hold India.919  
There is no doubt that Albania would have benefited from the presence of a British fleet in 
the Mediterranean which could reach the Adriatic. That was one more reason why Herbert 
made this suggestion which would result in a change of British policy. Grey admitted that 
some of the problems which were occurring within the territory of the Ottoman Empire 
were the result of the absence of a British fleet in the region. Therefore, Grey maintained 
that because of the absence of a British force, the Sultan in the past had adopted a violent 
approach towards these parts of his empire.920 Although this caused anger, anxiety and 
‘loud indignation of British public opinion’, and despite Herbert’s suggestion, Grey had no 
intention of changing the existing policy. 921  
By the end of June 1914 Herbert proposed in the House of Commons to send a British 
consul to south Albania. Grey maintained that the Greek government was no party to the 
atrocities but admitted that Athens faced difficulties in exercising control. As a matter of 
fact, this was not true as numerous reports that Grey received from his consuls showed 
clearly the direct involvement of the Greek government. Herbert insisted on more active 
and practical involvement of the British government in Albania. After a fierce debate, Grey 
came to the point that he had been avoiding for months and told Herbert and the House 
that he was not going to send a British Consul to south Albania or Epirus. Grey concluded 
that the British government had ‘taken the line that we are not prepared to send British 
troops into Albania’.922 To the dissatisfaction of Herbert, Grey explained the meaning and 
effect that British neutrality or non-involvement had in Albania: 
On the other hand, if you are not prepared to send troops of your own to use 
force, you must, of course, stand aside when things are very bad and other 
Powers take a different view, and you must not object to the measures they 
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propose to take. I can say no more about it […] It is very unsatisfactory, but we 
cannot find a remedy in the use of force. The most I can say is we are willing that, 
while we are not prepared to do things ourselves, we are not going to obstruct 
the steps other people will take for themselves.923  
Prince Wied had hoped that the Powers would send an international force to his assistance 
so Grey’s refusal to send troops to Albania was not good news. However, Wied was soon to 
be further disappointed when Grey suggested that the Prince should apply to Austria-
Hungary and Italy for support.924  
Grey, explaining his position, revealed that the Powers were nowhere near to fulfilling their 
duties and the state building process in Albania was going from bad to worse. Predicting 
the collapse of international involvement, Lamb decided to remind Grey that the British 
government had obligations towards Albania. Lamb stated that Grey, in his despatches, had 
written that the Conference of Ambassadors had established Albania in order to protect 
this country from being partitioned by the neighbouring countries and from the 
interference of Austria-Hungary and Italy.925  
Lamb maintained that the Powers were not giving a chance to the Albanian Government to 
organise its administration and spread its authority throughout the entire territory and 
lacked the will to help maintain the authority of Prince Wied. Lamb believed that Albania, 
‘in the opinion of all who reason objectively’, was being made a source of conflict. 
Therefore, he suggested that the Powers and Britain should adopt a just policy which would 
be in interest of Albania and Europe in order to obviate the risk of a bigger crisis. Lamb 
criticised the existing policy of the Powers which consisted of allowing Austria-Hungary and 
Italy to reach an understanding regarding the Albanian coast and because of this 
understanding the Balkan states were to be compensated with territory in the interior part 
of Albania.926  
Following the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo 
on 28 June 1914, the Powers showed almost no interest in Albania. Albania took a 
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secondary place in the European crisis which led to the outbreak of the World War I in 
August of that year. The international involvement of the Powers in Albania faded away. 
The international contingent, commanded by Colonel Phillips, withdrew from Shkodra in 
early August.927  
After Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August and on Austria-Hungary on 12 August, 
Harry Lamb left Albania on Foreign Office orders on 17 August. Prince Wied, who was cut 
off from the Powers' financial and military support, left on 3 September and was soon 
followed by all the members of the International Control Commission.928  
International involvement in Albania ended in failure. Albania, with no administrative or 
state structures, and above all, with no military or police force, was left in a chaotic 
situation and at the mercy of foreign invaders. In 1923, on his death bed Herbert recalled 
the situation. His last words about Grey were positive. Although the British government did 
not see the process through, he felt that the Albanians received their title-deeds at the 
hands of Edward Grey.929  
However, the most important personality in Britain who helped Albania in securing the 
status of the statehood among the European nations was Aubrey Herbert. Herbert, through 
the Albanian Committee and with his personal actions, from 1912 to the end of his life, had 
put in motion all possible mechanisms in Britain to help the Albanian state. 
 
Conclusion 
The British Liberals judged the Balkans from a historical and ideological context and 
regarded the expulsion of the Ottomans from Europe as long overdue. Those who did not 
see the liberation of the Christians as a religious duty, were in the minority. Some of them 
even blamed the Christians as generators of the violence in the Balkans. They originated 
from the ranks of the Conservatives, and as such were anti-Liberal, and were also against 
Russian pan-Slav policies. Supporters of this policy were Conservatives, mostly heirs of 
Disraeli, and other non-Liberals, supporters of the principle of nationality or self-
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determination, including British imperialists, Muslims and Jews. They gathered to support 
Aubrey Herbert’s idea of forming the Albanian Committee. Therefore, the Albanian 
Committee came as a response to the Balkan Committee. The Balkan Committee and 
Albanian Committee represented two different views of British and European attitudes 
based on two different patterns.930 
The Albanian Committee favoured a multicultural and multi-religious Albania and aimed to 
treat equally all the communities in the Balkans. In reality, the Albanian Committee was 
something the Balkan Committee should have been if the Balkans or Macedonia were to 
have a proper solution. Even within the membership of the Albanian Committee, the 
Macedonian question had attracted considerable attention. That could be seen through the 
example of Herbert’s activities during the Balkan Wars. When the Second Balkan War 
started, Herbert addressed the problem of Macedonia. He maintained that the spoils of the 
war lured the Allies, thus complicating the difficult situation in the Balkans even further. For 
the Allies, the division of Macedonia became a bigger problem than they thought. Herbert 
suggested that the danger could be stopped if Macedonia could be put beyond the reach of 
the Allies. As the Balkan people were not able to settle their differences and the quarrel 
was affecting Europe, Herbert suggested that the Macedonian problem could be solved 
only if ‘Europe takes the bull by the horns and not, as in the past, by the tail’.931  
While the Balkan Committee supported the war and the division of Macedonia, Herbert 
called for a compromise which he regarded as vital for bringing peace in the Balkans and 
stability in Europe. The compromise was an autonomous Macedonia. Herbert believed that 
an autonomous Macedonia would also ease difficulties on the eastern border of Albania. 
With this proposal, Herbert, probably wanted to eliminate future problems in the Balkans 
and secure an Albania within ethnic frontiers in its eastern part. However, with the Second 
Balkan War the situation developed differently and Herbert’s proposal could not be 
considered.  
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Although the Albanian Committee became very active in promoting the Albanian cause it 
could not undo the effect which was created by Liberal ideas which dominated in British 
public opinion, press and politics.  
The Liberal Gladstonians who had supported all the revolts against the Ottoman Empire in 
the Balkans, were not an exclusively British phenomenon. It was also a cross-European 
liberal trend which prioritised change in favour of the Christians and not peace in the 
Balkans. The international effect of Liberalism was seen in the London Conference which 
did not treat the Albanians according to the principle of nationality. Under these 
circumstances, unfavourable for the Albanians, Grey, pursuing the line of the British 
interest, had recognised the right of the Albanians to establish their own state. For that 
reason, Herbert praised the British government, specifically the foreign policy of Edward 
Grey. In Herbert’s words, a great number of Albanian lives were spared because of the 
diplomatic and humanitarian work of the British government.932 
The London Conference of Ambassadors did not bring a proper solution to the Albanian 
question but Herbert emphasised, more than once, that that was the most that could be 
done for Albania. However, the disinterested position of the British government on Albania 
that followed the London Conference caused Herbert to clash with Grey. The British 
government did not play its part in the international project of supporting the state building 
process of Albania. Partly as a result of this disinterested attitude, Albania failed as an 
international project as envisaged by the Great Powers in the Conference of London.  
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                                                                   Conclusion 
The Albanians’ desire for a British king can be seen as an effort to place Albania under the 
protection of a European Power. Albania preferred Great Britain to the other Powers in 
Europe because it was seen as more democratic. Britain’s position as a leading economic 
and political power, combined with the fact that, unlike Austria-Hungary and Italy, Britain 
had no direct interests in Albania, should be seen as further motivations. The leaders of the 
Albanian movement believed that a British king could secure a prosperous economic and 
political future for Albania. This also reflected Albania’s perceived need to distance itself 
from the East against the backdrop of a declining Ottoman Empire. In this regard, the 
Albanians, like other Balkan nations, had adopted the ‘western style of modernity’ and 
wanted to be included in the ‘process of Europeanisation.’933    
This thesis has attempted to offer an analysis of the development of Albanian nationalism. 
The gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans during the nineteenth 
century gave impetus to Albanian nationalism, which placed the future of the Albanian-
speaking lands as its priority. As seen above, Albanian ideologists developed the idea that 
the Albanians were descendants of the Illyrians, thereby reinforcing their longstanding 
presence in the Balkans and priority in their lands. Yet the leaders of this growing national 
movement were also aware of Albania’s weakness. Throughout history Albania had never 
been an independent country, unlike its neighbours Bulgaria and Serbia, and there was no 
clear indication of Albanian ethnic borders or independent government. The lands 
considered by the Albanian leaders to belong to Albania repeatedly became objects of 
desire for neighbouring countries such as Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro, which 
in many ways were better established as states. They also enjoyed the backing of the 
Powers; Greece was supported by most of the European Powers, while Russia stood firmly 
behind the Slavic nations of Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro. This situation made the 
Albanian leaders feel that the main danger to them was not the Great Powers but rather 
these small neighbouring states, thus making the question of protection of vital 
importance.   
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As seen in this thesis, for a long time Albanians saw the Ottoman Empire as their best 
option as a protector. As traditional patterns of Ottoman governance started to fail and the 
question of autonomy came into play, relations between the Ottomans and the Albanians 
entered into a crisis of modernisation in which old and new political elements came into 
conflict. Yet the key question of this thesis focused upon the moments in which Albanians 
desired autonomy while remaining inside the Ottoman Empire, which it was believed would 
lead to independence after the Empire’s impending collapse. When this collapse eventually 
became apparent, Albanian leaders were forced to look for another protector in Britain.   
This complex relationship between Albania and the Ottoman Empire from 1876 to 1914 has 
been analysed through the Albanians’ repeated efforts for autonomy. Britain’s relationship 
with the Ottoman Empire and, subsequently, its approach to the Albanian Question, can be 
best understood through the prism of British interests in the East. During this period the 
British Empire’s main aim was to protect the route to India, their rule in Egypt and to 
prevent the expansion of Russian and later German power. In this regard, British 
governments considered Albania an indirect interest and the prevention of Russian 
expansion into the Balkans thus became a common goal for both the Albanians and the 
British. However, this common interest did not manifest itself consistently, with the British 
showing a higher degree of interest in Albania only on two occasions: the Russo-Turkish 
War (1877-1878) and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). These conflicts challenged the very 
existence of the Ottoman Empire and led to two international peace conferences: the 
Conference of Berlin (1878) and the London Conference of Ambassadors (1912-1913). It 
was only during these wars that the British believed their major interests would be 
endangered if parts of the Balkans, and specifically Albania, which held a strategic position, 
were to fall under Russian rule or influence. Therefore, from the nineteenth to the 
beginning of the twentieth century, British policy took measures to preserve the presence 
of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans for as long as possible. If the Ottoman Empire were 
to collapse, then British policy would seek to ensure that the Balkans would not come 
under Russian or Austro-Hungarian rule. The fall of Albania to either of these two empires 
would have endangered British interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Adriatic.934  
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However, the nationalist movement in the Balkans became an obstacle to the British when 
it came to maintaining their interests. The existence of a distinct Albanian ethnicity and the 
desire of the Albanians to live autonomously from the Porte had been noted by British 
commentators since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Yet, it was not until 1878 
that Albanian nationalism came to the surface as an organised political force and made a 
request for autonomy to the Powers at the Congress of Berlin. The Congress was the first 
international diplomatic event to which the Albanian leaders, through the Albanian League, 
addressed their request for autonomy.935 Although this request was ignored, for the first 
time the question of Albania had been raised as an international problem to be solved by 
the European Powers. Though the Albanian League failed to achieve its political goal, it 
succeeded in elevating Albanian nationalism through subsequent developments in 
language, literature, education and culture. In the late nineteenth century, nationality was 
considered synonymous with language and ethnicity and so Albanian ideologists aspired to 
include all Albanian speakers in one independent state. In seeking to apply this idea, 
Albanian nationalism produced major developments in the Balkans. By 1912 the activities 
of the Albanian nationalists, by this time directed against Young Turk rule, destabilised the 
balances of power and strengthened the position of Albania’s neighbouring states. The 
actions of Albanian nationalists therefore became a catalyst for broader changes in the 
Balkans and across the political spectrum of Albanian leaders.  
By taking a stance against the Porte and the neighbouring countries, and without support 
from a European Power, Albanian efforts for independence would have been doomed to 
fail from the start. Albanian leaders feared failure would bring catastrophic results, possibly 
leading to the land being further divided between Albania’s neighbours, who never ceased 
their territorial ambitions in the region. Therefore, staying under the umbrella of the Porte 
remained the only viable option. The Ottoman Empire was still considered merely as a 
temporary protector and a source of power to be exploited by the Albanian national 
movement at a later stage. Thus, the future of the Albanian national movement, which 
continued its bid for autonomy as a step towards independence, was closely linked with the 
fate of the Ottoman Empire.  
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American Slavic and East European Review, 12. 2 (1953), pp. 219-232 (pp. 224-228).   
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This thesis began with a discussion of the image of Albania, which was initially constructed 
by travel writers and diplomats and which had an impact on both public perceptions and 
politicians. In analysing the origins and complexity of this subject, it has attempted to 
demonstrate that images of the Balkans and Albania in British public and political discourse 
continued to be presented and interpreted predominantly by the Liberals. Such images 
appeared primarily during times of crisis, when the Balkans was often presented as an 
imagined place ‘marked by a variety of essentially invented caricatures.’.936 The research 
points out that Conservatives, on the other hand, viewed the Balkans without religious bias 
and, to a degree, held a favourable position towards the Albanian Question. Conversely, 
the religiously-framed view, which was built by Gladstone and adopted by many Liberals, 
ignored the Albanian national cause and gave priority to the liberation of Balkan Christians. 
This view was also widely adopted in British public opinion. Yet the lack of direct British 
interests in the Balkans did not stop debate between the Liberals and Conservatives taking 
place in the British Parliament and the press on the Albanian Question. This continued 
during and after the Congress of Berlin, and when Gladstone returned to power for the 
second time in 1880 the Albanian Question became a subject of discord between him and 
the Sultan. The differences between the Conservatives and the Liberals were most visible 
when Gladstone accused Disraeli, on several occasions, of deliberately delaying the 
implementation of the Treaty of Berlin and encouraging the Albanians to continue their 
refusal to give up territories that were assigned to Montenegro and Greece. However, the 
aftermath of the Congress also revealed that both parties had accepted the need to 
maintain an Ottoman presence in the Balkans. In this Conservatives and Liberals aimed to 
protect broader British interests mentioned above.937  
Although Gladstone publicly appeared to believe that the Albanian Question had been 
solved in Berlin, he was still convinced that the Balkans was a troubled place. Therefore, 
Gladstone aimed to normalise relations with the Porte, which had temporarily deteriorated 
over the Albanian Question. Thus, Gladstone announced a solution for the Balkans. If this 
solution was to be realised, the nationalisms of the Balkans had to be restrained while 
                                                             
936   James Perkins, ‘Peasants and Politics: Re-thinking the British Imaginative Geography of the Balkans at the Time of the 
First World War’, European History Quarterly, 47 (2016), pp. 55-77 (p. 61).  
937   Medlicott, Congress of Berlin, p. 7. 
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Austria-Hungary and Russia were not to be allowed to intervene in Balkan affairs. In order 
to protect British interests, the Liberals aimed to ‘introduce tranquillity in the Balkans.’938  
In connection with this, many Liberal politicians regarded the Balkan states (Serbia, 
Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria) as ‘reasonable instruments for safeguarding Britain's 
principal interests in the eastern Mediterranean.’939 In return, the Liberals would supply the 
governments of these countries with advice, loans and arms, but would not offer any help 
in the form of military intervention.940 Above all, Albania, with its Muslim majority, was not 
included in their plans because it was regarded as part of the Ottoman Empire. Despite 
growing public pressure calling for greater involvement in the Balkans, the British 
government was unable to exercise influence given its lack of major interests or military 
presence in the region.  
This thesis shows a particular interest in the Macedonian question. Within this question I 
have attempted to present the importance of Macedonia for the Albanian Question by 
linking it with British and Ottoman policy. From 1903, when the Macedonian crisis came to 
the surface, British policy was, to a degree, influenced by the Balkan Committee. As an 
organisation dominated by Gladstonian Liberals, the Committee initially showed 
considerable interest in the Albanian Question but this gradually began to wane. As a result 
of its adherence to Gladstonian principles, the Committee showed little or no consideration 
for those nationalities or ethnic groups which did not belong to its preferred religion. For 
this reason, the Albanian Question in Macedonia did not receive sufficient attention from 
Committee members, the British government or the Powers, despite its status as an 
increasingly international problem. 
Following the Macedonian crisis, British policy become more active in the Balkans. In 
reality, it was again considerations of their interests in India and Egypt that influenced this 
move, leading the British government to seek an understanding with Russia and sign the 
Reval Agreement in 1908. Thus, those Albanian leaders who considered Macedonia, and 
particularly the western part of it, as one of their major national interests felt themselves 
ignored by the Powers and the Porte. As a result, Albanian leaders intensified their search 
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for a solution to their national question. The engagement of the Albanian nationalists in the 
structures of the Young Turk movement produced a new situation, not only in Albania but 
throughout the Balkans and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. The Albanian leaders had 
hoped that the Young Turk Revolution would create favourable conditions to advance their 
national cause.  
The British also supported the Young Turks in the hope of regaining the influence they had 
lost to the Germans. Although the Young Turk Revolution brought back the Ottoman 
Parliament as an important institution of democracy, it soon became clear that the 
Albanian Question could not be solved by peaceful political means. The activities of the 
Young Turks gave rise to Turkism as a new ideology, thereby changing the political 
landscape of the Ottoman Empire. The tensions between Albanian nationalism and 
Ottomanism were subsequently transformed into a confrontation with Turkism. The 
Albanian insurrections against the Porte that started in 1909 and went on until 1912 had 
severe repercussions throughout the Balkans.  
The Albanian insurrection of 1911 in particular received some public support in Britain and, 
as a result, brought changes in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the Albanian 
Question. The British expressed sympathy for the Albanian request for autonomy and 
exercised some pressure on the Porte. However, the British and other Powers ultimately 
refrained from exerting excessive pressure so as not to further jeopardise their relationship 
with the Ottoman Empire for the sake of Albania. 
By the time the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 broke out, the British had turned their back on 
the crumbling Ottoman Empire and supported the advance of the Balkan armies. The result 
of the Balkan Wars was also supported by public opinion. Liberal opinion did not favour the 
Albanian national cause, but the emergence of an Albanian state had shifted British 
interests in favour of the creation of an independent Albania.  
Through the neutral position that the British held in the London Conference of 
Ambassadors, they intended to maintain the balance of power in Europe. Edward Grey had 
repeatedly declared that his government had no interest in the Albanian issue, despite it 
being at the heart of discussions. In reality, Albania’s strategic position in the Balkans 
became an interest for the British government and British policy makers considered Albania 
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an instrument through which they could achieve their political objectives. An independent 
Albania, which came out of the Balkan Wars and the dismemberment of the Ottoman 
Empire in Europe, prevented the replacement of the Porte’s rule by Russia or Austria-
Hungary. This was the aim of the British government and their policy towards the new-born 
state of Albania thus became supportive.  
However, such British interests were not so vital as to lead them to provide a king and 
support an Albania within ethnic borders. For the British government, geopolitical interests 
were more important than the sentiment of the Albanians regarding their nationality. The 
British believed that the claims of the Albanians on ethnic settlement were too ambitious 
or radical. Thus, the claim of Albanian nationalism was not entirely compatible with the 
interests of the policy being made in London. Support for the Albanian state was stopped 
once it became obvious that the Russian and Habsburg empires would not extend their rule 
to the Adriatic and Mediterranean and thereby endanger British interests. The British 
government believed it had secured its interests and did not continue to support the 
development of Albanian state institutions, nor did it show interest in the geographical size 
of Albania. 
Had Liberal public opinion pressurised the British government to produce and implement a 
more favourable policy towards Albania, as it did for other Balkan nations, the situation 
could have been different and Albania could have included most parts of the four vilayets 
to which it aspired. The work of Edith Durham and the activities of Aubrey Herbert through 
the Albanian Committee could not undo the effect that the Liberals had created on British 
public opinion and government. Herbert’s work on behalf of the Albanian state could be 
characterised as an effort to influence the public and the British government to go beyond 
existing interests, but it soon became apparent this was not possible and Herbert was 
therefore willing to accept the actions of Edward Grey. Albania became independent but 
without most of the territories of Kosovo and the Janina vilayets. Yet, as Herbert declared 
on more than one occasion, things could have been worse for Albania if it was not for the 
British interest which was manifested by Edward Grey at the London Conference.  
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